American Journal of Law & Medicine最新文献

While physician-assisted suicide legislation is being drafted and passed across the United States, a gray-area continues to exist in regard to the legality of a lay person's assistance with suicide. Several high-profile cases have been covered in the media, namely that of Michelle Carter in Massachusetts and William Melchert-Dinkel in Minnesota, but there is also a growing volume of anonymous pro-suicide materials online. Pro-suicide groups fly under the radar and claim to help those desiring to take their own lives. This paper aims to identify the point at which an individual or group can be held civilly or criminally liable for assisting suicide and discusses how the First Amendment can be used to shield authors from such liability.

Since the publication of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Dobbs v Jackson Women's Health in June of 2022, much attention has been paid to the direct effects of that decision on reproductive health care for pregnant or potentially pregnant individuals; and to the potential effects of the Court's approach in Dobbs to other established precedent related to privacy and autonomy, such as rights to contraception and marriage equality. This Article will explore another potential negative consequence of Dobbs; its potential effect on the constitutional parameters of the law of civil commitment and involuntary medication of the mentally ill.The foundational Supreme Court case establishing the parameters of the State's right to involuntarily commit an individual to a mental institution was decided only two years after Roe v. Wade. In 1975, the Supreme Court in O'Connor v Donaldson held that an individual has a liberty interest in "prefer[ring] one's home to the comforts of an institution," and that a State could not, "without more," confine a non-dangerous individual. The two-prong test of requiring a showing of both mental illness and dangerousness to one's self or to others has remained the cornerstone of civil commitment law ever since.The language and analysis of O'Connor is similar to that of Roe, the abortion rights case overturned by Dobbs. In particular, the grounding of the right to avoid civil commitment in the individual liberty and privacy interests are common themes in the two cases. The current Court, in its decision in Dobbs, has cast substantial doubt on the continued vitality of that analysis; and one can easily imagine a reconceptualization of O'Connor along the lines of Dobbs that substantially alters the requirements for civil commitment. In particular, the reliance in Dobbs and other recent Supreme Court opinions on historical precedent as a linchpin of originalist analysis could lead the Court to search for justifications in colonial or 19^th-century mental health practices, time periods which predate modern psychiatric science.This Article will explore the parallels in approach between Roe and O'Connor, and will suggest ways in which the post-Dobbs Supreme Court majority might disrupt the civil commitment status quo, including potential expansion of civil commitment or other detention of pregnant individuals for the protection of the fetus; and possible relaxation of the dangerousness requirement for civil commitment articulated in O'Connor.

Suicide is one of the most common causes of death among individuals younger than eighteen years old. While psychological and social sciences continue to study the causes of the increasing prevalence of suicide in children and teens, the law largely continues to treat suicide as an isolated event. This Note tracks the historical treatment of suicide both under tort and criminal law, supporting the shift away from the traditional view of suicide towards one that more closely aligns with the growing understanding of the many factors that can contribute to a minor's suicide. Ultimately, this Note argues that many minor suicides should be treated as foreseeable, allowing actions in tort.

Propaganda and manipulation have long been employed to influence and shape individuals' thoughts and identities. In the advent of the digital era, these techniques have become more sophisticated and invasive, and are utilized to further various causes. This article investigates the extent to which international human rights law affords protection against manipulation techniques such as microtargeting and behavioral reading, which can negatively impact individuals' mental health and autonomy by threatening their right to construct their own identity. The right to freedom of thought in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 18), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 18), and the European Convention on Human Rights (Article 9) offers absolute protection to individuals' inner selves and covers the protection against manipulation on paper. However, in practice, the right has not received much attention and has not reached its full potential due to its abstract and ambiguous nature. This Article analyzes the preparatory works of these human rights law instruments, with a particular focus on the right to freedom of thought, to clarify its origins and the intention behind its creation. The Article contends that the historical origins of the right do not provide sufficient answers to the current issue and contribute to the ineffective application of the right against emerging manipulative practices. The Article also proposes potential ways to clarify and strengthen the legal framework related to the right to freedom of thought.