Cognitive Neuroscience最新文献

The use of naturalistic stimuli in cognitive neuroscience experiments inspires and requires theoretical foundations that bring together different cognitive domains, such as emotion, language, and morality. By zooming in on the digital environments in which we often perceive emotional messages today, and inspired by the Mixed and Ambiguous Emotions and Morality model, we here argue that successfully processing emotional information in the twenty-first century will often have to rely not only on simulation and/or mentalizing, but also on executive control and attention regulation.

Language comprehension must require some degree of attentional focus, but how do periods of inattention and/or split attention impact how language is processed? Here EEG was recorded while participants listened to full-length stories, and were periodically asked about whether they were fully attentive, were completely inattentive, or felt that they were in a split attention state. The ERP response to the words immediately preceding these attention questions was examined as a function of participant response, which allowed for the comparison of word processing in each of these attentional states. When participants were on-task, typical N400 effects of lexical frequency (smaller N400 for common compared to less common words), word position (smaller N400 for words appearing late in a sentence compared to words appearing with less preceding context), and surprisal (smaller N400 for relatively expected words compared to relatively unexpected words) were observed. When participants were in a fully inattentive state, the word-level effect of frequency was intact, but the context-dependent effects of word position and surprisal were significantly reduced. Interestingly, the pattern of results when participants were in a split attention state closely matched that of the fully inattentive state. Overall, the results demonstrate how attentional state influences sensitivity to language context during comprehension, and show that the consequences of inattention and split attention on word processing in context are quite similar, at least on the indices measured here.

It is important for mental health to be able to control unwanted intrusive memories. Previous studies suggest that middle frontal gyrus (MFG) down regulates pathways underlie the suppression of retrieval of general memories. However, the neural basis of motivated forgetting of autobiographical memories is unclear. Therefore, this study used two samples to explore the neural mechanisms of motivated forgetting of self-referential memories. Every participant provided 40 life events (20 negative and 20 neutral) from their past personal experience, and then completed the Think/No-Think task while undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). The first sample showed a significant reduction in recall in the No-Think condition relative to the Think condition. Attempting to exclude negative autobiographical memories from awareness was associated with increased activity in the right MFG, superior frontal gyrus (SFG), and inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), while reduced activity was observed in the bilateral Brodmann areas BA18 and BA19, bilateral medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), bilateral precuneus, bilateral post cingulate cortex (PCC), the left parahippocampus, and the left hippocampus. Functional connectivity analyses showed that the right MFG projected into the bilateral mPFC, bilateral precuneus, and bilateral middle occipital gyrus (MOG) for negative autobiographical memories. The second sample replicated the results of the first sample at both the behavioral and brain levels. These results suggest that retrieval suppression of autobiographical memories involve the pathway between the MFG and the mPFC and precuneus to exclude self-referential memories. These results reveal how people engage in motivated forgetting of negative events in their daily lives.

Numerous studies have shown that working memory modulates every frequency band's power in the human brain. Yet, the question of how the highly distributed working memory adapts to external demands remains unresolved. Here, we explored frequency band modulations underlying working memory load, taking executive control under account. We hypothesized that synchronizations underlying various cognitive functions may be sequenced in time to avoid interference and that transient modulation of decoding accuracy of task difficulty would vary with increasing difficulty. We recorded whole scalp EEG data from 12 healthy participants, while they performed a visuo-spatial n-back task with three conditions of increasing difficulty, after an initial learning phase. We analyzed evoked spectral perturbations and time-resolved decoding of individual synchronization. Surprisingly, our results provide evidence for persistent decoding above the level-of-chance (83.17% AUC) for combined frequency bands. In fact, the decoding accuracy was higher for the combined than for isolated frequency bands (AUC from 65.93% to 74.30%). However, in line with our hypothesis, frequency band clusters transiently emerged in parieto-occipital regions within two separate time windows for alpha-/beta-band (relative synchronization from approximately 200 to 600 ms) and for the delta-/theta-band (relative desynchronization from approximately 600 to 1000 ms). Overall, these findings highlight concurrent sustained and transient measurable features of working memory load. This could reflect the emergence of stability within and between functional networks of the complex working memory system. In turn, this process allows energy savings to cope with external demands.

Avoiding loss is a crucial, adaptive guide to human behavior. While previous developmental research has primarily focused on gaining rewards, less attention has been paid to loss processing and its avoidance. In daily life, it is often unknown how likely an action will result in a loss, making the role of uncertainty in loss processing particularly important. By using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we investigated the influence of varying outcome probabilities (12%, 34%, and 67%) on brain regions implicated in loss processing (ventral striatum (VS), anterior insula (AI)) by comparing 28 adolescents (10-18 years) and 24 adults (22-32 years) during the anticipation of potential monetary loss.Overall, results revealed slower RTs in adolescents compared to adults with both groups being faster in the experimental (monetary condition) vs. control trials (verbal condition). Fastest RTs were observed for the 67% outcome probability in both age groups. An age group × outcome probability interaction effect revealed the greatest differences between the groups for the 12% vs. the 67% outcome probability. Neurally, both age groups demonstrated a higher percent signal change in the VS and AI during the anticipation of potential monetary loss versus the verbal condition. However, adults demonstrated an even greater activation of VS and AI than adolescents during the anticipation of potential monetary loss, but not during the verbal condition. This may indicate that adolescents differ from adults regarding their experience of avoiding losing monetary rewards.

Few studies have examined the specific contribution of focal damage of the prefrontal cortex and executive dysfunction to emotion recognition deficits, with results reporting controversial findings. This study investigated the performance of 30 patients with prefrontal cortex damage and 30 matched controls on a battery of executive measures assessing processes of inhibition, flexibility, and planning and a task of emotion recognition with also a particular attention to the examination of the association between these domains. The results showed that compared with control participants, patients with prefrontal cortex damage were impaired in recognizing the three negative emotions of fear, sadness, and anger and were also impaired on all executive measures. Moreover, by examining the association between both these domains, using correlation and regression analyses, we noted that impaired performance in recognizing emotions of fear, sadness, and anger was predicted by impaired performances on the measures of inhibition and flexibility or "set-shifting" suggesting that the ability to recognize emotions could be at least to some extent cognitively mediated. Finally, using a voxel-based lesion technique, we identified a partially common prefrontal network underlying deficits on executive functions and emotions recognition centered on the ventral and medial parts of the prefrontal cortex, reflecting beyond the neural network involved in recognizing negative emotions per se that of the cognitive processes elicited by this emotion task.

Understanding emotions and moral intentions of other people is integral to being human. Humanities scholars have long recognized the complex and ambiguous nature of emotions and morality. People are rarely 'just' happy, or sad. Neither are they 'just' good or bad people. Despite this, most knowledge about the psychological and neural basis of emotions and moral understanding comes from experiments investigating unidimensional and non-ambiguous emotions and morality. The goal of this paper is twofold. First I want to point out why mixed and ambiguous emotions and morality are a promising research topic for cognitive neuroscientists. Observing or experiencing mixed or ambiguous emotions and morality tends to have a strong impact on humans. This impact is clearly visible in narratives and fiction, and I will argue that narratives make an excellent stimulus to study the effects of emotional and moral ambiguity. Second, I will sketch a model to help guide research in this promising corner of human cognition.

Observation of others' actions activates motor representations in sensorimotor cortex. Although action observation in the real-world often involves multiple agents displaying varying degrees of action involvement, most lab studies on action observation studied individual actions. We recorded EEG-mu suppression over sensorimotor cortex to investigate how the multi-agent nature of observed hand/arm actions is incorporated in sensorimotor action representations. Hereto we manipulated the extent of agent involvement in dyadic interactions presented in videos. In all clips two agents were present, of which agent-1 always performed the same action, while the involvement of agent-2 differed along three levels: (1) passive and uninvolved, (2) passively involved, (3) actively involved. Additionally, a no-action condition was presented. The occurrence of these four conditions was predictable thanks to cues at the start of each trial, which allowed to study possible mu anticipation effects. Dyadic interactions in which agent-2 was actively involved resulted in increased power suppression of the mu rhythm compared to dyadic interactions in which agent-2 was passively involved. The latter did not differ from actions in which agent-2 was present but not involved. No anticipation effects were found. The results suggest that the sensorimotor representation of a dyadic interaction takes into account the simultaneously performed bodily articulations of both agents, but no evidence was found for incorporation of their static articulated postures.

This commentary makes three suggestions on Willems' neurocognitive model for understanding mixed and ambiguous emotions and morality. First, it proposes that his atheoretical approach risks unwittingly adopting theoretical and conceptual limitations implicit in reigning paradigms and overlooking the need for theoretical impetus and constraints in the development of valid constructs of targeted emotions. Second, it suggests that a dynamical systems approach to emotions provides a fruitful theory and neuro-phenomenology as a corresponding methodology. Lastly, it proposes that Willems' objective would benefit from a more systematic integration of insights from the humanities into the nature and nuances of literary (moral) emotions.

Over the past decades, the emerging and ever-growing body of studies in empirical aesthetics has made one thing abundantly clear: our current models and conceptualizations of emotional experiences have outlived their usefulness. How do we go from here?