Kagakushi kenkyu. [Journal of the history of science, Japan最新文献

This paper examines how scientific figures got involved in the confrontation observed in environmental politics. Researchers in environmental history showed that authorities and industries sometimes manipulate figures in order to deny the existence of, or their responsibility for pollution and environmental problems. This paper argues that manipulation of figures is not only the problem for polluters but also for the side against polluters such as environmental campaigners. It focuses on the ways in which smoke abatement technology was evaluated in early-nineteenth century England. Smoke abatement technology was the key in promoting smoke abatement, but it sometimes did not work as well as planned. This case study shows how figures taken from one experiment were used as evidence by both polluting industry and a promoter of smoke abatement technology in order to support their respective claims. It is concluded that scientific figures did not necessarily settle their difference. Scientific figures could rather deepen the confrontation.

The first Japanese in vitro fertilization (IVF) baby was born in 1983. The author considered the processes,how clinical application of IVF started, focusing on the establishment of the Japan Society of Fertilization and Implantation (JSFI), and the movement of the Japan Society of Fertility and Sterility (JSFS), and the Microsurgery Study Group (MSG). For this purpose, the author mainly reviewed the relevant papers from professional journals. Fundamental studies of IVF were reported before clinical application in JSFS established in 1956 for studying infertility treatment. In 1982, while clinical-application was argumentative topic in JSFS, JSFI was established by obstetricians and gynecologists who supported the clinical application. The establishment of JSFI was told as a go sign for the clinical application. Also, one of the purposes of JSFI was said to be making a consensus for clinical application. It was however, not achieved at least with the civic groups such as the DNA Problem Study Group. MSG was established in 1979 for studying microsurgery of the fallopian tubes, which is practiced to the fallopian tube infertility like IVF. Those who criticized the clinical application of IVF had an expectation to the obstetricians and gynecologists who studied this surgery. However, this surgery was ineffective, especially for the treatment of severe diseases of the fallopian tubes. Also, main members of JSFI and MSG were duplicated. Therefore, MSG had limitations against the movement toward clinical application of IVF characterized by the establishment of JSFI.

This paper analyzes the distribution of the Subsidiary Fund for Scientific Research, a predecessor to the Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (KAKENHI), which operated in Japan from the 1930s to 1950s. It reveals that the Japanese government maintained this wide-ranging promotion system since its establishment during the war until well into the postwar period. Previous studies insist that, at the end of the war, the Japanese government generally only funded the research that it considered immediately and practically useful. In contrast to this general perception, my analysis illustrates that both before and after the war, funding was allotted to four research areas: natural science, engineering, agriculture, and medicine. In order to illuminate this continuity, I compare the Subsidiary Fund with another research fund existing from 1933 to 1947: the Grant of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS). The comparison demonstrates that the JSPS received externally raised capital from the military and munitions companies. However, while this group focused upon engineering and military-related research as the war dragged on, the Subsidiary Fund has consistently entrusted scientists with the authority to decide the allocation of financial support.

This paper discusses some facts that were pivotal in the process of the introduction of Bluegill Sunfish, Lepomis macrochirus, into various places in Japan, however have not been considered in the existing literature. This paper points out that L. macrochirus escaped, and also was stocked, to the open water in Osaka as a result of experiments by a fisheries experimental station in the 1960s and early 1970s. In Shiga Prefecture too, the fish escaped into Lake Biwa as a result of experiments by a fisheries experimental station in about 1969. Neither Osaka nor Shiga are mentioned, by previous studies based on questionnaire research, as the prefectures in which L. macrochirus inhabited in the years between 1960, when the fish was first introduced into Japan, and 1979. In addition, anglers, who considered L. macrochirus an ideal game fish, stocked ponds and lakes in some prefectures with L. macrochirus in around 1970 on purpose to multiply the species. During this process, a network among not only local governments, fisheries experimental stations, and fish farmers, but also industries targeting anglers, such as fishing tackle makers and a magazine for anglers, was being formed, which however did not get established after all. These findings will contribute to enrich the basis of today's genetic research on the distribution of L. macrochirus in Japan.

This paper gives an account of Prof. Dr. Kinji Shimizu, the first president of Nagoya Institute of Technology, and his establishment of Nagoya Municipal Science Museum. After graduating from the Electrical Engineering Department of Kyoto Imperial University in 1923, Shimizu was impressed by the German Museum in Munich during his stay there as a student in 1932. It's the first time that he learned the education in cooperation with industries. Just after the Second World War, he became director general of the Ministry of Education. However, new education system given by the United States focused not on developing practical ability but on gaining the basic knowledge, which is contrary to what he expected. Then, he contributed to the establishment of the Japanese Society for Engineering Education, besides working as the president of Nagoya Institute of Technology in the earlier 1950s. His idea was supported by industries for the economic growth. Throughout his career, Prof. Dr. Shimizu was convinced that practical engineering education would benefit Japan, and wanted to introduce cooperative education between universities and industries, along the lines of the same system in Germany and the United States. With this vision he founded Nagoya Municipal Science Museum in cooperation with local industries and local government as his final achievement. The museum was completed in 1964.

Japan and the United States signed in 1968 a new atomic energy agreement through which US light-water nuclear reactors, including those of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant of Tokyo Electric Power Company, were to be introduced into Japan. This paper studies the history of negotiations for the 1968 agreement using documents declassified in the 1990s in the US and Japan. After the success of the Chinese nuclear test in October 1964, the United States became seriously concerned about nuclear armament of other countries in Asia including Japan. Expecting that Japan would not have its own nuclear weapons, the US offered to help the country to demonstrate its superiority in some fields of science including peaceful nuclear energy to counter the psychological effect of the Chinese nuclear armament. Driven by his own political agenda, the newly appointed Prime Minister Eisaku Sato responded to the US expectation favorably. When he met in January 1965 with President Johnson, Sato made it clear that Japan would not pursue nuclear weapons. Although the US continued its support after this visit, it nevertheless gave priority to the control of nuclear technology in Japan through the bilateral peaceful nuclear agreement. This paper argues that the 1968 agreement implicitly meant a strategic measure to prevent Japan from going nuclear and also a tactic to persuade Japan to join the Nuclear Non -Proliferation Treaty.

In this paper, the author will make it clear that the main object of "Science Aiming to Product" published in 1941 by Jun TOSAKA (1900-45), based on historical investigation focusing on the role of 'technology' in his theory of ideology. Objects of this investigation will include some papers unrecorded in The Complete Works of Jun TOSAKA. In 1929, he put 'practice' as an important position in his theory of science and ideology, and didn't use 'experiment' or 'technology'. At first, his 'practice' meant 'politics' mainly, then that included meaning of 'experiment' and 'production' too in 1932. Since 1933, he became to put 'technology' as an important position in place of 'practice'. But he had been grasped experiment' as 'practice' until 1941. On the other hand, to grasp 'science' and 'technology' as 'practice' became the mainstream of the press in 1941. In that situation, he reviewed the relationship between 'science' and 'technology'. And he became to grasp 'experiment' as 'material production'. Then he could make the view of science founded on production thorough.