Pub Date : 1990-01-01DOI: 10.4324/9781351155168-15
Jack N. Rakove
{"title":"The Madisonian Theory of Rights","authors":"Jack N. Rakove","doi":"10.4324/9781351155168-15","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351155168-15","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":75324,"journal":{"name":"William and Mary law review","volume":"31 1","pages":"245"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1990-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70463316","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1989-01-01DOI: 10.1021/cen-v039n033.p054
Lloyd N. Cutler
{"title":"Now Is the Time For All Good Men","authors":"Lloyd N. Cutler","doi":"10.1021/cen-v039n033.p054","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1021/cen-v039n033.p054","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":75324,"journal":{"name":"William and Mary law review","volume":"30 1","pages":"387"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1021/cen-v039n033.p054","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"57649696","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1983-01-01DOI: 10.1163/2468-1733_shafr_sim030140003
W. Swindler
{"title":"Book Review of History of the Supreme Court of the United States, Volume II, Foundations of Power: John Marshall, 1801-1815","authors":"W. Swindler","doi":"10.1163/2468-1733_shafr_sim030140003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/2468-1733_shafr_sim030140003","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":75324,"journal":{"name":"William and Mary law review","volume":"24 1","pages":"329"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1983-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"64629722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1976-01-01DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199253609.003.0007
Jules L. Coleman
Accidents occur; personal property is damaged and sometimes is lost altogether. Accident victims are likely to suffer anything from mere bruises and headaches to temporary or permanent disability to death. The personal and social costs of accidents are staggering. Yet the question of who should bear these costs has turned the heads of few philosophers and has occasioned surprisingly little philosophic discussion. Perhaps that is because the answer has seemed so obvious; accident costs, at least the nontrivial ones, ought to be borne by those at fault in causing them.' The requirement of fault at one time appeared to be so deeply rooted in the concept of personal responsibility that in the famous Ives2 case, Judge Werner was moved to argue that liability without fault was not only immoral, but also an unconstitutional violation of due process of law. Al-
{"title":"The Morality of Strict Tort Liability","authors":"Jules L. Coleman","doi":"10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199253609.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199253609.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"Accidents occur; personal property is damaged and sometimes is lost altogether. Accident victims are likely to suffer anything from mere bruises and headaches to temporary or permanent disability to death. The personal and social costs of accidents are staggering. Yet the question of who should bear these costs has turned the heads of few philosophers and has occasioned surprisingly little philosophic discussion. Perhaps that is because the answer has seemed so obvious; accident costs, at least the nontrivial ones, ought to be borne by those at fault in causing them.' The requirement of fault at one time appeared to be so deeply rooted in the concept of personal responsibility that in the famous Ives2 case, Judge Werner was moved to argue that liability without fault was not only immoral, but also an unconstitutional violation of due process of law. Al-","PeriodicalId":75324,"journal":{"name":"William and Mary law review","volume":"18 1","pages":"259"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1976-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60648800","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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