Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security最新文献
Malware continues to remain one of the most important security problems on the Internet today. Whenever an anti-malware solution becomes popular, malware authors typically react promptly and modify their programs to evade defense mechanisms. For example, recently, malware authors have increasingly started to create malicious code that can evade dynamic analysis. One recent form of evasion against dynamic analysis systems is stalling code. Stalling code is typically executed before any malicious behavior. The attacker's aim is to delay the execution of the malicious activity long enough so that an automated dynamic analysis system fails to extract the interesting malicious behavior. This paper presents the first approach to detect and mitigate malicious stalling code, and to ensure forward progress within the amount of time allocated for the analysis of a sample. Experimental results show that our system, called HASTEN, works well in practice, and that it is able to detect additional malicious behavior in real-world malware samples.
{"title":"The power of procrastination: detection and mitigation of execution-stalling malicious code","authors":"C. Kolbitsch, E. Kirda, Christopher Krügel","doi":"10.1145/2046707.2046740","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046707.2046740","url":null,"abstract":"Malware continues to remain one of the most important security problems on the Internet today. Whenever an anti-malware solution becomes popular, malware authors typically react promptly and modify their programs to evade defense mechanisms. For example, recently, malware authors have increasingly started to create malicious code that can evade dynamic analysis.\u0000 One recent form of evasion against dynamic analysis systems is stalling code. Stalling code is typically executed before any malicious behavior. The attacker's aim is to delay the execution of the malicious activity long enough so that an automated dynamic analysis system fails to extract the interesting malicious behavior. This paper presents the first approach to detect and mitigate malicious stalling code, and to ensure forward progress within the amount of time allocated for the analysis of a sample. Experimental results show that our system, called HASTEN, works well in practice, and that it is able to detect additional malicious behavior in real-world malware samples.","PeriodicalId":72687,"journal":{"name":"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"11 1","pages":"285-296"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78363735","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Miro Enev, Sidhant Gupta, Tadayoshi Kohno, Shwetak N. Patel
We conduct an extensive study of information leakage over the powerline infrastructure from eight televisions (TVs) spanning multiple makes, models, and underlying technologies. In addition to being of scientific interest, our findings contribute to the overall debate of whether or not measurements of residential powerlines reveal significant information about the activities within a home. We find that the power supplies of modern TVs produce discernible electromagnetic interference (EMI) signatures that are indicative of the video content being displayed. We measure the stability of these signatures over time and across multiple instances of the same TV model, as well as the robustness of these signatures in the presence of other noisy electronic devices connected to the same powerline.
{"title":"Televisions, video privacy, and powerline electromagnetic interference","authors":"Miro Enev, Sidhant Gupta, Tadayoshi Kohno, Shwetak N. Patel","doi":"10.1145/2046707.2046770","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046707.2046770","url":null,"abstract":"We conduct an extensive study of information leakage over the powerline infrastructure from eight televisions (TVs) spanning multiple makes, models, and underlying technologies. In addition to being of scientific interest, our findings contribute to the overall debate of whether or not measurements of residential powerlines reveal significant information about the activities within a home. We find that the power supplies of modern TVs produce discernible electromagnetic interference (EMI) signatures that are indicative of the video content being displayed. We measure the stability of these signatures over time and across multiple instances of the same TV model, as well as the robustness of these signatures in the presence of other noisy electronic devices connected to the same powerline.","PeriodicalId":72687,"journal":{"name":"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"9 1","pages":"537-550"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82097373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
K. Jayaraman, Vijay Ganesh, Mahesh V. Tripunitara, M. Rinard, S. Chapin
Verifying that access-control systems maintain desired security properties is recognized as an important problem in security. Enterprise access-control systems have grown to protect tens of thousands of resources, and there is a need for verification to scale commensurately. We present a new abstraction-refinement technique for automatically finding errors in Administrative Role-Based Access Control (ARBAC) security policies. ARBAC is the first and most comprehensive administrative scheme for Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) systems. Underlying our approach is a change in mindset: we propose that error finding complements verification, can be more scalable, and allows for the use of a wider variety of techniques. In our approach, we use an abstraction-refinement technique to first identify and discard roles that are unlikely to be relevant to the verification question (the abstraction step), and then restore such abstracted roles incrementally (the refinement steps). Errors are one-sided: if there is an error in the abstracted policy, then there is an error in the original policy. If there is an error in a policy whose role-dependency graph diameter is smaller than a certain bound, then we find the error. Our abstraction-refinement technique complements conventional state-space exploration techniques such as model checking. We have implemented our technique in an access-control policy analysis tool. We show empirically that our tool scales well to realistic policies, and is orders of magnitude faster than prior tools.
{"title":"Automatic error finding in access-control policies","authors":"K. Jayaraman, Vijay Ganesh, Mahesh V. Tripunitara, M. Rinard, S. Chapin","doi":"10.1145/2046707.2046727","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046707.2046727","url":null,"abstract":"Verifying that access-control systems maintain desired security properties is recognized as an important problem in security. Enterprise access-control systems have grown to protect tens of thousands of resources, and there is a need for verification to scale commensurately. We present a new abstraction-refinement technique for automatically finding errors in Administrative Role-Based Access Control (ARBAC) security policies. ARBAC is the first and most comprehensive administrative scheme for Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) systems. Underlying our approach is a change in mindset: we propose that error finding complements verification, can be more scalable, and allows for the use of a wider variety of techniques. In our approach, we use an abstraction-refinement technique to first identify and discard roles that are unlikely to be relevant to the verification question (the abstraction step), and then restore such abstracted roles incrementally (the refinement steps). Errors are one-sided: if there is an error in the abstracted policy, then there is an error in the original policy. If there is an error in a policy whose role-dependency graph diameter is smaller than a certain bound, then we find the error. Our abstraction-refinement technique complements conventional state-space exploration techniques such as model checking. We have implemented our technique in an access-control policy analysis tool. We show empirically that our tool scales well to realistic policies, and is orders of magnitude faster than prior tools.","PeriodicalId":72687,"journal":{"name":"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"45 1","pages":"163-174"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84307792","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Risk and benefit are two implicit key factors to determine accesses in secure information sharing. Recent researches have shown that they can be explicitly quantified and used to improve the flexibility in information systems. This paper introduces the motivation and a technical design of Quantified riSk and Benefit adaptive Access Control (QSBAC) to strengthen the security of information sharing. The paper also introduces the key issues to design policies in QSBAC.
{"title":"Poster: using quantified risk and benefit to strengthen the security of information sharing","authors":"Weili Han, Chenguang Shen, Yuliang Yin, Yun Gu, Chen Chen","doi":"10.1145/2046707.2093492","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046707.2093492","url":null,"abstract":"Risk and benefit are two implicit key factors to determine accesses in secure information sharing. Recent researches have shown that they can be explicitly quantified and used to improve the flexibility in information systems. This paper introduces the motivation and a technical design of Quantified riSk and Benefit adaptive Access Control (QSBAC) to strengthen the security of information sharing. The paper also introduces the key issues to design policies in QSBAC.","PeriodicalId":72687,"journal":{"name":"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"198 1","pages":"781-784"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80027706","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
OneSwarm is a system for anonymous p2p file sharing in use by thousands of peers. It aims to provide Onion Routing-like privacy and BitTorrent-like performance. We demonstrate several flaws in OneSwarm's design and implementation through three different attacks available to forensic investigators. First, we prove that the current design is vulnerable to a novel timing attack that allows just two attackers attached to the same target to determine if it is the source of queried content. When attackers comprise 15% of OneSwarm peers, we expect over 90% of remaining peers will be attached to two attackers and therefore vulnerable. Thwarting the attack increases OneSwarm query response times, making them longer than the equivalent in Onion Routing. Second, we show that OneSwarm's vulnerability to traffic analysis by colluding attackers is much greater than was previously reported, and is much worse than Onion Routing. We show for this second attack that when investigators comprise 25% of peers, over 40% of the network can be investigated with 80% precision to find the sources of content. Our examination of the OneSwarm source code found differences with the technical paper that significantly reduce security. For the implementation in use by thousands of people, attackers that comprise 25% of the network can successfully use this second attack against 98% of remaining peers with 95% precision. Finally, we show that a novel application of a known TCP-based attack allows a single attacker to identify whether a neighbor is the source of data or a proxy for it. Users that turn off the default rate-limit setting are exposed. Each attack can be repeated as investigators leave and rejoin the network. All of our attacks are successful in a forensics context: Law enforcement can use them legally ahead of a warrant. Furthermore, private investigators, who have fewer restrictions on their behavior, can use them more easily in pursuit of evidence for such civil suits as copyright infringement.
{"title":"Forensic investigation of the OneSwarm anonymous filesharing system","authors":"Swagatika Prusty, B. Levine, M. Liberatore","doi":"10.1145/2046707.2046731","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046707.2046731","url":null,"abstract":"OneSwarm is a system for anonymous p2p file sharing in use by thousands of peers. It aims to provide Onion Routing-like privacy and BitTorrent-like performance. We demonstrate several flaws in OneSwarm's design and implementation through three different attacks available to forensic investigators. First, we prove that the current design is vulnerable to a novel timing attack that allows just two attackers attached to the same target to determine if it is the source of queried content. When attackers comprise 15% of OneSwarm peers, we expect over 90% of remaining peers will be attached to two attackers and therefore vulnerable. Thwarting the attack increases OneSwarm query response times, making them longer than the equivalent in Onion Routing. Second, we show that OneSwarm's vulnerability to traffic analysis by colluding attackers is much greater than was previously reported, and is much worse than Onion Routing. We show for this second attack that when investigators comprise 25% of peers, over 40% of the network can be investigated with 80% precision to find the sources of content. Our examination of the OneSwarm source code found differences with the technical paper that significantly reduce security. For the implementation in use by thousands of people, attackers that comprise 25% of the network can successfully use this second attack against 98% of remaining peers with 95% precision. Finally, we show that a novel application of a known TCP-based attack allows a single attacker to identify whether a neighbor is the source of data or a proxy for it. Users that turn off the default rate-limit setting are exposed. Each attack can be repeated as investigators leave and rejoin the network. All of our attacks are successful in a forensics context: Law enforcement can use them legally ahead of a warrant. Furthermore, private investigators, who have fewer restrictions on their behavior, can use them more easily in pursuit of evidence for such civil suits as copyright infringement.","PeriodicalId":72687,"journal":{"name":"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"165 1","pages":"201-214"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83875854","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
E. Chen, Jason Bau, C. Reis, A. Barth, Collin Jackson
Many browser-based attacks can be prevented by using separate browsers for separate web sites. However, most users access the web with only one browser. We explain the security benefits that using multiple browsers provides in terms of two concepts: entry-point restriction and state isolation. We combine these concepts into a general app isolation mechanism that can provide the same security benefits in a single browser. While not appropriate for all types of web sites, many sites with high-value user data can opt in to app isolation to gain defenses against a wide variety of browser-based attacks. We implement app isolation in the Chromium browser and verify its security properties using finite-state model checking. We also measure the performance overhead of app isolation and conduct a large-scale study to evaluate its adoption complexity for various types of sites, demonstrating how the app isolation mechanisms are suitable for protecting a number of high-value Web applications, such as online banking.
{"title":"App isolation: get the security of multiple browsers with just one","authors":"E. Chen, Jason Bau, C. Reis, A. Barth, Collin Jackson","doi":"10.1145/2046707.2046734","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046707.2046734","url":null,"abstract":"Many browser-based attacks can be prevented by using separate browsers for separate web sites. However, most users access the web with only one browser. We explain the security benefits that using multiple browsers provides in terms of two concepts: entry-point restriction and state isolation. We combine these concepts into a general app isolation mechanism that can provide the same security benefits in a single browser. While not appropriate for all types of web sites, many sites with high-value user data can opt in to app isolation to gain defenses against a wide variety of browser-based attacks. We implement app isolation in the Chromium browser and verify its security properties using finite-state model checking. We also measure the performance overhead of app isolation and conduct a large-scale study to evaluate its adoption complexity for various types of sites, demonstrating how the app isolation mechanisms are suitable for protecting a number of high-value Web applications, such as online banking.","PeriodicalId":72687,"journal":{"name":"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"3 1","pages":"227-238"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87585669","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We carry out a systematic study of existing visual CAPTCHAs based on distorted characters that are augmented with anti-segmentation techniques. Applying a systematic evaluation methodology to 15 current CAPTCHA schemes from popular web sites, we find that 13 are vulnerable to automated attacks. Based on this evaluation, we identify a series of recommendations for CAPTCHA designers and attackers, and possible future directions for producing more reliable human/computer distinguishers.
{"title":"Text-based CAPTCHA strengths and weaknesses","authors":"Elie Bursztein, Matthieu Martin, John C. Mitchell","doi":"10.1145/2046707.2046724","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046707.2046724","url":null,"abstract":"We carry out a systematic study of existing visual CAPTCHAs based on distorted characters that are augmented with anti-segmentation techniques. Applying a systematic evaluation methodology to 15 current CAPTCHA schemes from popular web sites, we find that 13 are vulnerable to automated attacks. Based on this evaluation, we identify a series of recommendations for CAPTCHA designers and attackers, and possible future directions for producing more reliable human/computer distinguishers.","PeriodicalId":72687,"journal":{"name":"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"39 1","pages":"125-138"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74866137","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Attribute based systems enable fine-grained access control among a group of users each identified by a set of attributes. Secure collaborative applications need such flexible attribute based systems for managing and distributing group keys. However, current group key management schemes are not well designed to manage group keys based on the attributes of the group members. In this poster, we propose a novel key management scheme that allows users whose attributes satisfy a certain policy to derive the group key. Our scheme efficiently supports rekeying operations when the group changes due to joins or leaves of group members. During a rekey operation, the private information issued to existing members remains unaffected and only the public information is updated to change the group key. Our scheme is expressive; it is able to support any monotonic policy over a set of attributes. Our scheme is resistant to collusion attacks; group members are unable to pool their attributes and derive the group key which they cannot derive individually.
{"title":"Poster: towards attribute based group key management","authors":"Mohamed Nabeel, E. Bertino","doi":"10.1145/2046707.2093502","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046707.2093502","url":null,"abstract":"Attribute based systems enable fine-grained access control among a group of users each identified by a set of attributes. Secure collaborative applications need such flexible attribute based systems for managing and distributing group keys. However, current group key management schemes are not well designed to manage group keys based on the attributes of the group members. In this poster, we propose a novel key management scheme that allows users whose attributes satisfy a certain policy to derive the group key. Our scheme efficiently supports rekeying operations when the group changes due to joins or leaves of group members. During a rekey operation, the private information issued to existing members remains unaffected and only the public information is updated to change the group key. Our scheme is expressive; it is able to support any monotonic policy over a set of attributes. Our scheme is resistant to collusion attacks; group members are unable to pool their attributes and derive the group key which they cannot derive individually.","PeriodicalId":72687,"journal":{"name":"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"108 1","pages":"821-824"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74416806","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Critical infrastructure, including the Internet, plays a vital role in the economic, political, and social fabric of society. This interdependency leaves society vulnerable to a wide range of threats that impact the security, reliability, availability, and overall trustworthiness of information technology resources. Assuring these properties in the face of adversarial behavior and an Internet that has changed dramatically in size, complexity, and diversity over the last decade has proven to be a critical challenge. In this talk, I will reflect on the evolution of Internet threats - from early threats, such as viruses and worms, to modern botnets. I will explore how changing attacker's technological means (e.g., resilient infrastructure, covert communication) have intertwined with attacker's changing social, behavioral, and economic motives (e.g., vandalism, crime, activism) to create today's large, complex, and diverse ecosystem of threats. I will also touch on how future innovation in the threat landscape will likely be driven by Internet adoption patterns such as the explosive growth of on-line data, the proliferation of mobile devices, and the emergence of the "cloud" computing paradigm. In response to these challenges, I will discuss the need for sustained, long-term research investments in a spectrum of scientific and technical areas with particular emphasis on calls to develop the scientific foundations of cyber-security and to accelerate the transition of knowledge into practice. I will articulate a vision in which a cyber secure society is necessary if we are to achieve the promise of computing to address a wide range of national priorities including health, energy, transportation, education and life-long learning, and public safety/emergency preparedness.
{"title":"Reflections on the evolution of internet threats: the growing imperative for a cyber secure society","authors":"F. Jahanian","doi":"10.1145/2046707.2046709","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046707.2046709","url":null,"abstract":"Critical infrastructure, including the Internet, plays a vital role in the economic, political, and social fabric of society. This interdependency leaves society vulnerable to a wide range of threats that impact the security, reliability, availability, and overall trustworthiness of information technology resources. Assuring these properties in the face of adversarial behavior and an Internet that has changed dramatically in size, complexity, and diversity over the last decade has proven to be a critical challenge. In this talk, I will reflect on the evolution of Internet threats - from early threats, such as viruses and worms, to modern botnets. I will explore how changing attacker's technological means (e.g., resilient infrastructure, covert communication) have intertwined with attacker's changing social, behavioral, and economic motives (e.g., vandalism, crime, activism) to create today's large, complex, and diverse ecosystem of threats. I will also touch on how future innovation in the threat landscape will likely be driven by Internet adoption patterns such as the explosive growth of on-line data, the proliferation of mobile devices, and the emergence of the \"cloud\" computing paradigm.\u0000 In response to these challenges, I will discuss the need for sustained, long-term research investments in a spectrum of scientific and technical areas with particular emphasis on calls to develop the scientific foundations of cyber-security and to accelerate the transition of knowledge into practice. I will articulate a vision in which a cyber secure society is necessary if we are to achieve the promise of computing to address a wide range of national priorities including health, energy, transportation, education and life-long learning, and public safety/emergency preparedness.","PeriodicalId":72687,"journal":{"name":"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"6 1","pages":"1-2"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90626090","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
SICE is a novel framework to provide hardware-level isolation and protection for sensitive workloads running on x86 platforms in compute clouds. Unlike existing isolation techniques, SICE does not rely on any software component in the host environment (i.e., an OS or a hypervisor). Instead, the security of the isolated environments is guaranteed by a trusted computing base that only includes the hardware, the BIOS, and the System Management Mode (SMM). SICE provides fast context switching to and from an isolated environment, allowing isolated workloads to time-share the physical platform with untrusted workloads. Moreover, SICE supports a large range (up to 4GB) of isolated memory. Finally, the most unique feature of SICE is the use of multicore processors to allow the isolated environments to run concurrently and yet securely beside the untrusted host. We have implemented a SICE prototype using an AMD x86 hardware platform. Our experiments show that SICE performs fast context switching (67 microseconds) to and from the isolated environment and that it imposes a reasonable overhead (3% on all but one benchmark) on the operation of an isolated Linux virtual machine. Our prototype demonstrates that, subject to a careful security review of the BIOS software and the SMM hardware implementation, current hardware architecture already provides abstractions that can support building strong isolation mechanisms using a very small SMM software foundation of about 300 lines of code.
{"title":"SICE: a hardware-level strongly isolated computing environment for x86 multi-core platforms","authors":"Ahmed M. Azab, P. Ning, Xiaolan Zhang","doi":"10.1145/2046707.2046752","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046707.2046752","url":null,"abstract":"SICE is a novel framework to provide hardware-level isolation and protection for sensitive workloads running on x86 platforms in compute clouds. Unlike existing isolation techniques, SICE does not rely on any software component in the host environment (i.e., an OS or a hypervisor). Instead, the security of the isolated environments is guaranteed by a trusted computing base that only includes the hardware, the BIOS, and the System Management Mode (SMM). SICE provides fast context switching to and from an isolated environment, allowing isolated workloads to time-share the physical platform with untrusted workloads. Moreover, SICE supports a large range (up to 4GB) of isolated memory. Finally, the most unique feature of SICE is the use of multicore processors to allow the isolated environments to run concurrently and yet securely beside the untrusted host. We have implemented a SICE prototype using an AMD x86 hardware platform. Our experiments show that SICE performs fast context switching (67 microseconds) to and from the isolated environment and that it imposes a reasonable overhead (3% on all but one benchmark) on the operation of an isolated Linux virtual machine. Our prototype demonstrates that, subject to a careful security review of the BIOS software and the SMM hardware implementation, current hardware architecture already provides abstractions that can support building strong isolation mechanisms using a very small SMM software foundation of about 300 lines of code.","PeriodicalId":72687,"journal":{"name":"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"185 1","pages":"375-388"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89005410","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：