Cognitive Neuroscience最新文献

According to the traditional memory-systems view, the hippocampus is critical during explicit (conscious) long-term memory, whereas other brain regions support implicit (nonconscious) memory. In the last two decades, some fMRI studies have reported hippocampal activity during implicit memory tasks. The aim of the present discussion paper was to identify whether any implicit memory fMRI studies have provided convincing evidence that the hippocampus is associated with nonconscious processes without being confounded by conscious processes. Experimental protocol and analysis parameters included the stimulus type(s), task(s), measures of subjective awareness, explicit memory accuracy, the relevant fMRI contrast(s) or analysis, and confound(s). A systematic review was conducted to identify implicit memory studies that reported fMRI activity in the hippocampus. After applying exclusion criteria, 13 articles remained for analysis. We found that there were no implicit memory fMRI studies where subjective awareness was absent, explicit memory performance was at chance, and there were no confounds that could have driven the observed hippocampal activity. The confounds included explicit memory (including false memory), imbalanced attentional states between conditions (yielding activation of the default-mode network), imbalanced stimuli between conditions, and differential novelty. As such, not a single fMRI study provided convincing evidence that implicit memory was associated with the hippocampus. Neuropsychological evidence was also considered, and implicit memory deficits were caused by factors known to disrupt brain regions beyond the hippocampus, such that the behavioral effects could not be attributed to this region. The present results indicate that implicit memory is not associated with the hippocampus.

The traditional memory-systems view is that explicit (conscious) long-term memory is associated with the hippocampus and implicit (nonconscious) memory is associated with non-hippocampal brain regions. This special issue of Cognitive Neuroscience focuses on whether the hippocampus is associated with implicit memory. An empirical fMRI paper by Miller, Kennard, Gowland, Antoniades, and Rosenthal (this issue) evaluated recognition memory performance of autobiographical amnesia patients with bilateral damage to hippocampal sub-region CA3 and found they had greater than chance recognition memory performance for spatial sequence learning, spatial item learning-same location, and non-spatial item learning, but chance performance for non-spatial sequence learning and spatial item learning-different location. These results are at odds with the view that the hippocampus is generally involved in sequence learning and complex event recognition. A discussion paper by Steinkrauss and Slotnick (this issue) considered whether fMRI studies have provided evidence that the hippocampus is associated with implicit memory. It was argued that all previous studies have been confounded by explicit memory, attentional states, stimuli, or novelty. This discussion paper is followed by commentaries from Hannula (this issue), Henke and Ruch (this issue), Rosenthal (this issue), Spaak (this issue), Thakral et al. (this issue), and Züst (this issue). The articles in this special issue illustrate that the association between the hippocampus and implicit memory is under active investigation and debate. It is hoped that the evidence and discourse in this issue will provide directions for future research.

Imagined events can be misremembered as experienced, leading to memory distortions. However, less is known regarding how imagining counterfactual versions of past events can impair existing memories. We addressed this issue, and used EEG to investigate the neurocognitive processes involved when retrieving memories of true events that are associated with a competing imagined event. Participants first performed simple actions with everyday objects (e.g., rolling dice). A week later, they were shown pictures of some of the objects and either imagined the same action they had originally performed, or imagined a counterfactual action (e.g., stacking the dice). Subsequent tests showed that memory for performed actions was reduced after counterfactual imagination when compared to both veridical imagination and a baseline condition that had not been imagined at all, providing novel evidence that counterfactual imagination impairs true memories beyond simple forgetting over time. ERPs and EEG oscillations showed evidence of separate processes associated with memory retrieval versus post-retrieval processes that were recruited to support recall of memories that were challenging to access. The findings show that counterfactual imagination can cause impairments to sensorimotor-rich event memories, and provide new evidence regarding the neurocognitive mechanisms that are recruited when people need to distinguish memories of imagined versus true events.

Previous research has suggested that the perception of emotional images may also activate brain regions related to the preparation of motoric plans. However, little research has investigated whether these emotion-movement interactions occur at early or later stages of visual perception. In the current research, event-related potentials (ERPs) were used to examine the time course of the independent - and combined - effects of perceiving emotions and implied movement. Twenty-five participants viewed images from four categories: 1) emotional with implied movement, 2) emotional with no implied movement, 3) neutral with implied movement, and 4) neutral with no implied movement. Both emotional stimuli and movement-related stimuli led to larger N200 (200-300 ms) waveforms. Furthermore, at frontal sites, there was a marginal interaction between emotion and implied movement, such that negative stimuli showed greater N200 amplitudes vs. neutral stimuli, but only for images with implied movement. At posterior sites, a similar effect was observed for images without implied movement. The late positive potential (LPP; 500-1000 ms) was significant for emotion (at frontal sites) and movement (at frontal, central, and posterior sites), as well as for their interaction (at parietal sites), with larger LPPs for negative vs. neutral images with movement only. Together, these results suggest that the perception of emotion and movement interact at later stages of visual perception.

Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) can modulate a targeted brain region to assess whether that region is involved in a cognitive process. When TMS is employed in cognitive neuroscience, participants are typically healthy volunteers, and the technique is described as noninvasive. However, TMS parameters can be set such that stimulation produces long-lasting effects. Critically, TMS effects that have any possibility of lasting beyond a participant's time in the lab are potentially harmful. In this editorial, evidence is considered that indicates a 20-Hz multi-day TMS protocol has long-lasting effects, and a continuous theta-burst stimulation protocol needs further testing before it is deemed noninvasive. The following guidelines are provided for TMS protocol evaluation: 1) Effects must be shown to completely dissipate before participants leave the lab by testing well beyond the expected duration. 2) Participants should complete a cognitive test battery before TMS and after the effects are expected to dissipate. 3) Protocols should not be employed that produce effects lasting longer than the time in the lab. 4) The number of participants should ensure error bars are small, and results generalize to the population. 5) Results should be assessed at the group and individual-participant level, and effects should dissipate for every participant. 6) Bayesian analysis should be conducted to evaluate evidence in favor of the null hypothesis. 7) Effects should be assessed in multiple cortical regions. It is hoped that these guidelines will be employed to ensure the continued use of TMS as a valuable tool in the field of cognitive neuroscience.

In a previous discussion paper , twenty-six working memory fMRI studies that reported activity in the hippocampus were systematically analyzed. None of these studies provided convincing evidence that the hippocampus was active during the late delay phase, the only period in which working memory can be isolated from long-term memory processes. Based on these results, it was concluded that working memory does not activate the hippocampus. Six commentaries on the discussion paper were received from Courtney (2022), Kessels and Bergmann (2022), Peters and Reithler (2022), Rose and Chao (2022), Stern and Hasselmo (2022), and Wood et al. (2022). Based on these commentaries, the present response paper considered whether there is evidence of sustained hippocampal activity during the working memory delay period based on depth-electrode recording, whether there are activity-silent working memory mechanisms in the hippocampus, and whether there is hippocampal lesion evidence indicating this region is important for working memory. There was no convincing electrophysiological or neuropsychological evidence that the hippocampus is associated with working memory maintenance, and activity-silent mechanisms were arguably speculative. Given that only a small fraction (approximately 5%) of working memory fMRI studies have reported hippocampal activity and lesion evidence indicates the hippocampus is not necessary for working memory, the burden of proof is on proponents of the view that the hippocampus is important for working memory to provide compelling evidence to support their position. To date, from my perspective, there is no convincing evidence that the hippocampus is associated with working memory.

Selective attention and conflict monitoring are daily human phenomena, yet the spatial and temporal neurological underpinnings of these processes are not fully understood. Current literature suggests these executive functions occur via diverse and highly interconnected neural networks, including top-down, bottom-up, and conflict-control loops. To investigate the spatiotemporal activity of these processes, we collected neuromagnetic data using magnetoencephalography (MEG) in 28 healthy adults (age 19-36), while they performed a computerized Stroop task based on color naming. We focused on low-frequency oscillations in the context of top-down control and hypothesized that conflict monitoring-related activity would first be observed in the left anterior cingulate cortex, followed by the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and subsequently in the parietal and temporal lobes. Significant activity between 600-1000 ms post-stimulus onset was found for incongruent vs. congruent/neutral contrasts. Interestingly, spatiotemporal analysis did not provide evidence for a top-down pattern of activation, instead revealing a simultaneous pattern of activation in the frontal and temporal lobes. Most notable is the involvement of the left posterior inferior temporal cortex (pITC) and the left temporoparietal junction (TPJ), which have not conventionally been considered active players in attentional control. These results may be largely driven by alpha and beta oscillations from our sample population. Our findings challenge early theoretical models of top-down processing in the context of cognitive control from an attention perspective and also suggest a need to investigate attentional centers in the temporal lobe. Furthermore, the study highlights the valuable temporal data provided by MEG, which has been missing from previous studies.

In this commentary we draw attention to a context involving mixed and ambiguous emotions: verbal irony. Irony is frequently used, evokes mixed emotional responses (e.g., criticism and amusement), and has been the focus of recent cognitive neuroscience research. Yet, irony has primarily been studied as a linguistic device, and has rarely been considered by emotion researchers. Similarly, linguistics has not considered mixed and ambiguous emotion when studying verbal irony. We argue that verbal irony offers rich opportunities to evoke and study mixed and ambiguous emotions, and might provide advantages for testing the MA-EM model.

The neurocognitive model of Mixed and Ambiguous Emotions and Morality (MA-EM) makes a relevant case for putting non-unidimensional emotions and morality more prominently on the research agenda. However, existing research challenges its assumptions about the distinction between mixed and ambiguous emotions and morality, and how they relate to reflective versus simulative processing routes, in three respects. First, the emotional state of being moved is generally conceptualized as a non-ambiguous rather than an ambiguous emotion. Second, mixed emotions have been found to elicit reflection rather than simulation. Third, the morality of narrative characters is typically perceived as mixed rather than ambiguous.