Human social networks are far larger than those of nonhuman primates. Maintaining cohesion in large networks requires a robust mechanism that can accommodate the dense webs of connections within communities. A parsimonious account of how humans achieve social cohesion is mental abstraction, which enables individuals to construct fuzzy network representations that facilitate information flow tracking and mitigate conflict.
The current manuscript rightly points out that non-human primates evolved complex social cognitive skills to maintain weaker social ties. However, these capacities are likely more expansive than currently proposed: research shows that apes behave more socially to those with whom they experience similar things, suggesting that they possess some precursor of humans' capacity to bond through shared experiences.
Drawing on our previous work on human trust networks, we provide further evidence of how group structure can foster group cohesion. But this work also raises doubts about two central tenets of the target paper: (1) the role assigned to cognitive abilities in group cohesion and stabilization; and (2) the emphasis on group size as the critical variable.
The paper of Dunbar (2025) on social stress is a strong demonstration that stress in itself can have a purely cognitive origin. The paper shows that the cognitive system can have profound impacts on the hypothalamus. As detailed in my commentary, this opens up new avenues of how to interpret psychiatric conditions, placebo, and other associations between perceptions and vegetative functions in the brain.
Facial expression has evolved as a solution to the primate group living problem. A growing body of empirical evidence suggests that the evolution of facial expression has been driven by the need to bond. Dunbar's theories of group cohesion are therefore key to understanding primate (including human) facial expression.
Ectotherms, particularly fish, challenge traditional brain evolution theories by exhibiting advanced cognitive abilities despite their smaller brains. While the social brain hypothesis may apply within clades, sensory-motor systems likely explain the brain size differences between average-brained ectotherms and endotherms. Evolved complex sensory-motor systems suggest that brain evolution models should expand to include sensory and motor systems, beyond cognitive processes alone.
Dunbar explains primates group cohesion through cognitive and structural mechanisms like grooming and social cognition. We extend this by highlighting collective social niche construction, where emergent social properties arise from feedback loops, selection pressures, and self-organisation. Adaptive social networks evolve through multilevel selection, cultural transmission, and ontogenetic changes, shaping survival, cognition, and collective intelligence across species.
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：