Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security最新文献
Quel ecrivain pourrait ignorer un pays avec un heritage litteraire si brillant (Gogol, Tourgueniev, Tolstoi et Dostoievski)et qui ne peut etre nomme autrement que monumental ? Et puis – comment ne pas s’interesser a ce meme pays devenu un polygone pour la doctrine (l’utopie ?) marxiste […],le pays ou sont apparues des personnalites aussi monumentales(dans le mal comme dans le bien) que Lenine, Trotski ou Staline ? La Russie occupe dans l’ethnographie imaginaire de Simon l’une des premieres pl...
{"title":"Simon au pays des soviets. Notes sur la réception de l’œuvre simonienne en Russie","authors":"Alexey Vishnyakov","doi":"10.4000/CCS.911","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/CCS.911","url":null,"abstract":"Quel ecrivain pourrait ignorer un pays avec un heritage litteraire si brillant (Gogol, Tourgueniev, Tolstoi et Dostoievski)et qui ne peut etre nomme autrement que monumental ? Et puis – comment ne pas s’interesser a ce meme pays devenu un polygone pour la doctrine (l’utopie ?) marxiste […],le pays ou sont apparues des personnalites aussi monumentales(dans le mal comme dans le bien) que Lenine, Trotski ou Staline ? La Russie occupe dans l’ethnographie imaginaire de Simon l’une des premieres pl...","PeriodicalId":72687,"journal":{"name":"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91396130","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2013-01-01DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-33914-1_13
Fei-Hu Hsieh, Fengxia Liu, Hui-Chang Hsieh
{"title":"Nonlinear Phenomena and Resonant Parametric Perturbation Control in QR-ZCS Buck DC-DC Converters","authors":"Fei-Hu Hsieh, Fengxia Liu, Hui-Chang Hsieh","doi":"10.1007/978-3-642-33914-1_13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33914-1_13","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":72687,"journal":{"name":"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89368682","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2013-01-01DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-33914-1_60
I. Andrei, G. Popescu, C. Ticoș, M. Pascu
{"title":"Optical Spectrum Analysis of Chaotic Synchronization in a Bidirectional Coupled Semiconductor Laser System","authors":"I. Andrei, G. Popescu, C. Ticoș, M. Pascu","doi":"10.1007/978-3-642-33914-1_60","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33914-1_60","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":72687,"journal":{"name":"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91396123","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
M. Heiderich, Tilman Frosch, Meiko Jensen, Thorsten Holz
Scalable Vector Graphics (SVG) images so far played a rather small role on the Internet, mainly due to the lack of proper browser support. Recently, things have changed: the W3C and WHATWG draft specifications for HTML5 require modern web browsers to support SVG images to be embedded in a multitude of ways. Now SVG images can be embedded through the classical method via specific tags such as or , or in novel ways, such as with tags, CSS or inline in any HTML5 document. SVG files are generally considered to be plain images or animations, and security-wise, they are being treated as such (e.g., when an embedment of local or remote SVG images into websites or uploading these files into rich web applications takes place). Unfortunately, this procedure poses great risks for the web applications and the users utilizing them, as it has been proven that SVG files must be considered fully functional, one-file web applications potentially containing HTML, JavaScript, Flash, and other interactive code structures. We found that even more severe problems have resulted from the often improper handling of complex and maliciously prepared SVG files by the browsers. In this paper, we introduce several novel attack techniques targeted at major websites, as well as modern browsers, email clients and other comparable tools. In particular, we illustrate that SVG images embedded via tag and CSS can execute arbitrary JavaScript code. We examine and present how current filtering techniques are circumventable by using SVG files and subsequently propose an approach to mitigate these risks. The paper showcases our research into the usage of SVG images as attack tools, and determines its impact on state-of-the-art web browsers such as Firefox 4, Internet Explorer 9, and Opera 11.
迄今为止，可缩放矢量图形(SVG)图像在Internet上的作用相当小，这主要是由于缺乏适当的浏览器支持。最近，情况发生了变化:W3C和WHATWG的HTML5规范草案要求现代web浏览器支持以多种方式嵌入SVG图像。现在，SVG图像可以通过传统方法通过特定的标记(如或)嵌入，或者以新颖的方式嵌入，例如在任何HTML5文档中使用标记、CSS或内联。SVG文件通常被认为是纯图像或动画，并且从安全角度来看，它们被视为纯图像或动画(例如，当将本地或远程SVG图像嵌入到网站中或将这些文件上传到富web应用程序中时)。不幸的是，这个过程给web应用程序和使用它们的用户带来了很大的风险，因为已经证明SVG文件必须被认为是功能齐全的、单文件的web应用程序，可能包含HTML、JavaScript、Flash和其他交互式代码结构。我们发现，更严重的问题是由于浏览器对复杂和恶意准备的SVG文件的处理不当造成的。在本文中，我们介绍了几种针对主要网站，以及现代浏览器，电子邮件客户端和其他类似工具的新型攻击技术。特别地，我们说明了通过标记和CSS嵌入的SVG图像可以执行任意JavaScript代码。我们将研究并展示如何通过使用SVG文件规避当前的过滤技术，并随后提出一种减轻这些风险的方法。本文展示了我们对使用SVG图像作为攻击工具的研究，并确定了它对最先进的web浏览器(如Firefox 4、Internet Explorer 9和Opera 11)的影响。
{"title":"Crouching tiger - hidden payload: security risks of scalable vectors graphics","authors":"M. Heiderich, Tilman Frosch, Meiko Jensen, Thorsten Holz","doi":"10.1145/2046707.2046735","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046707.2046735","url":null,"abstract":"Scalable Vector Graphics (SVG) images so far played a rather small role on the Internet, mainly due to the lack of proper browser support. Recently, things have changed: the W3C and WHATWG draft specifications for HTML5 require modern web browsers to support SVG images to be embedded in a multitude of ways. Now SVG images can be embedded through the classical method via specific tags such as or , or in novel ways, such as with tags, CSS or inline in any HTML5 document. SVG files are generally considered to be plain images or animations, and security-wise, they are being treated as such (e.g., when an embedment of local or remote SVG images into websites or uploading these files into rich web applications takes place). Unfortunately, this procedure poses great risks for the web applications and the users utilizing them, as it has been proven that SVG files must be considered fully functional, one-file web applications potentially containing HTML, JavaScript, Flash, and other interactive code structures. We found that even more severe problems have resulted from the often improper handling of complex and maliciously prepared SVG files by the browsers.\u0000 In this paper, we introduce several novel attack techniques targeted at major websites, as well as modern browsers, email clients and other comparable tools. In particular, we illustrate that SVG images embedded via tag and CSS can execute arbitrary JavaScript code. We examine and present how current filtering techniques are circumventable by using SVG files and subsequently propose an approach to mitigate these risks. The paper showcases our research into the usage of SVG images as attack tools, and determines its impact on state-of-the-art web browsers such as Firefox 4, Internet Explorer 9, and Opera 11.","PeriodicalId":72687,"journal":{"name":"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74882847","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Paper forgery is among the leading causes of corruption in many developing regions. In this paper, we introduce PaperSpeckle, a robust system that leverages the natural randomness property present in paper to generate a fingerprint for any piece of paper. Our goal in developing PaperSpeckle is to build a low-cost paper based authentication mechanism for applications in rural regions such as microfinance, healthcare, land ownership records, supply chain services and education which heavily rely on paper based records. Unlike prior paper fingerprinting techniques that have extracted fingerprints based on the fiber structure of paper, PaperSpeckle uses the texture speckle pattern, a random bright/dark region formation at the microscopic level when light falls on to the paper, to extract a unique fingerprint to identify paper. In PaperSpeckle, we show how to extract a "repeatable" texture speckle pattern of a microscopic region of a paper using low-cost machinery involving paper, pen and a cheap microscope. Using extensive testing on different types of paper, we show that PaperSpeckle can produce a robust repeatable fingerprint even if paper is damaged due to crumpling, printing or scribbling, soaking in water or aging with time.
{"title":"PaperSpeckle: microscopic fingerprinting of paper","authors":"Ashlesh Sharma, L. Subramanian, E. Brewer","doi":"10.1145/2046707.2046721","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046707.2046721","url":null,"abstract":"Paper forgery is among the leading causes of corruption in many developing regions. In this paper, we introduce PaperSpeckle, a robust system that leverages the natural randomness property present in paper to generate a fingerprint for any piece of paper. Our goal in developing PaperSpeckle is to build a low-cost paper based authentication mechanism for applications in rural regions such as microfinance, healthcare, land ownership records, supply chain services and education which heavily rely on paper based records. Unlike prior paper fingerprinting techniques that have extracted fingerprints based on the fiber structure of paper, PaperSpeckle uses the texture speckle pattern, a random bright/dark region formation at the microscopic level when light falls on to the paper, to extract a unique fingerprint to identify paper. In PaperSpeckle, we show how to extract a \"repeatable\" texture speckle pattern of a microscopic region of a paper using low-cost machinery involving paper, pen and a cheap microscope. Using extensive testing on different types of paper, we show that PaperSpeckle can produce a robust repeatable fingerprint even if paper is damaged due to crumpling, printing or scribbling, soaking in water or aging with time.","PeriodicalId":72687,"journal":{"name":"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75297430","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
While it is important to design anonymity systems to be robust against attacks, it is also important to provide good performance to users. We explore ways to improve the security and performance of anonymity systems by building both security and performance properties into the network topology. In particular, we study an expander graph based network topology and apply link-based performance metrics in order to build the topology graph. Such a network can be constructed to have enhanced performance and similar security properties to restricted route topologies with random links. Results show that a sparse, D-regular expander graph topology provides nearly the same security, as measured by the likelihood of an incoming stream exiting through any node in the network, as with a fully-connected graph. Further, when the expander graph is constructed with a bias towards faster links, there is a considerable gain in performance without much loss of security.
{"title":"Poster: shaping network topology for privacy and performance","authors":"Nayantara Mallesh, M. Wright","doi":"10.1145/2046707.2093500","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046707.2093500","url":null,"abstract":"While it is important to design anonymity systems to be robust against attacks, it is also important to provide good performance to users. We explore ways to improve the security and performance of anonymity systems by building both security and performance properties into the network topology. In particular, we study an expander graph based network topology and apply link-based performance metrics in order to build the topology graph. Such a network can be constructed to have enhanced performance and similar security properties to restricted route topologies with random links. Results show that a sparse, D-regular expander graph topology provides nearly the same security, as measured by the likelihood of an incoming stream exiting through any node in the network, as with a fully-connected graph. Further, when the expander graph is constructed with a bias towards faster links, there is a considerable gain in performance without much loss of security.","PeriodicalId":72687,"journal":{"name":"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73941447","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
On the one hand, compilers for secure computation protocols, such as FairPlay or FairPlayMP, have significantly simplified the development of such protocols. On the other hand, optimized protocols with high performance for special problems demand manual development and security verification. The question considered in this paper is: Can we construct a compiler that produces optimized protocols? We present an optimization technique based on logic inference about what is known from input and output. Using the example of median computation we can show that our program analysis and rewriting technique translates a FairPlay program into an equivalent -- in functionality and security -- program that corresponds to the protocol by Aggarwal et al. Nevertheless our technique is general and can be applied to optimize a wide variety of secure computation protocols.
{"title":"Automatically optimizing secure computation","authors":"F. Kerschbaum","doi":"10.1145/2046707.2046786","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046707.2046786","url":null,"abstract":"On the one hand, compilers for secure computation protocols, such as FairPlay or FairPlayMP, have significantly simplified the development of such protocols. On the other hand, optimized protocols with high performance for special problems demand manual development and security verification. The question considered in this paper is: Can we construct a compiler that produces optimized protocols? We present an optimization technique based on logic inference about what is known from input and output. Using the example of median computation we can show that our program analysis and rewriting technique translates a FairPlay program into an equivalent -- in functionality and security -- program that corresponds to the protocol by Aggarwal et al. Nevertheless our technique is general and can be applied to optimize a wide variety of secure computation protocols.","PeriodicalId":72687,"journal":{"name":"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1145/2046707.2046786","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72375197","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sven Bugiel, S. Nürnberger, T. Pöppelmann, A. Sadeghi, T. Schneider
Cloud Computing is an emerging technology promising new business opportunities and easy deployment of web services. Much has been written about the risks and benefits of cloud computing in the last years. The literature on clouds often points out security and privacy challenges as the main obstacles, and proposes solutions and guidelines to avoid them. However, most of these works deal with either malicious cloud providers or customers, but ignore the severe threats caused by unaware users. In this paper we consider security and privacy aspects of real-life cloud deployments, independently from malicious cloud providers or customers. We focus on the popular Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) and give a detailed and systematic analysis of various crucial vulnerabilities in publicly available and widely used Amazon Machine Images (AMIs) and show how to eliminate them. Our Amazon Image Attacks (AmazonIA) deploy an automated tool that uses only publicly available interfaces and makes no assumptions on the underlying cloud infrastructure. We were able to extract highly sensitive information (including passwords, keys, and credentials) from a variety of publicly available AMIs. The extracted information allows to (i) start (botnet) instances worth thousands of dollars per day, (ii) provide backdoors into the running machines, (iii) launch impersonation attacks, or (iv) access the source code of the entire web service. Our attacks can be used to completely compromise several real web services offered by companies (including IT-security companies), e.g., for website statistics/user tracking, two-factor authentication, or price comparison. Further, we show mechanisms to identify the AMI of certain running instances. Following the maxim "security and privacy by design" we show how our automated tools together with changes to the user interface can be used to mitigate our attacks.
{"title":"AmazonIA: when elasticity snaps back","authors":"Sven Bugiel, S. Nürnberger, T. Pöppelmann, A. Sadeghi, T. Schneider","doi":"10.1145/2046707.2046753","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046707.2046753","url":null,"abstract":"Cloud Computing is an emerging technology promising new business opportunities and easy deployment of web services. Much has been written about the risks and benefits of cloud computing in the last years. The literature on clouds often points out security and privacy challenges as the main obstacles, and proposes solutions and guidelines to avoid them. However, most of these works deal with either malicious cloud providers or customers, but ignore the severe threats caused by unaware users.\u0000 In this paper we consider security and privacy aspects of real-life cloud deployments, independently from malicious cloud providers or customers. We focus on the popular Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) and give a detailed and systematic analysis of various crucial vulnerabilities in publicly available and widely used Amazon Machine Images (AMIs) and show how to eliminate them.\u0000 Our Amazon Image Attacks (AmazonIA) deploy an automated tool that uses only publicly available interfaces and makes no assumptions on the underlying cloud infrastructure. We were able to extract highly sensitive information (including passwords, keys, and credentials) from a variety of publicly available AMIs. The extracted information allows to (i) start (botnet) instances worth thousands of dollars per day, (ii) provide backdoors into the running machines, (iii) launch impersonation attacks, or (iv) access the source code of the entire web service. Our attacks can be used to completely compromise several real web services offered by companies (including IT-security companies), e.g., for website statistics/user tracking, two-factor authentication, or price comparison. Further, we show mechanisms to identify the AMI of certain running instances.\u0000 Following the maxim \"security and privacy by design\" we show how our automated tools together with changes to the user interface can be used to mitigate our attacks.","PeriodicalId":72687,"journal":{"name":"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85852046","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Since the discovery of a fully homomorphic cryptographic scheme by Gentry, a number of different schemes have been proposed that apply the bootstrap technique of Gentry's original approach. However, to date no implementation of fully homomorphic encryption has been publicly released. This poster presents a working implementation of the Smart-Vercauteren scheme that will be freely available and gives substantial implementation hints.
{"title":"Poster: an implementation of the fully homomorphic smart-vercauteren crypto-system","authors":"H. Perl, Michael Brenner, Matthew Smith","doi":"10.1145/2046707.2093506","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046707.2093506","url":null,"abstract":"Since the discovery of a fully homomorphic cryptographic scheme by Gentry, a number of different schemes have been proposed that apply the bootstrap technique of Gentry's original approach. However, to date no implementation of fully homomorphic encryption has been publicly released. This poster presents a working implementation of the Smart-Vercauteren scheme that will be freely available and gives substantial implementation hints.","PeriodicalId":72687,"journal":{"name":"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73296702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Prithvi Bisht, Timothy L. Hinrichs, Nazari Skrupsky, V. Venkatakrishnan
Parameter tampering attacks are dangerous to a web application whose server fails to replicate the validation of user-supplied data that is performed by the client. Malicious users who circumvent the client can capitalize on the missing server validation. In this paper, we describe WAPTEC, a tool that is designed to automatically identify parameter tampering vulnerabilities and generate exploits by construction to demonstrate those vulnerabilities. WAPTEC involves a new approach to whitebox analysis of the server's code. We tested WAPTEC on six open source applications and found previously unknown vulnerabilities in every single one of them.
{"title":"WAPTEC: whitebox analysis of web applications for parameter tampering exploit construction","authors":"Prithvi Bisht, Timothy L. Hinrichs, Nazari Skrupsky, V. Venkatakrishnan","doi":"10.1145/2046707.2046774","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046707.2046774","url":null,"abstract":"Parameter tampering attacks are dangerous to a web application whose server fails to replicate the validation of user-supplied data that is performed by the client. Malicious users who circumvent the client can capitalize on the missing server validation. In this paper, we describe WAPTEC, a tool that is designed to automatically identify parameter tampering vulnerabilities and generate exploits by construction to demonstrate those vulnerabilities. WAPTEC involves a new approach to whitebox analysis of the server's code. We tested WAPTEC on six open source applications and found previously unknown vulnerabilities in every single one of them.","PeriodicalId":72687,"journal":{"name":"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79185780","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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