Pub Date : 2024-10-17DOI: 10.1146/annurev-psych-022324-042614
Ziv Ben-Zion, Ifat Levy
Subjective value is a core concept in neuroeconomics, serving as the basis for decision making. Despite the extensive literature on the neural encoding of subjective reward value in humans, the neural representation of punishment value remains relatively understudied. This review synthesizes current knowledge on the neural representation of reward value, including methodologies, involved brain regions, and the concept of common currency representation of diverse reward types in decision-making and learning processes. We then critically examine existing research on the neural representation of punishment value, highlighting conceptual and methodological challenges in human studies and insights gained from animal research. Finally, we explore how individual differences in reward and punishment processing may be linked to various mental illnesses, with a focus on stress-related psychopathologies. This review advocates for the integration of both rewards and punishments within value-based decision-making and learning frameworks, leveraging insights from cross-species studies and utilizing ecological gamified paradigms to reflect real-life scenarios.
{"title":"Representation of Anticipated Rewards and Punishments in the Human Brain","authors":"Ziv Ben-Zion, Ifat Levy","doi":"10.1146/annurev-psych-022324-042614","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-022324-042614","url":null,"abstract":"Subjective value is a core concept in neuroeconomics, serving as the basis for decision making. Despite the extensive literature on the neural encoding of subjective reward value in humans, the neural representation of punishment value remains relatively understudied. This review synthesizes current knowledge on the neural representation of reward value, including methodologies, involved brain regions, and the concept of common currency representation of diverse reward types in decision-making and learning processes. We then critically examine existing research on the neural representation of punishment value, highlighting conceptual and methodological challenges in human studies and insights gained from animal research. Finally, we explore how individual differences in reward and punishment processing may be linked to various mental illnesses, with a focus on stress-related psychopathologies. This review advocates for the integration of both rewards and punishments within value-based decision-making and learning frameworks, leveraging insights from cross-species studies and utilizing ecological gamified paradigms to reflect real-life scenarios.","PeriodicalId":8010,"journal":{"name":"Annual review of psychology","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":24.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142448283","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-16DOI: 10.1146/annurev-psych-020924-124753
Stefan M. Herzog, Ralph Hertwig
Behavioral public policy came to the fore with the introduction of nudging, which aims to steer behavior while maintaining freedom of choice. Responding to critiques of nudging (e.g., that it does not promote agency and relies on benevolent choice architects), other behavioral policy approaches focus on empowering citizens. Here we review boosting, a behavioral policy approach that aims to foster people's agency, self-control, and ability to make informed decisions. It is grounded in evidence from behavioral science showing that human decision making is not as notoriously flawed as the nudging approach assumes. We argue that addressing the challenges of our time—such as climate change, pandemics, and the threats to liberal democracies and human autonomy posed by digital technologies and choice architectures—calls for fostering capable and engaged citizens as a first line of response to complement slower, systemic approaches.
{"title":"Boosting: Empowering Citizens with Behavioral Science","authors":"Stefan M. Herzog, Ralph Hertwig","doi":"10.1146/annurev-psych-020924-124753","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-020924-124753","url":null,"abstract":"Behavioral public policy came to the fore with the introduction of nudging, which aims to steer behavior while maintaining freedom of choice. Responding to critiques of nudging (e.g., that it does not promote agency and relies on benevolent choice architects), other behavioral policy approaches focus on empowering citizens. Here we review boosting, a behavioral policy approach that aims to foster people's agency, self-control, and ability to make informed decisions. It is grounded in evidence from behavioral science showing that human decision making is not as notoriously flawed as the nudging approach assumes. We argue that addressing the challenges of our time—such as climate change, pandemics, and the threats to liberal democracies and human autonomy posed by digital technologies and choice architectures—calls for fostering capable and engaged citizens as a first line of response to complement slower, systemic approaches.","PeriodicalId":8010,"journal":{"name":"Annual review of psychology","volume":"97 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":24.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142444346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-16DOI: 10.1146/annurev-psych-020124-114222
Martin S. Hagger
This review provides a critical overview of current evidence on psychological health behavior determinants and its value in informing intervention and future determinants research. The review begins with work labeling and classifying the myriads of determinants available in the extant research to arrive at core groups of determinants. Next, the conceptual bases of these determinant groups are identified, and the weight of the evidence for their purported effects on health behavior, including belief-based determinants (e.g., outcome expectancies, capacity beliefs), determinants representing self-regulatory capacity (e.g., planning, action control) and nonconscious processes (e.g., habit, implicit cognition), and dispositional determinants (e.g., personality, regulatory control), is critically evaluated. The review also focuses on the theory-based mechanisms underpinning determinant effects and moderating conditions that magnify or diminish them. Finally, the review recommends a shift away from research on determinants as correlates, outlines how determinants can inform intervention development and mechanisms of action tests, suggests alternatives to predominant individualist approaches, and proposes future research directions.
{"title":"Psychological Determinants of Health Behavior","authors":"Martin S. Hagger","doi":"10.1146/annurev-psych-020124-114222","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-020124-114222","url":null,"abstract":"This review provides a critical overview of current evidence on psychological health behavior determinants and its value in informing intervention and future determinants research. The review begins with work labeling and classifying the myriads of determinants available in the extant research to arrive at core groups of determinants. Next, the conceptual bases of these determinant groups are identified, and the weight of the evidence for their purported effects on health behavior, including belief-based determinants (e.g., outcome expectancies, capacity beliefs), determinants representing self-regulatory capacity (e.g., planning, action control) and nonconscious processes (e.g., habit, implicit cognition), and dispositional determinants (e.g., personality, regulatory control), is critically evaluated. The review also focuses on the theory-based mechanisms underpinning determinant effects and moderating conditions that magnify or diminish them. Finally, the review recommends a shift away from research on determinants as correlates, outlines how determinants can inform intervention development and mechanisms of action tests, suggests alternatives to predominant individualist approaches, and proposes future research directions.","PeriodicalId":8010,"journal":{"name":"Annual review of psychology","volume":"73 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":24.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142444350","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-16DOI: 10.1146/annurev-psych-021524-110810
Charley M. Wu, Björn Meder, Eric Schulz
Generalization, defined as applying limited experiences to novel situations, represents a cornerstone of human intelligence. Our review traces the evolution and continuity of psychological theories of generalization, from its origins in concept learning (categorizing stimuli) and function learning (learning continuous input-output relationships) to domains such as reinforcement learning and latent structure learning. Historically, there have been fierce debates between approaches based on rule-based mechanisms, which rely on explicit hypotheses about environmental structure, and approaches based on similarity-based mechanisms, which leverage comparisons to prior instances. Each approach has unique advantages: Rules support rapid knowledge transfer, while similarity is computationally simple and flexible. Today, these debates have culminated in the development of hybrid models grounded in Bayesian principles, effectively marrying the precision of rules with the flexibility of similarity. The ongoing success of hybrid models not only bridges past dichotomies but also underscores the importance of integrating both rules and similarity for a comprehensive understanding of human generalization.
{"title":"Unifying Principles of Generalization: Past, Present, and Future","authors":"Charley M. Wu, Björn Meder, Eric Schulz","doi":"10.1146/annurev-psych-021524-110810","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-021524-110810","url":null,"abstract":"Generalization, defined as applying limited experiences to novel situations, represents a cornerstone of human intelligence. Our review traces the evolution and continuity of psychological theories of generalization, from its origins in concept learning (categorizing stimuli) and function learning (learning continuous input-output relationships) to domains such as reinforcement learning and latent structure learning. Historically, there have been fierce debates between approaches based on rule-based mechanisms, which rely on explicit hypotheses about environmental structure, and approaches based on similarity-based mechanisms, which leverage comparisons to prior instances. Each approach has unique advantages: Rules support rapid knowledge transfer, while similarity is computationally simple and flexible. Today, these debates have culminated in the development of hybrid models grounded in Bayesian principles, effectively marrying the precision of rules with the flexibility of similarity. The ongoing success of hybrid models not only bridges past dichotomies but also underscores the importance of integrating both rules and similarity for a comprehensive understanding of human generalization.","PeriodicalId":8010,"journal":{"name":"Annual review of psychology","volume":"31 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":24.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142444351","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-16DOI: 10.1146/annurev-psych-020924-124236
Kurt Gray, Samuel Pratt
Moral judgments differ across cultures and politics, but they share a common theme in our minds: perceptions of harm. Both cultural ethnographies on moral values and psychological research on moral cognition highlight this shared focus on harm. Perceptions of harm are constructed from universal cognitive elements—including intention, causation, and suffering—but depend on the cultural context, allowing many values to arise from a common moral mind. This review traces the concept of harm across philosophy, cultural anthropology, and psychology, then discusses how different values (e.g., purity) across various taxonomies are grounded in perceived harm. We then explore two theories connecting culture to cognition—modularity and constructionism—before outlining how pluralism across human moral judgment is explained by the constructed nature of perceived harm. We conclude by showing how different perceptions of harm help drive political disagreements and reveal how sharing stories of harm can help bridge moral divides.
{"title":"Morality in Our Mind and Across Cultures and Politics","authors":"Kurt Gray, Samuel Pratt","doi":"10.1146/annurev-psych-020924-124236","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-020924-124236","url":null,"abstract":"Moral judgments differ across cultures and politics, but they share a common theme in our minds: perceptions of harm. Both cultural ethnographies on moral values and psychological research on moral cognition highlight this shared focus on harm. Perceptions of harm are constructed from universal cognitive elements—including intention, causation, and suffering—but depend on the cultural context, allowing many values to arise from a common moral mind. This review traces the concept of harm across philosophy, cultural anthropology, and psychology, then discusses how different values (e.g., purity) across various taxonomies are grounded in perceived harm. We then explore two theories connecting culture to cognition—modularity and constructionism—before outlining how pluralism across human moral judgment is explained by the constructed nature of perceived harm. We conclude by showing how different perceptions of harm help drive political disagreements and reveal how sharing stories of harm can help bridge moral divides.","PeriodicalId":8010,"journal":{"name":"Annual review of psychology","volume":"209 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":24.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142444345","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-15DOI: 10.1146/annurev-psych-011624-025340
Jan Theeuwes
The current review presents an integrated tripartite framework for understanding attentional control, emphasizing the interaction and competition among top-down, bottom-up, and selection-history influences. It focuses on attentional capture, which refers to conditions in which salient objects or events receive attentional priority even when they are inconsistent with the goals, tasks, and intentions of the observer. The review describes which components of the tripartite framework are in play when distraction by salient objects is prevented and the conditions in which there is no control over the occurrence of attentional capture. It then concludes that attentional capture can be controlled in a proactive way mainly by implicit statistical learning mechanisms associated with selection history. Current and lingering controversies regarding the control of attentional capture are also discussed.
{"title":"Attentional Capture and Control","authors":"Jan Theeuwes","doi":"10.1146/annurev-psych-011624-025340","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-011624-025340","url":null,"abstract":"The current review presents an integrated tripartite framework for understanding attentional control, emphasizing the interaction and competition among top-down, bottom-up, and selection-history influences. It focuses on attentional capture, which refers to conditions in which salient objects or events receive attentional priority even when they are inconsistent with the goals, tasks, and intentions of the observer. The review describes which components of the tripartite framework are in play when distraction by salient objects is prevented and the conditions in which there is no control over the occurrence of attentional capture. It then concludes that attentional capture can be controlled in a proactive way mainly by implicit statistical learning mechanisms associated with selection history. Current and lingering controversies regarding the control of attentional capture are also discussed.","PeriodicalId":8010,"journal":{"name":"Annual review of psychology","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":24.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142440276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-08DOI: 10.1146/annurev-psych-021324-060611
Patricia L. Lockwood, Wouter van den Bos, Jean-Claude Dreher
Moral learning and decision-making are crucial throughout our lives, from infancy to old age. Emerging evidence suggests that there are important differences in learning and deciding in moral situations, and these are underpinned by co-occurring changes in the use of model-based values and theory of mind. Here, we review the decision neuroscience literature on moral choices and moral learning considering four key concepts. We show how in the earliest years, a sense of self/other distinction is foundational. Sensitivity to intention versus outcome is crucial for several moral concepts and is most similar in our earliest and oldest years. Across all ages, basic shifts in the influence of theory of mind and model-free and model-based learning support moral decision-making. Moving forward, a computational approach to key concepts of morality can help provide a mechanistic account and generate new hypotheses to test across the whole lifespan.
{"title":"Moral Learning and Decision-Making Across the Lifespan","authors":"Patricia L. Lockwood, Wouter van den Bos, Jean-Claude Dreher","doi":"10.1146/annurev-psych-021324-060611","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-021324-060611","url":null,"abstract":"Moral learning and decision-making are crucial throughout our lives, from infancy to old age. Emerging evidence suggests that there are important differences in learning and deciding in moral situations, and these are underpinned by co-occurring changes in the use of model-based values and theory of mind. Here, we review the decision neuroscience literature on moral choices and moral learning considering four key concepts. We show how in the earliest years, a sense of self/other distinction is foundational. Sensitivity to intention versus outcome is crucial for several moral concepts and is most similar in our earliest and oldest years. Across all ages, basic shifts in the influence of theory of mind and model-free and model-based learning support moral decision-making. Moving forward, a computational approach to key concepts of morality can help provide a mechanistic account and generate new hypotheses to test across the whole lifespan.","PeriodicalId":8010,"journal":{"name":"Annual review of psychology","volume":"64 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":24.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142385594","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-08DOI: 10.1146/annurev-psych-030124-114525
Tyler G. Okimoto, Mario Gollwitzer
Justice scholars have elaborated a variety of social psychological mechanisms that contribute to our desire to see some action following an injustice, to see justice done. Research over the past 20 years has significantly advanced our understanding of how to repair a sense of justice by articulating the psychological needs that follow from its experience from victim, offender, and observer perspectives. In this review, we summarize key insights from this literature, including the specific needs identified as relevant to justice, the challenges that arise when seeking justice for multiple parties in a conflict, and the procedural approaches that can aid in reconciling disparate perspectives. Following this review, we challenge our own assumption that justice repair is necessary. As a departure from this deficit model, we draw inspiration from adjacent fields of study to propose “justice making” as an alternative avenue for reconciliation in situations where justice repair is unachievable.
{"title":"The Social Psychology of Justice Repair","authors":"Tyler G. Okimoto, Mario Gollwitzer","doi":"10.1146/annurev-psych-030124-114525","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-030124-114525","url":null,"abstract":"Justice scholars have elaborated a variety of social psychological mechanisms that contribute to our desire to see some action following an injustice, to see justice done. Research over the past 20 years has significantly advanced our understanding of how to repair a sense of justice by articulating the psychological needs that follow from its experience from victim, offender, and observer perspectives. In this review, we summarize key insights from this literature, including the specific needs identified as relevant to justice, the challenges that arise when seeking justice for multiple parties in a conflict, and the procedural approaches that can aid in reconciling disparate perspectives. Following this review, we challenge our own assumption that justice repair is necessary. As a departure from this deficit model, we draw inspiration from adjacent fields of study to propose “justice making” as an alternative avenue for reconciliation in situations where justice repair is unachievable.","PeriodicalId":8010,"journal":{"name":"Annual review of psychology","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":24.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142385593","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-08DOI: 10.1146/annurev-psych-012224-025712
Paul W. Eastwick, Samantha Joel
Where do positive feelings about a romantic or sexual partner come from? This article offers an overview of—and imposes some structure on—the enormous literature on mate evaluation, from initial attraction to long-term relationship settings. First, we differentiate between research that identifies the factors that predict positive evaluation on average (i.e., normative desirability) and research that attempts to document for whom certain factors are more versus less positive (i.e., heterogeneity in desirability). Second, we review the positive biases that tend to dominate the evaluative process, as well as the promising (and sorely needed) new methods in this research space. Third, we cover contemporary perspectives on the mechanisms that explain how evaluations shift and change over the entire relationship arc. Fourth and finally, we discuss how diversifying the samples and perspectives in mate evaluation research will address novel and generative questions about culture, stigma, and socioeconomic status.
{"title":"How Do People Feel About Mates?","authors":"Paul W. Eastwick, Samantha Joel","doi":"10.1146/annurev-psych-012224-025712","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-012224-025712","url":null,"abstract":"Where do positive feelings about a romantic or sexual partner come from? This article offers an overview of—and imposes some structure on—the enormous literature on mate evaluation, from initial attraction to long-term relationship settings. First, we differentiate between research that identifies the factors that predict positive evaluation on average (i.e., normative desirability) and research that attempts to document for whom certain factors are more versus less positive (i.e., heterogeneity in desirability). Second, we review the positive biases that tend to dominate the evaluative process, as well as the promising (and sorely needed) new methods in this research space. Third, we cover contemporary perspectives on the mechanisms that explain how evaluations shift and change over the entire relationship arc. Fourth and finally, we discuss how diversifying the samples and perspectives in mate evaluation research will address novel and generative questions about culture, stigma, and socioeconomic status.","PeriodicalId":8010,"journal":{"name":"Annual review of psychology","volume":"107 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":24.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142385592","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-08DOI: 10.1146/annurev-psych-022024-103901
David Badre
Humans and other primates have a remarkable ability to perform a wide range of tasks and behaviors, even novel ones, in order to achieve their goals. Further, they are able to shift flexibly among these behaviors as the contexts demands. Cognitive control is the function at the base of this remarkable behavioral generativity and flexibility. The present review provides a survey of current research on cognitive control focusing on two of its primary features within a control systems framework: (a) the ability to select new behaviors based on context and (b) the ability to monitor ongoing behavior and adjust accordingly. Throughout, the review places an emphasis on how differences in the content and structure of task representations affect these core features of cognitive control.
{"title":"Cognitive Control","authors":"David Badre","doi":"10.1146/annurev-psych-022024-103901","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-022024-103901","url":null,"abstract":"Humans and other primates have a remarkable ability to perform a wide range of tasks and behaviors, even novel ones, in order to achieve their goals. Further, they are able to shift flexibly among these behaviors as the contexts demands. Cognitive control is the function at the base of this remarkable behavioral generativity and flexibility. The present review provides a survey of current research on cognitive control focusing on two of its primary features within a control systems framework: (a) the ability to select new behaviors based on context and (b) the ability to monitor ongoing behavior and adjust accordingly. Throughout, the review places an emphasis on how differences in the content and structure of task representations affect these core features of cognitive control.","PeriodicalId":8010,"journal":{"name":"Annual review of psychology","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":24.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142385591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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