Terrorism is one of the dreaded phenomenons affecting the Nigerian people and her economy. This phenomenon has defiled many solutions. This study examined the popular held view that the "root cause of terrorism" is poverty within the period 1980-2010. That is terrorism is caused by poverty related factors (economic variables - GDP, HDI, INFL, FDI, GI, UNE) and poverty (PI) itself. The study extended the investigation to determine the cost of terrorism as well as if political factors (PR, PP, SG, and REP) and demographical factors (POP, ERD) are also the root cause of terrorism as well the impacts of terrorism on GDP, GI and FDI. The findings from this study indicated that within the reviewed period, our study did not support the "rooted-in-poverty hypothesis", "terrorist-growth hypothesis", "growth-terrorist hypothesis", "terrorist-capital formation hypothesis", nor "rooted-in political demography hypothesis". That is none of these factors even poverty and ERD are the root cause for terrorism. Poverty related factors only make the country to be a breeding and dumping ground for terrorists and not the root cause for their activities. Nevertheless, among the variables used in this study, only POP and SG were found to be significant predictors of terrorism acts. Before arriving at this, we scan our data to ascertain their stationary state by applying the ADF and PP-test. However, we were unable to determine the existence of a long run relationship among our data set using the Johansen Co integration test. As such we ran the regression in their first difference employing the VAR and OLS estimating procedure. To complement our findings we carried out an impulse response function. Our results from it confirmed are findings from the VAR regression. Therefore, we recommended that if the government is determined to win the "fight against terrorism" focus must be on controlling the movement (immigration) of people into the country and ensuring that the principles or tenets of democracy are upheld.
{"title":"The Root Causes of Terrorism, Cost and its Impact on Economic Growth and Capital Formation and Foreign Direct Investment: 1980-2010","authors":"A. Essien","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2216606","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2216606","url":null,"abstract":"Terrorism is one of the dreaded phenomenons affecting the Nigerian people and her economy. This phenomenon has defiled many solutions. This study examined the popular held view that the \"root cause of terrorism\" is poverty within the period 1980-2010. That is terrorism is caused by poverty related factors (economic variables - GDP, HDI, INFL, FDI, GI, UNE) and poverty (PI) itself. The study extended the investigation to determine the cost of terrorism as well as if political factors (PR, PP, SG, and REP) and demographical factors (POP, ERD) are also the root cause of terrorism as well the impacts of terrorism on GDP, GI and FDI. The findings from this study indicated that within the reviewed period, our study did not support the \"rooted-in-poverty hypothesis\", \"terrorist-growth hypothesis\", \"growth-terrorist hypothesis\", \"terrorist-capital formation hypothesis\", nor \"rooted-in political demography hypothesis\". That is none of these factors even poverty and ERD are the root cause for terrorism. Poverty related factors only make the country to be a breeding and dumping ground for terrorists and not the root cause for their activities. Nevertheless, among the variables used in this study, only POP and SG were found to be significant predictors of terrorism acts. Before arriving at this, we scan our data to ascertain their stationary state by applying the ADF and PP-test. However, we were unable to determine the existence of a long run relationship among our data set using the Johansen Co integration test. As such we ran the regression in their first difference employing the VAR and OLS estimating procedure. To complement our findings we carried out an impulse response function. Our results from it confirmed are findings from the VAR regression. Therefore, we recommended that if the government is determined to win the \"fight against terrorism\" focus must be on controlling the movement (immigration) of people into the country and ensuring that the principles or tenets of democracy are upheld.","PeriodicalId":70912,"journal":{"name":"政治经济学季刊","volume":"101 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72884593","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper presents a simple model of industrial upgrading as a result of backward and forward information linkages between upstream and downstream relations. It also serves as an empirical investigation of the impact of mutual knowledge exchange on the knowledge production function using data on firms' self-reported customers and suppliers. Evidence from interconnected firms in Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines, and Viet Nam suggests that there are strong spillover effects between downstream and upstream firms in terms of international standard certification. The degree of product and process innovation is quite diverse across manufacturing firms within a local supply chain and within a global supply chain.
{"title":"Impact of Production Linkages on Industrial Upgrading in ASEAN, the People's Republic of China, and India: Organizational Evidence of a Global Supply Chain","authors":"T. Machikita, Y. Ueki","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2185277","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2185277","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents a simple model of industrial upgrading as a result of backward and forward information linkages between upstream and downstream relations. It also serves as an empirical investigation of the impact of mutual knowledge exchange on the knowledge production function using data on firms' self-reported customers and suppliers. Evidence from interconnected firms in Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines, and Viet Nam suggests that there are strong spillover effects between downstream and upstream firms in terms of international standard certification. The degree of product and process innovation is quite diverse across manufacturing firms within a local supply chain and within a global supply chain.","PeriodicalId":70912,"journal":{"name":"政治经济学季刊","volume":"88 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72633051","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Using panel data of public unemployment expenditure as a percentage of GDP of 34 OECD nations across year 1980-2010, I explore the effect of this ratio on three unemployment outcomes: total unemployment rate, long-term unemployment rate and youth unemployment, as well as labor participation rate and investment rate. After taking into account potential endogeneity of this ratio using Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, I find the data does not support the hypothesized aggregate demand effect of unemployment insurance (UI) expenditure in theory but gives strong support for hypothesized disincentive effect in theory. The estimates indicate that every percentage point increase in public unemployment welfare expenditure relative to GDP leads to 0.9 to 1.1 percentage point increase in total unemployment rate and 4.5 to 4.7 percentage point increase in long term unemployment rate. The distortionary effect of UI program on business is also verified by an estimate that every percentage point increase in this unemployment spending rate is associated with about 2.1 percentage point decrease in investment rate.
{"title":"Is Government's Help for Unemployed People Helpful for the Society? An Empirical Study on Macro Data of Public Unemployment Spending in OECD Nations","authors":"H. Ding","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2185624","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2185624","url":null,"abstract":"Using panel data of public unemployment expenditure as a percentage of GDP of 34 OECD nations across year 1980-2010, I explore the effect of this ratio on three unemployment outcomes: total unemployment rate, long-term unemployment rate and youth unemployment, as well as labor participation rate and investment rate. After taking into account potential endogeneity of this ratio using Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, I find the data does not support the hypothesized aggregate demand effect of unemployment insurance (UI) expenditure in theory but gives strong support for hypothesized disincentive effect in theory. The estimates indicate that every percentage point increase in public unemployment welfare expenditure relative to GDP leads to 0.9 to 1.1 percentage point increase in total unemployment rate and 4.5 to 4.7 percentage point increase in long term unemployment rate. The distortionary effect of UI program on business is also verified by an estimate that every percentage point increase in this unemployment spending rate is associated with about 2.1 percentage point decrease in investment rate.","PeriodicalId":70912,"journal":{"name":"政治经济学季刊","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82930539","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recent institutionalist scholarship has theorized the liberalization or “disorganization” of capitalism as the result of shifts in economic actors' “logic of action” towards opportunism. Little attention has been given to the reverse possibility that shifts in economic actors' “logic of action” away from opportunism might contribute to “embedding” or “organizing” capitalism. This paper builds on recent scholarship to theorize this scenario and then demonstrate its empirical validity with an historical institutionalist study of the emergence of such a “non-liberal” institution in Switzerland in 1961. The theoretical framework links three “logics of action” – opportunism, enlightened self-interest and strong solidarity – to Hopner's typology of capitalist institutions – organized, coordinated, and liberal. It theorizes the interactions between these logics and the social mechanism – goal signaling – that can explain a shift from one logic of action to another, potentially leading to change from one type of institution to another.
{"title":"Logics of Action and Models of Capitalism: Explaining Bottom-Up Non-Liberal Change","authors":"Julien Etienne, Gerhard Schnyder","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2185368","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2185368","url":null,"abstract":"Recent institutionalist scholarship has theorized the liberalization or “disorganization” of capitalism as the result of shifts in economic actors' “logic of action” towards opportunism. Little attention has been given to the reverse possibility that shifts in economic actors' “logic of action” away from opportunism might contribute to “embedding” or “organizing” capitalism. This paper builds on recent scholarship to theorize this scenario and then demonstrate its empirical validity with an historical institutionalist study of the emergence of such a “non-liberal” institution in Switzerland in 1961. The theoretical framework links three “logics of action” – opportunism, enlightened self-interest and strong solidarity – to Hopner's typology of capitalist institutions – organized, coordinated, and liberal. It theorizes the interactions between these logics and the social mechanism – goal signaling – that can explain a shift from one logic of action to another, potentially leading to change from one type of institution to another.","PeriodicalId":70912,"journal":{"name":"政治经济学季刊","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87504396","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Liberalisation of temporary contracts has become an important component of recent labour reforms but up to now available research has not paid attention to the impacts of these institutional changes on functional income distribution. The present paper intends to fill this gap by focussing on the reduction in strictness of employment protection of temporary jobs and analysing its effects on factor shares. We have estimated labour share, as well as its components, worker pays and employment, by considering country-sector evidence for 14 EU economies and the sample period 1995-2007. We have found that these legislative changes, that have favoured the extensive use of temporary contracts, have contributed to instability of working conditions and caused negative effects on workers’ pays. These impacts have more than counterbalanced the scanty positive effects on employment (due to greater access to the labour market of additional workers, likely young and women), thus leading to a decrease in income share accruing to workers.
{"title":"Labour Shares and Employment Protection in European Economies","authors":"M. Damiani, F. Pompei, A. Ricci","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2184274","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2184274","url":null,"abstract":"Liberalisation of temporary contracts has become an important component of recent labour reforms but up to now available research has not paid attention to the impacts of these institutional changes on functional income distribution. The present paper intends to fill this gap by focussing on the reduction in strictness of employment protection of temporary jobs and analysing its effects on factor shares. We have estimated labour share, as well as its components, worker pays and employment, by considering country-sector evidence for 14 EU economies and the sample period 1995-2007. We have found that these legislative changes, that have favoured the extensive use of temporary contracts, have contributed to instability of working conditions and caused negative effects on workers’ pays. These impacts have more than counterbalanced the scanty positive effects on employment (due to greater access to the labour market of additional workers, likely young and women), thus leading to a decrease in income share accruing to workers.","PeriodicalId":70912,"journal":{"name":"政治经济学季刊","volume":"70 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78761948","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We put forward a tractable, interpretable, and easily generalizable framework for modeling endogeneous factor-augmenting technology choice by monopolistically competitive firms. The setup is framed within the standard Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) model of monopolistic competition. Optimal technology choice is made here either by final goods producers or the representative household which holds the shares of (differentiated) intermediate goods producers. These two cases have different implications for the distribution of output but they yield the same aggregate level of output, the same aggregate production function and equivalent macroeconomic dynamics. Thanks to this property, the proposed framework can be used as a building block in a variety of embedding structures, including those which require to be solved recursively (separately for the dynamics of aggregate variables and for the distribution in each time period).
{"title":"Factor-Augmenting Technology Choice and Monopolistic Competition","authors":"J. Growiec","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2190812","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2190812","url":null,"abstract":"We put forward a tractable, interpretable, and easily generalizable framework for modeling endogeneous factor-augmenting technology choice by monopolistically competitive firms. The setup is framed within the standard Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) model of monopolistic competition. Optimal technology choice is made here either by final goods producers or the representative household which holds the shares of (differentiated) intermediate goods producers. These two cases have different implications for the distribution of output but they yield the same aggregate level of output, the same aggregate production function and equivalent macroeconomic dynamics. Thanks to this property, the proposed framework can be used as a building block in a variety of embedding structures, including those which require to be solved recursively (separately for the dynamics of aggregate variables and for the distribution in each time period).","PeriodicalId":70912,"journal":{"name":"政治经济学季刊","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84850670","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Homo transformaticus, therefore, is the carrier of a necroeconomy’s routine who transforms economy. Unlike a necroeconomy, whose routine is carried by a human being which is 'still-to-be-formed,' a zombie-economy’s routine is carried by the 'gone and departed' man, the so-called zombie economicus. Under the conditions of the present financial crisis, the threat of a zombie-economy is also aggressively knocking on the doors of those developed economies which, until recently, seemed to have escaped the zombieing of their economies. The only effective mechanism to get rid of both a necroeconomy and a zombieeconomy is to adopt a sound bankruptcy law.
{"title":"The Human Factor in the Modern Financial Crisis","authors":"V. Papava","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2183871","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2183871","url":null,"abstract":"Homo transformaticus, therefore, is the carrier of a necroeconomy’s routine who transforms economy. Unlike a necroeconomy, whose routine is carried by a human being which is 'still-to-be-formed,' a zombie-economy’s routine is carried by the 'gone and departed' man, the so-called zombie economicus. Under the conditions of the present financial crisis, the threat of a zombie-economy is also aggressively knocking on the doors of those developed economies which, until recently, seemed to have escaped the zombieing of their economies. The only effective mechanism to get rid of both a necroeconomy and a zombieeconomy is to adopt a sound bankruptcy law.","PeriodicalId":70912,"journal":{"name":"政治经济学季刊","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85188155","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study trade policy in a two-sector Krugman (1980) trade model, allowing for wage, import and export subsidies/taxes. We study non-cooperative trade policies, first for each individual instrument and then for the situation where all instruments can be set simultaneously, and contrast those with the efficient allocation. We show that in this general context there are four motives for non-cooperative trade policies: the correction of monopolistic distortions; the terms-of-trade manipulation; the delocation motive for protection (home market effect); the fiscal-burden-shifting motive. The Nash equilibrium when all instruments are available is characterized by first-best-level wage subsidies, and inefficient import subsidies and export taxes, which aim at relocating firms to the other economy and improving terms of trade. Thus, the dominating incentives for non-cooperative trade policies are the fiscal-burden-shifting motives and terms-of-trade effects.
{"title":"Trade Policy: Home Market Effect Versus Terms-of-Trade Externality","authors":"Alessia Campolmi, Harald Fadinger, Chiara Forlati","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2228125","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2228125","url":null,"abstract":"We study trade policy in a two-sector Krugman (1980) trade model, allowing for wage, import and export subsidies/taxes. We study non-cooperative trade policies, first for each individual instrument and then for the situation where all instruments can be set simultaneously, and contrast those with the efficient allocation. We show that in this general context there are four motives for non-cooperative trade policies: the correction of monopolistic distortions; the terms-of-trade manipulation; the delocation motive for protection (home market effect); the fiscal-burden-shifting motive. The Nash equilibrium when all instruments are available is characterized by first-best-level wage subsidies, and inefficient import subsidies and export taxes, which aim at relocating firms to the other economy and improving terms of trade. Thus, the dominating incentives for non-cooperative trade policies are the fiscal-burden-shifting motives and terms-of-trade effects.","PeriodicalId":70912,"journal":{"name":"政治经济学季刊","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90860600","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this study, we analyze two new potential determinants for mitigating fraud committed by firms: institutional investors and political connection. The role of institutional investors in the effective monitoring of firm management has also been well established and we in turn observe that firms with a large proportion of institutional investors have lower incidences of corporate fraud. The importance of political connection for enterprise in both developed and emerging markets such as the United States and China has also been established by prior studies. We find in this paper that it is possible to identify another positive effect on enterprise in that political connection could reduce incidences of corporate fraud, thus providing value to firms. We further find that political connection plays more pronounced role in reducing the incidence of regulatory enforcement against non-state owned enterprises in weaker legal environments, while institutional ownership plays a more important role in reducing the incidence of regulatory enforcement against state owned enterprises in weaker legal environments.
{"title":"Institutional Investors, Political Connections and Incidence of Corporate Fraud","authors":"Wenfeng Wu, S. Johan, Oliver M. Rui","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2181958","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2181958","url":null,"abstract":"In this study, we analyze two new potential determinants for mitigating fraud committed by firms: institutional investors and political connection. The role of institutional investors in the effective monitoring of firm management has also been well established and we in turn observe that firms with a large proportion of institutional investors have lower incidences of corporate fraud. The importance of political connection for enterprise in both developed and emerging markets such as the United States and China has also been established by prior studies. We find in this paper that it is possible to identify another positive effect on enterprise in that political connection could reduce incidences of corporate fraud, thus providing value to firms. We further find that political connection plays more pronounced role in reducing the incidence of regulatory enforcement against non-state owned enterprises in weaker legal environments, while institutional ownership plays a more important role in reducing the incidence of regulatory enforcement against state owned enterprises in weaker legal environments.","PeriodicalId":70912,"journal":{"name":"政治经济学季刊","volume":"108 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88062358","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：