Euro coins have a common European side and an individual national side. Thanks to coin migration, coins bearing a panoply of national sides are in circulation throughout the euro area. In this paper, we model the mixing of coins circulating in the euro area countries and in particular the extent of coin migration in the euro area. A model calibration suggests that, for the coin denominations €2, €1, 50 cent and 20 cent roughly the same quantity of euro coins migrate from Germany to the rest of the euro area as vice versa. Accordingly, the relatively large quantities of coins issued by the Federal Republic of Germany are not materially explained by exports of coins to other euro area countries.
{"title":"Coin Migration between Germany and Other Euro Area Countries","authors":"Matthias W. Uhl","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3699857","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3699857","url":null,"abstract":"Euro coins have a common European side and an individual national side. Thanks to coin migration, coins bearing a panoply of national sides are in circulation throughout the euro area. In this paper, we model the mixing of coins circulating in the euro area countries and in particular the extent of coin migration in the euro area. A model calibration suggests that, for the coin denominations €2, €1, 50 cent and 20 cent roughly the same quantity of euro coins migrate from Germany to the rest of the euro area as vice versa. Accordingly, the relatively large quantities of coins issued by the Federal Republic of Germany are not materially explained by exports of coins to other euro area countries.","PeriodicalId":10548,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Monetary Policy eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89948210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-12-01DOI: 10.5089/9781513524054.001
Wouter Bossu, A. Rossi
This paper discusses key legal issues in the design of Board Oversight in central banks. Central banks are complex and sophisticated organizations that are challenging to manage. While most economic literature focuses on decision-making in the context of monetary policy formulation, this paper focuses on the Board oversight of central banks—a central feature of sound governance. This form of oversight is the decision-making responsibility through which an internal body of the central bank—the Oversight Board—ensures that the central bank is well-managed. First, the paper will contextualize the role of Board oversight into the broader legal structure for central bank governance by considering this form of oversight as one of the core decision-making responsibilities of central banks. Secondly, the paper will focus on a number of important legal design issues for Board Oversight, by contrasting the current practices of the IMF membership’s 174 central banks with staff’s advisory practice developed over the past 50 years.
{"title":"The Role of Board Oversight in Central Bank Governance: Key Legal Design Issues","authors":"Wouter Bossu, A. Rossi","doi":"10.5089/9781513524054.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5089/9781513524054.001","url":null,"abstract":"This paper discusses key legal issues in the design of Board Oversight in central banks. Central banks are complex and sophisticated organizations that are challenging to manage. While most economic literature focuses on decision-making in the context of monetary policy formulation, this paper focuses on the Board oversight of central banks—a central feature of sound governance. This form of oversight is the decision-making responsibility through which an internal body of the central bank—the Oversight Board—ensures that the central bank is well-managed. First, the paper will contextualize the role of Board oversight into the broader legal structure for central bank governance by considering this form of oversight as one of the core decision-making responsibilities of central banks. Secondly, the paper will focus on a number of important legal design issues for Board Oversight, by contrasting the current practices of the IMF membership’s 174 central banks with staff’s advisory practice developed over the past 50 years.","PeriodicalId":10548,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Monetary Policy eJournal","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80208225","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Can massive online retailers such as Amazon and Alibaba issue digital tokens that potentially compete with bank debit accounts? There is a long history of trading stamps and loyalty points, but new technologies are poised to sharply raise the significance of redeemable assets as a store of value. Here we develop a simple stylized model of redeemable tokens that can be used to study sales and pricing strategies for issuing tokens, including ICOs. Our central finding is that platforms can potentially earn higher revenues by making tokens non-tradable unless they can generate a sufficiently high outside-platform convenience yield.
{"title":"Redeemable Platform Currencies","authors":"Yang You, Kenneth Rogoff","doi":"10.3386/w26464","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w26464","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Can massive online retailers such as Amazon and Alibaba issue digital tokens that potentially compete with bank debit accounts? There is a long history of trading stamps and loyalty points, but new technologies are poised to sharply raise the significance of redeemable assets as a store of value. Here we develop a simple stylized model of redeemable tokens that can be used to study sales and pricing strategies for issuing tokens, including ICOs. Our central finding is that platforms can potentially earn higher revenues by making tokens non-tradable unless they can generate a sufficiently high outside-platform convenience yield.","PeriodicalId":10548,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Monetary Policy eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75046607","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The purpose of central bank minutes is to give an account of monetary policy meeting discussions to outside observers, thereby enabling them to draw informed conclusions about future policy. However, minutes are by necessity a shortened and edited representation of a broader discussion. Consequently, they may omit information that is predictive of future policy decisions. To investigate this, we compare the information content of the FOMC's minutes and transcripts, focusing on three dimensions which are likely to be excluded from the minutes: 1) the committee's degree of hawkishness; 2) the chairperson's degree of hawkishness; and 3) the level of agreement between committee members. We measure committee and chairperson hawkishness with a novel dictionary that is constructed using the FOMC's minutes and transcripts. We measure agreement by performing deep transfer learning, a technique that involves training a deep learning model on one set of documents - U.S. congressional debates - and then making predictions on another: FOMC transcripts. Our findings suggest that transcripts are more informative than minutes and heightened committee agreement typically precedes policy rate increases.
{"title":"How Much Information Do Monetary Policy Committees Disclose? Evidence from the FOMC's Minutes and Transcripts","authors":"Mikael Apel, Marianna Blix Grimaldi, Isaiah Hull","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3747264","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3747264","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of central bank minutes is to give an account of monetary policy meeting discussions to outside observers, thereby enabling them to draw informed conclusions about future policy. However, minutes are by necessity a shortened and edited representation of a broader discussion. Consequently, they may omit information that is predictive of future policy decisions. To investigate this, we compare the information content of the FOMC's minutes and transcripts, focusing on three dimensions which are likely to be excluded from the minutes: 1) the committee's degree of hawkishness; 2) the chairperson's degree of hawkishness; and 3) the level of agreement between committee members. We measure committee and chairperson hawkishness with a novel dictionary that is constructed using the FOMC's minutes and transcripts. We measure agreement by performing deep transfer learning, a technique that involves training a deep learning model on one set of documents - U.S. congressional debates - and then making predictions on another: FOMC transcripts. Our findings suggest that transcripts are more informative than minutes and heightened committee agreement typically precedes policy rate increases.","PeriodicalId":10548,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Monetary Policy eJournal","volume":"125 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75496433","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-11-01DOI: 10.5089/9781513513294.001
T. Komatsuzaki, Steve Brito
We study the growth determinants in the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU), using the Growth at Risk (GaR) framework with a focus on financial variables. We find that excessive bank credit growth is associated with lower future real GDP growth in the medium term especially on the low quantiles of growth distribution. Moreover, worsening of both global financial conditions and external conditions are associated with lower future growth in the short term, especially at the high quantiles of growth distribution. Country-specific results are broadly in line with ECCU-wide results, with some variation potentially due to the strong Citizenship-By-Investment program inflows and lack of credit union data. The establishment of a macroprudential framework in the ECCU would need to pay close attention to credit growth not only of banks but also credit unions and continue to monitor global and external conditions.
{"title":"Financial Conditions and Growth at Risk in the ECCU","authors":"T. Komatsuzaki, Steve Brito","doi":"10.5089/9781513513294.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5089/9781513513294.001","url":null,"abstract":"We study the growth determinants in the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU), using the Growth at Risk (GaR) framework with a focus on financial variables. We find that excessive bank credit growth is associated with lower future real GDP growth in the medium term especially on the low quantiles of growth distribution. Moreover, worsening of both global financial conditions and external conditions are associated with lower future growth in the short term, especially at the high quantiles of growth distribution. Country-specific results are broadly in line with ECCU-wide results, with some variation potentially due to the strong Citizenship-By-Investment program inflows and lack of credit union data. The establishment of a macroprudential framework in the ECCU would need to pay close attention to credit growth not only of banks but also credit unions and continue to monitor global and external conditions.","PeriodicalId":10548,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Monetary Policy eJournal","volume":"50 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82699779","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We provide evidence that the ECB’s unconventional monetary policy dampens yield cycles in secondary Eurozone sovereign debt markets around new sovereign debt auctions. This effect increases in market volatility. Cycles caused by domestic auctions and the role of market volatility are largest for countries with low credit ratings. Auctions by these countries generate highly-significant auction cycles in other countries. Auction cycles can have a non-negligible effect on debt-servicing costs, but these may be contained by concentrating debt issuance in tranquil periods, and by coordinating auction calendars among countries, so as to maximize the dispersion of auction activity in time.
{"title":"Unconventional Monetary Policy and Auction Cycles of Eurozone Sovereign Debt","authors":"Josha Van Spronsen, R. Beetsma","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3490012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3490012","url":null,"abstract":"We provide evidence that the ECB’s unconventional monetary policy dampens yield cycles in secondary Eurozone sovereign debt markets around new sovereign debt auctions. This effect increases in market volatility. Cycles caused by domestic auctions and the role of market volatility are largest for countries with low credit ratings. Auctions by these countries generate highly-significant auction cycles in other countries. Auction cycles can have a non-negligible effect on debt-servicing costs, but these may be contained by concentrating debt issuance in tranquil periods, and by coordinating auction calendars among countries, so as to maximize the dispersion of auction activity in time.","PeriodicalId":10548,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Monetary Policy eJournal","volume":"64 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75114772","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-23DOI: 10.17573/cepar.2019.2.04
Andrea Magliari
A few years after the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the General Court of the European Union, in its new supervisory role, annulled for the first time the decisions adopted by the European Central Bank (ECB). These judgments are of particular interest because they allow a preliminary investigation of the intensity of judicial review of the ECB’s discretionary choices in the field of banking supervision. This article claims that the first case law of the General Court points to several interesting developments and indicates the resolve to carry out a judicial review which, although adhering strictly to the “limited review” standard, does not shy away from developing judicial techniques to ensure a more incisive scrutiny of the discretion enjoyed by the ECB. Despite the novelty of the issues brought to the attention of the EU judges, it seems possible as a result of this study to envisage, on the one hand, a gradual alignment of the scrutiny of supervisory decisions with those emerged in relation to the Commission’s decisions on competition matters. On the other hand, a differentiation from the “light touch” approach adopted in the field of monetary policy can be observed.
{"title":"Intensity of Judicial Review of the European Central Banks’s Supervisory Decisions","authors":"Andrea Magliari","doi":"10.17573/cepar.2019.2.04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17573/cepar.2019.2.04","url":null,"abstract":"A few years after the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the General Court of the European Union, in its new supervisory role, annulled for the first time the decisions adopted by the European Central Bank (ECB). These judgments are of particular interest because they allow a preliminary investigation of the intensity of judicial review of the ECB’s discretionary choices in the field of banking supervision. This article claims that the first case law of the General Court points to several interesting developments and indicates the resolve to carry out a judicial review which, although adhering strictly to the “limited review” standard, does not shy away from developing judicial techniques to ensure a more incisive scrutiny of the discretion enjoyed by the ECB. Despite the novelty of the issues brought to the attention of the EU judges, it seems possible as a result of this study to envisage, on the one hand, a gradual alignment of the scrutiny of supervisory decisions with those emerged in relation to the Commission’s decisions on competition matters. On the other hand, a differentiation from the “light touch” approach adopted in the field of monetary policy can be observed.","PeriodicalId":10548,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Monetary Policy eJournal","volume":"245 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80584754","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We identified the impact of the expansionary monetary policy in China during the 2008–2009 global financial crisis on the credit and investment allocation among firms after controlling for the simultaneous fiscal stimulus. We utilized the extent of the exposure to the construction sector, which is the primary beneficiary of the fiscal stimulus to control for the latter factor, as well as the variable indicating state ownership. We obtained robust evidence that the expansionary monetary policy led to the misallocation of bank credits to less productive firms after controlling for these confounding factors. However, we found that the investment increased more for more productive firms. Additional analyses showed that this is partly because more productive firms hoarded cash before the crisis, and partly because less productive firms more often engaged in building cash reserves.
{"title":"Expansionary Monetary Policy and Credit Misallocation: Evidence from China","authors":"Yue Cai","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3451635","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3451635","url":null,"abstract":"We identified the impact of the expansionary monetary policy in China during the 2008–2009 global financial crisis on the credit and investment allocation among firms after controlling for the simultaneous fiscal stimulus. We utilized the extent of the exposure to the construction sector, which is the primary beneficiary of the fiscal stimulus to control for the latter factor, as well as the variable indicating state ownership. We obtained robust evidence that the expansionary monetary policy led to the misallocation of bank credits to less productive firms after controlling for these confounding factors. However, we found that the investment increased more for more productive firms. Additional analyses showed that this is partly because more productive firms hoarded cash before the crisis, and partly because less productive firms more often engaged in building cash reserves.","PeriodicalId":10548,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Monetary Policy eJournal","volume":"88 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85552675","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There is a consensus that during the Great Recession period quantitative easing puts downward pressure on long-term interest rates. Using quarterly data and vector autoregressive model this note provides empirical evidence that quantitative easing, measured by changes in monetary base as a percentage of gross domestic product, instead, positively affects the U.S. 10-year government bond yield. One possible explanation for this is that increasing the size of the Federal Reserve balance sheets raises optimism about the macroeconomy.
{"title":"Does Quantitative Easing Lower the Long-Term Interest Rates?","authors":"N. Do","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3456424","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3456424","url":null,"abstract":"There is a consensus that during the Great Recession period quantitative easing puts downward pressure on long-term interest rates. Using quarterly data and vector autoregressive model this note provides empirical evidence that quantitative easing, measured by changes in monetary base as a percentage of gross domestic product, instead, positively affects the U.S. 10-year government bond yield. One possible explanation for this is that increasing the size of the Federal Reserve balance sheets raises optimism about the macroeconomy.","PeriodicalId":10548,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Monetary Policy eJournal","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90102069","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Monetary policymaking can be seen as an optimization exercise to be performed by central banks. In practice, central banks can be classified according to the monetary mandate assigned to them, mainly a single or a dual mandate. Among independent central banks, a majority are single-objective targeters, while the minority exercise a dual mandate. The main argument against adopting a double mandate is an apparent inconsistency between objectives and instruments and also about a potential risk for monetary independence. This paper illustrates how both mandates can be defined as an optimization problem. The dual mandate, far from being inconsistent or a threat to monetary independence, is more effective for improving social well-being since it represents the maximization of growth subject to the minimum of inflation.
{"title":"Monetary Policymaking As An Optimization Exercise","authors":"A. Coutiño","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3456181","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3456181","url":null,"abstract":"Monetary policymaking can be seen as an optimization exercise to be performed by central banks. In practice, central banks can be classified according to the monetary mandate assigned to them, mainly a single or a dual mandate. Among independent central banks, a majority are single-objective targeters, while the minority exercise a dual mandate. The main argument against adopting a double mandate is an apparent inconsistency between objectives and instruments and also about a potential risk for monetary independence. This paper illustrates how both mandates can be defined as an optimization problem. The dual mandate, far from being inconsistent or a threat to monetary independence, is more effective for improving social well-being since it represents the maximization of growth subject to the minimum of inflation.","PeriodicalId":10548,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Monetary Policy eJournal","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82890649","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：