Asian Review of Political Economy最新文献

Why do states realign their foreign policies toward a major power? Conventional wisdom holds that change in political leadership tends to result in less drastic foreign policy realignment in countries with large winning coalitions. The current study capitalizes on this conventional wisdom by invoking a key insight of the selectorate theory, the non-linear welfare function. Since the welfare of coalition members falls before it rises as the size of winning coalition becomes larger, one should expect the stabilizing effects of winning coalitions to be the weakest for low-to-medium sized winning coalitions. Thus, leadership turnover in countries with middle-sized winning coalitions is expected to result in greater foreign policy realignment than in countries with very large or very small coalitions. We test this theoretical proposition by studying the foreign policies of 154 countries towards China from 1972 to 2015. With newly constructed measures of leadership turnover and winning coalitions size, the evidence supports a non-linear relationship between change in leadership and foreign policy realignment along the continuum of winning coalition size.

Does transnational anti-bribery enforcement affect the risk-mitigation strategies of firms? This paper uses an original dataset on the enforcement actions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) to examine the law’s impact on corporate behavior and political risks for multinational corporations (MNCs). I argue that corrupt institutions are not necessarily undesirable for foreign investors. Foreign firms seek above-normal returns in high-risk markets through informal exchanges with the host government. FCPA enforcement provides a “fire alarm” that affects firms differently given their sensitivity to corruption concerns. FCPA enforcement has unequal deterrence against corporate misconduct, encouraging some firms to adopt transparency norms while incentivizing other firms to be more insidious in their corrupt business practices. I use a partial observability bivariate probit model to estimate the unobservable propensity of firms to engage in corrupt exchanges. Then I examine the impact of FCPA enforcement on Chinese FDI, and find that Chinese investments are deterred from markets with robust legal institutions. The FCPA’s deterrence effects against corrupt competitors is a positive outcome for U.S. MNCs. However, American companies experience diminished returns in countries with strong investor protection regimes. External legal interventions under the FCPA generate regulatory burdens on U.S. that limit their business opportunities.

The emergence of China as a major provider of development finance has garnered considerable scholarly debate. Chinese investments and their impact on recipient states have been extensively studied, mainly focusing on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In response to the BRI, the European Commission recently announced its connectivity strategy, the Global Gateway initiative. In this context, and even before the announcement, little work has been done to map Chinese state capitalist development finance side by side with the European Union’s (EU) market-led, public-private partnership-oriented strategies, especially within Europe’s own neighborhood. Additionally, the literature insufficiently explains why development institutions (agents) would act geo-economically to enforce their most powerful member states’ (principals) international agendas. This lack of theoretical explanatory power poses a serious puzzle. Thus, we ask, how has EU and Chinese institutional investment cooperation developed (legally and financially) in the EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) region in the previous EU Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) from 2014 to 2020? We argue that development institutions have acted in accordance with their principal’s policy goals by facilitating investment and institutional agreements and by offering beneficial cooperation conditions, so that the EU and China can direct investment in a geo-economic manner if they choose to do so. In the following, we find that European investment in the EaP countries Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, has been huge in absolute terms (amount invested) and strong in relative terms––through deeper economic cooperation––when compared to Chinese investment activity in the same countries. This development supports the EU’s aim of countering China’s increasing economic presence in the region. However, we find that this gap has been closing in total terms. Our study suggests that while China has not matched EU investment in the EaP region for the previous MFF, further research is needed to unpack individual sectors and their geo-economic implications for official development institutions and their respective states.

There are two main stream theories explaining China’s rapid economic development in the reform era: new institutionalism and developmental state theory. Realizing the weaknesses of two main stream theories and based on China’s unique experience as both a transitional economy and developing economy that experienced rapid industrialization and marketization, scholars also developed other theories with some revisions of the above two mainstream theories. While these theories have very different focuses, they agree on the importance of state capacity. The author argues that the Chinese Communist Party composes the institutional foundation of state capacities to promote economic growth and build market institutions, and discusses three important aspects of how party strength and state capacity helped the market transition, government restructuring and enterprise reform. The future challenges are discussed in the conclusion.

This article argues that the Bank of Japan is caught in a bind owing to both its quantitative easing policies of the last two decades and chronic inflation. In response to quantitative tightening abroad, the Bank of Japan is under pressure to raise interest rates and/or allow yields on ten-year government bonds to rise. This is because the response to inflation among G7 nations has undermined the yen, which have made clear the flaws of the Bank of Japan’s approach to restoring economic growth, namely quantitative easing as any attempt to adapt to international efforts to address inflation, using monetary methods, runs the risk of triggering a cascade of loan defaults due to illiquidity issues both at home and in foreign markets. To demonstrate this, the article evaluates Japanese quantitative easing measures, including the Bank of Japan’s yield curve control policy, and assesses the problems it faces due to inflation and the responses to it, including monetary tightening abroad.

The ongoing transfer of economic power from the West to the East created a shift in economic dominance and the global power balance, allowing emerging nations to enhance their positions. Several countries favor a Free and Open Indo-Pacific initiative to preserve the status quo. Because it maintains an essential seaport in the Indian Ocean, Bangladesh is recognized as a maritime nation. Bangladesh’s geographic advantage allows it to serve as a node and hub in regional and inter-regional trade and investment. This potential stems from the global movement of economic power toward the Indo-Pacific Region. This study assesses whether Japan’s FOIP can provide peace and stability to Bangladesh while grasping geopolitical sustainability. Furthermore, this paper argues FOIP’s regional economic cooperation is managed effectively, and Japanese investment might benefit Bangladesh’s economy for sustainable development. This qualitative study uses primary and secondary data to evaluate the feasibility of Japanese geopolitical projects in Bangladesh for peace, stability, and prosperity. This study provides a new paradigm in analyzing the strategic geopolitical implications of FOIP in the Bay of Bengal area, highlighting the repercussions of geopolitical transformation into a strategic focal point. This study depicts the equiangular developmental diplomacy’s balancing instrument and standards for joint stability and growth in the Bay of Bengal area.

Why would an emerging market economy without Western democratic institutions provide and promote social welfare to its citizens? This paper explores the driving forces behind the rapid yet unequal expansion of social welfare in China, a phenomenon notable since the late 1990s. Rather than adhering to the conventional state-centered approach that views welfare expansion as a strategy for one-party regimes to seek legitimacy, this study offers an alternate perspective that emphasizes the ‘demand’ side, particularly the role of business. Through a systematic analysis of all 336 Chinese municipalities from 2001 to 2012, the study demonstrates how big businesses act as ‘vanguard,’ pushing local governments to enhance social welfare provision. It suggests that big businesses, in the absence of institutionalized democratic institutions, serve as ‘functional equivalents,’ channeling societal demands to the government. This paper also finds that firms’ influence on social policy in non-democracies is more capability based instead of institutional based; large domestic and multinational corporations are more capable in lobbying the government.