Behavioral and Brain Sciences最新文献

Murayama and Jach criticize the use of high-level motivational constructs in psychology, urging psychologists to "unpack" the black box. These constructs are alleged to be "psychological constructions" with no causal powers of their own. I argue that this view is mistaken, and that high-level motivational constructs are causal even when unpacked in terms of underlying computational, algorithmic, and implementational processes.

In their proposal for unpacking the black box of motivation, Murayama and Jach (M&J) propose three types of reductions: From high-level to low-level motivational constructs, from motivation to cognition, and from contentful to contentless explanations. Although these reductions come with the promise of parsimony, they carry the risk of losing vital explanatory power.

Many motivational constructs are opaque "black boxes," and should be replaced by an explicit account of the underlying psychological mechanisms. The theory of motivational systems has begun to provide such an account. I recently contributed to this tradition with a general architecture of motivation, which connects "energization" and "direction" through the goal-setting activity of emotions, and serves as an evolutionary grounded map of motivational processes.

Murayama and Jach offer valuable suggestions for how to integrate computational processes into motivation theory, but these processes cannot do away with motivation altogether. Rewards are only rewarding because people want and like them - that is, because of motivation. Sexual desire is not primarily a quest for rewarding information. Elucidating the interface between motivation and cognition seems a promising way forward.

Integrating the predictive processing framework into our understanding of motivation offers promising avenues for theoretical development, while shedding light on the computational processes underlying motivated behavior. Here we decompose expected free energy into intrinsic value (i.e., epistemic affordance) and extrinsic value (i.e., instrumental affordance) to provide insights into how individuals adapt to and interact with their environment.

Murayama and Jach offer a thoughtful and timely critique of motivation constructs. We largely concur with their basic premises, but offer additional input and clarification regarding the importance of carefully considering the energization and direction components of motivation, and fully attending to the hierarchical aspect of motivation rather than prioritizing particular levels of analysis.

In their article, Murayama and Jach contend that a mental computational model demonstrates that high-level motivations are emergent properties from underlying cognitive processes rather than instigators of behaviors. Despite points of agreement with the authors' critiques of the motivation literature, I argue that their claim of dismantling the black box of the human mind has been constructed on shaking grounds.

Metacognitive feelings are an integral part of mental computational processes and influence the outcome of computations. We review supporting evidence on affect inherent in perceptual processes, fluency in study decisions, metacognitive feelings in aha-experiences and intuition, and affect in early phases of interest development. These findings connect to recent theories that combine metacognitive feelings with computational models.

There are indeed questionable motivation constructs in psychology. The diagnosis and proposed remedies in the target article both neglect the crucial consideration that all tendencies to behaviour compete for the same finite set of degrees of freedom. Action selection also has irreducibly economic aspects which should constrain motivation constructs and already inform healthy research programmes.

The proposed "black-box" problem and its solution are drawn from the same substance-oriented framework. This framework's assumptions have consequences that re-create the black-box problem at a foundational level. Specifically, Murayama and Jach's solution fails to explain novel behavior that emerges through an organism's development. A process-oriented theoretical shift provides an ontological explanation for emergent behavior and eliminates the black-box problem altogether.