The online platform political economy—that is, the interrelationship of economic and political power in the exchange of online services for personal information—has endowed platforms with overwhelming power to determine consumers’ information privacy. Mainstream legal scholarship on information privacy has focused largely on an economic problem: individual consumers do not obtain their “optimal” level of privacy due to a bevy of market failures. This Article presents the political issue: that platforms’ hegemonic control over consumers’ information privacy renders the rules they impose illegitimate from a democratic perspective. It argues platform hegemony over consumers’ information privacy is a political problem, in the first instance, due to the social foundations of normative information privacy and the social character of personal information. Although issues affecting society in this manner are typically met with government intervention—through the promulgation of law—or class-action litigation, neither of these safeguards have effectively protected consumers’ information privacy. Rather than empower consumers to determine information privacy norms and how to protect them, the law’s reliance on platform self-regulation through notice and consent has empowered platforms to make these determinations unilaterally.
Given the government’s failure to regulate effectively the platform political economy, this Article proposes an alternative to government action. Specifically, this Article contends that the existing private governance of information privacy ought to strive for democratic legitimacy. This Article draws an analogy between the platform political economy and the labor political economy of the early twentieth century and proposes that concepts and mechanisms from industrial democracy, which sought to legitimate workplace decision-making can serve as a toolkit for the legitimation of information privacy rules.
{"title":"Democratizing Platform Privacy","authors":"Sari Mazzurco","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3687332","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3687332","url":null,"abstract":"The online platform political economy—that is, the interrelationship of economic and political power in the exchange of online services for personal information—has endowed platforms with overwhelming power to determine consumers’ information privacy. Mainstream legal scholarship on information privacy has focused largely on an economic problem: individual consumers do not obtain their “optimal” level of privacy due to a bevy of market failures. This Article presents the political issue: that platforms’ hegemonic control over consumers’ information privacy renders the rules they impose illegitimate from a democratic perspective. It argues platform hegemony over consumers’ information privacy is a political problem, in the first instance, due to the social foundations of normative information privacy and the social character of personal information. Although issues affecting society in this manner are typically met with government intervention—through the promulgation of law—or class-action litigation, neither of these safeguards have effectively protected consumers’ information privacy. Rather than empower consumers to determine information privacy norms and how to protect them, the law’s reliance on platform self-regulation through notice and consent has empowered platforms to make these determinations unilaterally.<br><br>Given the government’s failure to regulate effectively the platform political economy, this Article proposes an alternative to government action. Specifically, this Article contends that the existing private governance of information privacy ought to strive for democratic legitimacy. This Article draws an analogy between the platform political economy and the labor political economy of the early twentieth century and proposes that concepts and mechanisms from industrial democracy, which sought to legitimate workplace decision-making can serve as a toolkit for the legitimation of information privacy rules.","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80877699","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) lending emerged over a decade ago and quickly evolved into a global industry. Since then, the P2P lending industry has become more complex, with increasingly diverse types of business models, each involving different risks and challenges. The Article analyzes the current state of the P2P market by exploring the different business models, the platforms' characteristics, the global market trends, and the different regulatory regimes around the world. As the COVID-19 pandemic bears an unprecedented effect on the global economy, we analyze its impact on P2P markets, especially focusing on small and medium entities (SMEs) as borrowers. While the COVID-19 crisis has had a profound impact on SMEs’ access to funding, alternative finance solutions, especially digital solutions, such as P2P lending, have come to play a crucial role in reducing the risk of bankruptcy for SMEs. In light of this developing situation, we empirically analyze a rich and detailed data set on loans given by a large P2P platform to SMEs between the years 2014 and 2020, focusing on the interest rate set by the platform for both borrowers and lenders. Our main findings regarding the borrowers indicate that the interest rate decreases as the size of the loan increases; however, the rate goes up with the duration of the loan and from year to year. Significant differences in loan interest rates were found across loan statuses, corporation types, industries, and the genders of the SME owners. As for lenders, we show that the average interest rate increases with the size of the loan and decreases with the number of loans into which the investment is divided. The empirical findings highlight the significant variables affecting the interest rate, which is the most important feature of a loan, and the conclusions drawn in this study can thus serve both regulators and policy makers in designing their future responses to the evolving and growing market challenges, especially in these times of global health and economic crisis.
{"title":"An Empirical View of Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Lending Platforms","authors":"Moran Ofir, Ido Tzang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3807550","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3807550","url":null,"abstract":"Peer-to-Peer (P2P) lending emerged over a decade ago and quickly evolved into a global industry. Since then, the P2P lending industry has become more complex, with increasingly diverse types of business models, each involving different risks and challenges. The Article analyzes the current state of the P2P market by exploring the different business models, the platforms' characteristics, the global market trends, and the different regulatory regimes around the world. As the COVID-19 pandemic bears an unprecedented effect on the global economy, we analyze its impact on P2P markets, especially focusing on small and medium entities (SMEs) as borrowers. While the COVID-19 crisis has had a profound impact on SMEs’ access to funding, alternative finance solutions, especially digital solutions, such as P2P lending, have come to play a crucial role in reducing the risk of bankruptcy for SMEs. \u0000 \u0000In light of this developing situation, we empirically analyze a rich and detailed data set on loans given by a large P2P platform to SMEs between the years 2014 and 2020, focusing on the interest rate set by the platform for both borrowers and lenders. Our main findings regarding the borrowers indicate that the interest rate decreases as the size of the loan increases; however, the rate goes up with the duration of the loan and from year to year. Significant differences in loan interest rates were found across loan statuses, corporation types, industries, and the genders of the SME owners. As for lenders, we show that the average interest rate increases with the size of the loan and decreases with the number of loans into which the investment is divided. The empirical findings highlight the significant variables affecting the interest rate, which is the most important feature of a loan, and the conclusions drawn in this study can thus serve both regulators and policy makers in designing their future responses to the evolving and growing market challenges, especially in these times of global health and economic crisis.","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77308235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We use data from the U.S. airline industry to test the hypothesis, consistent with the general equilibrium oligopoly model of Azar and Vives (forthcoming), that inter-industry common ownership should be associated with lower prices in product markets. We find that, as the model predicts, increases over time in intra-industry common ownership are associated with higher prices, while increases in inter-industry common ownership are associated with lower prices. We also find that common ownership by the "Big Three" (BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street) is associated with lower airline prices, while common ownership by shareholders other than the Big Three is associated with higher prices. The results highlight the limitations of partial equilibrium oligopoly theory in the context of common ownership, and the need to consider a general equilibrium perspective.
{"title":"Revisiting the Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership","authors":"José Azar, X. Vives","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3805047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3805047","url":null,"abstract":"We use data from the U.S. airline industry to test the hypothesis, consistent with the general equilibrium oligopoly model of Azar and Vives (forthcoming), that inter-industry common ownership should be associated with lower prices in product markets. We find that, as the model predicts, increases over time in intra-industry common ownership are associated with higher prices, while increases in inter-industry common ownership are associated with lower prices. We also find that common ownership by the \"Big Three\" (BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street) is associated with lower airline prices, while common ownership by shareholders other than the Big Three is associated with higher prices. The results highlight the limitations of partial equilibrium oligopoly theory in the context of common ownership, and the need to consider a general equilibrium perspective.","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73825957","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It is time to free antitrust law from the yoke of Robert Bork’s consumer welfare terminology. Bork’s vision has gained ascendency over the past 40 plus years and, subject to variations, is now widely regarded as the core antitrust paradigm. In a companion article, I examined why a consumer welfare standard cannot sustain this role. I made the case for a symmetric welfare standard anchored to the traditional view that the Sherman Act protects the competitive process. In this article, I expand this analysis. A consumer-labelled paradigm invites a static analysis—one focused on competitive effects at only one end of the distribution chain. In fact, competition is a dynamic and interactive process in which players at all levels of the chain add value and affect each other’s choices. All participants in the distribution chain are disciplined by competition – and all should be protected from power-based abuse of competition. I provide extended analysis of why non-price and non-efficiency preferences of buyers and sellers are a critical part of the competitive process and cannot be comfortably accommodated by consumer welfare standards. I offer examples of preferences, not just of consumers but of all participants in the distribution of goods and services, that are at the heart of the competitive process. I then examine Supreme Court decisions. More than a few recent cases demonstrate a fixation with consumer welfare standards and fail to protect competition. Righting the antitrust ship will require embracing a tradition-based, symmetric welfare standard that equally protects all players in the competitive system.
{"title":"Breaking Out of Consumer Welfare Jail: Addressing the Supreme Court's Failure to Protect the Competitive Process","authors":"Warren S. Grimes","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3711097","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3711097","url":null,"abstract":"It is time to free antitrust law from the yoke of Robert Bork’s consumer welfare terminology. Bork’s vision has gained ascendency over the past 40 plus years and, subject to variations, is now widely regarded as the core antitrust paradigm. In a companion article, I examined why a consumer welfare standard cannot sustain this role. I made the case for a symmetric welfare standard anchored to the traditional view that the Sherman Act protects the competitive process. In this article, I expand this analysis. A consumer-labelled paradigm invites a static analysis—one focused on competitive effects at only one end of the distribution chain. In fact, competition is a dynamic and interactive process in which players at all levels of the chain add value and affect each other’s choices. All participants in the distribution chain are disciplined by competition – and all should be protected from power-based abuse of competition. I provide extended analysis of why non-price and non-efficiency preferences of buyers and sellers are a critical part of the competitive process and cannot be comfortably accommodated by consumer welfare standards. I offer examples of preferences, not just of consumers but of all participants in the distribution of goods and services, that are at the heart of the competitive process. I then examine Supreme Court decisions. More than a few recent cases demonstrate a fixation with consumer welfare standards and fail to protect competition. Righting the antitrust ship will require embracing a tradition-based, symmetric welfare standard that equally protects all players in the competitive system.<br><br>","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86580387","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the December 2020, the European Commission has presented its proposal for a Digital Market Act (DMA) aiming at promoting competition and preventing unfair practices on digital markets. The DMA creates a new category of platforms, "gatekeepers'', based on criteria relative to their turnover and number of users, that will be subject to specific rules and obligations. Analyzing the current proposal from a law and economics perspective and taking into account the particularities of the digital economy, this paper observes that such a regulation based on the size of platforms is likely to hinder competition, reduce innovation and harm consumers.
{"title":"Regulating 'Gatekeepers': Predictable 'Unitended Consequences' of the DMA for Users' Welfare","authors":"Pierre Bentata","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3804067","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3804067","url":null,"abstract":"In the December 2020, the European Commission has presented its proposal for a Digital Market Act (DMA) aiming at promoting competition and preventing unfair practices on digital markets. The DMA creates a new category of platforms, \"gatekeepers'', based on criteria relative to their turnover and number of users, that will be subject to specific rules and obligations. Analyzing the current proposal from a law and economics perspective and taking into account the particularities of the digital economy, this paper observes that such a regulation based on the size of platforms is likely to hinder competition, reduce innovation and harm consumers.","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89784491","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Supporters of free markets often have a general feeling that there is too much regulation or that it is too intrusive, badly formulated, and ineffective. However, proponents of these positions are often lacking in empirical evidence and are susceptible to accusations of either exaggerating the impact of regulation or not caring about the environment, workers, children or consumers. However, supporters of free markets value and recognise the importance of these and believe that market solutions would improve the overall situation. As the UK leaves the EU, it will adopt an independent regulatory policy with the ability to repeal and amend EU rules, and introduce new regulations in fields of EU competence. This freedom will have to be exercised in line with Britain's international commitments and the impact on trade with the EU that will come from diverging at a national level from its regulations. Regulation has been a tool of EU integration. The implications of this driver being removed from UK regulatory policy should not be underestimated. Regulation is a major source of concern for businesses, though the concerns tend to differ between the strategic interests of larger businesses with legal and lobbying firepower and small and new businesses ,for whom the costs of regulation represent barriers to entry and growth. The perception that unelected officials in entrenched positions are enforcing rules contributed to the feelings of dissatisfaction that led British people to vote to leave the EU in 2016. There is a risk now, with EU laws being transposed en masse into UK law and regulators pouring cold water on suggestions of reforms, that the innate stickiness of the regulatory state will assert itself and the opportunity for meaningful change will be lost.
{"title":"Rules Britannia: Analysing Britain's Regulatory Burden","authors":"Victoria Hewson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3852044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3852044","url":null,"abstract":"Supporters of free markets often have a general feeling that there is too much regulation or that it is too intrusive, badly formulated, and ineffective. However, proponents of these positions are often lacking in empirical evidence and are susceptible to accusations of either exaggerating the impact of regulation or not caring about the environment, workers, children or consumers. However, supporters of free markets value and recognise the importance of these and believe that market solutions would improve the overall situation. As the UK leaves the EU, it will adopt an independent regulatory policy with the ability to repeal and amend EU rules, and introduce new regulations in fields of EU competence. This freedom will have to be exercised in line with Britain's international commitments and the impact on trade with the EU that will come from diverging at a national level from its regulations. Regulation has been a tool of EU integration. The implications of this driver being removed from UK regulatory policy should not be underestimated. Regulation is a major source of concern for businesses, though the concerns tend to differ between the strategic interests of larger businesses with legal and lobbying firepower and small and new businesses ,for whom the costs of regulation represent barriers to entry and growth. The perception that unelected officials in entrenched positions are enforcing rules contributed to the feelings of dissatisfaction that led British people to vote to leave the EU in 2016. There is a risk now, with EU laws being transposed en masse into UK law and regulators pouring cold water on suggestions of reforms, that the innate stickiness of the regulatory state will assert itself and the opportunity for meaningful change will be lost.<br>","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81766892","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A cornerstone of for-profit schools’ business model is to encourage students to borrow as much as possible to finance their college attendance. After drawing people in with misleading advertisements, for-profit colleges quickly hand prospective students off to financial aid officers who rush students through the process of explaining the financial aid system—if they explain it at all. These employees drive students to take on massive federal and private debt loads, including loans that the school itself originates. They will sometimes fill out or even fraudulently sign forms on students’ behalf, all the while insisting that they are working in the students’ interest. Each of these tactics has one goal: boosting schools’ revenues by inflating students’ debt balances, regardless of how unmanageable those loans are likely to be for borrowers.This issue brief argues that each of these areas of conduct place for-profit colleges squarely within the authority of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), and that the Bureau can therefore intervene to protect borrowers. The CFPB’s authorizing statute states that anyone providing a consumer financial product or service is a “covered person” and therefore falls under the Bureau’s purview, including with respect to the prohibition on unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts and practices. As this issue brief outlines, each one of the common features of the for-profit college business model described above is alone sufficient to make a for-profit college a “covered person,” including the practices of lending to students through institutional loan programs, brokering student loans through third parties, and providing students financial advisory services in the financial aid process (regardless of the quality of the advice).With for-profit college enrollment surging due to COVID, the need to rein in the industry has never been more pressing. The CFPB has the tools to combat the rampant illegal practices that the for-profit college industry relies on.
{"title":"For-Profit Schools as Covered Persons under the CFPA","authors":"Marsha Lawler, Michelle Dold","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3801973","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3801973","url":null,"abstract":"A cornerstone of for-profit schools’ business model is to encourage students to borrow as much as possible to finance their college attendance. After drawing people in with misleading advertisements, for-profit colleges quickly hand prospective students off to financial aid officers who rush students through the process of explaining the financial aid system—if they explain it at all. These employees drive students to take on massive federal and private debt loads, including loans that the school itself originates. They will sometimes fill out or even fraudulently sign forms on students’ behalf, all the while insisting that they are working in the students’ interest. Each of these tactics has one goal: boosting schools’ revenues by inflating students’ debt balances, regardless of how unmanageable those loans are likely to be for borrowers.This issue brief argues that each of these areas of conduct place for-profit colleges squarely within the authority of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), and that the Bureau can therefore intervene to protect borrowers. The CFPB’s authorizing statute states that anyone providing a consumer financial product or service is a “covered person” and therefore falls under the Bureau’s purview, including with respect to the prohibition on unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts and practices. As this issue brief outlines, each one of the common features of the for-profit college business model described above is alone sufficient to make a for-profit college a “covered person,” including the practices of lending to students through institutional loan programs, brokering student loans through third parties, and providing students financial advisory services in the financial aid process (regardless of the quality of the advice).With for-profit college enrollment surging due to COVID, the need to rein in the industry has never been more pressing. The CFPB has the tools to combat the rampant illegal practices that the for-profit college industry relies on.","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89086867","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The duality between cost and production function can be a key point to explore regulation process in Agent-Principal model because the Principal observes outputs in inputs and has asymmetric information about the cost by the Agent. This paper investigates the properties of production functions related with cost functions proposed by Mizutani (2020) to different industry structures using some properties explained in cost production duality problem to linear models. The motivation to this investigation is to have more parameters to understand how to regulate network industries observing production can be used to purpose politics of separate or integrate railways structures. The results indicate that production function must have bounders as structures of the railway industry changes from the integrated to separated depending on the competition, density, scope and scale. The paper can be extended with increasing and decreasing returns of scale.
{"title":"Equivalence between Cost and Production Functions by the Mizutani Cost Functons to Different Industrie Structures: What Can We Learn?","authors":"Francisco Gildemir Ferreira da Silva","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3801069","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3801069","url":null,"abstract":"The duality between cost and production function can be a key point to explore regulation process in Agent-Principal model because the Principal observes outputs in inputs and has asymmetric information about the cost by the Agent. This paper investigates the properties of production functions related with cost functions proposed by Mizutani (2020) to different industry structures using some properties explained in cost production duality problem to linear models. The motivation to this investigation is to have more parameters to understand how to regulate network industries observing production can be used to purpose politics of separate or integrate railways structures. The results indicate that production function must have bounders as structures of the railway industry changes from the integrated to separated depending on the competition, density, scope and scale. The paper can be extended with increasing and decreasing returns of scale.","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78938976","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A growing number of studies explore the determinants of economic freedom. Very few of them consider constitutional design. We study entrenchment, i.e., the extent to which constitutions are more costly to change than ordinary policies and institutions. We utilize 1970-2017 data and study episodes where countries adopted meaningfully more entrenched constitutions. Using matching methods, we construct plausible counterfactuals against which to compare their post-treatment changes in economic freedom. We report no significant effects on overall freedom. There is some evidence that entrenchment leads to smaller government size, more regulation, and weaker property rights. However, none of these results are robust.
{"title":"Does Constitutional Entrenchment Matter for Economic Freedom?","authors":"Justin T. Callais, A. Young","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3663374","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3663374","url":null,"abstract":"A growing number of studies explore the determinants of economic freedom. Very few of them consider constitutional design. We study entrenchment, i.e., the extent to which constitutions are more costly to change than ordinary policies and institutions. We utilize 1970-2017 data and study episodes where countries adopted meaningfully more entrenched constitutions. Using matching methods, we construct plausible counterfactuals against which to compare their post-treatment changes in economic freedom. We report no significant effects on overall freedom. There is some evidence that entrenchment leads to smaller government size, more regulation, and weaker property rights. However, none of these results are robust.","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84056380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article explores different accounts of private regulation in Artificial Intelligence (PRAI) and asks whose views are being implemented in the development of non-state rules for AI. This question is explored through a normative analysis of the political economy of technology and ethical standardisation. The research characterises the distributional outcomes of private regulation, showing how private regulation is currently shaping AI governance. The article argues that the current AI governance framework is built not only on its technical and ethical layers but also -and perhaps most importantly- on the institutional and procedural architecture of international standardisation. Drawing on empirical research, the article finds an increasing role of China in private governance and suggests that the incorporation of ethical discussions into standard-setting would be a first building block in the formation of forthcoming AI governance in an imminently hyperconnected world.
{"title":"From Private Regulation to Power Politics: The Rise of China in AI Private Governance Through Standardisation","authors":"Marta Cantero Gamito","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3794761","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3794761","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores different accounts of private regulation in Artificial Intelligence (PRAI) and asks whose views are being implemented in the development of non-state rules for AI. This question is explored through a normative analysis of the political economy of technology and ethical standardisation. The research characterises the distributional outcomes of private regulation, showing how private regulation is currently shaping AI governance. The article argues that the current AI governance framework is built not only on its technical and ethical layers but also -and perhaps most importantly- on the institutional and procedural architecture of international standardisation. Drawing on empirical research, the article finds an increasing role of China in private governance and suggests that the incorporation of ethical discussions into standard-setting would be a first building block in the formation of forthcoming AI governance in an imminently hyperconnected world.","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82148184","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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