Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security最新文献
We extend Goldberg's multi-server information-theoretic private information retrieval (PIR) with a suite of protocols for privacy-preserving e-commerce. Our first protocol adds support for single-payee tiered pricing, wherein users purchase database records without revealing the indices or prices of those records. Tiered pricing lets the seller set prices based on each user's status within the system; e.g., non-members may pay full price while members may receive a discounted rate. We then extend tiered pricing to support group-based access control lists with record-level granularity; this allows the servers to set access rights based on users' price tiers. Next, we show how to do some basic bookkeeping to implement a novel top-K replication strategy that enables the servers to construct bestsellers lists, which facilitate faster retrieval for these most popular records. Finally, we build on our bookkeeping functionality to support multiple payees, thus enabling several sellers to offer their digital goods through a common database while enabling the database servers to determine to what portion of revenues each seller is entitled. Our protocols maintain user anonymity in addition to query privacy; that is, queries do not leak information about the index or price of the record a user purchases, the price tier according to which the user pays, the user's remaining balance, or even whether the user has ever queried the database before. No other priced PIR or oblivious transfer protocol supports tiered pricing, access control lists, multiple payees, or top-K replication, whereas ours supports all of these features while preserving PIR's sublinear communication complexity. We have implemented our protocols as an add-on to Percy++, an open source implementation of Goldberg's PIR scheme. Measurements indicate that our protocols are practical for deployment in real-world e-commerce applications.
{"title":"Practical PIR for electronic commerce","authors":"Ryan Henry, Femi G. Olumofin, I. Goldberg","doi":"10.1145/2046707.2046784","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046707.2046784","url":null,"abstract":"We extend Goldberg's multi-server information-theoretic private information retrieval (PIR) with a suite of protocols for privacy-preserving e-commerce. Our first protocol adds support for single-payee tiered pricing, wherein users purchase database records without revealing the indices or prices of those records. Tiered pricing lets the seller set prices based on each user's status within the system; e.g., non-members may pay full price while members may receive a discounted rate. We then extend tiered pricing to support group-based access control lists with record-level granularity; this allows the servers to set access rights based on users' price tiers. Next, we show how to do some basic bookkeeping to implement a novel top-K replication strategy that enables the servers to construct bestsellers lists, which facilitate faster retrieval for these most popular records. Finally, we build on our bookkeeping functionality to support multiple payees, thus enabling several sellers to offer their digital goods through a common database while enabling the database servers to determine to what portion of revenues each seller is entitled. Our protocols maintain user anonymity in addition to query privacy; that is, queries do not leak information about the index or price of the record a user purchases, the price tier according to which the user pays, the user's remaining balance, or even whether the user has ever queried the database before. No other priced PIR or oblivious transfer protocol supports tiered pricing, access control lists, multiple payees, or top-K replication, whereas ours supports all of these features while preserving PIR's sublinear communication complexity. We have implemented our protocols as an add-on to Percy++, an open source implementation of Goldberg's PIR scheme. Measurements indicate that our protocols are practical for deployment in real-world e-commerce applications.","PeriodicalId":72687,"journal":{"name":"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87223465","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The advent of cloud computing has ushered in an era of mass data storage in remote servers. Remote data storage offers reduced data management overhead for data owners in a cost effective manner. Sensitive documents, however, need to be stored in encrypted format due to security concerns. But, encrypted storage makes it difficult to search on the stored documents. Therefore, this poses a major barrier towards selective retrieval of encrypted documents from the remote servers. Various protocols have been proposed for keyword search over encrypted data (commonly referred to as searchable encryption) to address this issue. Oblivious RAM type protocols offer secure search over encrypted data, but are too expensive to be used in practical applications. Unfortunately, all of the symmetric key based encryption protocols leak data access patterns due to efficiency reasons. In this poster, we are the first to analyze the effects of access pattern disclosure. To that end, we introduce a novel attack model that exploits access pattern leakage to disclose significant amount of sensitive information using a modicum of prior knowledge. We also present a preliminary set of empirical results on a real dataset to justify our claim.
{"title":"Poster: inference attacks against searchable encryption protocols","authors":"M. S. Islam, Mehmet Kuzu, Murat Kantarcioglu","doi":"10.1145/2046707.2093508","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046707.2093508","url":null,"abstract":"The advent of cloud computing has ushered in an era of mass data storage in remote servers. Remote data storage offers reduced data management overhead for data owners in a cost effective manner. Sensitive documents, however, need to be stored in encrypted format due to security concerns. But, encrypted storage makes it difficult to search on the stored documents. Therefore, this poses a major barrier towards selective retrieval of encrypted documents from the remote servers. Various protocols have been proposed for keyword search over encrypted data (commonly referred to as searchable encryption) to address this issue. Oblivious RAM type protocols offer secure search over encrypted data, but are too expensive to be used in practical applications. Unfortunately, all of the symmetric key based encryption protocols leak data access patterns due to efficiency reasons. In this poster, we are the first to analyze the effects of access pattern disclosure. To that end, we introduce a novel attack model that exploits access pattern leakage to disclose significant amount of sensitive information using a modicum of prior knowledge. We also present a preliminary set of empirical results on a real dataset to justify our claim.","PeriodicalId":72687,"journal":{"name":"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87569024","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Nils Ole Tippenhauer, C. Pöpper, Kasper Bonne Rasmussen, Srdjan Capkun
An increasing number of wireless applications rely on GPS signals for localization, navigation, and time synchronization. However, civilian GPS signals are known to be susceptible to spoofing attacks which make GPS receivers in range believe that they reside at locations different than their real physical locations. In this paper, we investigate the requirements for successful GPS spoofing attacks on individuals and groups of victims with civilian or military GPS receivers. In particular, we are interested in identifying from which locations and with which precision the attacker needs to generate its signals in order to successfully spoof the receivers. We will show, for example, that any number of receivers can easily be spoofed to one arbitrary location; however, the attacker is restricted to only few transmission locations when spoofing a group of receivers while preserving their constellation. In addition, we investigate the practical aspects of a satellite-lock takeover, in which a victim receives spoofed signals after first being locked on to legitimate GPS signals. Using a civilian GPS signal generator, we perform a set of experiments and find the minimal precision of the attacker's spoofing signals required for covert satellite-lock takeover.
{"title":"On the requirements for successful GPS spoofing attacks","authors":"Nils Ole Tippenhauer, C. Pöpper, Kasper Bonne Rasmussen, Srdjan Capkun","doi":"10.1145/2046707.2046719","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046707.2046719","url":null,"abstract":"An increasing number of wireless applications rely on GPS signals for localization, navigation, and time synchronization. However, civilian GPS signals are known to be susceptible to spoofing attacks which make GPS receivers in range believe that they reside at locations different than their real physical locations. In this paper, we investigate the requirements for successful GPS spoofing attacks on individuals and groups of victims with civilian or military GPS receivers. In particular, we are interested in identifying from which locations and with which precision the attacker needs to generate its signals in order to successfully spoof the receivers. We will show, for example, that any number of receivers can easily be spoofed to one arbitrary location; however, the attacker is restricted to only few transmission locations when spoofing a group of receivers while preserving their constellation. In addition, we investigate the practical aspects of a satellite-lock takeover, in which a victim receives spoofed signals after first being locked on to legitimate GPS signals. Using a civilian GPS signal generator, we perform a set of experiments and find the minimal precision of the attacker's spoofing signals required for covert satellite-lock takeover.","PeriodicalId":72687,"journal":{"name":"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90917406","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We develop a flexible information-flow type system for a range of encryption primitives, precisely reflecting their diverse functional and security features. Our rules enable encryption, blinding, homomorphic computation, and decryption, with selective key re-use for different types of payloads. We show that, under standard cryptographic assumptions, any well-typed probabilistic program using encryptions is secure that is, computationally non-interferent) against active adversaries, both for confidentiality and integrity. We illustrate our approach using %on classic schemes such as ElGamal and Paillier encryption. We present two applications of cryptographic verification by typing: (1) private search on data streams; and (2) the bootstrapping part of Gentry's fully homomorphic encryption. We provide a prototype typechecker for our system.
{"title":"Information-flow types for homomorphic encryptions","authors":"C. Fournet, Jérémy Planul, Tamara Rezk","doi":"10.1145/2046707.2046747","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046707.2046747","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a flexible information-flow type system for a range of encryption primitives, precisely reflecting their diverse functional and security features. Our rules enable encryption, blinding, homomorphic computation, and decryption, with selective key re-use for different types of payloads. We show that, under standard cryptographic assumptions, any well-typed probabilistic program using encryptions is secure that is, computationally non-interferent) against active adversaries, both for confidentiality and integrity. We illustrate our approach using %on classic schemes such as ElGamal and Paillier encryption. We present two applications of cryptographic verification by typing: (1) private search on data streams; and (2) the bootstrapping part of Gentry's fully homomorphic encryption. We provide a prototype typechecker for our system.","PeriodicalId":72687,"journal":{"name":"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90609712","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Traditional public key infrastructure is an example for basing the security of communication among users and servers on trusting a Certificate Authority (CA) which is a Trusted Authority (TA). A traditional, centralized CA or TA should only be involved in a setup stage for communication, or risk causing a bottleneck. Peer to peer assistance may replace the CA during the actual communication transactions. We introduce such assistants that we call arbitrators. Arbitrators are semi-trusted entities that facilitate communication or business transactions. The communicating parties, users and servers, agree before a communication transaction on a set of arbitrators that they trust (reputation systems may support their choice). Then, the arbitrators receive resources, e.g. a deposit, and a service level agreement between participants such that the resources of a participant are returned if and only if the participant acts according to the agreement. We demonstrate the usage of arbitrators in the scope of conditional (positive) anonymity. A user may interact anonymously with a server as long as the terms for anonymous communication are honored. In case the server finds a violation of the terms, the server proves to the arbitrators that a violation took place and the arbitrators publish the identity of the user. Since the arbitrators may be corrupted, the scheme ensures that only a large enough set of arbitrators may reveal user's identity, which is the deposited resource in the case of conditional anonymity.
{"title":"Poster: arbitrators in the security infrastructure, supporting positive anonymity","authors":"S. Dolev, N. Gilboa, Ofer Hermoni","doi":"10.1145/2046707.2093485","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046707.2093485","url":null,"abstract":"Traditional public key infrastructure is an example for basing the security of communication among users and servers on trusting a Certificate Authority (CA) which is a Trusted Authority (TA). A traditional, centralized CA or TA should only be involved in a setup stage for communication, or risk causing a bottleneck. Peer to peer assistance may replace the CA during the actual communication transactions. We introduce such assistants that we call arbitrators. Arbitrators are semi-trusted entities that facilitate communication or business transactions. The communicating parties, users and servers, agree before a communication transaction on a set of arbitrators that they trust (reputation systems may support their choice). Then, the arbitrators receive resources, e.g. a deposit, and a service level agreement between participants such that the resources of a participant are returned if and only if the participant acts according to the agreement. We demonstrate the usage of arbitrators in the scope of conditional (positive) anonymity. A user may interact anonymously with a server as long as the terms for anonymous communication are honored. In case the server finds a violation of the terms, the server proves to the arbitrators that a violation took place and the arbitrators publish the identity of the user. Since the arbitrators may be corrupted, the scheme ensures that only a large enough set of arbitrators may reveal user's identity, which is the deposited resource in the case of conditional anonymity.","PeriodicalId":72687,"journal":{"name":"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90664452","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ünal Koçabas, A. Sadeghi, C. Wachsmann, Steffen Schulz
We present the design and implementation of a lightweight remote attestation scheme for embedded devices that combines software attestation with Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs). In contrast to standard software attestation, our scheme (i) is secure against collusion attacks to forge the attestation checksum, (ii) allows for the authentication and attestation of remote provers, and (iii) enables the detection of hardware attacks on the prover.
{"title":"Poster: practical embedded remote attestation using physically unclonable functions","authors":"Ünal Koçabas, A. Sadeghi, C. Wachsmann, Steffen Schulz","doi":"10.1145/2046707.2093496","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046707.2093496","url":null,"abstract":"We present the design and implementation of a lightweight remote attestation scheme for embedded devices that combines software attestation with Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs). In contrast to standard software attestation, our scheme (i) is secure against collusion attacks to forge the attestation checksum, (ii) allows for the authentication and attestation of remote provers, and (iii) enables the detection of hardware attacks on the prover.","PeriodicalId":72687,"journal":{"name":"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86619652","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Online tracking of users in support of behavioral advertising is widespread. Several researchers have proposed non-tracking online advertising systems that go well beyond the requirements of the Do-Not-Track initiative launched by the US Federal Trace Commission (FTC). The primary goal of these systems is to allow for behaviorally targeted advertising without revealing user behavior (clickstreams) or user profiles to the ad network. Although these designs purport to be practical solutions, none of them adequately consider the role of the ad auctions, which today are central to the operation of online advertising systems. This paper looks at the problem of running auctions that leverage user profiles for ad ranking while keeping the user profile private. We define the problem, broadly explore the solution space, and discuss the pros and cons of these solutions. We analyze the performance of our solutions using data from Microsoft Bing advertising auctions. We conclude that, while none of our auctions are ideal in all respects, they are adequate and practical solutions.
{"title":"Auctions in do-not-track compliant internet advertising","authors":"Alexey Reznichenko, S. Guha, P. Francis","doi":"10.1145/2046707.2046782","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046707.2046782","url":null,"abstract":"Online tracking of users in support of behavioral advertising is widespread. Several researchers have proposed non-tracking online advertising systems that go well beyond the requirements of the Do-Not-Track initiative launched by the US Federal Trace Commission (FTC). The primary goal of these systems is to allow for behaviorally targeted advertising without revealing user behavior (clickstreams) or user profiles to the ad network. Although these designs purport to be practical solutions, none of them adequately consider the role of the ad auctions, which today are central to the operation of online advertising systems. This paper looks at the problem of running auctions that leverage user profiles for ad ranking while keeping the user profile private. We define the problem, broadly explore the solution space, and discuss the pros and cons of these solutions. We analyze the performance of our solutions using data from Microsoft Bing advertising auctions. We conclude that, while none of our auctions are ideal in all respects, they are adequate and practical solutions.","PeriodicalId":72687,"journal":{"name":"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87026259","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Type systems are effective tools for verifying the security of cryptographic programs. They provide automation, modularity and scalability, and have been applied to large security protocols. However, they traditionally rely on abstract assumptions on the underlying cryptographic primitives, expressed in symbolic models. Cryptographers usually reason on security assumptions using lower level, computational models that precisely account for the complexity and success probability of attacks. These models are more realistic, but they are harder to formalize and automate. We present the first modular automated program verification method based on standard cryptographic assumptions. We show how to verify ideal functionalities and protocols written in ML by typing them against new cryptographic interfaces using F7, a refinement type checker coupled with an SMT-solver. We develop a probabilistic core calculus for F7 and formalize its type safety in Coq. We build typed module and interfaces for MACs, signatures, and encryptions, and establish their authenticity and secrecy properties. We relate their ideal functionalities and concrete implementations, using game-based program transformations behind typed interfaces. We illustrate our method on a series of protocol implementations.
{"title":"Modular code-based cryptographic verification","authors":"C. Fournet, Markulf Kohlweiss, Pierre-Yves Strub","doi":"10.1145/2046707.2046746","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046707.2046746","url":null,"abstract":"Type systems are effective tools for verifying the security of cryptographic programs. They provide automation, modularity and scalability, and have been applied to large security protocols. However, they traditionally rely on abstract assumptions on the underlying cryptographic primitives, expressed in symbolic models. Cryptographers usually reason on security assumptions using lower level, computational models that precisely account for the complexity and success probability of attacks. These models are more realistic, but they are harder to formalize and automate. We present the first modular automated program verification method based on standard cryptographic assumptions. We show how to verify ideal functionalities and protocols written in ML by typing them against new cryptographic interfaces using F7, a refinement type checker coupled with an SMT-solver. We develop a probabilistic core calculus for F7 and formalize its type safety in Coq.\u0000 We build typed module and interfaces for MACs, signatures, and encryptions, and establish their authenticity and secrecy properties. We relate their ideal functionalities and concrete implementations, using game-based program transformations behind typed interfaces. We illustrate our method on a series of protocol implementations.","PeriodicalId":72687,"journal":{"name":"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85636138","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Lucas Davi, A. Dmitrienko, Manuel Egele, Thomas Fischer, Thorsten Holz, R. Hund, S. Nürnberger, A. Sadeghi
Despite extensive research over the last two decades, runtime attacks on software are still prevalent. Recently, smartphones, of which millions are in use today, have become an attractive target for adversaries. However, existing solutions are either ad-hoc or limited in their effectiveness. In this poster, we present a general countermeasure against runtime attacks on smartphone platforms. Our approach makes use of control-flow integrity (CFI), and tackles unique challenges of the ARM architecture and smartphone platforms. Our framework and implementation is efficient, since it requires no access to source code, performs CFI enforcement on-the-fly during runtime, and is compatible to memory randomization and code signing/encryption. We chose Apple iPhone for our reference implementation, because it has become an attractive target for runtime attacks. Our performance evaluation on a real iOS device demonstrates that our implementation does not induce any notable overhead when applied to popular iOS applications.
{"title":"Poster: control-flow integrity for smartphones","authors":"Lucas Davi, A. Dmitrienko, Manuel Egele, Thomas Fischer, Thorsten Holz, R. Hund, S. Nürnberger, A. Sadeghi","doi":"10.1145/2046707.2093484","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046707.2093484","url":null,"abstract":"Despite extensive research over the last two decades, runtime attacks on software are still prevalent. Recently, smartphones, of which millions are in use today, have become an attractive target for adversaries. However, existing solutions are either ad-hoc or limited in their effectiveness. In this poster, we present a general countermeasure against runtime attacks on smartphone platforms. Our approach makes use of control-flow integrity (CFI), and tackles unique challenges of the ARM architecture and smartphone platforms. Our framework and implementation is efficient, since it requires no access to source code, performs CFI enforcement on-the-fly during runtime, and is compatible to memory randomization and code signing/encryption. We chose Apple iPhone for our reference implementation, because it has become an attractive target for runtime attacks. Our performance evaluation on a real iOS device demonstrates that our implementation does not induce any notable overhead when applied to popular iOS applications.","PeriodicalId":72687,"journal":{"name":"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85363818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this work, we investigate the application of geometric representation of hash vectors of the information packets in multicast authentication protocols. To this end, a new authentication approach based on geometric properties of hash vectors in an $n-$dimensional vector space is proposed. The proposed approach enables the receiver to authenticate the source packets and removes malicious packets that may have been injected by an adversary into the channel. A salient feature of the proposed scheme is that its bandwidth overhead is independent from the number of injected packets. Moreover, the performance analysis verifies that the proposed scheme significantly reduces the bandwidth overhead as compared to the well known multicast authentication protocols in the literature (e.g., PRABS).
{"title":"Poster: a geometric approach for multicast authentication in adversarial channels","authors":"Seyed Ali Ahmadzadeh, G. Agnew","doi":"10.1145/2046707.2093479","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046707.2093479","url":null,"abstract":"In this work, we investigate the application of geometric representation of hash vectors of the information packets in multicast authentication protocols. To this end, a new authentication approach based on geometric properties of hash vectors in an $n-$dimensional vector space is proposed. The proposed approach enables the receiver to authenticate the source packets and removes malicious packets that may have been injected by an adversary into the channel. A salient feature of the proposed scheme is that its bandwidth overhead is independent from the number of injected packets. Moreover, the performance analysis verifies that the proposed scheme significantly reduces the bandwidth overhead as compared to the well known multicast authentication protocols in the literature (e.g., PRABS).","PeriodicalId":72687,"journal":{"name":"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80270390","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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