Pub Date : 2021-07-16DOI: 10.1142/S0217595921500317
Yukun Cheng, Xiaotie Deng, Yuhao Li
There have recently been extensive studies on proportional response protocol, which is motivated by the successful BitTorrent system for file sharing over a P2P network. The proportional response protocol has been proved to be strategy-proof against weight cheating attacks and edge cheating attacks, in order to allocate a single type of resource on P2P networks. This strategy-proof property holds due to an elegant combinatorial structure: the bottleneck decomposition of the underlying network structure, and the utility function, defined as the total resources that one agent receives from its neighbors. However, Sybil attacks, under which an agent may form several fictitious players and split its resource among them, have been shown as a more difficult attack to defend against, and thus a strategic agent playing Sybil attacks may result in personal gain. Previous efforts have been made to show that an agent may generate a gain, but with limited gains by Sybil attacks on several special networks, including trees, cliques, and rings. This paper is the first to study the agent’s incentives by adopting a Sybil attack on general networks. The main contribution is to prove that any agent cannot obtain more than three times as much as the revenue when it plays honestly.
{"title":"Study on Agent Incentives for Resource Sharing on P2P Networks","authors":"Yukun Cheng, Xiaotie Deng, Yuhao Li","doi":"10.1142/S0217595921500317","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S0217595921500317","url":null,"abstract":"There have recently been extensive studies on proportional response protocol, which is motivated by the successful BitTorrent system for file sharing over a P2P network. The proportional response protocol has been proved to be strategy-proof against weight cheating attacks and edge cheating attacks, in order to allocate a single type of resource on P2P networks. This strategy-proof property holds due to an elegant combinatorial structure: the bottleneck decomposition of the underlying network structure, and the utility function, defined as the total resources that one agent receives from its neighbors. However, Sybil attacks, under which an agent may form several fictitious players and split its resource among them, have been shown as a more difficult attack to defend against, and thus a strategic agent playing Sybil attacks may result in personal gain. Previous efforts have been made to show that an agent may generate a gain, but with limited gains by Sybil attacks on several special networks, including trees, cliques, and rings. This paper is the first to study the agent’s incentives by adopting a Sybil attack on general networks. The main contribution is to prove that any agent cannot obtain more than three times as much as the revenue when it plays honestly.","PeriodicalId":8478,"journal":{"name":"Asia Pac. J. Oper. Res.","volume":"1 1","pages":"2150031:1-2150031:27"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82914385","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-07DOI: 10.1142/S0217595921400303
Qijun Wang, J. Nie, S. Xia
Component suppliers and manufacturers in a supply chain have long faced different dilemmas. The component supplier intends to adopt new technologies to reduce production costs, but the new technologies usually require significant investment costs. The encroachment into retailing can bring more revenue to manufacturers, but the significant costs of establishing and maintaining direct channels and the potential conflicting interests with the retailer might discourage the manufacturer’s encroachment. This study aims to address these dilemmas facing the component supplier and manufacturer by investigating an interesting scenario in which they both can obtain benefits. Within the given context, the manufacturer’s encroachment increases the order of the components, which motivates the supplier to make more technological investments to reduce production costs. The reduction of component costs enables suppliers and manufacturers to reduce the wholesale prices of components and final products. In this case, the manufacturer’s encroachment can benefit both the manufacturer and the retailer. This study is one of the first to investigate how the interaction between the manufacturer and supplier helps solve their respective dilemmas and provide benefits to the whole supply chain. Additionally, we extend the literature on manufacturer encroachment on retailers by considering supplier investment in cost-reduction production.
{"title":"How to Escape Supply Chain Dilemmas? Manufacturer Encroachment and Supplier Cost-Reduction Investment","authors":"Qijun Wang, J. Nie, S. Xia","doi":"10.1142/S0217595921400303","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S0217595921400303","url":null,"abstract":"Component suppliers and manufacturers in a supply chain have long faced different dilemmas. The component supplier intends to adopt new technologies to reduce production costs, but the new technologies usually require significant investment costs. The encroachment into retailing can bring more revenue to manufacturers, but the significant costs of establishing and maintaining direct channels and the potential conflicting interests with the retailer might discourage the manufacturer’s encroachment. This study aims to address these dilemmas facing the component supplier and manufacturer by investigating an interesting scenario in which they both can obtain benefits. Within the given context, the manufacturer’s encroachment increases the order of the components, which motivates the supplier to make more technological investments to reduce production costs. The reduction of component costs enables suppliers and manufacturers to reduce the wholesale prices of components and final products. In this case, the manufacturer’s encroachment can benefit both the manufacturer and the retailer. This study is one of the first to investigate how the interaction between the manufacturer and supplier helps solve their respective dilemmas and provide benefits to the whole supply chain. Additionally, we extend the literature on manufacturer encroachment on retailers by considering supplier investment in cost-reduction production.","PeriodicalId":8478,"journal":{"name":"Asia Pac. J. Oper. Res.","volume":"10 1","pages":"2140030:1-2140030:22"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84037051","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-06DOI: 10.1142/s0217595921500342
M. Karaoğlu, G. Kara
In today’s intensive competition conditions, it is an inevitable necessity for the companies operating in the e-commerce sector to manage their physical distribution processes efficiently and effectively. The most important step in e-commerce logistics processes is the last step delivery operations in the city. In order for these operations to be carried out quickly and efficiently, delivery vehicles and personnel must be optimally led. These problems, referred to as vehicle routing problem (VRP) in the literature, include determining the least cost routes that vehicles will cover to meet customer needs. In this study, the urban delivery problems of the enterprises operating in the online retail sector are examined. In line with these problems, VRP for urban e-commerce deliveries has been modified; open, multi-depot, distribution aggregation, time-window VRP is discussed. A mathematical model for the modified VRP has been developed and a new heuristic algorithm consisting of two stages has been developed for large-scale problems. The developed algorithm was tested on three different cases. The results are compared with the solution of the nearest neighbor method and the performance of the proposed algorithm is presented.
{"title":"Two-Stage Heuristic Algorithm Proposal for Urban E-Commerce Deliveries","authors":"M. Karaoğlu, G. Kara","doi":"10.1142/s0217595921500342","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0217595921500342","url":null,"abstract":"In today’s intensive competition conditions, it is an inevitable necessity for the companies operating in the e-commerce sector to manage their physical distribution processes efficiently and effectively. The most important step in e-commerce logistics processes is the last step delivery operations in the city. In order for these operations to be carried out quickly and efficiently, delivery vehicles and personnel must be optimally led. These problems, referred to as vehicle routing problem (VRP) in the literature, include determining the least cost routes that vehicles will cover to meet customer needs. In this study, the urban delivery problems of the enterprises operating in the online retail sector are examined. In line with these problems, VRP for urban e-commerce deliveries has been modified; open, multi-depot, distribution aggregation, time-window VRP is discussed. A mathematical model for the modified VRP has been developed and a new heuristic algorithm consisting of two stages has been developed for large-scale problems. The developed algorithm was tested on three different cases. The results are compared with the solution of the nearest neighbor method and the performance of the proposed algorithm is presented.","PeriodicalId":8478,"journal":{"name":"Asia Pac. J. Oper. Res.","volume":"38 1","pages":"2150034:1-2150034:36"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76292134","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-28DOI: 10.1142/S0217595921500275
H. Nath, S. Dempe, T. N. Dhamala
{"title":"A Bicriteria Approach for Saving a Path Maximizing Dynamic Contraflow","authors":"H. Nath, S. Dempe, T. N. Dhamala","doi":"10.1142/S0217595921500275","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S0217595921500275","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":8478,"journal":{"name":"Asia Pac. J. Oper. Res.","volume":"5 1","pages":"2150027:1-2150027:24"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84952594","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-28DOI: 10.1142/S021759592150024X
Yin-Feng Xu, Rongteng Zhi, Feifeng Zheng, Ming Liu
{"title":"Parallel Machine Scheduling with Due Date-to-Deadline Window, Order Sharing and Time Value of Money","authors":"Yin-Feng Xu, Rongteng Zhi, Feifeng Zheng, Ming Liu","doi":"10.1142/S021759592150024X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S021759592150024X","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":8478,"journal":{"name":"Asia Pac. J. Oper. Res.","volume":"12 1","pages":"2150024:1-2150024:32"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87454319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-21DOI: 10.1142/S0217595921500305
Chun-Chih Chiu, James T. Lin
Stochastic resource allocation problems (SRAPs) involve determining the optimal configuration of a limited resource to achieve an objective function under given constraints and random effects in manufacturing systems (MSs) and service systems (SSs). The problems are traditionally solved by determining the optimal solution. It is generally preferable to determine as many global optima as possible, or at least a small set of diverse but good candidates, to help the decision-maker rapidly adopt alternative solutions from the set if one solution is unsuitable. However, many local or global optima occur in SRAPs in MSs and SSs due to the interaction between random system factors, such as processing time uncertainty and machine failure rates. Thus, enhancing the searching efficiency of algorithms for SRAPs is a challenge. This study proposes an efficient simulation–optimization approach, called elite-based particle swarm optimization (EPSO), using an optimal replication allocation strategy (ORAS) (i.e., EPSO[Formula: see text], to address three types of SRAPs from the literature. Three simulation models were constructed to evaluate the system performance under random factors. We developed a novel EPSO to explore and exploit the solution space. We created an elite group (EG) that includes multiple solutions, and each solution of the EG has a statistically nonsignificant difference from the current optimal solution. The new feature of EPSO updates the velocity and position of the particles in the design space based on multiple global optima from the EG to enhance diversity and prevent premature convergence. We propose an ORAS to allocate a limited number of replications to each solution. Three numerical experiments were performed to verify the effectiveness and efficiency of EPSO[Formula: see text] compared with other simulation–optimization approaches, namely particle swarm optimization (PSO) and the genetic algorithm (GA) with both optimal computing budget allocation (OCBA) and the ORAS. The experimental results reveal that the solution quality of EPSO improved compared with that of PSO and GA, and the ORAS provides a more efficient allocation of the number of replications compared with the OCBA in the three experiments. Finally, the proposed approach also provides an elite set at the end of the algorithm, instead of a single optimal solution, to support decision-making.
{"title":"An Efficient Elite-Based Simulation-Optimization Approach for Stochastic Resource Allocation Problems in Manufacturing and Service Systems","authors":"Chun-Chih Chiu, James T. Lin","doi":"10.1142/S0217595921500305","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S0217595921500305","url":null,"abstract":"Stochastic resource allocation problems (SRAPs) involve determining the optimal configuration of a limited resource to achieve an objective function under given constraints and random effects in manufacturing systems (MSs) and service systems (SSs). The problems are traditionally solved by determining the optimal solution. It is generally preferable to determine as many global optima as possible, or at least a small set of diverse but good candidates, to help the decision-maker rapidly adopt alternative solutions from the set if one solution is unsuitable. However, many local or global optima occur in SRAPs in MSs and SSs due to the interaction between random system factors, such as processing time uncertainty and machine failure rates. Thus, enhancing the searching efficiency of algorithms for SRAPs is a challenge. This study proposes an efficient simulation–optimization approach, called elite-based particle swarm optimization (EPSO), using an optimal replication allocation strategy (ORAS) (i.e., EPSO[Formula: see text], to address three types of SRAPs from the literature. Three simulation models were constructed to evaluate the system performance under random factors. We developed a novel EPSO to explore and exploit the solution space. We created an elite group (EG) that includes multiple solutions, and each solution of the EG has a statistically nonsignificant difference from the current optimal solution. The new feature of EPSO updates the velocity and position of the particles in the design space based on multiple global optima from the EG to enhance diversity and prevent premature convergence. We propose an ORAS to allocate a limited number of replications to each solution. Three numerical experiments were performed to verify the effectiveness and efficiency of EPSO[Formula: see text] compared with other simulation–optimization approaches, namely particle swarm optimization (PSO) and the genetic algorithm (GA) with both optimal computing budget allocation (OCBA) and the ORAS. The experimental results reveal that the solution quality of EPSO improved compared with that of PSO and GA, and the ORAS provides a more efficient allocation of the number of replications compared with the OCBA in the three experiments. Finally, the proposed approach also provides an elite set at the end of the algorithm, instead of a single optimal solution, to support decision-making.","PeriodicalId":8478,"journal":{"name":"Asia Pac. J. Oper. Res.","volume":"158 1","pages":"2150030:1-2150030:30"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79991623","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-21DOI: 10.1142/S0217595921500251
Yihong Hu, Q. Qiang
This paper studies efficiency loss and coordination mechanism in a supply chain with one online retailer and multiple competitive shipping companies in the presence of congestion effects. We build a three-level game between customers, shipping companies and the retailer. The equilibrium market structure is determined. The optimal volume–investment ratio for each shipping company is the same for both centralized and decentralized supply chains, and it is dependent on the delivery time function, independent of competitors’ decisions. The efficiency loss of the decentralized supply chain with one retailer and one shipping company is found to be 1/4, independent of the delivery time function and the demand function. The loss is reduced when competition is introduced into shipping companies and an upper bound of efficiency loss with multiple homogeneous shipping companies is derived. Revenue-sharing contracts may be designed to allow the decentralized supply chain to perform as well as a centralized one. The necessity of coordination is reduced when competition is introduced and the number of competitive companies increases. Finally, we extend the model to consider heterogeneous shipping companies and find that the disparity between shipping companies increases the efficiency loss because in the decentralized supply chain less efficient shipping companies also provide service. This research explicates the relationship options between e-commerce retailers and shipping companies, providing managerial insights for industry practitioners.
{"title":"Efficiency Loss and Coordination in the Online Shopping Supply Chain with Competitive Shipping Companies","authors":"Yihong Hu, Q. Qiang","doi":"10.1142/S0217595921500251","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S0217595921500251","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies efficiency loss and coordination mechanism in a supply chain with one online retailer and multiple competitive shipping companies in the presence of congestion effects. We build a three-level game between customers, shipping companies and the retailer. The equilibrium market structure is determined. The optimal volume–investment ratio for each shipping company is the same for both centralized and decentralized supply chains, and it is dependent on the delivery time function, independent of competitors’ decisions. The efficiency loss of the decentralized supply chain with one retailer and one shipping company is found to be 1/4, independent of the delivery time function and the demand function. The loss is reduced when competition is introduced into shipping companies and an upper bound of efficiency loss with multiple homogeneous shipping companies is derived. Revenue-sharing contracts may be designed to allow the decentralized supply chain to perform as well as a centralized one. The necessity of coordination is reduced when competition is introduced and the number of competitive companies increases. Finally, we extend the model to consider heterogeneous shipping companies and find that the disparity between shipping companies increases the efficiency loss because in the decentralized supply chain less efficient shipping companies also provide service. This research explicates the relationship options between e-commerce retailers and shipping companies, providing managerial insights for industry practitioners.","PeriodicalId":8478,"journal":{"name":"Asia Pac. J. Oper. Res.","volume":"19 1","pages":"2150025:1-2150025:30"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84436657","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-21DOI: 10.1142/s0217595921500329
Shanshan Ma, Liyan Wang
Companies have started to use a business-to-business (B2B) spot market in combination with their traditional long-term procurement contracts to procure intermediate goods. This study investigates whether or not the market players should share their demand forecast information with one another in a supplier — manufacturer supply chain and assess the benefits of sharing information in the presence of the B2B spot market. First, the supplier and manufacturer make forecast on the demand, and during this period they select an information-sharing arrangement, that is, whether to share information or not. Then, the supplier sets the wholesale price and the manufacturer submits an order after observing the wholesale price. Both the supplier and manufacturer can trade their intermediate goods in a B2B spot market. We find that the manufacturer can infer the supplier’s demand forecast from the wholesale price in the non-information-sharing case, but the supplier cannot enjoy such an advantage. We also find that information sharing benefits both the supplier and the manufacturer, if and only if demand and spot price are positively correlated and the supplier’s expectation of the manufacturer’s forecast is medium. By contrast, obtaining more demand forecast information can hurt supply chain players. Information sharing benefits the manufacturer but hurts the supplier when the supplier’s expectation of the manufacturer’s forecast is high. However, when the supplier’s expectation of the manufacturer’s forecast is low, information sharing benefits the supplier but hurts the manufacturer.
{"title":"Demand Information Sharing in the Presence of B2B Spot Market","authors":"Shanshan Ma, Liyan Wang","doi":"10.1142/s0217595921500329","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0217595921500329","url":null,"abstract":"Companies have started to use a business-to-business (B2B) spot market in combination with their traditional long-term procurement contracts to procure intermediate goods. This study investigates whether or not the market players should share their demand forecast information with one another in a supplier — manufacturer supply chain and assess the benefits of sharing information in the presence of the B2B spot market. First, the supplier and manufacturer make forecast on the demand, and during this period they select an information-sharing arrangement, that is, whether to share information or not. Then, the supplier sets the wholesale price and the manufacturer submits an order after observing the wholesale price. Both the supplier and manufacturer can trade their intermediate goods in a B2B spot market. We find that the manufacturer can infer the supplier’s demand forecast from the wholesale price in the non-information-sharing case, but the supplier cannot enjoy such an advantage. We also find that information sharing benefits both the supplier and the manufacturer, if and only if demand and spot price are positively correlated and the supplier’s expectation of the manufacturer’s forecast is medium. By contrast, obtaining more demand forecast information can hurt supply chain players. Information sharing benefits the manufacturer but hurts the supplier when the supplier’s expectation of the manufacturer’s forecast is high. However, when the supplier’s expectation of the manufacturer’s forecast is low, information sharing benefits the supplier but hurts the manufacturer.","PeriodicalId":8478,"journal":{"name":"Asia Pac. J. Oper. Res.","volume":"19 1","pages":"2150032:1-2150032:33"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78428133","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-16DOI: 10.1142/S0217595921500299
Sachin Rastogi, Akhlad Iqbal, Sanjeev Rajan
In this paper, we introduce the concept and applications of gH-symmetrical derivative for interval-valued multi-objective functions, which is the generalization of generalized Hukuhara derivative (gH-derivative). By a suitable example it has been shown that gH-symmetrically derivative is an extension of gH-derivative. Furthermore, we apply this new derivative to investigate the Fritz John type optimality conditions for interval-valued multiobjective programming problems. We use LR type of order relation in this context.
{"title":"Fritz John Optimality Conditions for Interval-Valued Multi-Objective Functions Using gH-Symmetrical Derivative","authors":"Sachin Rastogi, Akhlad Iqbal, Sanjeev Rajan","doi":"10.1142/S0217595921500299","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S0217595921500299","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we introduce the concept and applications of gH-symmetrical derivative for interval-valued multi-objective functions, which is the generalization of generalized Hukuhara derivative (gH-derivative). By a suitable example it has been shown that gH-symmetrically derivative is an extension of gH-derivative. Furthermore, we apply this new derivative to investigate the Fritz John type optimality conditions for interval-valued multiobjective programming problems. We use LR type of order relation in this context.","PeriodicalId":8478,"journal":{"name":"Asia Pac. J. Oper. Res.","volume":"90 1","pages":"2150029:1-2150029:15"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76642111","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-16DOI: 10.1142/S0217595921400248
Jianheng Zhou, Qingying Li
In this paper, we conduct an incentive study on the adoption of the blockchain technology in a two-period model with retailer’s use of strategic inventory. Without the adoption of the blockchain technology, the retailer has private information regarding the market size. We investigate the retailer’s voluntary signaling decisions via his pricing and strategic inventory decisions. We determine the retailer’s equilibrium price and the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price. Both separating and pooling equilibria are discussed, and the unique lexicographically maximum sequential equilibrium is identified. With the adoption of the blockchain technology, there is no information asymmetric between the supply chain members. We find that the manufacturer has the incentive to adopt the blockchain technology when the demand uncertainty is moderate to high, and the retailer has the incentive to adopt the blockchain technology when the demand uncertainty is low or high. When the manufacturer and the retailer have a misalignment in the adoption of the technology, a central planner can help to achieve coordination.
{"title":"The Incentive Study in the Blockchain Era: A Two-Period Strategic Inventory Game","authors":"Jianheng Zhou, Qingying Li","doi":"10.1142/S0217595921400248","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S0217595921400248","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we conduct an incentive study on the adoption of the blockchain technology in a two-period model with retailer’s use of strategic inventory. Without the adoption of the blockchain technology, the retailer has private information regarding the market size. We investigate the retailer’s voluntary signaling decisions via his pricing and strategic inventory decisions. We determine the retailer’s equilibrium price and the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price. Both separating and pooling equilibria are discussed, and the unique lexicographically maximum sequential equilibrium is identified. With the adoption of the blockchain technology, there is no information asymmetric between the supply chain members. We find that the manufacturer has the incentive to adopt the blockchain technology when the demand uncertainty is moderate to high, and the retailer has the incentive to adopt the blockchain technology when the demand uncertainty is low or high. When the manufacturer and the retailer have a misalignment in the adoption of the technology, a central planner can help to achieve coordination.","PeriodicalId":8478,"journal":{"name":"Asia Pac. J. Oper. Res.","volume":"4 1","pages":"2140024:1-2140024:22"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74373632","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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