Asian Review of Political Economy最新文献

With the advancement of the reform and opening up, the non-state Sectors (NSS) in China and Vietnam have developed rapidly. The ruling parties, which used to have comprehensive control over politics, economy, and society, have now found it difficult to control the new economic space. To effectively control NSS, the Communist Party of China and the Communist Party of Vietnam have attempted to embed themselves in NSS by expanding grassroots party organizations. In this process, they have adopted different strategies and procedures, resulting in two distinct models: China’s expansion model, which is characterized by a proactive approach combining rigidity and flexibility, and Vietnam's expansion model, which is characterized by a flexible approach with a focus on soft cooperation. This study compares the formation, nature, and main characteristics of the two models for party organization expansion in China and Vietnam, hoping to provide a more comprehensive and objective understanding of the developments in China and Vietnam, preliminarily elucidate, from an academic perspective, the operational model of party-building in NSS in the two countries, and enrich the theoretical research on the continuous expansion of the existing Leninist parties in the new era.

In Southeast Asia, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines are defined by the World Bank as countries that failed to overcome the "middle income trap". The four Southeast Asian countries (hereinafter referred to as the "ASEAN Four") entered the ranks of middle-income economies in the late 1970s and early 1980s and achieved rapid economic development throughout the 1980s and 1990s. However, since the early 2000s, the competitive advantages of these countries’ labor-intensive industries have started to decline, while the process of industrial transformation and technological improvement has been stagnated due to the lack of innovation resources. With limited R&D input and insufficient indigenous tech innovation, these countries’ manufacturing industry show a trend of "deindustrialization" and the "middle technology trap" phenomenon emerged. As the manufacturing sector failed to generate value-added that promotes economic growth and national income increase, ASEAN Four have so far yet to enter the high-income ranks. Drawing from the cases of ASEAN Four, this paper argues that the "middle technology trap" is a key contributing factor to the “middle income trap,” and countries fallen into the “middle income trap” often experience the "middle technology trap" as a concomitant phenomenon. The paper first introduces the industrialization process of ASEAN Four while analyzes the challenges they faced in industrial structural transformation and technology advancement. It then discusses major reasons that these countries failed to step over both the "middle technology trap" and the “middle income trap”, including limited technology spillovers from FDI, R&D investment shortages and insufficient industrial policies, low-quality education system, deficient intellectual property protection and underdeveloped regional capital markets. The paper concludes with some implications for China and discussion on potential future research on distinctions of the “middle technology trap” phenomenon between upper middle-income and lower middle-income countries.

This study examines the possible emergence of a Middle Technology Trap (MTT) in U.S.-China strategic competition through the lens of the Global Financial Network (GFN) and the Global Innovation Network (GIN). By conducting doctrinal analysis, theoretically informed case studies, and in-depth interviews, we offer a granular study into how the U.S. has been weaponizing its leading position in the GFN to affect China’s level of participation in the GIN. Our findings reveal three U.S. tactics to induce the MTT with China: first, leveraging U.S. private equity and venture capital (PEVC) to enhance its technology advantage over China; second, pushing U.S. investors to withdraw from China’s PEVC market, thereby restricting Chinese access to American capital; and third, inducing Advanced Business Services (ABS) supporting innovation and global business to cease or reduce their operations in China, thereby increasing intermediation costs for innovation. Although Chinese government-guided funds (GGFs) have managed to partially mitigate the “funding gap” from the departure of American PEVCs, they have yet to assume the brokerage role previously played by American PEVCs in both the GIF and the GIN. As such, our study contributes to a better understanding and theoretical advancements of the MTT by linking up the scholarship of innovation and finance with financial statecraft.

Most Latin American countries entered the ranks of middle-income levels almost simultaneously with Japan and South Korea. However, while Japan and South Korea embarked on the path of economic development through technological innovation and industrial upgrading, Latin America fell into the middle-income trap. By examining the history of industrial and technological development in Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico, three representative countries in Latin America, this paper finds that the fundamental reasons for Latin America falling into the middle-income trap lie in the tension between the choice of industrialization path and primitive accumulation, as well as the institutional deficiencies in technology and industrial development. Latin America, which has fallen into the middle-income trap, finds it hard to upgrade its technology and is trapped in premature industrialization and the middle-technology trap. It can be said that Latin America has fallen into a double trap, which reinforces each other and forms a solid trap pattern. The warning from the Latin American experience is that late-developing countries need to maintain an open attitude during the process of technological catching up, build a complete technological innovation system, enhance industrial and technological governance capabilities, and seize the window of opportunity for technological and industrial upgrading. Otherwise, there is a significant risk of falling into the middle-income trap and even the double trap.

This article examines the concept of the "middle technology trap" as a critical challenge for China in transitioning from a middle-income to a high-income economy. It argues that overcoming this trap is essential for China to achieve high-quality economic development and sustain its growth momentum. The study compares China's technological landscape with that of both developed economies and those stuck in the middle-income trap, identifying the necessity of transitioning from applied to original technology for economic leapfrogging. Through comprehensive analysis, it is highlighted that China's current technological capabilities, although leading in certain areas, predominantly remain at an intermediate level, characterized by a significant reliance on foreign core technologies and a lack of original technological innovation. The paper further explores historical contexts, policy implications, and strategic reforms required to navigate this trap, emphasizing the importance of an open policy, the cultivation of a robust innovation ecosystem, and the strategic role of government in facilitating technological progress and industrial upgrading. It draws on the experiences of developed economies and successful latecomers, advocating for a "new whole nation system" that embraces openness and global integration, rather than isolation. By analyzing the complex interplay between technology diffusion, talent migration, industrial policies, and the global geopolitical landscape, this study provides insights into the systemic reforms and strategic initiatives China must undertake. It stresses the need for a balanced approach between leveraging external technologies and fostering domestic innovation capabilities to escape the middle technology trap and secure a position as a global technology leader. The findings contribute to the broader discourse on technology-led development strategies and offer policy recommendations for economies facing similar technological and developmental challenges.

This special issue explores the relationship between digital trade and security, emphasizing the geopolitical implications for the global economy in the digital age. The rapid growth of digital trade has introduced significant challenges and opportunities, necessitating robust data governance to balance national security interests with the free flow of goods, services, and data across borders. The papers explore the different models of data governance championed by the US, China, and the EU, highlighting the complexities of cross-border data flows and their impact on international relations. Through detailed analyses of various international agreements and frameworks, this special issue provides a comprehensive overview of the current landscape of digital trade and its security implications, with a particular focus on China's evolving approach to data governance and its global influence.

China, the European Union, and the United States are the three largest digital economies in the world. This article compares the antitrust regulation of the digital economy in the three regions after the 2000s. It argues that over time, the antitrust regulation of the digital economy in the three regions tends to converge along three dimensions: growing separation of the antitrust regulation of the digital economy from that of the other economic sectors, convergence of regulatory objectives, and convergence of regulatory methods. In combination with the geopoliticization of the platform economy, this article argues that four factors have contributed to shape such convergence: (1) historical factors, (2) globalization of the digital economy, (3) increasing policy imitation and policy competition among the major digital powers of the world, (4) support from the civil society.

The full understanding of the importance of submarine cables as part of the global network infrastructure in the digital economy era, along with decades of knowledge accumulation in this field, has not prevented Hong Kong from facing increasing difficulties in gaining more access to submarine cable systems since 2017. Given that geopolitical differences between China and the U.S. are dividing the international network infrastructure, the business interests of Hong Kong enterprises and the urban development prospects of the Hong Kong government have been forced to defer to Beijing’s security concerns. Meanwhile, in recent years China has been acquiring data power by modelling the “data collection – data sharing – data space governance” path that the United States and its allies set previously. During this process, the power shaped by China’s unique technological, social and institutional characteristics offers an alternative to American dominance, although it exacerbates the global divergence of internet infrastructure. Many projects along the Belt and Road Initiative and the Digital Silk Road are the examples of China’s data power projection, and will bring opportunities for Hong Kong’s own submarine cables sector and for the city’s role as a super connector in the coming years.

Amid economic globalisation and the rapid development of advanced technologies in recent years, the world economy has shown an increasing trend of digitalisation, whilst digital trade has become the primary pattern of international trade. Based on differences rooted in socio-political systems, as well as the current precarious geopolitical realities, governments adopt different ideas in accordance with their respective interests in the institutionalisation of digital trade. As the world’s second-largest economy and a major digital power, China’s behaviours and ideological stances attract scholarly attention and states’ concern. Whilst Western countries and scholars have criticised China’s ideas of “government intervention in data regulation” and “cyber sovereignty” applied in its existing approach to digital trade, warning that China’s approach poses a threat to Western powers’ adherence to liberalism in the international digital trade system and the idea of “free data flow” in their approaches to digital trade, there has been insufficient research into how China’s approach to digital trade has evolved over time and which ideas and interests have influenced it. To bridge this gap in the literature, this paper divides the evolution of China’s approach to digital trade over the past three decades (1993–2023) into three phases using a longitudinal approach. This research conducts qualitative content analysis using official documents, white papers, and declarations from official Chinese websites, then adopts the 3I analytical framework to analyse which ideas and interests have influenced China’s approach in each phase and how its approach to digital trade has evolved over time.

How has China’s privacy protection strategy been developed, with its broad scope and stringent requirements for data localization and cross-border data flows? What are the broader geopolitical implications of its divergence from Western models of data privacy? This paper argues that China's privacy protection strategy, characterized by its comprehensive regulatory framework and government access to data, is redefining the contours of global data governance and creating new geopolitical fault lines. Drawing on official documents, laws, regulations, and a case study, this paper highlights the evolution of the regulatory framework in response to emerging challenges posed by technological innovations and the wider geopolitical environment. This paper contributes to the broader discussion regarding the implications of China's privacy protection approach, highlighting potential normative clashes with countries that favor a more open digital economy. China's efforts in developing its own privacy protection strategy have also resulted in the formulation of global standards for data privacy.