Behavioral and Brain Sciences最新文献

Primate species deploy a suite of behavioural and cognitive adaptations to offset the costs of group-living. Dunbar uses species-level comparisons to posit a series of cumulative steps that describe large-scale phylogenetic patterns in the evolution of sociality. Here, we highlight the value of population-level variation within species for empirically testing the predicted socio-ecological correlations that underpin Dunbar's hypothesis.

Dunbar proposes strategies to solve the fragmentation problem experienced by group-living animals. We highlight that bondedness not only mitigates stress but also provides structural scaffolding for group stability. Furthermore, we posit tolerance as a complementary mechanism smoothing social interactions and argue that variation in cohesion-promoting traits reflects context-dependent socio-ecological pressures, challenging static models linking sociality to cognition. Finally, we propose two further mechanisms-cultural transmission and dominance dynamics-that can enhance social cohesion by aligning behaviour and reducing uncertainty.

The commentaries debated numerous points in the target article. Many questioned the existence of a crisis and the benefits of a paradigm shift, even though none countered the listed signs of a crisis. Paradigm shifts are an important way that science progresses. There remains hope for a unifying theory, and for a reawakening of an ambitious science of visual attention.

We agree that while there is a "crisis" in visual attention, the Rosenholtz' article does not offer bold enough solutions. We argue that the real crisis extends beyond attention, reflecting a broader need for theoretical integration. Addressing this requires abandoning artificial subdivisions and adopting a more ecologically valid, contextually grounded approach to cognition.

We examine "allocentric" neglect from Rosenholtz's perspective, focusing on visual limitations in the periphery rather than attention. Studies of allocentric neglect report no or limited data on visual field defects and extinction. We propose that if visual input is degraded, patients may fail to detect the left part of the stimulus and complete it perceptually (preattentively) rather than attentionally.

We suggest that the crisis in visual attention is caused by problems prevalent in many other areas of psychology: low-power experiments and questionable research practices. We demonstrate that many attention experiments use sample sizes that are several orders of magnitude too small and argue that it is unreasonable to expect theoretical clarity based on such unreliable empirical data.

Rosenholtz is right that the multiple meanings of attention hinder development of a unified attention theory, but this is not a crisis. Embracing its diversity can advance fields like clinical psychology. However, inattentional blindness challenges attempts to move beyond attention as an explanatory concept. I illustrate this by highlighting attentional set, which demonstrates selective prioritization rather than mere task constraints.

Understanding the limits of visual processing is at the core of understanding visual attention. Rosenholtz proposes task complexity as a potential solution to identify a putative unifying capacity limit. We argue that if task complexity is indeed used to identify a unifying limit, effort must crucially be incorporated to prevent a future crisis in the field of visual attention.

The debate on attention's validity in cognitive psychology persists. However, attention remains essential beyond peripheral vision constraints, as it is a resource-limited process (Norman & Bobrow, 1975). The outright dismissal of attention proposed in the target article risks conceptual voids without superior alternatives. Instead, refining attention as a theoretical framework offers a pragmatic path for advancing cognitive research.

While I agree with Rosenholtz that attention as mechanism should often be "banned"-this conception is confused and often explanatorily useless-I suggest that the real crisis is the proliferation of different, too often underspecified, mechanisms as attention. Attention is not an explainer. It is what we are trying to explain. Confusion on this point leads to unnecessary theoretical disunity.