Journal of Occupational Accidents最新文献

The best efforts of qualified personnel to engineer out system faults and ensure mishap-free performance systems are not successful. We find that aspects beyond our skills and resources preclude dealing with the risk prevention problems of both simple and complex systems and the interaction between non-connected systems. Risk analysis techniques, are typically unable to assess all signs and root causes analyses in a systems approach. A management-based overview approach is suggested to control the environmental forces that impinge on risk prevention, be they technical, human, social, political or organizational.

Models are presented of the deviation process which leads to failure and accidents, and of the way in which human action intervenes to provokes and/or recover from deviations. The three levels of human information processing and their typical error types are summarised. The models are used to derive lessons for system designers and system managers in producing and running systems which will be robust against failure throughout their life cycle.

The demand for liability covers is related to fundamental changes towards a “service” economy and is likely to grow substantially in the future. This development will require the most efficient redistribution of roles between government, industry and insurance.

Companies of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group operate a very wide range of manufacturing installations which include oil refineries, gas processing and liquefaction plants and chemical plants.

The safety assessment of these installations is approached from a background of experience. The necessary experience to do this is continously brought to bear in design by involving appropriately selected staff and by applying established guidelines, standards and design/engineering procedures throughout the development of a project. In addition, structured safety reviews are carried out to check that all aspects have been properly dealt with.

The safety assessment of existing plants follows a pattern of enquiry which is similar to that for new plants.

Finally the question of residual risk is addressed: in general the assessment of the consequences of a failure scenario is more reliable than the judgement of its probability. Nevertheless there are instances where a closer look at probabilities can help in making design decisions. It is questionable whether risk analysis results can be used meaningfully in an absolute sense to judge the acceptability of an installation.

Safe operation of chemical plants is not only a question of operation procedures. Safe operation possibility starts very early during the design phase of a chemical plant where all the risk factors can be evaluated, and adequate techniques against those risks can be found out.

Principally, there are only a few typical risk factors like fire, explosion, chemical reactions and toxic risks for environment or personnel. Those risk factors can be looked for by systematic methods and - if necessary by some repeating steps - effective measures against those risks can be evaluated.

It needs a very consequent planning which is strongly correlated to the steps of risk analysis and even a strong quality assurance in course of the phase of erection of the chemical plant.

Nevertheless, a strict management during the phases of operation and, especially, the phases of maintenance, repair or changes in design is necessary.

An overview of the instruments of safety analysis is given, and the way by which risks are eliminated, is shown by an example.

The health and environmental risks and benefits of technological products and processes should be evaluated and managed in comprehensive fashion, taking into account the entire production life-cycle from the obtaining of raw materials, to production, through distribution and use, and on through final disposal of the product and all associated wastes. We have begun to do this, in choosing among alternative sources of electricity, in developing liquefied natural gas systems, and in minimizing the risks in major industrial complexes. This ambitious technico-cultural foresightedness deserves to be encouraged.