The issue of bank dividend regulation has become highly controversial as the stress induced on bank capital during the 2008 financial crisis and the covid pandemic created a demand for enhanced regulation and restrictions on bank dividend payments. This paper examines this issue from a historical perspective by analyzing the dividend decisions of a sample of central-reserve-city banks during the Great Depression and its aftermath to 1973, and in particular the active risk management role that dividend policy may have played for study banks. Dividend policy was used to balance the interests of stockholders and depositors, and to preserve the long-term solvency of the bank. Overall our study results show that despite an initial reluctance to cut dividends, banks cut dividend levels by 24% in 1932 and by 12.7% in 1933 (in median terms). Post-Great Depression dividends remained at depressed levels through most of the 1930s and 1940s. Our study results indicate that this period of depressed and relatively constant dividends allowed banks to rebuild capital levels, which had fallen sharply with the Great Depression. Capital rebuilding post-depression represented risk-shifting in favor of depositors and likely contributed to the stability of the U.S. banking system in the post-depression era.
{"title":"Should Bank Dividends Be Regulated? What Is the Long-Term Historical Evidence?","authors":"A. Saunders, Berry K. Wilson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3740258","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3740258","url":null,"abstract":"The issue of bank dividend regulation has become highly controversial as the stress induced on bank capital during the 2008 financial crisis and the covid pandemic created a demand for enhanced regulation and restrictions on bank dividend payments. This paper examines this issue from a historical perspective by analyzing the dividend decisions of a sample of central-reserve-city banks during the Great Depression and its aftermath to 1973, and in particular the active risk management role that dividend policy may have played for study banks. Dividend policy was used to balance the interests of stockholders and depositors, and to preserve the long-term solvency of the bank. Overall our study results show that despite an initial reluctance to cut dividends, banks cut dividend levels by 24% in 1932 and by 12.7% in 1933 (in median terms). Post-Great Depression dividends remained at depressed levels through most of the 1930s and 1940s. Our study results indicate that this period of depressed and relatively constant dividends allowed banks to rebuild capital levels, which had fallen sharply with the Great Depression. Capital rebuilding post-depression represented risk-shifting in favor of depositors and likely contributed to the stability of the U.S. banking system in the post-depression era.","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79253691","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The applicability of the notion of killer acquisition to digital platforms has long been debated. The case of the proceedings brought by the U.S. DoJ against Visa is even more interesting insofar as it makes it possible to illustrate and discuss its different facets ranging from the notion of competition suppression to that of consolidation and extension of the dominant position. The complaint analysis also makes it possible to question inter-digital ecosystem competition and shed light on the issues related to the monitoring of acquisitions undertaken by dominant companies in the sector.
{"title":"Visa Acquiring Plaid: A Tartan Over a Killer Acquisition? Reflections on the Risks of Harming Competition Through the Acquisition of Startups Within Digital Ecosystems","authors":"F. Marty, Thierry Warin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3738299","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3738299","url":null,"abstract":"The applicability of the notion of killer acquisition to digital platforms has long been debated. The case of the proceedings brought by the U.S. DoJ against Visa is even more interesting insofar as it makes it possible to illustrate and discuss its different facets ranging from the notion of competition suppression to that of consolidation and extension of the dominant position. The complaint analysis also makes it possible to question inter-digital ecosystem competition and shed light on the issues related to the monitoring of acquisitions undertaken by dominant companies in the sector.","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82015743","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Over the past decade, societies significantly improved their understanding of the competitive dynamics at play in digital markets. However, a challenge remains in designing remedies that actually improve overall welfare. This paper first maps out the frontier of remedy design in the digital world. Section I summarizes antitrust remedies imposed on digital companies to both group cases according to the different underlying concerns they tackle and to identify potential interplays with regulatory interventions that share the same rationale. Section II complements this analysis by reviewing eighteen key independent reports on competition in digital markets to identify proposals to advance antitrust or regulatory interventions. The overall conclusion is that while the interplay between antitrust and regulation is bound to grow, authorities lack a coherent framework that would allow them coherently and rationally apply these policies in practice. Section III, the core of the paper, fills this gap by introducing a new framework to integrate antitrust and regulatory interventions in the digital world—one that is focused on two different levels of remedy design. First, it develops a compounded error-cost framework authorities can apply when choosing between remedies for a given conduct: when authorities accept higher risks of over-enforcement in deciding to intervene they should compensate by taking lower risks of over-enforcement in remedy design, and vice-versa. Second, it proposes four criteria authorities can rely on to allocate between different regulators three connected but different key activities in remedy design: (i) the identification of harmful behavior; (ii) the design of the intervention; and (iii) monitoring and adaptation of the remedy. Section IV concludes by applying this framework to seven types of conduct that Sections I and II identified as potentially problematic: (i) discrimination, unfair treatment and self-preferencing; (ii) exclusivity relations with suppliers, distributors or clients; (iii) tying or bundling through contractual agreements; (iv) MFNs and other price parity clauses; (v) refusals to deal, limited interoperability and lack of data portability; (vi) rules and terms of service imposed by digital platforms; and (vii) nudges, sludges and other concerns in user interfaces.
{"title":"Designing Remedies for Digital Markets: The Interplay Between Antitrust and Regulation","authors":"F. Lancieri, Caio Mario da Silva Pereira Neto","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3704763","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3704763","url":null,"abstract":"Over the past decade, societies significantly improved their understanding of the competitive dynamics at play in digital markets. However, a challenge remains in designing remedies that actually improve overall welfare. \u0000This paper first maps out the frontier of remedy design in the digital world. Section I summarizes antitrust remedies imposed on digital companies to both group cases according to the different underlying concerns they tackle and to identify potential interplays with regulatory interventions that share the same rationale. Section II complements this analysis by reviewing eighteen key independent reports on competition in digital markets to identify proposals to advance antitrust or regulatory interventions. The overall conclusion is that while the interplay between antitrust and regulation is bound to grow, authorities lack a coherent framework that would allow them coherently and rationally apply these policies in practice. \u0000Section III, the core of the paper, fills this gap by introducing a new framework to integrate antitrust and regulatory interventions in the digital world—one that is focused on two different levels of remedy design. First, it develops a compounded error-cost framework authorities can apply when choosing between remedies for a given conduct: when authorities accept higher risks of over-enforcement in deciding to intervene they should compensate by taking lower risks of over-enforcement in remedy design, and vice-versa. Second, it proposes four criteria authorities can rely on to allocate between different regulators three connected but different key activities in remedy design: (i) the identification of harmful behavior; (ii) the design of the intervention; and (iii) monitoring and adaptation of the remedy. \u0000Section IV concludes by applying this framework to seven types of conduct that Sections I and II identified as potentially problematic: (i) discrimination, unfair treatment and self-preferencing; (ii) exclusivity relations with suppliers, distributors or clients; (iii) tying or bundling through contractual agreements; (iv) MFNs and other price parity clauses; (v) refusals to deal, limited interoperability and lack of data portability; (vi) rules and terms of service imposed by digital platforms; and (vii) nudges, sludges and other concerns in user interfaces.","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":"93 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78246312","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The application of AI and Machine Learning (ML) techniques is becoming a primary issue of investigation in the legal and regulatory domain. Antitrust agencies are into the spotlight because antitrust is the first arm of government regulation by tackling forms of monopoly and collusive practices in any markets, including new digital-data-driven markets. A question the antitrust community is asking is whether antitrust agencies are equipped with the appropriate tools and powers to face today’s increasingly dynamic markets. Our study aims to tackle this question by building and testing an ML antitrust algorithm (AML) based on an unsupervised approach, devoid of any human intervention. It shows how a relatively simple algorithm can, in an autonomous manner, discover underlying patterns from past antitrust cases classified by commuting similarity. Thus, we recognize that teaching antitrust to an algorithm is possible, although we admit that AI cannot replace antitrust agencies, such as the FTC. Today, having an increasingly fast and uniform way to enforce antitrust principles is fundamental as we move into a new digital economic transformation. Our contribution aims to pave the way for future AI applications in markets’ regulation starting from antitrust regulation. Government’s adoption of emerging technologies, such as AI, appears to be the key for ensuring consumer welfare and market efficiency in the age of AI and big data.
{"title":"Can AI Replace the FTC?","authors":"Giovanna Massarotto, A. Ittoo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3733324","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3733324","url":null,"abstract":"The application of AI and Machine Learning (ML) techniques is becoming a primary issue of investigation in the legal and regulatory domain. Antitrust agencies are into the spotlight because antitrust is the first arm of government regulation by tackling forms of monopoly and collusive practices in any markets, including new digital-data-driven markets. A question the antitrust community is asking is whether antitrust agencies are equipped with the appropriate tools and powers to face today’s increasingly dynamic markets. Our study aims to tackle this question by building and testing an ML antitrust algorithm (AML) based on an unsupervised approach, devoid of any human intervention. It shows how a relatively simple algorithm can, in an autonomous manner, discover underlying patterns from past antitrust cases classified by commuting similarity. Thus, we recognize that teaching antitrust to an algorithm is possible, although we admit that AI cannot replace antitrust agencies, such as the FTC. Today, having an increasingly fast and uniform way to enforce antitrust principles is fundamental as we move into a new digital economic transformation. Our contribution aims to pave the way for future AI applications in markets’ regulation starting from antitrust regulation. Government’s adoption of emerging technologies, such as AI, appears to be the key for ensuring consumer welfare and market efficiency in the age of AI and big data.","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82113046","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We develop the first comprehensive mapping of the revolving door phenomenon in the U.S. by examining the work experience in executive branch agencies of 1,910,150 individuals covering top corporate positions in 373,011 unique firms. We document that the phenomenon is prevalent, with one out of every 15 firms, and one out of every three publicly traded firms, having at least one top employee with prior work experience in U.S. executive branch agencies. On average, former regulators are hired in response to or concomitant with increases in regulation as well as concomitant with more aggressive regulator behavior in the form of a higher incidence of fines. Firms headquartered in more corrupt states, firms seemingly more corruption-prone, and established violators receive benefits in the form of a reduction in the incidence of fines after hiring former regulators from fine-imposing agencies. In contrast, we do not observe other firms receiving benefits on average.
{"title":"Exposing the Revolving Door in Executive Branch Agencies","authors":"Logan P. Emery, M. Faccio","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3732484","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3732484","url":null,"abstract":"We develop the first comprehensive mapping of the revolving door phenomenon in the U.S. by examining the work experience in executive branch agencies of 1,910,150 individuals covering top corporate positions in 373,011 unique firms. We document that the phenomenon is prevalent, with one out of every 15 firms, and one out of every three publicly traded firms, having at least one top employee with prior work experience in U.S. executive branch agencies. On average, former regulators are hired in response to or concomitant with increases in regulation as well as concomitant with more aggressive regulator behavior in the form of a higher incidence of fines. Firms headquartered in more corrupt states, firms seemingly more corruption-prone, and established violators receive benefits in the form of a reduction in the incidence of fines after hiring former regulators from fine-imposing agencies. In contrast, we do not observe other firms receiving benefits on average.","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":"99 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73370488","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We submitted these comments in response to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network's advance notice of proposed rulemaking on the definition of an "effective and reasonably designed" anti-money laundering program applicable broadly to financial institutions. Our comments highlight industry-specific obligations of brokers and dealers in securities to have reasonably designed anti-money-laundering programs.
We argue that in undertaking future rulemaking, FinCEN should account for industry-specific statutory requirements, and how these bear on regulators’ experiences implementing AML program obligations analogous to those the advance notice of proposed rulemaking contemplates. Regulators’ experience enforcing compliance with FINRA's informal guidance under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, for instance, raises questions about whether FinCEN’s proposals to elaborate on AML obligations through periodic guidance would impose obligations enforceable at all. In particular, FinCEN should carefully consider whether essential enforcement regimes will require additional rulemaking because simply issuing official guidance may not create fully enforceable obligations in all regulatory frameworks. For self-regulatory organizations overseen by the SEC, guidance alone may not suffice to create an enforceable obligation. In instances where the SEC reviews SRO enforcement actions, it considers whether conduct violated the SRO's “rules,” meaning rules approved by the SEC. As explained in greater detail below, official guidance may not meet this standard, creating doubt, enforcement challenges, and likely inhibiting FinCEN’s compliance objectives.
我们提交这些评论是为了回应金融犯罪执法网络(Financial Crimes Enforcement Network)关于“有效且设计合理”的反洗钱计划的定义的拟议规则制定通知，该计划广泛适用于金融机构。我们的意见强调了证券经纪人和交易商在合理设计反洗钱程序方面的行业特定义务。我们认为，在进行未来的规则制定时，FinCEN应考虑到行业特定的法定要求，以及这些要求如何影响监管机构实施“反洗钱”计划义务的经验，类似于拟议规则制定的预先通知所考虑的那些。例如，监管机构根据1934年《证券交易法》(Securities Exchange Act of 1934)强制遵守FINRA非正式指导的经验，引发了人们的疑问，即FinCEN通过定期指导详细阐述“反洗钱”义务的提议是否会强制执行义务。特别是，FinCEN应仔细考虑必要的执法制度是否需要额外的规则制定，因为仅仅发布官方指导可能无法在所有监管框架中产生完全可执行的义务。对于受SEC监管的自律组织来说，仅凭指导可能不足以形成可执行的义务。在美国证券交易委员会审查SRO执法行动的情况下，它会考虑行为是否违反了SRO的“规则”，即美国证券交易委员会批准的规则。正如下面更详细地解释的那样，官方指导可能不符合这一标准，从而产生疑问，执法挑战，并可能阻碍FinCEN的合规目标。
{"title":"Comment Letter on Fincen's Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Anti-Money Laundering Program Effectiveness","authors":"Benjamin Edwards, James Fallows Tierney","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3731801","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3731801","url":null,"abstract":"We submitted these comments in response to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network's advance notice of proposed rulemaking on the definition of an \"effective and reasonably designed\" anti-money laundering program applicable broadly to financial institutions. Our comments highlight industry-specific obligations of brokers and dealers in securities to have reasonably designed anti-money-laundering programs.<br><br>We argue that in undertaking future rulemaking, FinCEN should account for industry-specific statutory requirements, and how these bear on regulators’ experiences implementing AML program obligations analogous to those the advance notice of proposed rulemaking contemplates. Regulators’ experience enforcing compliance with FINRA's informal guidance under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, for instance, raises questions about whether FinCEN’s proposals to elaborate on AML obligations through periodic guidance would impose obligations enforceable at all. In particular, FinCEN should carefully consider whether essential enforcement regimes will require additional rulemaking because simply issuing official guidance may not create fully enforceable obligations in all regulatory frameworks. For self-regulatory organizations overseen by the SEC, guidance alone may not suffice to create an enforceable obligation. In instances where the SEC reviews SRO enforcement actions, it considers whether conduct violated the SRO's “rules,” meaning rules approved by the SEC. As explained in greater detail below, official guidance may not meet this standard, creating doubt, enforcement challenges, and likely inhibiting FinCEN’s compliance objectives.","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":"104 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76012092","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Using novel data, we develop a similarity score which compares the regulatory exposure of each two companies, for example if they lobby against similar rules. Regulatory similarity transcends industrial, geographic, and product market boundaries, but responds to exogenous regulatory shocks. Consistent with rational learning and efficient contract theories, regulatory similarity explains the co-movement of key corporate outcomes and the relative performance evaluation of corporate executives. Converting the pairwise similarities into a regulatory network, we find that network centrality increases complexity and reduces the quantity and quality of firm-specific information. Combined, our results highlight important economic implications of shared regulatory exposure.
{"title":"The Economic Consequences of Regulatory Similarity","authors":"Joseph Kalmenovitz, Jason Chen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3730721","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3730721","url":null,"abstract":"Using novel data, we develop a similarity score which compares the regulatory exposure of each two companies, for example if they lobby against similar rules. Regulatory similarity transcends industrial, geographic, and product market boundaries, but responds to exogenous regulatory shocks. Consistent with rational learning and efficient contract theories, regulatory similarity explains the co-movement of key corporate outcomes and the relative performance evaluation of corporate executives. Converting the pairwise similarities into a regulatory network, we find that network centrality increases complexity and reduces the quantity and quality of firm-specific information. Combined, our results highlight important economic implications of shared regulatory exposure.","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":"77 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72767604","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This chapter examines how public choice concerns, most prominently “rent-seeking” behavior, have been manifested in initiatives to regulate digital markets. The chapter first summarizes key insights from public choice and describes the phenomenon of rent-seeking. It then documents the existence of rent-seeking activity and other public choice concerns in the regulation of digital markets. It closes with a brief observation about how the structure of regulatory interventions may constrain or exacerbate rent-seeking and other public choice concerns in digital markets.
{"title":"Rent-Seeking and Public Choice in Digital Markets","authors":"T. Lambert","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3733707","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3733707","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines how public choice concerns, most prominently “rent-seeking” behavior, have been manifested in initiatives to regulate digital markets. The chapter first summarizes key insights from public choice and describes the phenomenon of rent-seeking. It then documents the existence of rent-seeking activity and other public choice concerns in the regulation of digital markets. It closes with a brief observation about how the structure of regulatory interventions may constrain or exacerbate rent-seeking and other public choice concerns in digital markets.","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":"92 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88630195","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this chapter, we address three issues relating to vertical mergers and antitrust: (1) incorporating the elimination of double marginalization into the analysis of the likelihood of a unilateral price effect rather than treating it as a separate efficiencies defense; (2) recognizing, inter alia, the importance of reduced transaction costs in analyzing the efficiencies commonly associated with vertical mergers; and (3) highlighting that the weight of the empirical evidence continues to support the proposition that vertical mergers are less likely to generate competitive concerns than horizontal mergers.
{"title":"Vertical Mergers and Integration in Digital Markets","authors":"John M. Yun","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3733684","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3733684","url":null,"abstract":"In this chapter, we address three issues relating to vertical mergers and antitrust: (1) incorporating the elimination of double marginalization into the analysis of the likelihood of a unilateral price effect rather than treating it as a separate efficiencies defense; (2) recognizing, inter alia, the importance of reduced transaction costs in analyzing the efficiencies commonly associated with vertical mergers; and (3) highlighting that the weight of the empirical evidence continues to support the proposition that vertical mergers are less likely to generate competitive concerns than horizontal mergers.","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83638777","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this chapter, we address a number of foundational questions. What exactly are platforms? How do platforms relate to the various types of network effects? Importantly, do we need different tools to assess potential anticompetitive conduct that involves platforms?
Specifically, we begin with a discussion of the various types of network effects, as these effects are integral to understanding the nature of platforms. Next, we consider platforms more from the perspective of incentives rather than an overt focus on a standardized definition. We also discuss how platforms compete, including discussions of “zero-price” markets and the associated idea of “attention” markets. Finally, we offer some guidance on some relevant economic issues to consider when assessing platform markets in the context of antitrust cases.
{"title":"Overview of Network Effects & Platforms in Digital Markets","authors":"John M. Yun","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3733656","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3733656","url":null,"abstract":"In this chapter, we address a number of foundational questions. What exactly are platforms? How do platforms relate to the various types of network effects? Importantly, do we need different tools to assess potential anticompetitive conduct that involves platforms?<br><br>Specifically, we begin with a discussion of the various types of network effects, as these effects are integral to understanding the nature of platforms. Next, we consider platforms more from the perspective of incentives rather than an overt focus on a standardized definition. We also discuss how platforms compete, including discussions of “zero-price” markets and the associated idea of “attention” markets. Finally, we offer some guidance on some relevant economic issues to consider when assessing platform markets in the context of antitrust cases.","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":"48 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90273389","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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