Asian Review of Political Economy最新文献

This article addresses a critical issue facing developing countries: overcoming the “middle-technology trap” to achieve sustainable economic growth. It posits that transitioning to an innovation-driven economic growth model is pivotal for surmounting this trap and is an essential prerequisite for high-quality development. This study introduces a strategic approach through a new development model, emphasizing the synergy among three core systems: basic scientific research, applied technology, and financial support. This “three-pronged” collaboration model is argued to foster sustainable innovation-driven growth, essential for leaping over the “middle-income trap” towards high-quality development. By analyzing the historical trajectories of the Soviet Union and the United States, the article delineates the critical role of the proposed model in fostering an innovation economy. The Soviet Union’s failure and the United States’ success are examined through the lens of their respective approaches to integrating basic scientific research, applied technology, and financial systems. The analysis underscores the necessity of a balanced and interactive relationship among these systems for technological innovation, industrial development, and sustainable economic growth. The article concludes that for China to overcome the “middle-technology trap” and achieve long-term prosperity, it should embrace this “three-pronged” new development model, ensuring continuous scientific exploration, technological innovation, and productivity enhancement.

This paper aims to unveil the role of openness in fostering enterprises to achieve technological progress. By conducting a comparative analysis of Chinese and Western companies’ supply chain strategies in the internet and new energy industries, the article finds that American enterprises have a higher level of supply chain openness than Chinese enterprises in both two industries. Based on the case analysis, that paper argues that openness plays a vital role in promoting technological innovation in enterprises. The profound influence of openness in promoting technological advancement may be observed through three aspects: openness at the technical level, openness in attracting talent, and openness in facilitating the development of rules and regulations. Accordingly, suggestions are proposed to assist Chinese enterprises in avoiding the “Middle-Technology Trap” through openness on the basis of legislation and public policy intervention. Meanwhile, the Chinese government is suggested to promote national coordination to establish a national unified market to realize the three levels of openness of the supply chain and industrial chain strategies: enterprise-level, domestic regional level, and international level.

This article aims to elucidate the varying effects of democratization in ASEAN members on the normative changes in the core principles of the “ASEAN Way.” Utilizing a regional-centric approach that emphasizes ASEAN members’ agency, the article posits that two critical variables shape the changing trajectory of ASEAN norms: ASEAN members' democratic performances and their regional status. While an ASEAN member’s democratic performance influences its willingness to advocate for normative changes, its regional status is also crucial in determining its capability to implement changes by navigating the divergent interests among ASEAN members. Only the ASEAN member with a high-quality democratic performance at home and recognized regional leadership can effectively bring about normative changes to ASEAN norms. Otherwise, either the domestic democratic deficit or a lack of leadership status will hinder the ASEAN members’ efforts to promote normative changes. Using the process-tracing method, the article empirically focuses on the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia for comparative case studies. The findings reveal that the Philippines’ poor democratic performance since the democratic restoration in 1986 has hindered its motivation to push for normative changes in ASEAN, rendering the Philippines a reluctant promoter. Although Thailand has made notable achievements in democratic consolidation since the downfall of junta rule in 1992, its lack of regional leadership has greatly limited its capability to reconcile the divergent interests among ASEAN members, resulting in the failure of its “flexible engagement” initiative. Conversely, Indonesia, with a high-quality democratic performance at home and bolstered by its regional leadership status, successfully brought significant changes to ASEAN norms by facilitating the ASEAN Charter signed in 2007.

With the advancement of the reform and opening up, the non-state Sectors (NSS) in China and Vietnam have developed rapidly. The ruling parties, which used to have comprehensive control over politics, economy, and society, have now found it difficult to control the new economic space. To effectively control NSS, the Communist Party of China and the Communist Party of Vietnam have attempted to embed themselves in NSS by expanding grassroots party organizations. In this process, they have adopted different strategies and procedures, resulting in two distinct models: China’s expansion model, which is characterized by a proactive approach combining rigidity and flexibility, and Vietnam's expansion model, which is characterized by a flexible approach with a focus on soft cooperation. This study compares the formation, nature, and main characteristics of the two models for party organization expansion in China and Vietnam, hoping to provide a more comprehensive and objective understanding of the developments in China and Vietnam, preliminarily elucidate, from an academic perspective, the operational model of party-building in NSS in the two countries, and enrich the theoretical research on the continuous expansion of the existing Leninist parties in the new era.

In Southeast Asia, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines are defined by the World Bank as countries that failed to overcome the "middle income trap". The four Southeast Asian countries (hereinafter referred to as the "ASEAN Four") entered the ranks of middle-income economies in the late 1970s and early 1980s and achieved rapid economic development throughout the 1980s and 1990s. However, since the early 2000s, the competitive advantages of these countries’ labor-intensive industries have started to decline, while the process of industrial transformation and technological improvement has been stagnated due to the lack of innovation resources. With limited R&D input and insufficient indigenous tech innovation, these countries’ manufacturing industry show a trend of "deindustrialization" and the "middle technology trap" phenomenon emerged. As the manufacturing sector failed to generate value-added that promotes economic growth and national income increase, ASEAN Four have so far yet to enter the high-income ranks. Drawing from the cases of ASEAN Four, this paper argues that the "middle technology trap" is a key contributing factor to the “middle income trap,” and countries fallen into the “middle income trap” often experience the "middle technology trap" as a concomitant phenomenon. The paper first introduces the industrialization process of ASEAN Four while analyzes the challenges they faced in industrial structural transformation and technology advancement. It then discusses major reasons that these countries failed to step over both the "middle technology trap" and the “middle income trap”, including limited technology spillovers from FDI, R&D investment shortages and insufficient industrial policies, low-quality education system, deficient intellectual property protection and underdeveloped regional capital markets. The paper concludes with some implications for China and discussion on potential future research on distinctions of the “middle technology trap” phenomenon between upper middle-income and lower middle-income countries.

This study examines the possible emergence of a Middle Technology Trap (MTT) in U.S.-China strategic competition through the lens of the Global Financial Network (GFN) and the Global Innovation Network (GIN). By conducting doctrinal analysis, theoretically informed case studies, and in-depth interviews, we offer a granular study into how the U.S. has been weaponizing its leading position in the GFN to affect China’s level of participation in the GIN. Our findings reveal three U.S. tactics to induce the MTT with China: first, leveraging U.S. private equity and venture capital (PEVC) to enhance its technology advantage over China; second, pushing U.S. investors to withdraw from China’s PEVC market, thereby restricting Chinese access to American capital; and third, inducing Advanced Business Services (ABS) supporting innovation and global business to cease or reduce their operations in China, thereby increasing intermediation costs for innovation. Although Chinese government-guided funds (GGFs) have managed to partially mitigate the “funding gap” from the departure of American PEVCs, they have yet to assume the brokerage role previously played by American PEVCs in both the GIF and the GIN. As such, our study contributes to a better understanding and theoretical advancements of the MTT by linking up the scholarship of innovation and finance with financial statecraft.

Most Latin American countries entered the ranks of middle-income levels almost simultaneously with Japan and South Korea. However, while Japan and South Korea embarked on the path of economic development through technological innovation and industrial upgrading, Latin America fell into the middle-income trap. By examining the history of industrial and technological development in Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico, three representative countries in Latin America, this paper finds that the fundamental reasons for Latin America falling into the middle-income trap lie in the tension between the choice of industrialization path and primitive accumulation, as well as the institutional deficiencies in technology and industrial development. Latin America, which has fallen into the middle-income trap, finds it hard to upgrade its technology and is trapped in premature industrialization and the middle-technology trap. It can be said that Latin America has fallen into a double trap, which reinforces each other and forms a solid trap pattern. The warning from the Latin American experience is that late-developing countries need to maintain an open attitude during the process of technological catching up, build a complete technological innovation system, enhance industrial and technological governance capabilities, and seize the window of opportunity for technological and industrial upgrading. Otherwise, there is a significant risk of falling into the middle-income trap and even the double trap.

This article examines the concept of the "middle technology trap" as a critical challenge for China in transitioning from a middle-income to a high-income economy. It argues that overcoming this trap is essential for China to achieve high-quality economic development and sustain its growth momentum. The study compares China's technological landscape with that of both developed economies and those stuck in the middle-income trap, identifying the necessity of transitioning from applied to original technology for economic leapfrogging. Through comprehensive analysis, it is highlighted that China's current technological capabilities, although leading in certain areas, predominantly remain at an intermediate level, characterized by a significant reliance on foreign core technologies and a lack of original technological innovation. The paper further explores historical contexts, policy implications, and strategic reforms required to navigate this trap, emphasizing the importance of an open policy, the cultivation of a robust innovation ecosystem, and the strategic role of government in facilitating technological progress and industrial upgrading. It draws on the experiences of developed economies and successful latecomers, advocating for a "new whole nation system" that embraces openness and global integration, rather than isolation. By analyzing the complex interplay between technology diffusion, talent migration, industrial policies, and the global geopolitical landscape, this study provides insights into the systemic reforms and strategic initiatives China must undertake. It stresses the need for a balanced approach between leveraging external technologies and fostering domestic innovation capabilities to escape the middle technology trap and secure a position as a global technology leader. The findings contribute to the broader discourse on technology-led development strategies and offer policy recommendations for economies facing similar technological and developmental challenges.

This special issue explores the relationship between digital trade and security, emphasizing the geopolitical implications for the global economy in the digital age. The rapid growth of digital trade has introduced significant challenges and opportunities, necessitating robust data governance to balance national security interests with the free flow of goods, services, and data across borders. The papers explore the different models of data governance championed by the US, China, and the EU, highlighting the complexities of cross-border data flows and their impact on international relations. Through detailed analyses of various international agreements and frameworks, this special issue provides a comprehensive overview of the current landscape of digital trade and its security implications, with a particular focus on China's evolving approach to data governance and its global influence.

China, the European Union, and the United States are the three largest digital economies in the world. This article compares the antitrust regulation of the digital economy in the three regions after the 2000s. It argues that over time, the antitrust regulation of the digital economy in the three regions tends to converge along three dimensions: growing separation of the antitrust regulation of the digital economy from that of the other economic sectors, convergence of regulatory objectives, and convergence of regulatory methods. In combination with the geopoliticization of the platform economy, this article argues that four factors have contributed to shape such convergence: (1) historical factors, (2) globalization of the digital economy, (3) increasing policy imitation and policy competition among the major digital powers of the world, (4) support from the civil society.