‘No connection!’ That may be the thought of conventional, old-fashioned thinking as to ‘literary theory’, on the one hand, and ‘WTO treaty interpretation’, on the other hand. In fact, the conventional wisdom as to how the World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body must interpret disputed terms in a treaty is incomplete. That orthodoxy says the Appellate Body is restricted to the tools provided by Articles 31– 32 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The key such tool is a lexicographic hammer, namely, finding the plain meaning of a word or phrase at issue in a case between two WTO Members, with occasional recourse to surrounding passages or to the purpose of the treaty in which the disputed term is located. But Articles 31–32 comprise a larger tool kit than obsessive focus on the definition of a disputed word or phrase. In truth, those Articles allow not only for Textualist and Contextualist techniques, but also Pragmatic ones. All such techniques are rich, nuanced tools familiar in English Literary Theory. An honest, open-minded account of the tools the Appellate Body has at its disposal to make decisions should acknowledge the possibilities this tripartite taxonomy affords, rather than castigate the Appellate Body for judicial activism if it allegedly strays from strict constructionism. interpretation, treaty, WTO Appellate Body, pragmatic, literary, Vienna Convention, trade
“没有关系!这可能是传统的、老式的思想，一方面是“文学理论”，另一方面是“世贸组织条约解释”。事实上，关于世界贸易组织(WTO)上诉机构必须如何解释条约中有争议的条款的传统智慧是不完整的。这种正统观点认为，上诉机构仅限于1969年《维也纳条约法公约》(Vienna Convention on treaty of Law)第31至32条规定的工具。这种工具的关键是词典编纂的锤子，即在两个WTO成员之间的案件中找到有争议的单词或短语的明确含义，偶尔求助于周围段落或争议术语所在条约的目的。但第31-32条包含了一个更大的工具包，而不是过分关注有争议的单词或短语的定义。事实上，这些文章不仅允许使用文本主义和语境主义的技巧，也允许使用语用主义的技巧。所有这些技巧在英国文学理论中都是丰富而细致的工具。一个诚实、开放的帐户的工具上诉机构在处理决策应该承认这三方分类提供可能性,而不是谴责上诉机构司法能动主义如果涉嫌偏离严格constructionism.interpretation,条约,世贸组织上诉机构,务实、文学、维也纳公约,贸易
{"title":"Pragmatic Literary Theories and WTO Treaty Interpretation","authors":"R. Bhala, Eric Witmer","doi":"10.54648/trad2021017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2021017","url":null,"abstract":"‘No connection!’ That may be the thought of conventional, old-fashioned thinking as to ‘literary theory’, on the one hand, and ‘WTO treaty interpretation’, on the other hand. In fact, the conventional wisdom as to how the World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body must interpret disputed terms in a treaty is incomplete.\u0000That orthodoxy says the Appellate Body is restricted to the tools provided by Articles 31– 32 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The key such tool is a lexicographic hammer, namely, finding the plain meaning of a word or phrase at issue in a case between two WTO Members, with occasional recourse to surrounding passages or to the purpose of the treaty in which the disputed term is located. But Articles 31–32 comprise a larger tool kit than obsessive focus on the definition of a disputed word or phrase.\u0000In truth, those Articles allow not only for Textualist and Contextualist techniques, but also Pragmatic ones. All such techniques are rich, nuanced tools familiar in English Literary Theory. An honest, open-minded account of the tools the Appellate Body has at its disposal to make decisions should acknowledge the possibilities this tripartite taxonomy affords, rather than castigate the Appellate Body for judicial activism if it allegedly strays from strict constructionism.\u0000interpretation, treaty, WTO Appellate Body, pragmatic, literary, Vienna Convention, trade","PeriodicalId":103245,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Trade Law (Topic)","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124521639","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article aims to clarify three long‐standing puzzles concerning the place of private standards in the World Trade Organization (WTO) through the lens of FSC labelling. The first question is whether the FSC label falls within the regulatory scope of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement). The second question is the extent of WTO member States’ obligations under the TBT Agreement if the FSC is an active standardizing body in their territories. The third question asks whether the FSC standard may qualify as an ‘international standard’ as defined in the TBT Agreement and thus may exert quasi‐legislative effects on WTO members’ national forest conservation laws and regulations. A detailed case study of the relationship between the FSC labelling and the TBT Agreement shows that the answers to these questions are much more nuanced than the existing scholarship suggests.
{"title":"Clearing the fog: Forest Stewardship Council labelling and the World Trade Organization","authors":"Ming Du","doi":"10.1111/REEL.12373","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/REEL.12373","url":null,"abstract":"This article aims to clarify three long‐standing puzzles concerning the place of private standards in the World Trade Organization (WTO) through the lens of FSC labelling. The first question is whether the FSC label falls within the regulatory scope of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement). The second question is the extent of WTO member States’ obligations under the TBT Agreement if the FSC is an active standardizing body in their territories. The third question asks whether the FSC standard may qualify as an ‘international standard’ as defined in the TBT Agreement and thus may exert quasi‐legislative effects on WTO members’ national forest conservation laws and regulations. A detailed case study of the relationship between the FSC labelling and the TBT Agreement shows that the answers to these questions are much more nuanced than the existing scholarship suggests.","PeriodicalId":103245,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Trade Law (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130514547","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.46340/eppd.2020.7.4.5
Juliia Kabrera
Ukrainian abstract: Ця стаття дає уявлення про межі застосування торгових звичаїв. Торгові звичаї можуть служити додатковим засобом для вирішення спору або як матеріальне право. Річ у тім, що рівень та ступінь юридичної сили торгових звичаїв можуть збільшуватися або зменшуватися, залежно від того, які правові норми були обрані сторонами як застосовне матеріальне право чи умови, що містяться в договорі. Аналізуючи сутність торгових звичаїв, юридичну практику міжнародних комерційних арбітражних судів, конвенцій, юридичних актів, національних та міжнародних документів, що використовуються у світовій торгівлі, думки видатних вчених, автор обґрунтував юридичні межі застосування торгових звичаїв у міжнародній системі врегулювання спорів та показала їх правову природу. Для досягнення цілей статті автор окреслив особливості юридичних кордонів застосування торгових звичаїв залежно від матеріального права, обраного сторонами для вирішення спору. В результаті вивчення вищезгаданих питань, автор дійшов висновку, що торгові звичаї не можуть переважати над умовами контракту чи застосовуваного матеріального права. Вони можуть служити лише додатковим джерелом тлумачення положень договору або доповненням у випадку прогалини в договорі чи матеріальному праві. Вони можуть застосовуватися лише в тій мірі, яка не буде суперечити матеріальним нормам обраного закону. Але, в той же час, торгові звичаї завжди будуть мати перевагу над положеннями Віденської конвенції, незважаючи на те, що остання може використовуватися як матеріальне право до суті спору. Коли торговельні звичаї прописані в самому контракті, вони стають обов'язковими умовами договору, крім того, торговельні звичаї, також, можуть бути використані як застосовне матеріальне право.
English abstract: This article provides an understanding of the extent of the trade usages application. Trade usages can serve as additional means of resolving the dispute or as substantive law. The point is that the level and the degree of trade usages legal force may be increased or decreased depending on which legal norms were chosen by the parties as applicable law or terms contained in the contract. Analyzing the meaning of trade usages, legal practice of international commercial arbitration tribunals, conventions, juridical acts, national and international documents used in the world trade, opinions of the prominent scholars, the author, has substantiated the juridical borders of the trade usages application in international dispute resolution system and showed their legal nature. To achieve the objectives of the article the author has outlined the peculiarities of the trade usages application legal degree depending on the substantive law chosen by the parties in order to resolve the dispute. As a result of the study of the mentioned issues, the author has concluded that trade usages cannot prevail over the terms of the contract or of the applicable law. They may only serve as the additional source of the
{"title":"ОСОБЛИВОСТІ ЗАСТОСУВАННЯ ТОРГОВИХ ЗВИЧАЇВ У МІЖНАРОДНИХ КОМЕРЦІЙНИХ АРБІТРАЖНИХ СПОРАХ (Peculiarities of Trade Usages Application in International Commercial Arbitration Disputes)","authors":"Juliia Kabrera","doi":"10.46340/eppd.2020.7.4.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46340/eppd.2020.7.4.5","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Ukrainian abstract:</b> Ця стаття дає уявлення про межі застосування торгових звичаїв. Торгові звичаї можуть служити додатковим засобом для вирішення спору або як матеріальне право. Річ у тім, що рівень та ступінь юридичної сили торгових звичаїв можуть збільшуватися або зменшуватися, залежно від того, які правові норми були обрані сторонами як застосовне матеріальне право чи умови, що містяться в договорі. Аналізуючи сутність торгових звичаїв, юридичну практику міжнародних комерційних арбітражних судів, конвенцій, юридичних актів, національних та міжнародних документів, що використовуються у світовій торгівлі, думки видатних вчених, автор обґрунтував юридичні межі застосування торгових звичаїв у міжнародній системі врегулювання спорів та показала їх правову природу. Для досягнення цілей статті автор окреслив особливості юридичних кордонів застосування торгових звичаїв залежно від матеріального права, обраного сторонами для вирішення спору. В результаті вивчення вищезгаданих питань, автор дійшов висновку, що торгові звичаї не можуть переважати над умовами контракту чи застосовуваного матеріального права. Вони можуть служити лише додатковим джерелом тлумачення положень договору або доповненням у випадку прогалини в договорі чи матеріальному праві. Вони можуть застосовуватися лише в тій мірі, яка не буде суперечити матеріальним нормам обраного закону. Але, в той же час, торгові звичаї завжди будуть мати перевагу над положеннями Віденської конвенції, незважаючи на те, що остання може використовуватися як матеріальне право до суті спору. Коли торговельні звичаї прописані в самому контракті, вони стають обов'язковими умовами договору, крім того, торговельні звичаї, також, можуть бути використані як застосовне матеріальне право.<br><br><b>English abstract:</b> This article provides an understanding of the extent of the trade usages application. Trade usages can serve as additional means of resolving the dispute or as substantive law. The point is that the level and the degree of trade usages legal force may be increased or decreased depending on which legal norms were chosen by the parties as applicable law or terms contained in the contract. Analyzing the meaning of trade usages, legal practice of international commercial arbitration tribunals, conventions, juridical acts, national and international documents used in the world trade, opinions of the prominent scholars, the author, has substantiated the juridical borders of the trade usages application in international dispute resolution system and showed their legal nature. To achieve the objectives of the article the author has outlined the peculiarities of the trade usages application legal degree depending on the substantive law chosen by the parties in order to resolve the dispute. As a result of the study of the mentioned issues, the author has concluded that trade usages cannot prevail over the terms of the contract or of the applicable law. They may only serve as the additional source of the ","PeriodicalId":103245,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Trade Law (Topic)","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114841625","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This century has been described by governments around the world as the Asian century. The resulting effect has seen Asia as the fastest-growing region economically. The recent acceptance of both the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Transpacific Partnership (TPP) and also the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) has reinforced the consolidation of trade in this region of the world. While India has yet to sign up to these trade agreements, their strategic importance in the region will only continue to grow. Thus, one question is whether it is time for India to ratify the Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG)? There have been calls for India to adopt the CISG that date back to more than a decade ago. Importantly, a development in relation to adoption of the CISG in the region is taking place. Recently, Vietnam and North Korea have acceded to the Convention. India, unfortunately, is one of the few important economic nations which has not yet signed the Convention. This article will argue that it is indeed in India’s interest, if not a necessary step, also to sign the Convention. However, it is also understood by the authors that further economic and legal analysis is likely needed by India to fully appreciate and understand the benefits afforded by the CISG.
{"title":"Is it Time for India to Adopt the Convention on the Sale of Goods?","authors":"Robert Henry Walters","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3702669","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3702669","url":null,"abstract":"This century has been described by governments around the world as the Asian century. The resulting effect has seen Asia as the fastest-growing region economically. The recent acceptance of both the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Transpacific Partnership (TPP) and also the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) has reinforced the consolidation of trade in this region of the world. While India has yet to sign up to these trade agreements, their strategic importance in the region will only continue to grow. Thus, one question is whether it is time for India to ratify the Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG)? There have been calls for India to adopt the CISG that date back to more than a decade ago. Importantly, a development in relation to adoption of the CISG in the region is taking place. Recently, Vietnam and North Korea have acceded to the Convention. India, unfortunately, is one of the few important economic nations which has not yet signed the Convention. This article will argue that it is indeed in India’s interest, if not a necessary step, also to sign the Convention. However, it is also understood by the authors that further economic and legal analysis is likely needed by India to fully appreciate and understand the benefits afforded by the CISG.","PeriodicalId":103245,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Trade Law (Topic)","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128153800","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Financial Liberalization in recent years is seen as a driver of economic growth. However, at the same time, many authors have argued that free capital mobility produces macroeconomic instability and contributes to financial vulnerability in emerging nations. For example, Stiglitz (2002) has argued that pressuring emerging and transition countries to relax controls on capital mobility during the 1990s was a huge mistake. The questions remain why some countries benefit from liberalization while some do not. We proposed that governance institutions may be the deciding factor in this regard. Where institutions' quality is weak, most of the foreign investment would be opportunistic and short term in nature, hence would huge outflows later on after liberalization. However, in the case of strong institutions, the investment would be in long term Greenfield projects, leading to sustainable returns. In this way surplus funds would be reinvested, relieving the pressure from the current account in the long run. To establish its empirical validity, an econometric analysis was performed, using data of 50 countries (40 developing) from 2009 to 2018. KAOPEN (Capital account openness based on IMF’s Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restriction) was used as a proxy for financial liberalization along with institutions (WGI), and their impact on Current account (CA) was assessed using other variables like Inflation (CPI), Trade Openness (exports and imports as % of GDP), financial development (Deposit to GDP), and real GDP as control. The results suggested that liberalization seems to have a negative but insignificant effect on the Current account. Whereas, Institutions have a significant and positive effect. However, the interaction effect showed a negative complementarity of institutions in liberalization and CA relationship. This implies that strong institutions not only promote CA inflow ever in the long run but also decrease the effect of legalization on CA, meaning if the effect is negative, institutions would decrease its severity. Other interesting findings suggested that financial development has a negative and significant effect on CA. Hence, institutions seem to act as a crucial factor in solving the liberalization puzzle, and developing countries should make their governance institutions strong before opening up to the world.
{"title":"Impact of Financial Liberalization on Current Account with Complementary Effect of Institution: A Global Evidence","authors":"Nouman Mustafa, D. Siddiqui","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3681330","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3681330","url":null,"abstract":"Financial Liberalization in recent years is seen as a driver of economic growth. However, at the same time, many authors have argued that free capital mobility produces macroeconomic instability and contributes to financial vulnerability in emerging nations. For example, Stiglitz (2002) has argued that pressuring emerging and transition countries to relax controls on capital mobility during the 1990s was a huge mistake. The questions remain why some countries benefit from liberalization while some do not. We proposed that governance institutions may be the deciding factor in this regard. Where institutions' quality is weak, most of the foreign investment would be opportunistic and short term in nature, hence would huge outflows later on after liberalization. However, in the case of strong institutions, the investment would be in long term Greenfield projects, leading to sustainable returns. In this way surplus funds would be reinvested, relieving the pressure from the current account in the long run. To establish its empirical validity, an econometric analysis was performed, using data of 50 countries (40 developing) from 2009 to 2018. KAOPEN (Capital account openness based on IMF’s Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restriction) was used as a proxy for financial liberalization along with institutions (WGI), and their impact on Current account (CA) was assessed using other variables like Inflation (CPI), Trade Openness (exports and imports as % of GDP), financial development (Deposit to GDP), and real GDP as control. The results suggested that liberalization seems to have a negative but insignificant effect on the Current account. Whereas, Institutions have a significant and positive effect. However, the interaction effect showed a negative complementarity of institutions in liberalization and CA relationship. This implies that strong institutions not only promote CA inflow ever in the long run but also decrease the effect of legalization on CA, meaning if the effect is negative, institutions would decrease its severity. Other interesting findings suggested that financial development has a negative and significant effect on CA. Hence, institutions seem to act as a crucial factor in solving the liberalization puzzle, and developing countries should make their governance institutions strong before opening up to the world.","PeriodicalId":103245,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Trade Law (Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116804045","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the context of trade, the EU emerges as a singular global actor from a fundamental rights perspective: unlike other international actors, the EU’s external action is to be guided by interests as much as values. The Treaty of Lisbon does not erase the tension between market goals and respect of fundamental rights, it opens up the possibility for the EU to pursue fundamental rights both in and through trade. Yet for a very long time, the EU has been a global actor through trade: it has taken for granted an understanding of human rights in trade that sees them as a development issue for third countries. No more sophisticated conceptualisations have been explored, making the EU’s current approach heavily reliant on this legacy. The way fundamental rights are provided protection in the Post-Lisbon new generation EU trade agreements emerges as outdated and not fit for purpose. The aim of this paper is to urge new conceptualisations of the relationship between trade agreements and fundamental rights.
{"title":"Fundamental Rights in the EU’s External Trade Relations: From Promotion ‘Through’ Trade Agreements to Protection ‘In’ Trade Agreements","authors":"I. Mancini","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3628235","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3628235","url":null,"abstract":"In the context of trade, the EU emerges as a singular global actor from a fundamental rights perspective: unlike other international actors, the EU’s external action is to be guided by interests as much as values. The Treaty of Lisbon does not erase the tension between market goals and respect of fundamental rights, it opens up the possibility for the EU to pursue fundamental rights both in and through trade. Yet for a very long time, the EU has been a global actor through trade: it has taken for granted an understanding of human rights in trade that sees them as a development issue for third countries. No more sophisticated conceptualisations have been explored, making the EU’s current approach heavily reliant on this legacy. The way fundamental rights are provided protection in the Post-Lisbon new generation EU trade agreements emerges as outdated and not fit for purpose. The aim of this paper is to urge new conceptualisations of the relationship between trade agreements and fundamental rights.","PeriodicalId":103245,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Trade Law (Topic)","volume":"01 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130795681","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Michael Blanga-Gubbay, P. Conconi, Mathieu Parenti
We study the role of firms in the political economy of trade agreements. Using detailed information from lobbying reports filed under the Lobbying Disclosure Act, we find that virtually all firms that lobby on free trade agreements (FTAs) support their ratification. Moreover, relative to non-lobbying firms, lobbying firms are larger, and more likely to be engaged in international trade and to operate in comparative advantage sectors. To rationalize these findings, we develop a model in which heterogeneous firms decide whether to lobby and how much to spend in favor or against a proposed FTA. We show that the distributional effects are asymmetric: the winners from the FTA have higher stakes in the agreement than the losers, which explains why only pro-FTA firms select into lobbying. The model also delivers predictions on the intensive margin of lobbying. In line with these predictions, we find that firms spend more supporting agreements that generate larger potential gains - in terms of the extent of the reduction of tariffs on their final goods and intermediate inputs, the depth of the agreement, and the export and sourcing potential of the FTA partners - and when politicians are less likely to be in favor of ratification.
{"title":"Globalization for Sale","authors":"Michael Blanga-Gubbay, P. Conconi, Mathieu Parenti","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3635480","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3635480","url":null,"abstract":"We study the role of firms in the political economy of trade agreements. Using detailed information from lobbying reports filed under the Lobbying Disclosure Act, we find that virtually all firms that lobby on free trade agreements (FTAs) support their ratification. Moreover, relative to non-lobbying firms, lobbying firms are larger, and more likely to be engaged in international trade and to operate in comparative advantage sectors. To rationalize these findings, we develop a model in which heterogeneous firms decide whether to lobby and how much to spend in favor or against a proposed FTA. We show that the distributional effects are asymmetric: the winners from the FTA have higher stakes in the agreement than the losers, which explains why only pro-FTA firms select into lobbying. The model also delivers predictions on the intensive margin of lobbying. In line with these predictions, we find that firms spend more supporting agreements that generate larger potential gains - in terms of the extent of the reduction of tariffs on their final goods and intermediate inputs, the depth of the agreement, and the export and sourcing potential of the FTA partners - and when politicians are less likely to be in favor of ratification.","PeriodicalId":103245,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Trade Law (Topic)","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115377774","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Populists are trying to take down the global economic order and its institutions. While some of those forces might be fueled by racism, they also play to legitimate social concerns that include massive plant closings and deindustrialization, inadequate skills programs, and lack of decent jobs. Some of these problems also concern the Global South, as workers there face exploitation, unhealthy working conditions, and other social ills caused by global capitalism. In light of these problems, this Article argues that the International Labor Organization (ILO) should design new conventions on lead firm liability and mass layoffs. While other scholars and policymakers have already argued that lead firms should shoulder employer responsibilities of their suppliers, contractors, and franchisees, this is the first law review article that calls for an ILO convention that can diffuse such rules globally.
The Article also calls on the World Trade Organization (WTO) to advise the ILO on these labor-protective conventions. The WTO, as an expert trade body, can better ensure stakeholders that these new conventions will comply with international trade law and policy, including with WTO “public morals” exception rules and with rules on technical barriers on trade and tax and subsidies. In doing so, the WTO can guarantee that the new conventions, far from hurting trade, will help to enhance the global trade regime. Moreover, the WTO, through its “peer review” practice, where stakeholders can discuss how to create and implement new labor and trade policies, can help coordinate a much needed global dialogue for a more inclusive globalization.
This is also true of the ILO conventions that we advocate for here. We conclude by addressing likely arguments against our proposal, including from scholars and policymakers skeptical of the role that international law can have on the current political turmoil. After addressing those objections to our proposal, we maintain that collaboration between the ILO and the WTO, while certainly not the panacea for all the complex and daunting problems of our times, remains critical to restore legitimacy to the global economic order in a postpopulist era.
{"title":"Labor, Trade, and Populism: How ILO-WTO Collaboration Can Save the Global Economic Order","authors":"Sungjoon Cho, César F. Rosado Marzán","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3559051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3559051","url":null,"abstract":"Populists are trying to take down the global economic order and its institutions. While some of those forces might be fueled by racism, they also play to legitimate social concerns that include massive plant closings and deindustrialization, inadequate skills programs, and lack of decent jobs. Some of these problems also concern the Global South, as workers there face exploitation, unhealthy working conditions, and other social ills caused by global capitalism. In light of these problems, this Article argues that the International Labor Organization (ILO) should design new conventions on lead firm liability and mass layoffs. While other scholars and policymakers have already argued that lead firms should shoulder employer responsibilities of their suppliers, contractors, and franchisees, this is the first law review article that calls for an ILO convention that can diffuse such rules globally.<br><br>The Article also calls on the World Trade Organization (WTO) to advise the ILO on these labor-protective conventions. The WTO, as an expert trade body, can better ensure stakeholders that these new conventions will comply with international trade law and policy, including with WTO “public morals” exception rules and with rules on technical barriers on trade and tax and subsidies. In doing so, the WTO can guarantee that the new conventions, far from hurting trade, will help to enhance the global trade regime. Moreover, the WTO, through its “peer review” practice, where stakeholders can discuss how to create and implement new labor and trade policies, can help coordinate a much needed global dialogue for a more inclusive globalization. <br><br>This is also true of the ILO conventions that we advocate for here. We conclude by addressing likely arguments against our proposal, including from scholars and policymakers skeptical of the role that international law can have on the current political turmoil. After addressing those objections to our proposal, we maintain that collaboration between the ILO and the WTO, while certainly not the panacea for all the complex and daunting problems of our times, remains critical to restore legitimacy to the global economic order in a postpopulist era.<br><br>","PeriodicalId":103245,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Trade Law (Topic)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132616243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
American sanctions target around two dozen countries, with some states experiencing what amounts to near-total economic embargoes. Why are these policies in place, what effects do they have, and how successful are they in achieving their geopolitical objectives? Sanctions have massive humanitarian costs and are not only ineffective but likely counterproductive. On these points, there is overwhelming agreement in the academic literature. Such policies can reduce the economic performance of the targeted state, degrade public health, and cause tens of thousands of deaths per year under the most crushing sanctions regimes. Moreover, they almost always fail to achieve their goals, particularly when the aim is regime change or significant behavioral changes pertaining to what states consider their fundamental interests. Sanctions can even backfire, making mass killing and repression more likely, while decreasing the probability of democratization.
Why, then, does the United States use economic sanctions so often? The popularity of sanctions owes more to the domestic interests of politicians than their ability to achieve geopolitical goals. American policymakers show little interest in the empirical research on sanctions and they often do not supplement trade restrictions with diplomatic efforts that can help achieve a bargain. In contrast, sanctions make sense from the perspective of domestic politics and political psychology. They provide a middle ground between military force and doing nothing and are unlikely to cause a domestic backlash because the damage they inflict is indirect and largely unobserved. Taking into account political realities, here are several suggestions to prevent the overuse of sanctions: when implemented, they should be restricted to symbolic targets, which would allow American leaders to achieve their political goals without harming innocents abroad; the United States should be laxer in the enforcement of current and future sanctions regimes; and Congress should legislate to make it more difficult for the executive branch to unilaterally impose sanctions without end, which would create a legal cause of action for those affected. Finally, opponents of current policies should continue to make the public aware of the effects of robust sanctions, which can remove the political incentive to enact and implement them. The more often that imposing heavy economic sanctions is seen as an ineffective policy that harms innocents abroad for self‐interested reasons, the less likely they are to be used.
{"title":"Ineffective, Immoral, Politically Convenient: America's Overreliance on Economic Sanctions and What to Do About It","authors":"R. Hanania","doi":"10.36009/pa.884","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36009/pa.884","url":null,"abstract":"American sanctions target around two dozen countries, with some states experiencing what amounts to near-total economic embargoes. Why are these policies in place, what effects do they have, and how successful are they in achieving their geopolitical objectives? Sanctions have massive humanitarian costs and are not only ineffective but likely counterproductive. On these points, there is overwhelming agreement in the academic literature. Such policies can reduce the economic performance of the targeted state, degrade public health, and cause tens of thousands of deaths per year under the most crushing sanctions regimes. Moreover, they almost always fail to achieve their goals, particularly when the aim is regime change or significant behavioral changes pertaining to what states consider their fundamental interests. Sanctions can even backfire, making mass killing and repression more likely, while decreasing the probability of democratization.<br><br>Why, then, does the United States use economic sanctions so often? The popularity of sanctions owes more to the domestic interests of politicians than their ability to achieve geopolitical goals. American policymakers show little interest in the empirical research on sanctions and they often do not supplement trade restrictions with diplomatic efforts that can help achieve a bargain. In contrast, sanctions make sense from the perspective of domestic politics and political psychology. They provide a middle ground between military force and doing nothing and are unlikely to cause a domestic backlash because the damage they inflict is indirect and largely unobserved. Taking into account political realities, here are several suggestions to prevent the overuse of sanctions: when implemented, they should be restricted to symbolic targets, which would allow American leaders to achieve their political goals without harming innocents abroad; the United States should be laxer in the enforcement of current and future sanctions regimes; and Congress should legislate to make it more difficult for the executive branch to unilaterally impose sanctions without end, which would create a legal cause of action for those affected. Finally, opponents of current policies should continue to make the public aware of the effects of robust sanctions, which can remove the political incentive to enact and implement them. The more often that imposing heavy economic sanctions is seen as an ineffective policy that harms innocents abroad for self‐interested reasons, the less likely they are to be used.","PeriodicalId":103245,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Trade Law (Topic)","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128728211","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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