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Financing a Sustainable Energy Transiton 为可持续能源转型融资
Pub Date : 2020-08-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3676703
Bradford Cornell, C. Cicchetti
We begin by identifying the four major obstacles for financing the transition to a sustainable energy world: the immense size of the required financing, the need to coordinate investments in dozens of interrelated projects required for an orderly transition, the need to get the investment incentive right and to avoid crony capitalism, and the need to manage the political economics of electricity regulation and pricing. We then show that these obstacles cannot be overcome by sole reliance on either public or private finance. What is need is a creative combination of the two. In this regard, we suggest several possible policies. These include an expanded role of government guarantees of the private financing of sustainable energy projects, a focus on the funding of basic research, and an entire rethinking of the role of electricity pricing and regulation.
我们首先确定向可持续能源世界过渡的融资四大障碍:所需融资的巨大规模,为有序过渡所需的数十个相互关联的项目协调投资的需要,获得正确的投资激励和避免裙带资本主义的需要,以及管理电力监管和定价的政治经济学的需要。然后我们表明,仅依靠公共或私人资金是无法克服这些障碍的。我们需要的是两者的创造性结合。在这方面,我们提出了几项可能的政策建议。这些措施包括扩大政府为可持续能源项目的私人融资提供担保的作用,注重为基础研究提供资金,以及全面重新思考电价和监管的作用。
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引用次数: 1
The Effect of Medical Cannabis Laws on Pharmaceutical Marketing to Physicians 医用大麻法律对向医生推销药品的影响
Pub Date : 2020-08-03 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3666454
Thomas Lebesmuehlbacher, Rhet A. Smith
Although cannabis is federally prohibited, a majority of U.S. states have implemented medical cannabis laws (MCLs). As more individuals consider the drug for medical treatment, they potentially substitute away from prescription drugs. Therefore, an MCL signals competitor entry. This paper exploits geographic and temporal variation in MCLs to examine the strategic response in direct-to-physician marketing by pharmaceutical firms as cannabis enters the market. Using office detailing records from 2014-2018 aggregated to the county level, we find weak evidence of a relatively small and delayed response in substitute prescription drug- and opioid-related detailing. While these effects on detailing dollars are more pronounced among smaller pharmaceutical firms, the magnitudes are economically small and likely muted at aggregate levels by the small percent of doctors that actively recommend cannabis for medical treatment.
虽然大麻是联邦禁止的,但美国大多数州都实施了医用大麻法。随着越来越多的人考虑将这种药物用于医疗治疗,他们可能会取代处方药。因此,MCL是竞争者进入的信号。本文利用地理和时间的变化,在mcl检查战略反应直接向医生营销的制药公司作为大麻进入市场。使用汇总到县级的2014-2018年的办公室详细记录,我们发现在替代处方药和阿片类药物相关详细信息方面反应相对较小且延迟的证据不足。虽然这些对医疗费用的影响在较小的制药公司中更为明显,但从经济角度来看,影响的幅度很小,而且在总体水平上可能被一小部分积极推荐使用大麻进行医疗的医生所抵消。
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引用次数: 5
Price Transparency in Healthcare: Apply with Caution 医疗保健价格透明度:谨慎使用
Pub Date : 2020-08-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3684790
Robert F. Graboyes, Jessica McBirney
There’s a widespread perception that transparent pricing would push healthcare prices downward. While this may be true in certain markets, in many others, it would have little price impact or could even push prices upward via tacit collusion. Under perfect competition, prices are universally known and vary little across buyers and sellers. Such conditions are absent in many or most American healthcare markets. The industrial organization and antitrust literatures suggest that when the number of sellers in a market is small and barriers to entry for new sellers are high—as is true of most healthcare services—public knowledge of prices can lead to tacit collusion. In such cases, sellers act on price information as though they are conspiring to restrict supply and raise prices, without any actual conspiracy, while consumers cannot or do not use prices to change their behavior. Aside from tacit collusion, providers have better information on health and care than patients do. Emergency patients can’t price-shop. Third-party payers, not patients, reap most of the benefits of price-shopping. Even when patients are provided with price-shopping tools, they fail to compare prices. These cautions do not imply a blanket condemnation of price transparency, but they do suggest that policymakers should be highly selective in issuing transparency mandates.
人们普遍认为,透明定价将推动医疗价格下降。虽然这在某些市场可能是正确的,但在许多其他市场,它对价格的影响很小,甚至可能通过默契的共谋推动价格上涨。在完全竞争条件下,价格是众所周知的,买卖双方的价格差别很小。这些条件在许多或大多数美国医疗保健市场都不存在。产业组织和反垄断文献表明,当市场上的卖家数量很少,新卖家的进入门槛很高时——大多数医疗保健服务都是如此——公众对价格的了解会导致隐性串通。在这种情况下,卖方根据价格信息采取行动,就好像他们在合谋限制供应和提高价格,而没有任何实际的合谋,而消费者不能或不会用价格来改变他们的行为。除了心照不宣的串通,医疗服务提供者比病人掌握更多的健康和护理信息。急诊病人不能讨价还价。从价格购物中获益最多的是第三方付款人,而不是患者。即使为患者提供了价格购物工具,他们也无法比较价格。这些警告并不意味着全面谴责价格透明度,但它们确实表明,政策制定者在发布透明度指令时应该高度选择性。
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引用次数: 0
The Impact of Economic Regulation on Growth: Survey and Synthesis 经济调控对经济增长的影响:综述与综合
Pub Date : 2020-08-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3684759
James Broughel, R. Hahn
This study provides a survey of research that uses cross-country comparisons to examine how economic regulation affects growth. Studies in the peer-reviewed literature tend to rely on either World Bank or Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development measures of regulation. Those studies seem to reflect a consensus that entry regulation and anticompetitive product and labor market regulations are generally harmful to growth. The results from this cross-country research, taken in conjunction with economic theory as well as other country specific studies of economic regulation, support the hypothesis that economic regulation tends to reduce welfare in competitive markets. Given the continued use of certain types of economic regulation, the findings may offer important lessons for policymakers.
这项研究提供了一项研究的调查,该研究使用跨国比较来研究经济监管如何影响增长。同行评议文献中的研究往往依赖于世界银行(World Bank)或经合组织(oecd)的监管措施。这些研究似乎反映了一种共识,即进入监管、反竞争产品和劳动力市场监管通常对增长有害。这项跨国研究的结果与经济理论以及其他国家对经济管制的具体研究相结合,支持了经济管制倾向于减少竞争市场福利的假设。鉴于某些类型的经济监管仍在继续使用,研究结果可能为政策制定者提供重要的经验教训。
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引用次数: 5
Horizontal Mergers in the Presence of Network Externalities 网络外部性下的横向并购
Pub Date : 2020-07-18 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3461769
Susumu Sato
Evaluating network effects and two-sidedness is critical for merger control in the digital economy. To examine the impact of network effects on the welfare properties of mergers, this study analyzes a model of multiproduct-firm oligopoly with firm-level direct and indirect network externalities using an aggregative-games approach. The analysis shows that network externalities increase both the consumer benefits of mergers through network expansion and the cost of accompanying market power. The former justifies mergers involving small firms, but the latter makes mergers between dominant firms more likely to hurt consumers. In two-sided markets, the effect of mergers on consumer surplus depends on merging parties' pre-merger price structures. In particular, when a consumer group is subsidized through two-sided pricing by merging parties, such consumers are likely to benefit from mergers. These results provide theoretical guidance on merger policy toward platforms.
评估网络效应和双边性对数字经济中的并购控制至关重要。为了检验网络效应对并购福利属性的影响,本研究运用聚集博弈方法分析了具有企业直接和间接网络外部性的多产品企业寡头垄断模型。分析表明,网络外部性既增加了通过网络扩张并购的消费者利益,也增加了伴随而来的市场支配力成本。前者证明了涉及小企业的合并是正当的,但后者使得主导企业之间的合并更有可能伤害消费者。在双边市场中,并购对消费者剩余的影响取决于并购方并购前的价格结构。特别是当一个消费者群体通过并购方的双边定价得到补贴时,这些消费者很可能从并购中受益。研究结果为平台并购政策的制定提供了理论指导。
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引用次数: 6
Online Search Engine Competition with First-Mover Advantages, Potential Competition and a Competitive Fringe: Implications for Data Access Regulation and Antitrust 在线搜索引擎竞争与先发优势,潜在竞争和竞争边缘:对数据访问监管和反垄断的启示
Pub Date : 2020-07-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3647092
Jordi Casanova
Are dominant online search engines monopolies enjoying low contest-ability, due to high barriers to entry, or innovative first-movers? This paper argues that dominant online search engines maintain their leadership through an “innovation feedback loop”: a process whereby increasing R&D expenses allow dominant online search engines to maintain superior quality and achieve greater earnings over time, which in turn allow them to further increase R&D expenses to maintain leadership. Dominant online search engines use the innovation feedback loop to maintain their first-mover advantages, as entry barriers in the form of either economies of scale, switching costs or network effects do not protect their rents from technological discontinuities by potential or fringe competitors. Furthermore, first-mover advantages are also maintained via entry into adjacent markets, through either acquisition or organic growth. This allows dominant online search engines to increase advertising monetization, through collecting differentiated user data, and to improve their position against entry from potential competitors and competition from the fringe. We argue that when dominance is derived from first-mover advantages and innovation feedback loops, rather than high and non-transitory barriers to entry, competition policy and regulation should avoid undermining first-mover advantages through access regulation, as this is likely to result in trade-offs on innovation by all market players. We support instead a focus on prohibiting exclusionary behavior by first movers to avoid leadership derived from anti-competitive foreclosing abuses rather than from competition on the merits.
由于进入门槛高,占据主导地位的在线搜索引擎垄断企业是否具有较低的可竞争性,还是具有创新精神的先行者?本文认为,占主导地位的在线搜索引擎通过“创新反馈循环”保持其领导地位:在这个过程中,增加研发费用使占主导地位的在线搜索引擎保持卓越的质量,并随着时间的推移获得更高的收益,这反过来又使它们进一步增加研发费用以保持领先地位。占主导地位的在线搜索引擎利用创新反馈循环来保持它们的先发优势,因为规模经济、转换成本或网络效应等形式的进入壁垒并不能保护它们的租金不受潜在或边缘竞争对手的技术中断的影响。此外,通过收购或有机增长进入邻近市场,也保持了先发优势。这使得占主导地位的在线搜索引擎可以通过收集差异化的用户数据来增加广告货币化,并提高他们在对抗潜在竞争对手和边缘竞争对手的竞争中的地位。我们认为,当主导地位来源于先发优势和创新反馈循环,而非高且非暂时性的进入壁垒时,竞争政策和监管应避免通过准入监管削弱先发优势,因为这可能导致所有市场参与者在创新方面的权衡。相反,我们支持将重点放在禁止先行者的排他性行为上,以避免由于反竞争的止赎权滥用而产生的领导地位,而不是基于优点的竞争。
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引用次数: 1
Governing Artificial Intelligence to benefit the UN Sustainable Development Goals 治理人工智能,助力联合国可持续发展目标
Pub Date : 2020-07-01 DOI: 10.1002/sd.2048
J. Truby
Big Tech's unregulated roll-out out of experimental AI poses risks to the achievement of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), with particular vulnerability for developing countries. The goal of financial inclusion is threatened by the imperfect and ungoverned design and implementation of AI decision-making software making important financial decisions affecting customers. Automated decision-making algorithms have displayed evidence of bias, lack ethical governance, and limit transparency in the basis for their decisions, causing unfair outcomes and amplify unequal access to finance. Poverty reduction and sustainable development targets are risked by Big Tech's potential exploitation of developing countries by using AI to harvest data and profits. Stakeholder progress toward preventing financial crime and corruption is further threatened by potential misuse of AI. In the light of such risks, Big Tech's unscrupulous history means it cannot be trusted to operate without regulatory oversight. The article proposes effective pre-emptive regulatory options to minimize scenarios of AI damaging the SDGs. It explores internationally accepted principles of AI governance, and argues for their implementation as regulatory requirements governing AI developers and coders, with compliance verified through algorithmic auditing. Furthermore, it argues that AI governance frameworks must require a benefit to the SDGs. The article argues that proactively predicting such problems can enable continued AI innovation through well-designed regulations adhering to international principles. It highlights risks of unregulated AI causing harm to human interests, where a public and regulatory backlash may result in over-regulation that could damage the otherwise beneficial development of AI.
大型科技公司不受监管地推出实验性人工智能,对实现联合国可持续发展目标(sdg)构成了风险,发展中国家尤其容易受到影响。人工智能决策软件做出影响客户的重要金融决策,其设计和实施不完善、不受监管,这对普惠金融的目标构成了威胁。自动决策算法已经显示出偏见,缺乏道德治理,并且限制了决策基础的透明度,导致不公平的结果,并扩大了获得融资的不平等机会。大型科技公司利用人工智能获取数据和利润,对发展中国家的潜在剥削,使减贫和可持续发展目标面临风险。利益相关者在预防金融犯罪和腐败方面的进展受到人工智能潜在滥用的进一步威胁。考虑到这些风险,大型科技公司肆无忌惮的历史意味着,在没有监管监督的情况下,它不能被信任。本文提出了有效的先发制人的监管方案,以尽量减少人工智能破坏可持续发展目标的情况。它探讨了国际上公认的人工智能治理原则,并主张将其作为管理人工智能开发人员和编码人员的监管要求实施,并通过算法审计验证合规性。此外,它认为人工智能治理框架必须有利于可持续发展目标。文章认为,积极预测这些问题可以通过遵循国际原则的精心设计的法规来实现持续的人工智能创新。它强调了不受监管的人工智能对人类利益造成损害的风险,公众和监管部门的强烈反对可能导致过度监管,从而损害人工智能本来有益的发展。
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引用次数: 56
The Economic Impact of Telecommunications in the Republic of Guinea 几内亚共和国电信的经济影响
Pub Date : 2020-07-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3652571
Raul L. Katz, Juan Jung
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the economic impact of telecommunications in the Republic of Guinea. The empirical analysis conducted suggests that the sector generates a significant direct and indirect economic impact, contributing to 6.02% of the country’s 2019 GDP. From a direct effect standpoint, the Guinean telecommunications companies have generated in 2019 US$ 581 million in revenues, which represent 5.04% of the country’s GDP. On the other hand, the sector generates approximately 1,413 direct jobs and 1.03% of total salaries in the Guinean workforce. Beyond the direct effects, the telecommunications industry has indirectly contributed US$ 113 million on average per year to the whole economy since 2010 (0.98% of the 2019 GDP). This contribution is driven by mobile services (voice and data), but does not consider fixed broadband, which has no impact, due to the limited number of subscribers. Sectors mostly impacted by telecommunications were found to be business services (43.04% of the indirect economic impact), financial services (15.81%), trade (12.28%), other services (mainly entertainment, 9.42%), the electricity, gas and water sector (9.25%), and manufacturing industries (5.98%). Given the economic importance of telecommunications, public policies and regulatory frameworks need to be defined to maximize investment in network deployment, particularly in mobile broadband.
本文的目的是分析几内亚共和国电信的经济影响。实证分析表明,该行业产生了重大的直接和间接经济影响,占该国2019年GDP的6.02%。从直接效应的角度来看,几内亚电信公司在2019年创造了5.81亿美元的收入,占该国GDP的5.04%。另一方面,该部门创造了约1,413个直接就业机会,占几内亚劳动力总工资的1.03%。除直接影响外,自2010年以来,电信业平均每年间接为整个经济贡献1.13亿美元(占2019年GDP的0.98%)。这一贡献是由移动服务(语音和数据)推动的,但不包括固定宽带,由于用户数量有限,固定宽带没有影响。受电信影响最大的行业是商业服务(占间接经济影响的43.04%)、金融服务(15.81%)、贸易(12.28%)、其他服务(主要是娱乐,9.42%)、电力、天然气和水行业(9.25%)和制造业(5.98%)。鉴于电信的经济重要性,需要确定公共政策和监管框架,以最大限度地增加对网络部署的投资,特别是对移动宽带的投资。
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引用次数: 1
Regulation in the Digital Economy. Is Ex-Ante Regulation of 'Gatekeepers' An Efficient and Fair Solution? 数字经济中的监管。事前监管“看门人”是有效和公平的解决方案吗?
Pub Date : 2020-06-26 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3705928
Christophe Carugati
The European Commission (hereinafter “the Commission”) recently released two Inception Impact Assessments (IIA) and public consultations on a possible new competition tool and a possible ex-ante regulation of large online platforms (so-called “gatekeepers”). After the publication of many reports on the topic “competition law in the digital economy”, the Commission is ready to act by adapting its antitrust law and by regulating large digital players before the end of the year (Q4-2020). To regulate or not to regulate is not anymore a Shakespearian issue. A regulation is inevitable. If the why seems obvious the how is still an open question. Should the regulation be symmetric (applicable to all firms equally) or asymmetric (applicable only to large online platforms against objective criteria)? From a law and economics point of view, an ex-ante asymmetric regulation may not only be inefficient but also unfair. Section I provides a brief summary of why a regulation is necessary and section 2 explains why an ex-ante asymmetric regulation is not an efficient and fair solution.
欧盟委员会(以下简称“委员会”)最近发布了两份初始影响评估(IIA)和公众咨询,内容涉及可能的新竞争工具和可能的大型在线平台(所谓的“看门人”)事前监管。在发表了许多关于“数字经济中的竞争法”的报告之后,欧盟委员会准备在今年年底(2020年第四季度)之前通过调整其反垄断法和监管大型数字企业来采取行动。管制或不管制不再是莎士比亚式的问题。监管是不可避免的。如果“为什么”似乎显而易见,那么“怎么做”仍然是一个悬而未决的问题。监管应该是对称的(平等地适用于所有公司)还是不对称的(只适用于符合客观标准的大型在线平台)?从法律和经济学的角度来看,事前不对称监管不仅效率低下,而且不公平。第一节简要总结了为什么监管是必要的,第二节解释了为什么事前不对称监管不是一个有效和公平的解决方案。
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引用次数: 2
The Effects of Dental Hygienist Autonomy on Dental Care Utilization 牙科保健员自主性对牙科保健利用的影响
Pub Date : 2020-06-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3635762
Jie Chen, C. Meyerhoefer, E. Timmons
Because of the limited supply of health care providers relative to the demand for health care services, increases in provider autonomy are believed to improve access to health care by reducing barriers to the provision of certain services. However, research on the impact of scope of practice laws for health and dental professionals is limited. We investigate the effects of regulations governing the practice autonomy of dental hygienists on dental care use and expenditure using the 2001–2014 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. We measure the strength of autonomy regulations by extending the Dental Hygiene Professional Practice Index to the years 2001–2014, allowing us to capture changes in regulations within states over time. Using a difference-in-differences framework, we find that relaxing supervision requirements to provide dental hygienists greater autonomy results in higher levels of dental care utilization in areas with a shortage of dental care providers. Moreover, expanding dental hygienist autonomy increased the use of many services that dental hygienists perform, such as cleanings, fluoride treatments, sealant applications, and fillings. We also find that greater autonomy reduces costs associated with dental treatment for both individuals and third-party payers.
由于卫生保健提供者的供应相对于卫生保健服务的需求有限,人们认为,增加卫生保健提供者的自主权可以减少提供某些服务的障碍,从而改善获得卫生保健的机会。然而,关于执业范围法对卫生和牙科专业人员的影响的研究是有限的。我们使用2001-2014年医疗支出小组调查来调查管理牙科保健师实践自主权的法规对牙科保健使用和支出的影响。我们通过将口腔卫生专业实践指数扩展到2001-2014年来衡量自治法规的强度,使我们能够捕捉各州内法规随时间的变化。使用差异中的差异框架,我们发现放松监督要求,为牙科保健员提供更大的自主权,在牙科保健提供者短缺的地区,牙科保健利用水平更高。此外,扩大牙科保健员的自主权增加了牙科保健员提供的许多服务的使用,如清洁、氟化物治疗、密封剂应用和填充物。我们还发现,更大的自主权降低了个人和第三方支付者与牙科治疗相关的成本。
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引用次数: 1
期刊
ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)
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