Asian Review of Political Economy最新文献

India's engagement with the Gulf region has a long-standing history, spanning cultural, economic, and diasporic dimensions. Since Prime Minister Modi's tenure, India's Gulf policy has undergone significant adjustments, aiming to enhance its geopolitical influence, ensure energy security, and advance economic and security cooperation by strengthening ties with Gulf nations. Despite achieving some successes, India continues to confront challenges such as U.S. sanctions on Iran and China's competitive presence in West Asia, particularly in the context of intensifying China-U.S. strategic competition. The impact of China-U.S. strategic rivalry on India's Gulf policy is multifaceted. Firstly, the pressure to maintain a dynamic balance in geopolitical maneuvering has increased, necessitating India to remain adaptable in a complex international environment. Secondly, the intensifying China-U.S. competition has prompted India to reassess and adjust its Gulf policy to better safeguard its interests and adapt to the evolving international landscape. Thirdly, the urgency to formulate policies that preserve India's traditional interests has escalated. In response to these challenges, the Modi administration has recalibrated India's Gulf policy, which exhibits three key shifts. Firstly, the Gulf region has gained greater prominence in India's overall diplomatic strategy. Secondly, India has deepened its economic ties with Gulf nations through enhanced trade and investment cooperation. Thirdly, India has selectively coordinated policies with the U.S. to ensure the protection of its interests in the security domain. Looking ahead, India's Gulf policy can be further refined by deepening cooperation in the region and leveraging China's development momentum to share the economic benefits in the Gulf. Additionally, it is imperative for India to formulate a pragmatic and cautious policy towards Iran, characterized by risk aversion and limited proactive engagement.

This paper explores weaponized interdependence and tipping point dynamics. The United States employs export controls to maintain technological leadership and restrict China's access to essential semiconductor technology. Conversely, China intensifies its investment in the semiconductor sector, aiming for technological independence and lessening its dependence on U.S.-controlled technologies. The paper introduces a Stackelberg nested game model to analyze the strategic interactions between the U.S., China, and Chinese semiconductor companies. A tipping point indicates a departure from a unified global network to a polarized structure of technological spheres led by the U.S. and China. Utilizing Bayesian Q-learning, the paper uncovers that continuous escalations could result in detrimental outcomes, including wasted resources and a split global technology regime. The study underscores the limitations of weaponized interdependence as a long-term strategic tool and calls for a recalibration of strategies to prevent irreversible fragmentation of the global technological landscape.

This paper examines the policies of the United States and Russia in arming non-state actors in the Middle East, analysing their objectives, consequences, and implications for regional stability. The study's central question is: How have the actions of the US and Russia in arming non-state actors impacted the conflicts and stability in the Middle East? Using a qualitative analysis of case studies from Syria, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and Yemen, the paper explores the differing strategic approaches of the two powers—America’s tactical, short-term goals versus Russia’s long-term, strategic objectives—and the resulting consequences for the region. The findings suggest that both powers' interventions have exacerbated instability, with the arming of non-state actors often leading to prolonged wars and the emergence of new conflicts. The involvement of regional powers, such as Iran, U.A.E and Türkiye, further complicates the situation, creating an endless cycle of proxy warfare. In contrast, China’s abstention from arming non-state actors is driven by economic concerns and a preference for regional stability.

Given the significant religious connotations, political demands, and social implications associated with Islamic extremism, it is crucial that counter-extremism strategies address a wide array of areas. This is particularly vital in the realms of political participation, religious management, and social governance, all of which are essential for the prevention of Islamic extremism. The complexity and diversity present in the political, religious, and social landscapes of Middle Eastern countries have led to variations in the policies and effectiveness of governance approaches related to Islamic extremism. These variations provide valuable lessons and insights. This article aims to analyze the differences and implications of governance approaches to extremism in the Middle East through a multidimensional assessment of the interrelations among politics and religion, religious-secular relations, and state-society relations. Rather than categorizing these approaches as inherently positive or negative, it is imperative for each country to identify governance strategies that are congruent with its unique circumstances.

The recent events in the Middle East caught most political commentators, observers and thinkers by surprise. Who would have imagined that a non-state actor like Hamas could launch an attack on Israel and create such a complex condition for a powerful state, heavily supported by the USA and Western powers? However, crises in the Middle East often escalate unpredictably, defying calculations and expectations. This paper argues that since October 7th 2023, not only in the Middle East but also in several other regions worldwide, major rival powers have been struggling with crises that are leading to reshape the global order. The paper argues that the realms of Economy, Security, and Diplomacy among the primary global powers are all under scrutiny as they navigate the crises that have intensified significantly towards altering the global order.

This study aims to discuss China’s bilateral partnership with Southeast Asia under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China’s BRI framework of cooperation serves as a platform for enhancing economic, cultural, tourism, and trade relationships with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states, promoting regional development and cooperation. China’s BRI cooperation framework comprehensively defines “Globalization 5.0” and this research speaks rationally about the theory of power transition. As a result, BRI projects not only benefit Southeast Asian countries by improving infrastructure and economic growth but also contribute to China’s strategic goal of expanding its influence in the region through connectivity and cooperation. The BRI has been instrumental in developing large-scale infrastructure projects across Southeast Asia, including railways, ports, highways, and energy projects. The China-Laos Railway, which connects Vientiane with Kunming, is a notable example, promoting regional connectivity and trade. Similarly, the Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway in Indonesia is another high-profile project aimed at enhancing transportation efficiency. In addition to economic and infrastructure projects, the BRI has enhanced cultural ties between China and Southeast Asia. This includes educational exchanges, joint research initiatives, and people-to-people exchanges, fostering stronger mutual understanding and cooperation. Collaborative cultural programs and tourism initiatives have been promoted to strengthen these ties.

How regime types affect the provision of social spending in the context of developing countries? This article provides a novel political-economic approach, arguing that single-party regimes are more likely to spend on pensions than other types of autocratic states to co-opt the large number of critical members although the regime type does not affect the general welfare spending across autocratic states. The theory emphasizes the effect of institutional and power structure heterogeneity across autocracies in shaping the incentives and strategies that the ruling elites co-opt and respond to the demands of the ruling coalition across different autocratic regimes. Using panel, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with lagged dependent variable along with several empirical strategies, it finds the evidence supporting this argument with a new dataset from 1990 to 2012. The study provides new insights on how autocratic institutions especially the party utilize strategic social policies to resolve the elite-level dictator dilemma for regime survival that are absent in other autocratic types.

Since the 1990s, China’s engagement beyond its geographical periphery, especially with Asian regions, has grown exceptionally, which is best evident in the Gulf sub-region and Western Asian nations. Indeed, energy-based interactions were the first to be established with Gulf Arab countries, and today, more than two decades after the Cold War, such relationships have evolved into tighter partnerships and engagement networks. Thus, in the last decade, China has increased its economic and political footprint in the Gulf region, as it has become one of the region’s largest external investors and trade partners. In its relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, China faces varying challenges as each country pursues its interests, making the Chinese strategy in the region more complex. The Gulf countries have had to balance their relationship between the US as a security guarantor and China as an important economic partner. They strive to maximize their political and economic interests in the process. The main contention of this paper is that the GCC should not be viewed as a homogenous entity and that the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a flexible approach designed to bolster China’s economic objectives in each Gulf country. Our research scrutinizes China’s geo-economic strategy and geopolitical aims about the Gulf States’ aspirations to maximize their economic ties with China. Against this background, this paper discusses the political and economic relationships between the People’s Republic of China and the Gulf Arab states: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

This study proposes a framework to analyze the interaction between geopolitics and the Middle-Technology Trap, drawing on evidence from China's CNC machine-tool industry. Qualitative methods such as interviews have been utilized to identify geopolitical variables that have driven the development of the Chinese CNC machine tools industry. To explore the combined effects of the Middle-Technology Trap and the intense competition between China and the West, this article focuses on an industry that has been significantly influenced by the economic decoupling between China and the US, a phenomenon deeply rooted in recent great power competition. While several industries may illustrate the new status quo of the Middle-Technology Trap, the CNC machine-tool industry is particularly exemplary due to its close interrelation with geopolitics. Accordingly, this study presents a catch-up case that incorporates technology-oriented aspects and factors from strategic competition, underlining three scenarios that geopolitics could influence the result of addresing the Middle-Technology Trap, respectively technological decoupling, the relocation of supply chain, and industrial policy.