Behavioral and Brain Sciences最新文献

Here, we argue that Rosenholtz' call for a paradigm shift in attention theory is unwarranted based on psychological evidence as well as philosophical theory and would disrupt scientific progress by preventing incremental science. To move forward, we suggest a different philosophical view on attention research that preserves the cumulative nature of scientific progress rather than waxing and waning theoretical paradigms.

How has human culture become so complex? We argue that a key process is social tinkering: the gradual accumulation of ad hoc innovations to the social rules that coordinate behavior in response to immediate challenges. Momentary innovations provide precedents that can be reused, entrenched, adapted and recombined to handle future challenges. Interactions between these social rules create rich cultural systems (languages, ethics, political organization) of increasing complexity through processes of spontaneous order, not deliberate design. To explain the historical emergence of cumulative cultural complexity, we distinguish between six overlapping and interacting stages: (1) non-social tinkering to solve problems in the natural world; (2) learning and copying from the tinkering of others; (3) social tinkering involving jointly agreeing on momentary conventions to coordinate interactions, typically for mutual benefit; (4) creating communicative conventions (language) to support more complex social interactions; (5) social tinkering of linguistically-formulated cultural rules leading to laws, organizations, institutions, etc.; and (6) tinkering with linguistically-formulated non-social knowledge, allowing for the creation of science and technology. The rich interplay of innovation across the six stages is crucial for explaining increasing cultural and organizational complexity and our collective mastery of the natural world. Because social and non-social tinkering requires two different kinds of learning, this analysis has important implications for the understanding of human learning and cognition, including moral and evolutionary psychology, theory of mind, and the view of the child-as-scientist. Social tinkering also has substantial implications for current theories of cultural evolution.

Human success in navigating the social world is typically attributed to our capacity to represent other minds-a mentalistic stance. We argue that humans are endowed with a second equally powerful intuitive theory: an institutional stance. In contrast to the mentalistic stance, which helps us predict and explain unconstrained behavior via unobservable mental states, the institutional stance interprets social interactions in terms of role-based structures that constrain and regulate behavior via rule-like behavioral expectations. We argue that this stance is supported by a generative grammar that builds structured models of social collectives, enabling people to rapidly infer, track, and manipulate the social world. The institutional stance emerges early in development and its precursors can be traced across social species, but its full-fledged generative capacity is uniquely human. Once in place, the ability to reason about institutional structures takes on a causal role, allowing people to create and modify social structures, supporting new forms of institutional life. Human social cognition is best understood as an interplay between a system for representing the unconstrained behavior of individuals in terms of minds and a system for representing the constrained behavior of social collectives in terms of institutional structures composed of interlocking sets of roles.

The human brain makes up just 2% of body mass but consumes closer to 20% of the body's energy. Nonetheless, it is significantly more energy-efficient than most modern computers. Although these facts are well-known, models of cognitive capacities rarely account for metabolic factors. In this paper, we argue that metabolic considerations should be integrated into cognitive models. We distinguish two uses of metabolic considerations in modeling. First, metabolic considerations can be used to evaluate models. Evaluative metabolic considerations function as explanatory constraints. Metabolism limits which types of computation are possible in biological brains. Further, it structures and guides the flow of information in neural systems. Second, metabolic considerations can be used to generate new models. They provide: a starting point for inquiry into the relation between brain structure and information processing, a proof-of-concept that metabolic knowledge is relevant to cognitive modeling, and potential explanations of how a particular type of computation is implemented. Evaluative metabolic considerations allow researchers to prune and partition the space of possible models for a given cognitive capacity or neural system, while generative considerations populate that space with new models. Our account suggests cognitive models should be consistent with the brain's metabolic limits, and modelers should assess how their models fit within these bounds. Our account offers fresh insights into the role of metabolism for cognitive models of mental effort, philosophical views of multiple realization and medium independence, and the comparison of biological and artificial computational systems.

Many traditional subsistence groups have been described as 'egalitarian societies'. Definitions of 'egalitarianism', especially beyond anthropology, have often emphasised equality in resource access, prestige or rank, alongside generalised preferences for fairness and equality. However, there are no human societies where equality is genuinely realised in all areas of life. Here we demonstrate, empirically, that nominally egalitarian societies are often unequal across seven important interconnected domains: embodied capital, social capital, leadership, gender, age/knowledge, material capital/land tenure, and reproduction. We also highlight evidence that individuals in nominally egalitarian societies do not unfailingly adhere to strong equality preferences. We propose a new operational framework for understanding egalitarianism in traditional subsistence groups, focussing on individual motivations, rather than equality. We redefine "egalitarianism" societies as those where socio-ecological circumstances enable most individuals to successfully secure their own resource access, status, and autonomy. We show how this emphasis on self-interest - particularly status concerns, resource access and autonomy - dispels naive enlightenment notions of the 'noble savage', and clarifies the plural processes (demand-sharing, risk-pooling, status-levelling, prosocial reputation-building, consensus-based collective decision-making, and residential mobility) by which relative equality is maintained. We finish with suggestions for better operationalizing egalitarianism in future research.

The two-tiered model offers a meaningful advance in life history theory, but refinements are needed to enhance testability. We highlight challenges related to the timing of Tier 1 and 2 effects and potential curvilinearity in Tier 2 responses. Clarifying these dimensions would improve falsifiability and strengthen the model's utility for guiding empirical research.

The field of life history "theory" is in a state of heightened entropy; the paper by Ellis, Reid, and Kramer provides a proposal for structuring future research on this topic. I find their proposal a constructive one and describe its potential benefits. Furthermore, I propose several ways in which we can additionally develop the life history framework.

Harsh extreme-Earth and extra-Earth mortality sources pressure countervailing shifts in human life-history traits and survival-reproductive strategies, trading shorter lifespans and reproduction spans to hedge scarce gametes with sex-chromosome resilience. Darwinian trajectories for genotypes and phenotypes nonetheless remain unknown for future Earth-population sustainability and deep-space colonization. Controversial technology-assisted human evolution may be needed to narrow anthropological evolutionary-medicine disparities and prevent Humanity's extinction.

The two-tiered model proposed by Ellis et al. offers a compelling framework for understanding how extrinsic mortality (EM) sources shape life history strategies, including fertility. This commentary evaluates this model in light of modern fertility trends, identifies gaps in its current formulation, and proposes modifications to enhance its explanatory power in modern contexts.

This commentary expands Ellis et al.'s 2-tiered life history (LH) model by integrating shyness and insecure attachment as mediators of environmental adaptation. Shyness balances survival-reproduction trade-offs with mixed LH outcomes. Avoidant attachment accelerates LH strategies under harsh conditions; anxious attachment delays reproduction under unpredictable conditions. Incorporating social behaviors, which are related to survival and safety, enhances the model's applicability across behavioral domains.