Annual review of psychology最新文献

Interpersonal communication is an integral part of everyday life. People are constantly sharing thoughts, opinions, and information with others, both online and offline. Further, such social sharing has important implications for what people think, buy, and do. However, while it is clear that interpersonal communication is both frequent and important, research is only starting to understand what people share and why. This article reviews the literature on interpersonal communication and word of mouth, focusing on the drivers of social transmission and the implications for individuals and society at large. It discusses how factors like audiences, modalities (e.g., speaking or writing), channels (e.g., email or text), and devices (e.g., phone or PC) moderate what gets shared, and it outlines areas that deserve further attention. Such areas include the diffusion of false information, conversations and conversational dynamics, and how automated textual analysis can be used to shed light on a range of interesting questions.

This article reviews empirical data demonstrating robust ingroup favoritism in political judgment. Partisans display systematic tendencies to seek out, believe, and remember information that supports their political beliefs and affinities. However, the psychological drivers of partisan favoritism have been vigorously debated, as has its consistency with rational inference. We characterize decades-long debates over whether such tendencies violate normative standards of rationality, focusing on the phenomenon of motivated reasoning. In light of evidence that both motivational and cognitive factors contribute to partisan bias, we advocate for a descriptive approach to partisan bias research. Rather than adjudicating the (ir)rationality of partisan favoritism, future research should prioritize the identification and measurement of its predictors and clarify the cognitive mechanisms underlying motivated political reasoning. Ultimately, we argue that political judgment is best evaluated by a standard of ecological rationality based on its practical implications for individual well-being and functional democratic governance.

The imagination is central to human social life but undervalued worldwide and underexplored in psychology. Here, we offer Possible Worlds Theory as a synthetic theory of the imagination. We first define the imagination, mapping the mental states it touches, from dreams and hallucinations to satire and fiction. The conditions that prompt people to imagine range from trauma to physical and social deprivation, and they challenge the sense of reality, stirring a need to create possible worlds. We theorize about four cognitive operations underlying the structure of the mental states of the imagination. We then show how people embody the imagination in social behaviors such as pretense and ritual, which give rise to experiences of a special class of feelings defined by their freedom from reality. We extend Possible Worlds Theory to four domains-play, spirituality, morality, and art-and show how in flights of the imagination people create new social realities shared with others.

Many individuals struggle to regulate their own consumption of food. Beginning with general theories of self-control, we review psychological factors that have been shown to influence the regulation of eating, including those related to particular personality variables, such as external eating, restrained eating, and reward sensitivity, as well as situational constraints, including normative influences, emotions, and calorie deprivation. Strategies for the self-control of eating, including reappraisal, effortful inhibition, and various automatic strategies are also reviewed, along with a discussion of the strengths and limitations of historical and contemporary psychological studies investigating food consumption. Whereas extensive examinations of food preferences and body weight have appeared in the psychological literature, we call for more robust research that prioritizes actual eating as the primary dependent measure.

A key debate in the psychology of ideology is whether leftists and rightists are psychologically similar or different. A long-standing view holds that left-wing and right-wing people are meaningfully different from one another across a whole host of basic personality and cognitive features. Scholars have recently pushed back, suggesting that left-wing and right-wing people are more psychologically similar than distinct. We review evidence regarding the psychological profiles of left-wing and right-wing people across a wide variety of domains, including their dispositions (values, personality, cognitive rigidity, threat-sensitivity, and authoritarianism), information processing (motivated reasoning and susceptibility to misinformation), and their interpersonal perceptions and behaviors (empathy, prejudice, stereotyping, and violence). Our review paints a nuanced picture: People across the ideological divide are much more similar than scholars sometimes appreciate. And yet, they differ-to varying degrees-in their personality, values, and (perhaps most importantly) in the groups and causes they prioritize, with important implications for downstream attitudes and behavior in the world.