Women patients have experienced a history of discrimination in medical practice. Medical malpractice litigation offers an avenue for patients affected by practitioner negligence to recoup the costs inflicted by their injuries. The present study investigates the impact of patient gender on plaintiffs’ recovery amounts in medical malpractice suits alleging delayed, wrongful, or misdiagnosis, as women are more vulnerable to diagnosisrelated malpractice. This study also analyzes the impact of contextual factors such as state demographics, state malpractice legislation, and features of each instance of litigation, such as the duration of each case. Using a national database of resolved malpractice cases from 2004 to 2018, this study uses several different statistical models to shed light on the contours of the gender gap in medical malpractice litigation. This study also offers suggestions for future research and potential solutions to address the gender gap and increase equal access to legal recourse after medical injury due to negligence for patients of all genders.
{"title":"Miss Diagnosis: Gendered Injustice in Medical Malpractice Law","authors":"C. Plaza","doi":"10.7916/CJGL.V39I2.5701","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/CJGL.V39I2.5701","url":null,"abstract":"Women patients have experienced a history of discrimination in medical practice. Medical malpractice litigation offers an avenue for patients affected by practitioner negligence to recoup the costs inflicted by their injuries. The present study investigates the impact of patient gender on plaintiffs’ recovery amounts in medical malpractice suits alleging delayed, wrongful, or misdiagnosis, as women are more vulnerable to diagnosisrelated malpractice. This study also analyzes the impact of contextual factors such as state demographics, state malpractice legislation, and features of each instance of litigation, such as the duration of each case. Using a national database of resolved malpractice cases from 2004 to 2018, this study uses several different statistical models to shed light on the contours of the gender gap in medical malpractice litigation. This study also offers suggestions for future research and potential solutions to address the gender gap and increase equal access to legal recourse after medical injury due to negligence for patients of all genders.","PeriodicalId":84468,"journal":{"name":"Columbia journal of gender and law","volume":"39 1","pages":"91-139"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42293943","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In July 2018, twenty-year-old Sarita approached the Supreme Court of India seeking permission to terminate her twenty-five-week pregnancy.1 Sarita was a domestic violence survivor and suffered from other health complications due to epilepsy. She had learned of her pregnancy at seventeen weeks and her petition stated that she had become pregnant as a result of her husband’s refusal to use contraceptives. At twenty-one weeks, when she first approached the Bombay High Court, Sarita was just one week over the legal limit specified in the 1971 Medical Termination of Pregnancy (MTP Act), which permits
{"title":"Reimagining Reproductive Rights Jurisprudence in India: Reflections on the Recent Decisions on Privacy and Gender Equality from the Supreme Court of India","authors":"D. Jain, Payal Shah","doi":"10.7916/CJGL.V39I2.5673","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/CJGL.V39I2.5673","url":null,"abstract":"In July 2018, twenty-year-old Sarita approached the Supreme Court of India seeking permission to terminate her twenty-five-week pregnancy.1 Sarita was a domestic violence survivor and suffered from other health complications due to epilepsy. She had learned of her pregnancy at seventeen weeks and her petition stated that she had become pregnant as a result of her husband’s refusal to use contraceptives. At twenty-one weeks, when she first approached the Bombay High Court, Sarita was just one week over the legal limit specified in the 1971 Medical Termination of Pregnancy (MTP Act), which permits","PeriodicalId":84468,"journal":{"name":"Columbia journal of gender and law","volume":"39 1","pages":"1-53"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43964987","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The urgent problems facing Black boys and young men have triggered the proliferation of single-sex initiatives aimed at tackling these obstacles, namely public single-sex schools and programs inspired by President Obama’s My Brother’s Keeper initiative. Black girls have largely been left out of these initiatives despite facing many of the same barriers as Black boys and disadvantages of their own. This Article identifies, critiques, and explains this disproportionate intervention for Black boys. It argues that these single-sex initiatives are a poor policy tool for fighting racial oppression because (1) there is no evidence that these boys-only initiatives work to achieve their stated goals; (2) statistical gender gaps between Black boys and girls are not large enough to warrant disproportionate intervention; and (3) these initiatives have great potential to reify destructive aspects of dominant Black masculinity. It then employs critical race theory to explain how this current disproportionate intervention is part of a historically-based discourse that prioritizes Black men’s needs over those of Black women, casts Black men as “privileged victims” of racism, and seeks to restore patriarchy in the Black community. Finally, it predicts that these initiatives will continue to proliferate for two reasons. First, the current legal frameworks, specifically Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause, do not necessarily prevent the increasing disproportionality of these initiatives and the resulting unfairness to Black girls. Second, there is insufficient political will to halt the expansion of these initiatives—they face little to no political opposition, even from politicians on the Left who claim to champion gender equity.
{"title":"My Brother's Keeper, My Sister's Neglector: A Critique and Explanation of Single-Sex Initiatives for Black Boys","authors":"Laura Lane-Steele","doi":"10.7916/CJGL.V39I1.4558","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/CJGL.V39I1.4558","url":null,"abstract":"The urgent problems facing Black boys and young men have triggered the proliferation of single-sex initiatives aimed at tackling these obstacles, namely public single-sex schools and programs inspired by President Obama’s My Brother’s Keeper initiative. Black girls have largely been left out of these initiatives despite facing many of the same barriers as Black boys and disadvantages of their own. This Article identifies, critiques, and explains this disproportionate intervention for Black boys. It argues that these single-sex initiatives are a poor policy tool for fighting racial oppression because (1) there is no evidence that these boys-only initiatives work to achieve their stated goals; (2) statistical gender gaps between Black boys and girls are not large enough to warrant disproportionate intervention; and (3) these initiatives have great potential to reify destructive aspects of dominant Black masculinity. It then employs critical race theory to explain how this current disproportionate intervention is part of a historically-based discourse that prioritizes Black men’s needs over those of Black women, casts Black men as “privileged victims” of racism, and seeks to restore patriarchy in the Black community. Finally, it predicts that these initiatives will continue to proliferate for two reasons. First, the current legal frameworks, specifically Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause, do not necessarily prevent the increasing disproportionality of these initiatives and the resulting unfairness to Black girls. Second, there is insufficient political will to halt the expansion of these initiatives—they face little to no political opposition, even from politicians on the Left who claim to champion gender equity.","PeriodicalId":84468,"journal":{"name":"Columbia journal of gender and law","volume":"39 1","pages":"60-109"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43763290","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
On August 19, 2019, the City Council of Fayetteville, Arkansas, had a ten-hour meeting. More than a hundred citizens lined up to share their thoughts on Ordinance 119, a proposed regulation that had become a source of great public debate in the town. Only after they had all spoken did the meeting adjourn at 3:30 AM. The City Council then passed Ordinance 119 by a six-to-two margin, approving its establishment of protections on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity in the city’s nondiscrimination law, and making Fayetteville the first town in the state to extend such protections to LGBT individuals. Six months later, the law was invalidated. The Arkansas General Assembly preempted Fayetteville’s legislation, making it outside of the city’s authority as a municipality to create protected classes beyond those that exist at the state level. Arkansas state law does not protect sexual orientation and gender identity.
{"title":"We Are Not Struck with Blindness: The Establishment Clause and Religiously Motivated State Preemption of Municipal Non-Discrimination Law","authors":"K. Ritter","doi":"10.7916/CJGL.V39I1.4560","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/CJGL.V39I1.4560","url":null,"abstract":"On August 19, 2019, the City Council of Fayetteville, Arkansas, had a ten-hour meeting. More than a hundred citizens lined up to share their thoughts on Ordinance 119, a proposed regulation that had become a source of great public debate in the town. Only after they had all spoken did the meeting adjourn at 3:30 AM. The City Council then passed Ordinance 119 by a six-to-two margin, approving its establishment of protections on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity in the city’s nondiscrimination law, and making Fayetteville the first town in the state to extend such protections to LGBT individuals. Six months later, the law was invalidated. The Arkansas General Assembly preempted Fayetteville’s legislation, making it outside of the city’s authority as a municipality to create protected classes beyond those that exist at the state level. Arkansas state law does not protect sexual orientation and gender identity.","PeriodicalId":84468,"journal":{"name":"Columbia journal of gender and law","volume":"39 1","pages":"205-250"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43489416","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The family plays a starring role in American law. Families, the law tells us, are special. They merit, among others, tax deductions, testimonial privileges, untaxed inheritance, parental presumptions, and, over the course of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court has expanded individual rights stemming from familial relationships. In this Article, we argue that family matters as much for when it is ignored as for when it is featured. We shed light on the use of the family in the law by contrasting policies in which the family is the key unit of analysis with others in which it is not. Looking at four seemingly disparate recent areas of policymaking—the travel ban, family separation at the southern border, agricultural subsidies, and the religious rights of closely held corporations—we explore the interplay between the family, the individual, and the corporation in modern law. We observe that both liberals and conservatives make use of the family to humanize or empower certain people, and both reject the family when seeking to dehumanize or disempower. Where liberals and conservatives differ is over which families to champion. Ultimately, we conclude that the use of family as a mechanism through which to confer rights and benefits becomes a cover to hide policies that entrench and exacerbate existing racial and religious hierarchies. Further, in the context of family businesses, it risks becoming a stepping stone for radical expansion of rights to businesses themselves. To tell this story, we analyze the use and rhetoric of family in politics, in the media, and in recent Supreme Court decisions such as Trump v. Hawaii (2018), Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014), Kerry v. Din (2015), and Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n (2018).
{"title":"The Right Family","authors":"Noam Ben-Asher, Margot J. Pollans","doi":"10.7916/CJGL.V39I1.4518","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/CJGL.V39I1.4518","url":null,"abstract":"The family plays a starring role in American law. Families, the law tells us, are special. They merit, among others, tax deductions, testimonial privileges, untaxed inheritance, parental presumptions, and, over the course of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court has expanded individual rights stemming from familial relationships. In this Article, we argue that family matters as much for when it is ignored as for when it is featured. We shed light on the use of the family in the law by contrasting policies in which the family is the key unit of analysis with others in which it is not. Looking at four seemingly disparate recent areas of policymaking—the travel ban, family separation at the southern border, agricultural subsidies, and the religious rights of closely held corporations—we explore the interplay between the family, the individual, and the corporation in modern law. We observe that both liberals and conservatives make use of the family to humanize or empower certain people, and both reject the family when seeking to dehumanize or disempower. Where liberals and conservatives differ is over which families to champion. Ultimately, we conclude that the use of family as a mechanism through which to confer rights and benefits becomes a cover to hide policies that entrench and exacerbate existing racial and religious hierarchies. Further, in the context of family businesses, it risks becoming a stepping stone for radical expansion of rights to businesses themselves. To tell this story, we analyze the use and rhetoric of family in politics, in the media, and in recent Supreme Court decisions such as Trump v. Hawaii (2018), Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014), Kerry v. Din (2015), and Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n (2018).","PeriodicalId":84468,"journal":{"name":"Columbia journal of gender and law","volume":"39 1","pages":"1-59"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42703386","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recently, several cases have been filed in North America and Europe alleging that fertility physicians inseminated former patients with their own sperm only to have this conduct come to light decades later when their unsuspecting adult children use direct-to-consumer genetic tests and learn that they are not biologically related to their fathers and often that they have multiple half-siblings. For instance, Donald Cline of Indianapolis, Indiana, has over sixty doctor-conceived children, with more continuing to come forward. Although these cases induce disgust, it has thus far proven difficult to hold these physicians legally accountable because their conduct falls within gaps in existing civil and criminal laws. This Article explores the legal contours of fertility fraud cases involving illicit physician inseminations, explaining why it falls through gaps in existing criminal and civil law and why it is essential to take whatever measures are necessary to hold physicians accountable. Part I discusses six physicians who have thus far faced criminal or civil charges for their conduct in North America and explores how artificial insemination has long been a stigmatized practice cloaked in secrecy. Part II discusses how fertility fraud violates various ethical and legal interests of female and male former patients and their doctor-conceived children. Part III assesses how Cline’s illicit inseminations affected parents and progeny and how Cline’s progeny learn of new genetic connections, what they think of Cline and his motivations, how they derive support from one another, their reactions to criminal proceedings against Cline, and why they regard a legislative “fertility fraud” bill as an ideal outcome. Part IV analyzes why it is difficult to hold physicians criminally and civilly liable under existing law, including excerpts from an interview with the prosecutor in the Cline case. Finally, Part V discusses successful efforts to overcome these difficulties through passing fertility fraud legislation in Indiana and Texas.
{"title":"Understanding Illicit Insemination and Fertility Fraud, From Patient Experience to Legal Reform","authors":"J. Madeira","doi":"10.7916/CJGL.V39I1.4559","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/CJGL.V39I1.4559","url":null,"abstract":"Recently, several cases have been filed in North America and Europe alleging that fertility physicians inseminated former patients with their own sperm only to have this conduct come to light decades later when their unsuspecting adult children use direct-to-consumer genetic tests and learn that they are not biologically related to their fathers and often that they have multiple half-siblings. For instance, Donald Cline of Indianapolis, Indiana, has over sixty doctor-conceived children, with more continuing to come forward. Although these cases induce disgust, it has thus far proven difficult to hold these physicians legally accountable because their conduct falls within gaps in existing civil and criminal laws. This Article explores the legal contours of fertility fraud cases involving illicit physician inseminations, explaining why it falls through gaps in existing criminal and civil law and why it is essential to take whatever measures are necessary to hold physicians accountable. Part I discusses six physicians who have thus far faced criminal or civil charges for their conduct in North America and explores how artificial insemination has long been a stigmatized practice cloaked in secrecy. Part II discusses how fertility fraud violates various ethical and legal interests of female and male former patients and their doctor-conceived children. Part III assesses how Cline’s illicit inseminations affected parents and progeny and how Cline’s progeny learn of new genetic connections, what they think of Cline and his motivations, how they derive support from one another, their reactions to criminal proceedings against Cline, and why they regard a legislative “fertility fraud” bill as an ideal outcome. Part IV analyzes why it is difficult to hold physicians criminally and civilly liable under existing law, including excerpts from an interview with the prosecutor in the Cline case. Finally, Part V discusses successful efforts to overcome these difficulties through passing fertility fraud legislation in Indiana and Texas.","PeriodicalId":84468,"journal":{"name":"Columbia journal of gender and law","volume":"39 1","pages":"110-204"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71363524","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Her husband eventually abandoned her and their three children to return to his first wife. As a single mother, Beauty relies on agricultural work to feed her children and often loses the chance to work due to regular flooding in her area. Even though tuition is waived for primary school in Bangladesh, she was forced to take her two daughters out of school after class five and class three,2 as they could not afford to purchase school
{"title":"Does Climate Change Increase the Risk of Child Marriage? a Look at What We Know - and What We Don't - with Lessons from Bangladesh and Mozambique","authors":"C. McLeod, H. Barr, Katherina Rall","doi":"10.7916/CJGL.V38I1.4604","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/CJGL.V38I1.4604","url":null,"abstract":"Her husband eventually abandoned her and their three children to return to his first wife. As a single mother, Beauty relies on agricultural work to feed her children and often loses the chance to work due to regular flooding in her area. Even though tuition is waived for primary school in Bangladesh, she was forced to take her two daughters out of school after class five and class three,2 as they could not afford to purchase school","PeriodicalId":84468,"journal":{"name":"Columbia journal of gender and law","volume":"38 1","pages":"96-145"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48572289","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This Article posits that the issue of gender-affirming genital surgery conjures competing constructions of the incarcerated trans body that reflect different conceptions of its relationship to state power. It offers a reading of this conflict as a clash between a biopolitical and a necropolitical conception of the incarcerated trans body. Biopolitics is a theory of state power that views the state as the arbiter and administrator of life and all life processes. Necropolitics, on the other hand, posits that sovereignty is defined by its power to mark out certain populations for social and literal death.
{"title":"Biopolitical and Necropolitical Constructions of the Incarcerated Trans Body","authors":"Christopher Zhang","doi":"10.7916/CJGL.V37I2.2787","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/CJGL.V37I2.2787","url":null,"abstract":"This Article posits that the issue of gender-affirming genital surgery conjures competing constructions of the incarcerated trans body that reflect different conceptions of its relationship to state power. It offers a reading of this conflict as a clash between a biopolitical and a necropolitical conception of the incarcerated trans body. Biopolitics is a theory of state power that views the state as the arbiter and administrator of life and all life processes. Necropolitics, on the other hand, posits that sovereignty is defined by its power to mark out certain populations for social and literal death.","PeriodicalId":84468,"journal":{"name":"Columbia journal of gender and law","volume":"37 1","pages":"257-299"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48231140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In many states in the United States, a man who killed his wife upon discovering that she had been unfaithful to him can rely upon the provocation defense so long as he can demonstrate that sudden discovery of the infidelity affected his subjective judgement. This essay proposes a different rationale for the doctrine of provocation, which negates the reliance on the provocation defense in the case of an unfaithful spouse. The proposed rationale is neither excuse, which focuses on reduced guilt due to the defendant’s loss of self-control, nor justification, in that the victim was partly responsible for his or her own death. Rather, the rationale rests upon an understanding of why murder is prohibited and an examination of the protected values at the core of the offense of murder.
{"title":"A New Rationale for the Doctrine of Provocation: Applications to Cases of Killing an Unfaithful Spouse","authors":"Roni M. Rosenberg","doi":"10.7916/CJGL.V37I2.2786","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/CJGL.V37I2.2786","url":null,"abstract":"In many states in the United States, a man who killed his wife upon discovering that she had been unfaithful to him can rely upon the provocation defense so long as he can demonstrate that sudden discovery of the infidelity affected his subjective judgement. This essay proposes a different rationale for the doctrine of provocation, which negates the reliance on the provocation defense in the case of an unfaithful spouse. The proposed rationale is neither excuse, which focuses on reduced guilt due to the defendant’s loss of self-control, nor justification, in that the victim was partly responsible for his or her own death. Rather, the rationale rests upon an understanding of why murder is prohibited and an examination of the protected values at the core of the offense of murder.","PeriodicalId":84468,"journal":{"name":"Columbia journal of gender and law","volume":"37 1","pages":"220-256"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48538377","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The purpose of this article is to begin conceptualizing the interests and motivations of bereaved parents, or would-be grandparents, who wish to produce a grandchild following the death of an adult son. It argues that two characteristics of this reproductive practice— the experience of loss that precedes it and the familial relationship that lies between its consumers (the would-be grandparents) and its subjects (the deceased sons)—provide the social context in which parents’ personal motivations to pursue postmortem grandparenthood can be understood.
{"title":"Securing Posterity: The Right to Postmortem Grandparenthood and the Problem for Law","authors":"Nofar Yakovi Gan-or","doi":"10.7916/CJGL.V37I2.2784","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/CJGL.V37I2.2784","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this article is to begin conceptualizing the interests and motivations of bereaved parents, or would-be grandparents, who wish to produce a grandchild following the death of an adult son. It argues that two characteristics of this reproductive practice— the experience of loss that precedes it and the familial relationship that lies between its consumers (the would-be grandparents) and its subjects (the deceased sons)—provide the social context in which parents’ personal motivations to pursue postmortem grandparenthood can be understood.","PeriodicalId":84468,"journal":{"name":"Columbia journal of gender and law","volume":"37 1","pages":"109-168"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49349852","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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