Ilar Journal最新文献

For many years, researchers, veterinarians, animal ethics committees, and regulators have focused on minimizing pain and distress as a primary goal of refinement when working with animals in science. More recent publications as well as a shift in animal ethics and public opinion have emphasized promotion of positive affective states, culminating in the concept of positive animal welfare. Robust measures are required to know when positive animal welfare states are occurring, and a number of measures are proposed and discussed. Regardless of whether there are newer methods available that focus exclusively on measuring positive affective states, consistent consideration of research animal behavioral programs, refinement, and adopting periodic stand-alone animal welfare assessments for all species involved will help to push the care and practices of research animals towards an increased focus on positive animal welfare.

This article appeals to virtue ethics to help guide laboratory animal research by considering the role of character and flourishing in these practices. Philosophical approaches to animal research ethics have typically focused on animal rights or on the promotion of welfare for all affected, while animal research itself has been guided in its practice by the 3Rs (reduction, refinement, replacement). These different approaches have sometimes led to an impasse in debates over animal research where the philosophical approaches are focused on whether or when animal studies are justifiable, while the 3Rs assume a general justification for animal work but aim to reduce harm to sentient animals and increase their welfare in laboratory spaces. Missing in this exchange is a moral framework that neither assumes nor rejects the justifiability of animal research and focuses instead on the habits and structures of that work. I shall propose a place for virtue ethics in laboratory animal research by considering examples of relevant character traits, the moral significance of human-animal bonds, mentorship in the laboratory, and the importance of animals flourishing beyond mere welfare.

The focus of this paper is the requirement that the use of live animals in experiments and in vivo assays should never be allowed if those uses involve severe suffering. This requirement was first implemented in Danish legislation, was later adopted by the European Union, and has had limited uptake in North America. Animal suffering can arise from exposure to a wide range of different external and internal events that threaten biological or social functions, while the severity of suffering may be influenced by the animals' perceptions of their own situation and the degree of control they are able to exert. Severe suffering is more than an incremental increase in negative state(s) but involves a qualitative shift whereby the normal mechanisms to contain or keep negative states at arm's length no longer function. The result of severe suffering will be a loss of the ability of cope. The idea of putting a cap on severe suffering may be justified from multiple ethical perspectives. In most, if not all, cases it is possible to avoid imposing severe suffering on animals during experiments without giving up the potential benefits of finding new ways to cure, prevent, or alleviate serious human diseases and generate other important knowledge. From this it follows that there is a strong ethical case to favor a regulatory ban on animal experiments involving severe suffering.

The significance of ethical considerations for animal research policy has long been acknowledged, but the role of philosophical ethics in the policymaking process has been less clear. By comparing the ethical framework of animal research policy with that for human subjects research, this article considers how the legacies of these two policy areas influence current policy and suggests that ethicists and ethical scholarship have been underutilized in developing animal research policy. An important aspect of policymaking is gathering and responding to input provided by various stakeholders. Given their expertise in a highly relevant area, ethicists should be considered key stakeholders in animal research policy deliberations. This article explores the role of ethicists and ethical scholarship in influencing animal research policy and suggests that a more robust engagement with the professional ethics community throughout the deliberative process is vital for policymakers to adequately account for ethical considerations.

Rapid advances in gene-editing and stem-cell technology have expanded the range of possible future applications in human-animal chimera research. Most notably, recent developments may allow researchers to generate whole personalized human organs in pigs for the purpose of transplantation into human patients. Though human-animal chimera research in small animals, such as mice, is routine, human-animal chimeric techniques are now increasingly being applied to larger animals. Moreover, these chimeras include increasing amounts of human material, which is potentially present in more morally significant locations, such as the brain and the reproductive system. These developments raise important ethical questions about whether we should create such chimeras, and if so, how we should treat them. Answers to these ethical questions are needed to inform the development of policies regulating human-animal chimera research and its applications. Here, we provide a review of some of the most important or widespread ethical concerns.

Some animal research is arguably morally wrong, and some animal research is morally bad but could be improved. Who is most likely to be able to identify wrong or bad animal research and advocate for improvements? I argue that philosophical ethicists have the expertise that makes them the likely best candidates for these tasks. I review the skills, knowledge, and perspectives that philosophical ethicists tend to have that makes them ethical experts. I argue that, insofar as Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees are expected to ensure that research is ethical, they must have philosophical ethicists as members.

Behavioral management programs aim to enhance the welfare of animal subjects that participate in research, thereby enhancing our ability to conduct ethical research projects. Socialization strategies, environmental enrichment techniques, opportunities for subjects to voluntarily participate in research procedures, and the provision of Functionally Appropriate Captive Environments are 4 major components of most behavioral management programs. The appropriate implementation of behavioral management programs should provide animals with opportunities to engage in species-typical activity patterns, contributing to valid and reliable animal models that require the smallest number of subjects to achieve meaningful results. The role that socialization strategies, environmental enrichment techniques, and positive reinforcement training can play in maintaining and enhancing welfare through the stimulation of species-typical behavior and the prevention of abnormal behavior is discussed. The value of empirically assessing the effects of behavioral management techniques is emphasized. Additionally, the necessity of adjusting the relative prioritization of needs related to the convenience of human caregivers and the animals themselves is addressed. For the purposes of this discussion, research projects are considered to be ethical if they (1) involve animals with high welfare, (2) provide data that are reliable and valid, (3) involve appropriate numbers of subjects, and (4) involve animals that are appropriate models to test meaningful hypotheses.

"Animal-based research should be held to the highest ethical standards" is becoming an increasingly common refrain. Though I think such a commitment is what we should expect of those using animals in science, much as we would if the participants were humans, some key insights of discussions in applied ethics and moral philosophy only seem to slowly impact what reasonably qualifies as the highest standards in animal research ethics. Early in my paper, I will explain some of these insights and loosely tie them to animal research ethics. Two emergent practices in laboratory animal science, positive reinforcement training and "rehoming," will then be discussed, and I will defend the view that both should be mandatory on no more ethical grounds than what is outlined in the first section. I will also provide reasons for foregrounding the moral significance of dissent and why, most of the time, an animal research subject's sustained dissent should be respected. Taken together, what I will defend promises to change how at least some animals are used in science and what happens to them afterwards. But I will also show how an objective ethics requires nothing less. Ignoring these constraints in the scientific use of animals comes at the cost of abandoning any claim to adhering to our highest ethical standards and, arguably, any claim to the moral legitimacy of such scientific use.

Most would agree that animals in research should be spared "unnecessary" harm, pain, or distress, and there is also growing interest in providing animals with some form of environmental enrichment. But is this the standard of care that we should aspire to? We argue that we need to work towards a higher standard-specifically, that providing research animals with a "good life" should be a prerequisite for their use. The aims of this paper are to illustrate our vision of a "good life" for laboratory rats and mice and to provide a roadmap for achieving this vision. We recognize that several research procedures are clearly incompatible with a good life but describe here what we consider to be the minimum day-to-day living conditions to be met when using rodents in research. A good life requires that animals can express a rich behavioral repertoire, use their abilities, and fulfill their potential through active engagement with their environment. In the first section, we describe how animals could be housed for these requirements to be fulfilled, from simple modifications to standard housing through to better cage designs and free-ranging options. In the second section, we review the types of interactions with laboratory rodents that are compatible with a good life. In the third section, we address the potential for the animals to have a life outside of research, including the use of pets in clinical trials (the animal-as-patient model) and the adoption of research animals to new homes when they are no longer needed in research. We conclude with a few suggestions for achieving our vision.