Contact tracing technology has been introduced in many countries as part of the COVID-19 containment strategy. However, research indicates that current adoption rates are too low for tracing apps to be effective. To address the complexity of app adoption, a typology-based approach is presented that differentiates between refusers who generally reject app adoption, ditherers who hesitate to adopt the app, adopters who have downloaded and activated the app, and de-adopters who had installed the app but later uninstalled it. A national online survey of N = 1,535 participants in Switzerland revealed significant differences among these groups of people regarding their perceptions about app-related benefits and costs, knowledge about data handling in technology, and app-related opinion leadership. The results indicate that communication strategies that aim to enhance the rate of app adoption should focus on ditherers and adopters; the former are the most promising target group for behavioral change efforts, and the latter seem to be the best means to reach out to this promising group.
{"title":"A Typology-Based Approach to Tracing-App Adoption During the COVID-19 Pandemic: The Case of the SwissCovid App","authors":"Sarah Geber, Thomas N. Friemel","doi":"10.51685/JQD.2021.007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.51685/JQD.2021.007","url":null,"abstract":"Contact tracing technology has been introduced in many countries as part of the COVID-19 containment strategy. However, research indicates that current adoption rates are too low for tracing apps to be effective. To address the complexity of app adoption, a typology-based approach is presented that differentiates between refusers who generally reject app adoption, ditherers who hesitate to adopt the app, adopters who have downloaded and activated the app, and de-adopters who had installed the app but later uninstalled it. A national online survey of N = 1,535 participants in Switzerland revealed significant differences among these groups of people regarding their perceptions about app-related benefits and costs, knowledge about data handling in technology, and app-related opinion leadership. The results indicate that communication strategies that aim to enhance the rate of app adoption should focus on ditherers and adopters; the former are the most promising target group for behavioral change efforts, and the latter seem to be the best means to reach out to this promising group.","PeriodicalId":93587,"journal":{"name":"Journal of quantitative description: digital media","volume":"68 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72868444","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Concern over online news echo chambers has been a consistent theme in recent debates on how people get news and information. Yet, we lack a basic descriptive understanding of how many people occupy bounded online news spaces in different countries. Using online survey data from seven countries we find that (i) politically partisan left-right online news echo chambers are real, but only a minority of approximately 5% of internet news users inhabit them, (ii) in every country covered, more people consume no online news at all than occupy partisan online echo chambers, and (iii) except for the US, decisions over the inclusion or exclusion of particular news outlets make little difference to echo chamber estimates. Differences within and between media systems mean we should be very cautious about direct comparisons between different echo chambers, but underlying patterns of audience overlap, and the continued popularity of mainstream outlets, often preclude the formation of large partisan echo chambers.
{"title":"How Many People Live in Politically Partisan Online News Echo Chambers in Different Countries?","authors":"R. Fletcher, Craig T. Robertson, R. Nielsen","doi":"10.51685/jqd.2021.020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.51685/jqd.2021.020","url":null,"abstract":"Concern over online news echo chambers has been a consistent theme in recent debates on how people get news and information. Yet, we lack a basic descriptive understanding of how many people occupy bounded online news spaces in different countries. Using online survey data from seven countries we find that (i) politically partisan left-right online news echo chambers are real, but only a minority of approximately 5% of internet news users inhabit them, (ii) in every country covered, more people consume no online news at all than occupy partisan online echo chambers, and (iii) except for the US, decisions over the inclusion or exclusion of particular news outlets make little difference to echo chamber estimates. Differences within and between media systems mean we should be very cautious about direct comparisons between different echo chambers, but underlying patterns of audience overlap, and the continued popularity of mainstream outlets, often preclude the formation of large partisan echo chambers.","PeriodicalId":93587,"journal":{"name":"Journal of quantitative description: digital media","volume":"463 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85757550","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
S. Grossman, Katie Jonsson, Nicholas Lyon, L. Sizer
In fragile contexts such as Libya where social media penetration is high, foreign social media outlets with political interests can use social media platforms to influence the country's politics. In this study, we assess how social media content varies by the country of the information producer. We create a dataset of Facebook posts about a strongman’s recent attack on Tripoli (N=16,662). We find that more than half of the posts originated from outside Libya and that posts from countries aligned with the Tripoli-based government are biased in that direction and posts from countries aligned with the eastern-based strongman are biased toward his forces. However, many Pages are not slanted: the correlations are instead driven by a smaller number of hyperpartisan Pages. Our findings have implications for our understanding of how social media content -- especially from abroad -- shapes citizen perceptions of the legitimacy of competing political actors.
{"title":"Slanted Narratives, Social Media, and Foreign Influence in Libya","authors":"S. Grossman, Katie Jonsson, Nicholas Lyon, L. Sizer","doi":"10.51685/jqd.2022.010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.51685/jqd.2022.010","url":null,"abstract":"In fragile contexts such as Libya where social media penetration is high, foreign social media outlets with political interests can use social media platforms to influence the country's politics. In this study, we assess how social media content varies by the country of the information producer. We create a dataset of Facebook posts about a strongman’s recent attack on Tripoli (N=16,662). We find that more than half of the posts originated from outside Libya and that posts from countries aligned with the Tripoli-based government are biased in that direction and posts from countries aligned with the eastern-based strongman are biased toward his forces. However, many Pages are not slanted: the correlations are instead driven by a smaller number of hyperpartisan Pages. Our findings have implications for our understanding of how social media content -- especially from abroad -- shapes citizen perceptions of the legitimacy of competing political actors.","PeriodicalId":93587,"journal":{"name":"Journal of quantitative description: digital media","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88122261","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Does online political involvement reinforce or compensate participatory deficiencies at the polls? Extant survey evidence portrays online participation as a weapon of the strong, wielded by a highly politically involved, white, and affluent subset of the American electorate. Surveys face systematic sampling and measurement errors in the domain of political participation, though. In this study, I revisit this question using individual voter registration records that I integrate with observed Twitter activity. Based on a large sample that reflects Florida’s voting-eligible population, I find that political involvement on Twitter is prevalent across the electorate and extends to those most likely to abstain from voting. Moreover, race and income, which are salient dividing lines in voting, do not structure social media-based political participation. These results challenge reinforcement theory and substantiate social media’s compensatory potential for more inclusive representation. I discuss implications for political representation and future research examining political involvement.
{"title":"Voting and Social Media-Based Political Participation","authors":"Sascha Göbel","doi":"10.31235/osf.io/sjq4g","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/sjq4g","url":null,"abstract":"Does online political involvement reinforce or compensate participatory deficiencies at the polls? Extant survey evidence portrays online participation as a weapon of the strong, wielded by a highly politically involved, white, and affluent subset of the American electorate. Surveys face systematic sampling and measurement errors in the domain of political participation, though. In this study, I revisit this question using individual voter registration records that I integrate with observed Twitter activity. Based on a large sample that reflects Florida’s voting-eligible population, I find that political involvement on Twitter is prevalent across the electorate and extends to those most likely to abstain from voting. Moreover, race and income, which are salient dividing lines in voting, do not structure social media-based political participation. These results challenge reinforcement theory and substantiate social media’s compensatory potential for more inclusive representation. I discuss implications for political representation and future research examining political involvement.","PeriodicalId":93587,"journal":{"name":"Journal of quantitative description: digital media","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78988284","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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