Eurosurveillance最新文献

The emergence of clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses in 2021 has led to unprecedented epidemics in poultry, changing epidemiological patterns of year-round infections in resident wild avifauna and more frequent spill-over events to mammals. Given this situation, it is important that we recognise that traditional HPAI management strategies are no longer sufficient, and policy changes are required. Poultry vaccination has emerged as a crucial intervention in the current control of HPAI, as evidenced by France's nationwide campaign targeting domestic ducks. However, due to the logistical challenges and potential trade implications of vaccination, broader structural reforms appear also necessary. These include a shift from farm-level to territorial-level biosecurity approaches, putting into practice the concept of 'regional biosecurity'. Given the role duck farm density has played in successive HPAI epidemics in France, there is a need to think about the spatial distribution of poultry farms as a structural component of regional biosecurity and to consider the reduction of farm concentration as a measure to prevent viral spread. The integration of regional biosecurity and poultry vaccination into prevention strategies should impact the way poultry are produced and traded in the future.

During 2023/24, all children aged 6 to 59 months were targeted for seasonal influenza vaccination in Spain nationally. Using a test-negative case-control design with sentinel surveillance data, we estimated adjusted influenza vaccine effectiveness (IVE) against any influenza type to be 70% (95% confidence interval (CI): 51 to 81%) for primary care patients with acute respiratory illness (ARI) and 77% (95% CI: 21 to 93%) for hospitalised patients with severe ARI. In primary care, where most subtyped viruses (61%; 145/237) were A(H1N1), adjusted IVE was 77% (95% CI: 56 to 88%) against A(H1N1)pdm09.

The capacity to deliver programmes that prevent and control infectious diseases is a key public health function. The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) aims to support and strengthen this capacity in European Union/ European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries as part of its 2021-27 strategy which includes explicit attention to social and behavioural aspects of disease prevention. To achieve its strategic goals, it is important that ECDC improves its knowledge of prevention strategies, actors and activities in EU/EEA countries. In this Perspective, we summarise three challenges to implementing the prevention framework proposed by ECDC: (i) defining, recognising and identifying with 'prevention', (ii) integrating new understandings into established ways of thinking, and (iii) the need for more attention to prevention in governance. These challenges are derived from the findings of a project which conducted a preliminary mapping of prevention actors, networks and activities in four EU countries to support the development of a community of practice within the new ECDC prevention framework. This Perspective serves to draw attention to this prevention framework and the three identified challenges for those working on its implementation.

BackgroundAirport and luggage (also called Odyssean) malaria are chance events where Plasmodium infection results from the bite of an infected mosquito which was transported by aircraft from a malaria-endemic area. Infrequent case reports and a lack of central data collection challenge a comprehensive overview.AimTo update the epidemiological, clinical and biological understanding of airport and luggage malaria cases in Europe.MethodsWe conducted a systematic review of studies indexed from 1969 to January 2024 in MEDLINE, Embase and OpenGrey databases. A data call to EU/EEA and UK public health institutes was launched in December 2022.ResultsOf the 145 cases (89 cases from 48 studies and 56 cases from the data call) described from nine countries, 105 were classified as airport malaria, 32 as luggage malaria and eight as either airport or luggage malaria. Most airport malaria cases were reported in France (n = 52), Belgium (n = 19) and Germany (n = 9). Half of cases resided or worked near or at an international airport (mean distance of 4.3 km, n = 28). Despite disruptions in air travel amid the COVID-19 pandemic, one third of cases reported since 2000 occurred between 2018 and 2022, with a peak in 2019.ConclusionWhile airport and luggage malaria cases are rare, reports in Europe have increased, highlighting the need for effective prevention measures and a more structured surveillance of cases in Europe. Prevention measures already in place such as aircraft disinsection should be assessed for compliance and effectiveness.

BackgroundDespite the unprecedented measures implemented globally in early 2020 to prevent the spread of SARS-CoV-2, Sweden, as many other countries, experienced a severe first wave during the COVID-19 pandemic.AimWe investigated the introduction and spread of SARS-CoV-2 into Sweden.MethodsWe analysed stored respiratory specimens (n = 1,979), sampled 7 February-2 April 2020, by PCR for SARS-CoV-2 and sequenced PCR-positive specimens. Sequences generated from newly detected cases and stored positive specimens February-June 2020 (n = 954) were combined with sequences (Sweden: n = 730; other countries: n = 129,913) retrieved from other sources for Nextstrain clade assignment and phylogenetic analyses.ResultsTwelve previously unrecognised SARS-CoV-2 cases were identified: the earliest was sampled on 3 March, 1 week before recognised community transmission. We showed an early influx of clades 20A and 20B from Italy (201/328, 61% of cases exposed abroad) and clades 19A and 20C from Austria (61/328, 19%). Clade 20C dominated the first wave (20C: 908/1,684, 54%; 20B: 438/1,684, 26%; 20A: 263/1,684, 16%), and 800 of 1,684 (48%) Swedish sequences formed a country-specific 20C cluster defined by a spike mutation (G24368T). At the regional level, the proportion of clade 20C sequences correlated with an earlier weighted mean date of COVID-19 deaths.ConclusionCommunity transmission in Sweden started when mitigation efforts still focused on preventing influx. This created a transmission advantage for clade 20C, likely introduced from ongoing cryptic spread in Austria. Therefore, pandemic preparedness should have a comprehensive approach, including capacity for large-scale diagnostics to allow early detection of travel-related cases and community transmission.

BackgroundHighly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5Nx and human H1N1pdm2009 influenza viruses can infect cats. Infections in cats may result in viral adaptations or recombinant viruses, which may facilitate zoonotic transfer.AimWe aimed to investigate the presence of HPAI H5 clade 2.3.4.4 and H1 influenza viruses and antibodies to these viruses in domestic and rural stray cats in the Netherlands and factors associated with exposure.MethodsSera from stray and domestic cats, sampled 2020-2023, were analysed by ELISA and confirmed by hemagglutination inhibition assay (HAI) and pharyngeal swabs and lung tissue for influenza A virus by RT-qPCR.ResultsIn 701 stray cats, 83 (11.8%; 95% confidence interval (CI): 9.5-14.5) sera were positive for HPAI H5 and 65 findings were confirmed. In HAI, two sera were positive for both HPAI H5 and H1. In 871 domestic cats, four (0.46%; 95% CI: 0.13-1.2) sera were HPAI H5 positive and none were confirmed but 40 (4.6%; 95% CI: 3.3-6.2) sera were seropositive for H1 and 26 were confirmed. Stray cats living in nature reserves (odds ratio (OR) = 5.4; 95% CI: 1.5-20.1) and older cats (OR = 3.8; 95% CI: 2.7-7.1) were more likely to be HPAI H5 seropositive. No influenza A virus was detected in 230 cats.ConclusionThe higher HPAI H5 seroprevalence in stray cats compared with domestic cats suggests more frequent viral exposure, most likely due to foraging on wild birds. In contrast, exposure to H1 was more common in domestic cats compared with stray cats.

We analysed mpox cases in Burundi from July to September 2024, following the introduction of Clade Ib virus. Of 607 samples from the whole population of suspected cases, 154 were PCR-positive, of whom 85 were children under 15 years, with a higher proportion of female children testing positive. Geographical analysis demonstrates case concentration in Bujumbura Mairie (91/154). Age- and sex-specific interventions, as well as community engagement, are important for outbreak containment, as are targeted public health strategies in Burundi.

In response to the mpox outbreak in 2022 and 2023, widespread vaccination with modified vaccinia Ankara-Bavarian Nordic (MVA-BN, also known as JYNNEOS or Imvanex) was initiated. Here, we demonstrate that orthopoxvirus-specific binding and MVA-neutralising antibodies waned to undetectable levels 1 year post vaccination in at-risk individuals who received two doses of MVA-BN administered subcutaneously with an interval of 4 weeks, without prior smallpox or mpox vaccination. Continuous surveillance is essential to understand the impact of declining antibody levels.