Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.5771/2363-6270-2019-2-135
{"title":"Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis","authors":"","doi":"10.5771/2363-6270-2019-2-135","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5771/2363-6270-2019-2-135","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":121115,"journal":{"name":"Recht in Afrika","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129922818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.5771/2363-6270-2019-2-175
Lena Scheibinger
The practice of levirate marriage describes cases where, under the customary conception of marriage, a male relative of the deceased husband ‘inherits’ or ‘takes over’ his widow. Based on the concept of legal pluralism, the paper analyses different notions of marriage in customary law and statutory law. Within this legal framework the collective character of marriage under customary law and the assumption that the alliance entered by two kin groups is not dissolved by the death of one spouse function as central preliminaries for the levirate marriage. Even though the levirate shows a large number of variables, all these arrangements were initially created as a support system for the widow and her children. Furthermore, it allowed the perpetuation of the lineage and the maintenance of the alliance between two families. By referring to case studies from various ethnic groups in Kenya and Uganda the paper discusses current developments of and challenges for this complex practice that constitutes a field of multiple negotiations especially in its legal-pluralistic context.
{"title":"Die gewohnheitsrechtliche Praktik der Leviratsehe in Kenia und Uganda","authors":"Lena Scheibinger","doi":"10.5771/2363-6270-2019-2-175","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5771/2363-6270-2019-2-175","url":null,"abstract":"The practice of levirate marriage describes cases where, under the customary conception of marriage, a male relative of the deceased husband ‘inherits’ or ‘takes over’ his widow. Based on the concept of legal pluralism, the paper analyses different notions of marriage in customary law and statutory law. Within this legal framework the collective character of marriage under customary law and the assumption that the alliance entered by two kin groups is not dissolved by the death of one spouse function as central preliminaries for the levirate marriage. Even though the levirate shows a large number of variables, all these arrangements were initially created as a support system for the widow and her children. Furthermore, it allowed the perpetuation of the lineage and the maintenance of the alliance between two families. By referring to case studies from various ethnic groups in Kenya and Uganda the paper discusses current developments of and challenges for this complex practice that constitutes a field of multiple negotiations especially in its legal-pluralistic context.","PeriodicalId":121115,"journal":{"name":"Recht in Afrika","volume":"455 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123048950","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.5771/2363-6270-2023-1-55
Jules Masuku Ayikaba
The law of the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA) enshrines the principle of compulsory representation by lawyer before its High Court, the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration (CCJA). It follows from this principle that any appeal before the CCJA and any related procedural document such as the reply or replication, not signed by a lawyer belonging to a Bar in the OHADA geographical area, are to be declared inadmissible. Notwithstanding the explicit consecration of this principle in OHADA law, the CCJA has been called upon on many occasions to define its contour. This paper examines the interpretation of this principle by this court. It first notes the scope of this principle as defined by the CCJA in relation to the criteria retained for the exercise of the ministry of counsel before its jurisdiction. Finally, it dwells on its jurisprudence concerning the form and statements of the special mandate to be given to the lawyer, on the one hand, and on the legal consequences attached to it, on the other hand. It concludes by pointing out that OHADA law, and the High Court in its jurisprudential practice, are more flexible and better adapted to the obligation of representation by a lawyer than the law of certain OHADA member states.
{"title":"Portée du principe de la représentation obligatoire par avocat devant la Cour Commune de Justice et d’arbitrage (CCJA) à l’aune de la pratique jurisprudentielle","authors":"Jules Masuku Ayikaba","doi":"10.5771/2363-6270-2023-1-55","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5771/2363-6270-2023-1-55","url":null,"abstract":"The law of the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA) enshrines the principle of compulsory representation by lawyer before its High Court, the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration (CCJA). It follows from this principle that any appeal before the CCJA and any related procedural document such as the reply or replication, not signed by a lawyer belonging to a Bar in the OHADA geographical area, are to be declared inadmissible. Notwithstanding the explicit consecration of this principle in OHADA law, the CCJA has been called upon on many occasions to define its contour. This paper examines the interpretation of this principle by this court. It first notes the scope of this principle as defined by the CCJA in relation to the criteria retained for the exercise of the ministry of counsel before its jurisdiction. Finally, it dwells on its jurisprudence concerning the form and statements of the special mandate to be given to the lawyer, on the one hand, and on the legal consequences attached to it, on the other hand. It concludes by pointing out that OHADA law, and the High Court in its jurisprudential practice, are more flexible and better adapted to the obligation of representation by a lawyer than the law of certain OHADA member states.","PeriodicalId":121115,"journal":{"name":"Recht in Afrika","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128701540","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.5771/2363-6270-2021-2-240
Lepere Kumba Kwambanda
Il est question d’une étude qui propose une réflexion autour de l’effectivité de l’obligation de motivation des arrêts de la Cour constitutionnelle en République Démocratique du Congo (RDC). Depuis la constitution du 18 février 2006, la motivation des décisions de la Cour constitutionnelle est apparue comme une obligation constitutionnellement garantie par l’article 21. En effet, la motivation est perçue comme la garantie d’une justice constitutionnelle transparente, impartiale et indépendante. Et par ailleurs, elle est gage de la paix sociale et de la recherche de l’État de droit en RDC. Toutefois, la présente contribution visera à démontrer qu’en dépit de sa consécration constitutionnelle, cette obligation semble avoir un caractère aléatoire. En effet, la pratique du juge constitutionnel n’apparaît pas élever la motivation des décisions au rang « d’obligation » de telle manière que sa mise en œuvre n’est pas totalement effective. Par ailleurs, à l’aune des exemples étrangers, il sera également question d’appréhender la manière dont la justice constitutionnelle est rendue afin d’apporter des solutions dynamiques favorisant l’effectivité d’une telle obligation.
{"title":"Les enjeux de la motivation des arrêts de la Cour constitutionnelle en République Démocratique du Congo: Analyse à l’aide des exemples étrangers","authors":"Lepere Kumba Kwambanda","doi":"10.5771/2363-6270-2021-2-240","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5771/2363-6270-2021-2-240","url":null,"abstract":"Il est question d’une étude qui propose une réflexion autour de l’effectivité de l’obligation de motivation des arrêts de la Cour constitutionnelle en République Démocratique du Congo (RDC). Depuis la constitution du 18 février 2006, la motivation des décisions de la Cour constitutionnelle est apparue comme une obligation constitutionnellement garantie par l’article 21. En effet, la motivation est perçue comme la garantie d’une justice constitutionnelle transparente, impartiale et indépendante. Et par ailleurs, elle est gage de la paix sociale et de la recherche de l’État de droit en RDC. Toutefois, la présente contribution visera à démontrer qu’en dépit de sa consécration constitutionnelle, cette obligation semble avoir un caractère aléatoire. En effet, la pratique du juge constitutionnel n’apparaît pas élever la motivation des décisions au rang « d’obligation » de telle manière que sa mise en œuvre n’est pas totalement effective. Par ailleurs, à l’aune des exemples étrangers, il sera également question d’appréhender la manière dont la justice constitutionnelle est rendue afin d’apporter des solutions dynamiques favorisant l’effectivité d’une telle obligation.","PeriodicalId":121115,"journal":{"name":"Recht in Afrika","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126384386","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.5771/2363-6270-2019-2-246
H. Sippel
{"title":"Hatem Elliesie: Völkerrechtliche Beziehungen zwischen Äthiopien und Italien im Lichte des Vertrages von Uccialli/Wuchale (1889).","authors":"H. Sippel","doi":"10.5771/2363-6270-2019-2-246","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5771/2363-6270-2019-2-246","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":121115,"journal":{"name":"Recht in Afrika","volume":"54 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124858830","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.5771/2363-6270-2023-1-26
Jovan Ivan Mugga, J. Gupta, R. Lefeber
The academic literature scarcely covers court cases from the Global South on climate change. Hence, this paper examines the impact of existing climate litigation on shaping Africa’s climate action and the role of courts in climate change jurisprudence on the continent. The paper determines that: NGOs are key actors in challenging state granted environmental authorisations of projects whose activities violate human rights, affect climate change, and contravene formal procedures. Courts are deciding that fossil fuel activities like gas flaring violate fundamental human rights and exacerbate climate change. They call for amending laws allowing for such activities to bring them in conformity with laws on the protection of fundamental human rights. In a balancing act of the socio-economic rights and environmental human rights violations courts acknowledge that fossil fuels form part of the energy mix of sources on account of existing government laws and policies aimed at addressing priorities like energy security and poverty alleviation, a context that should inform climate change action. The implication is that short of laws banning fossil fuel activities, these activities will continue under enabling laws thus limiting the extent of court’s intervention in challenging climate change.
{"title":"Shaping Africa’s Climate Action through Climate Litigation: An Impact Assessment","authors":"Jovan Ivan Mugga, J. Gupta, R. Lefeber","doi":"10.5771/2363-6270-2023-1-26","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5771/2363-6270-2023-1-26","url":null,"abstract":"The academic literature scarcely covers court cases from the Global South on climate change. Hence, this paper examines the impact of existing climate litigation on shaping Africa’s climate action and the role of courts in climate change jurisprudence on the continent. The paper determines that: NGOs are key actors in challenging state granted environmental authorisations of projects whose activities violate human rights, affect climate change, and contravene formal procedures. Courts are deciding that fossil fuel activities like gas flaring violate fundamental human rights and exacerbate climate change. They call for amending laws allowing for such activities to bring them in conformity with laws on the protection of fundamental human rights. In a balancing act of the socio-economic rights and environmental human rights violations courts acknowledge that fossil fuels form part of the energy mix of sources on account of existing government laws and policies aimed at addressing priorities like energy security and poverty alleviation, a context that should inform climate change action. The implication is that short of laws banning fossil fuel activities, these activities will continue under enabling laws thus limiting the extent of court’s intervention in challenging climate change.","PeriodicalId":121115,"journal":{"name":"Recht in Afrika","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129464928","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.5771/2363-6270-2021-1-96
Dieu-Merci Ngusu Masuta
The jurisdictional protection of the Constitution is designed to guaranty the affectivity of the legal state in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The fulfillment of this requirement has passed through the establishment of the constitutional Court which received from the Constitution the main competence of knowing the requests related to the conformity of the public authorities’ acts to the Constitution. This paper has tried to determine the effective sweep of this protection by making a criticism-analysis of its juridical base with regard to the judgment of the constitutional Court delivered under R. Const. 0038. By this judgment, the constitutional Court extended its competence to the act that normally should not be submitted to its appreciation. This extension was justified by the need of protecting the human rights and the public liberties furthered in the Constitution. However, it is important to insert in the Constitution this new competence in order to protect the constitutional principles as well as the human rights and the public liberties.
{"title":"La justiciabilité de la Constitution en droit congolais. Note d’observation sous Cour constitutionnelle (RDC), Matière d’appréciation de la conformité à la Constitution, R. Const. 0038, 28 Août 2015","authors":"Dieu-Merci Ngusu Masuta","doi":"10.5771/2363-6270-2021-1-96","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5771/2363-6270-2021-1-96","url":null,"abstract":"The jurisdictional protection of the Constitution is designed to guaranty the affectivity of the legal state in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The fulfillment of this requirement has passed through the establishment of the constitutional Court which received from the Constitution the main competence of knowing the requests related to the conformity of the public authorities’ acts to the Constitution. This paper has tried to determine the effective sweep of this protection by making a criticism-analysis of its juridical base with regard to the judgment of the constitutional Court delivered under R. Const. 0038. By this judgment, the constitutional Court extended its competence to the act that normally should not be submitted to its appreciation. This extension was justified by the need of protecting the human rights and the public liberties furthered in the Constitution. However, it is important to insert in the Constitution this new competence in order to protect the constitutional principles as well as the human rights and the public liberties.","PeriodicalId":121115,"journal":{"name":"Recht in Afrika","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128570951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.5771/2363-6270-2019-2-235
Issa Maige
In November 2019, the author together with Justice Thadeo Mwenempazi represented the judiciary of Tanzania in an exchange programme for judges and lawyers held in Germany.1 The programme involved visiting of various courts and law enforcement agencies. In the process, the author participated in various discussions with judges, public prosecutors, ad‐ vocates and jurists on legal system in Germany. The legal systems in these two countries are significantly different. While Tanzania follows the adversarial system, Germany follows the inquisitorial system. Nevertheless, it is a fact that neither of the systems can claim to be better than the other. There is, however, a lot which each of the systems can learn from an‐ other. This report, therefore, is an observation of the lessons that Tanzania can learn from the German judicial system. It is contended that a combination of adversarial and inquisito‐ rial systems in some areas of the law may be relevant in addressing some of the apparent weaknesses in the system of administration of justice in Tanzania. In so doing, this paper discusses, basing on the observations from the exchange programme in Germany and some documentary review, the legal systems and judicatures in the two countries and pinpoints what Tanzania can learn from Germany. For obvious reason, the report shall confine itself to Tanzania Mainland and the German State of Baden-Württemberg.
{"title":"What can the Tanzania Judicial System learn from Germany?","authors":"Issa Maige","doi":"10.5771/2363-6270-2019-2-235","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5771/2363-6270-2019-2-235","url":null,"abstract":"In November 2019, the author together with Justice Thadeo Mwenempazi represented the judiciary of Tanzania in an exchange programme for judges and lawyers held in Germany.1 The programme involved visiting of various courts and law enforcement agencies. In the process, the author participated in various discussions with judges, public prosecutors, ad‐ vocates and jurists on legal system in Germany. The legal systems in these two countries are significantly different. While Tanzania follows the adversarial system, Germany follows the inquisitorial system. Nevertheless, it is a fact that neither of the systems can claim to be better than the other. There is, however, a lot which each of the systems can learn from an‐ other. This report, therefore, is an observation of the lessons that Tanzania can learn from the German judicial system. It is contended that a combination of adversarial and inquisito‐ rial systems in some areas of the law may be relevant in addressing some of the apparent weaknesses in the system of administration of justice in Tanzania. In so doing, this paper discusses, basing on the observations from the exchange programme in Germany and some documentary review, the legal systems and judicatures in the two countries and pinpoints what Tanzania can learn from Germany. For obvious reason, the report shall confine itself to Tanzania Mainland and the German State of Baden-Württemberg.","PeriodicalId":121115,"journal":{"name":"Recht in Afrika","volume":"68 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130261847","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.5771/2363-6270-2021-1-109
A. Niyonkuru
Vers un pouvoir judiciaire du Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature? C’est ce que donne à penser la loi organique n°1/02 du 23 janvier 2021 régissant l’organisation et le fonctionnement du Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature. Outre son rôle d’antan de veiller à la bonne administration de la justice et de garant de l’indépendance des magistrats du siège dans l’exercice de leurs fonctions, le Conseil se voit, dorénavant, confier deux missions qui suscitent interrogations dans un Etat de droit : « contrôler la qualité des jugements, arrêts et autres décisions judiciaires dénoncés ou portés à [sa]connaissance (…) ainsi que leurs mesures d’exécution », d’une part, statuer sur les plaintes concernant les « mal jugés manifestes coulés en force de chose jugée », d’autre part. A l’aune de la garantie d’indépendance du pouvoir judiciaire, cette réflexion discute ces deux nouvelles missions du Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature.
{"title":"Le Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature du Burundi selon la loi n° 1/02 du 23 janvier 2021 : avancée ou recul en matière d’indépendance de la justice?","authors":"A. Niyonkuru","doi":"10.5771/2363-6270-2021-1-109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5771/2363-6270-2021-1-109","url":null,"abstract":"Vers un pouvoir judiciaire du Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature? C’est ce que donne à penser la loi organique n°1/02 du 23 janvier 2021 régissant l’organisation et le fonctionnement du Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature. Outre son rôle d’antan de veiller à la bonne administration de la justice et de garant de l’indépendance des magistrats du siège dans l’exercice de leurs fonctions, le Conseil se voit, dorénavant, confier deux missions qui suscitent interrogations dans un Etat de droit : « contrôler la qualité des jugements, arrêts et autres décisions judiciaires dénoncés ou portés à [sa]connaissance (…) ainsi que leurs mesures d’exécution », d’une part, statuer sur les plaintes concernant les « mal jugés manifestes coulés en force de chose jugée », d’autre part. A l’aune de la garantie d’indépendance du pouvoir judiciaire, cette réflexion discute ces deux nouvelles missions du Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature.","PeriodicalId":121115,"journal":{"name":"Recht in Afrika","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117092309","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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