Behavioral and Brain Sciences最新文献

Twenty-five commentaries raise questions concerning the origins of knowledge, the interplay of iconic and propositional representations in mental life, the architecture of numerical and social cognition, the sources of uniquely human cognitive capacities, and the borders among core knowledge, perception, and thought. They also propose new methods, drawn from the vibrant, interdisciplinary cognitive sciences, for addressing these questions and deepening understanding of infant minds.

Elizabeth Spelke's What Babies Know is a scholarly presentation of core knowledge theory and a masterful compendium of empirical evidence that supports it. Unfortunately, Spelke's principal theoretical assumption is that core knowledge is simply the innate product of cognitive evolution. As such, her theory fails to explicate the developmental mechanisms underlying the emergence of the cognitive systems on which that knowledge depends.

While Spelke provides powerful support for concept nativism, her focus on understanding concept nativism through six innate core knowledge systems is too confining. There is also no reason to suppose that the curse of a compositional mind constitutes a principled reason for positing less innate structure in explaining the origins of concepts. Any solution to such problems must take into account poverty of the stimulus considerations, which argue for postulating more innate structure, not less.

Why have core knowledge? Standard answers typically emphasize the difficulty of learning core knowledge from experience, or the benefits it confers for learning about the world. Here, we suggest a complementary reason: Core knowledge is critical for learning not just about the external world, but about the mind itself.

Decades of research have pushed us closer to understanding what babies know. However, a powerful approach - representational similarity analysis (RSA) - is underused in developmental research. I discuss the strengths of this approach and what it can tell us about infant conceptual knowledge. As a case study, I focus on numerosity as a domain where RSA can make unique progress.

Spelke convincingly argues that we should posit six innate modular systems beyond the periphery (i.e., beyond low-level perception and motor control). I focus on the case of spatial navigation (Ch. 3) to claim that there remain powerful considerations in favor of positing additional innate, nonperipheral modules. This opens the door to stronger forms of nativism and nonperipheral modularism than Spelke's.

I focus here on concepts that are not part of core knowledge - the ability to treat people as social agents with shareable mental states. Spelke proposes that learning language from another might account for the development of these concepts. I suggest that homesigners, who create language rather than learn it, may be a potential counterexample to this hypothesis.

Somewhat questioning Elizabeth Spelke's attempt to account for infants' social knowledge, our commentary argues that social cognition might be divided into several specialized systems. In addition to the core system dedicated to the intersubjective dimension of close relationships, infants could be prewired to process social relationships, such as dominance, characterized by their impersonal, normative dimension.

Spelke's sweeping proposal requires greater precision in specifying the place of language in early cognition. We now know by 3 months of age, infants have already begun to forge a link between language and core cognition. This precocious link, which unfolds dynamically over development, may indeed offer an entry point for acquiring higher-order, abstract conceptual and representational capacities.

Core knowledge systems play an important role in theories of cognitive development. However, recent studies suggest that fundamental principles of the object and agent systems can be revised by adults and preschoolers, when given small amounts of counterevidence. We argue that not all core knowledge systems are created equal, and they may be subject to revision throughout development.