Asian Review of Political Economy最新文献

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) promises to expand trade substantially for businesses in the agreement’s 15 members countries, but who will be more likely to capture the gains from trade liberalization? Drawing on insights from the emerging research program on the politics of global production networks and value chains, this study unpacks the differential benefits of free trade agreements as a function of a firm’s degree of supply chain linkages with partner countries, thus moving beyond traditional theories of trade that draw the distinction primarily between import-competing and export-oriented firms. Leveraging an original survey of more than 500 firms in China, the empirical analyses show that the more backward and forward supply chain linkages with RCEP countries a firm has, the greater its likelihood of anticipating positive impact from the RCEP, even among exporters. These findings enrich our understanding of the political economy of preferential trade liberalization and global supply chains and offer policy suggestions for member countries hoping to maximize benefits for their businesses from the largest trade agreement in the world today.

How to understand the relative success and institutional basis of the industrial policies implemented by the Chinese government since the reform and opening up? And, In the context of a new round of scientific and technological revolution, disruptive technologies are constantly emerging, what kind of challenges will this new situation bring to China's existing industrial policy paradigm? In this paper, I employ the method of literature and theoretical analysis, combined with a series of related studies, especially of my own, to answer the above questions. In my view, China's relatively successful industrial policy paradigm will become a trap of China under the rise of disruptive technologies. To prevent China from falling into the trap, the Chinese government need to transform from a selective industrial policy to a functional industrial policy. It should conduct a comprehensive reflection on the existing national innovation system and reshape the science policy, technology policy, talent policy and competition policy. Therefore, it is also necessary to establish an institutional foundation compatible with the new industrial policy paradigm in terms of incentives through institutional reform.

This paper expands the research on how shared prosperity is achieved in East Asian countries (regions). Based on welfare production regime theory, this paper advances a theoretical framework to link economic growth to income distribution. The main argument is that the match between the skills developed by social protection systems and the needs of product market strategies is key to economic progress. The skills and the social protection systems could also influence income allocation through distribution and redistribution. The net effect of the two channels determines the result of income equality. A longitudinal exploration of Japan, Taiwan and Korea in the export-led growth period (1961–1979) and the knowledge economy period (1980–1996) supports the argument. A policy implication of the argument is that China could strategically adjust its welfare production regime to achieve shared prosperity.

Drawing on a field survey of 116 villages in rural China conducted by the authors in 2005, we analyze whether and to what extent the official electoral institutions, as administered by local government, were a system that was consistent with the public preferences of villagers. We find a positive correlation between public opinion and actual electoral institutions; that is, if more villagers believed a certain electoral institution was ideal, the probability increased that such an electoral institution was implemented in practical village elections. The opinion-policy linkage, however, suggests that central government interventions and pressure from villagers’ collective protests were more effective than institutionalized and regular deliberations.