The laborer becomes poorer the more wealth he produces, indeed, the more powerful and wide-ranging his production becomes. Labor does not only produce commodities, it produces itself and the laborer as a commodity and in relation to the level at which it produces commodities. The product of labor is labor, which fixes itself in the object, it becomes a thing, and it is the objectification of labor. The objectification of labor manifests itself so much as a loss of objects, that the laborer is robbed of the most necessary objects, not only to maintain his own life, but even objects with which to labor. Indeed, labor itself becomes an object, which only with the greatest effort and with random interruptions can be acquired. Appropriation of objects manifests itself so much as estrangement, that the more objects the laborer produces, the fewer he can own and so he plunges deeper under the mastery of his product: Capital.
{"title":"Karl Marx: Epitome","authors":"Anthony P. Johnson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1596770","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1596770","url":null,"abstract":"The laborer becomes poorer the more wealth he produces, indeed, the more powerful and wide-ranging his production becomes. Labor does not only produce commodities, it produces itself and the laborer as a commodity and in relation to the level at which it produces commodities. The product of labor is labor, which fixes itself in the object, it becomes a thing, and it is the objectification of labor. The objectification of labor manifests itself so much as a loss of objects, that the laborer is robbed of the most necessary objects, not only to maintain his own life, but even objects with which to labor. Indeed, labor itself becomes an object, which only with the greatest effort and with random interruptions can be acquired. Appropriation of objects manifests itself so much as estrangement, that the more objects the laborer produces, the fewer he can own and so he plunges deeper under the mastery of his product: Capital.","PeriodicalId":122208,"journal":{"name":"INSEAD Working Paper Series","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125740485","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper develops a concept of a “multiplex triad,” i.e., a triplet composed of actors playing different roles and interconnected by different kinds of relationships. An example of such triad is a social structure comprising two producers connected via horizontal relationships and a customer connected to producers via vertical ties. Multiplex triads are important drivers of network evolution, but their dynamics remains poorly understood. Although conventional wisdom suggests that horizontal ties between producers are driven solely by their prior interactions, we find that vertical ties drive the formation of horizontal relationships in a multiplex triad. We also find that these triads are affected by the agency of the customers who (a) force producers into horizontal relationships with those producers that have protected the customers' interests in the past and (b) prevent closure in triads containing strong horizontal relationships because of the divergent objectives of these triads' members. By drawing attention to the existence of multiplex triads and their underlying dynamics, this paper advances a novel view on transitivity incorporating conflicting interests and agencies of actors within social systems.
{"title":"The Missing Link: The Effect of Customers on the Formation of Relationships Among Producers in the Multiplex Triads","authors":"A. Shipilov, Stan Xiao Li","doi":"10.1287/orsc.1100.0568","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1100.0568","url":null,"abstract":"This paper develops a concept of a “multiplex triad,” i.e., a triplet composed of actors playing different roles and interconnected by different kinds of relationships. An example of such triad is a social structure comprising two producers connected via horizontal relationships and a customer connected to producers via vertical ties. Multiplex triads are important drivers of network evolution, but their dynamics remains poorly understood. Although conventional wisdom suggests that horizontal ties between producers are driven solely by their prior interactions, we find that vertical ties drive the formation of horizontal relationships in a multiplex triad. We also find that these triads are affected by the agency of the customers who (a) force producers into horizontal relationships with those producers that have protected the customers' interests in the past and (b) prevent closure in triads containing strong horizontal relationships because of the divergent objectives of these triads' members. By drawing attention to the existence of multiplex triads and their underlying dynamics, this paper advances a novel view on transitivity incorporating conflicting interests and agencies of actors within social systems.","PeriodicalId":122208,"journal":{"name":"INSEAD Working Paper Series","volume":"121 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127283661","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
An important challenge faced by media broadcasting companies is how to allocate limited advertising space between upfront (forward) contracts and the spot market (referred to in advertising as the scatter market) to maximize profits and meet contractual commitments. We develop stylized optimization models of airtime capacity planning and allocation across multiple clients under audience uncertainty. In a short-term profit maximizing setting, our results provide insight for capacity planning decisions upfront and during the broadcasting season. Our results suggest that broadcasting companies should prioritize upfront clients according to marginal revenue per audience unit. We find that accepted upfront market contracts can be aggregated across clients and served in proportion to the audience demanded. Closed-form solutions are obtained in a static setting. These results remain valid in a dynamic setting, when considering the opportunity to increase allocation by airing make-goods during the broadcasting season. Our structural results characterize the impact of contracting parameters, time, and audience uncertainty on profits and capacity decisions. The results hold under general audience and spot market profit models. Overall, we find that ignoring audience uncertainty can have a significant cost for media capacity planning and allocation.
{"title":"Media Revenue Management with Audience Uncertainty: Balancing Upfront and Spot Market Sales","authors":"V. F. Araman, I. Popescu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1291729","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1291729","url":null,"abstract":"An important challenge faced by media broadcasting companies is how to allocate limited advertising space between upfront (forward) contracts and the spot market (referred to in advertising as the scatter market) to maximize profits and meet contractual commitments. We develop stylized optimization models of airtime capacity planning and allocation across multiple clients under audience uncertainty. In a short-term profit maximizing setting, our results provide insight for capacity planning decisions upfront and during the broadcasting season. Our results suggest that broadcasting companies should prioritize upfront clients according to marginal revenue per audience unit. We find that accepted upfront market contracts can be aggregated across clients and served in proportion to the audience demanded. Closed-form solutions are obtained in a static setting. These results remain valid in a dynamic setting, when considering the opportunity to increase allocation by airing make-goods during the broadcasting season. Our structural results characterize the impact of contracting parameters, time, and audience uncertainty on profits and capacity decisions. The results hold under general audience and spot market profit models. Overall, we find that ignoring audience uncertainty can have a significant cost for media capacity planning and allocation.","PeriodicalId":122208,"journal":{"name":"INSEAD Working Paper Series","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128861165","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Deception of research participants is a pervasive ethical issue in experimental consumer research. Content analyses find as many as three-quarters of published human participant studies in our field involved some form of deception and almost all of these deceptive studies employed experimental methodologies. However, researchers have little guidance on the acceptability of this use of deception, notwithstanding the codes of root disciplines. We turn to the theories of moral philosophy and use social contract theory to identify conditions under which deception may be justified as morally permissible. Seven principles to guide research practice are formulated and their implications for consumer researchers and others are identified, together with practical recommendations for decision making on deception studies.
{"title":"Social Contract Theory and the Ethics of Deception in Consumer Research","authors":"N. Smith, Allan J. Kimmel, Jill Klein","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1336895","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1336895","url":null,"abstract":"Deception of research participants is a pervasive ethical issue in experimental consumer research. Content analyses find as many as three-quarters of published human participant studies in our field involved some form of deception and almost all of these deceptive studies employed experimental methodologies. However, researchers have little guidance on the acceptability of this use of deception, notwithstanding the codes of root disciplines. We turn to the theories of moral philosophy and use social contract theory to identify conditions under which deception may be justified as morally permissible. Seven principles to guide research practice are formulated and their implications for consumer researchers and others are identified, together with practical recommendations for decision making on deception studies.","PeriodicalId":122208,"journal":{"name":"INSEAD Working Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129573495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We use monthly stock market indices for 58 countries to construct pairwise correlations of returns and explain these correlations with differences in the industrial structure across these countries. We find that countries with similar industries have stock markets that exhibit high correlation of returns. The results are robust to the inclusion of other regressors like differences in income per capita, stock market capitalizations, measures of institutions, as well as various fixed time, country and country-pair effects. We also find that differences in the structure of exports explain stock market correlations quite well. Our results are consistent with models in which the impact of each industry-specific shock is proportional to the share of this industry in the overall industrial output of the country. We also show that differences in production structures have higher explanatory power for segmented markets rather than for markets that are integrated.
{"title":"Stock Market Comovements and Industrial Structure","authors":"Pushan Dutt, I. Mihov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1253269","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1253269","url":null,"abstract":"We use monthly stock market indices for 58 countries to construct pairwise correlations of returns and explain these correlations with differences in the industrial structure across these countries. We find that countries with similar industries have stock markets that exhibit high correlation of returns. The results are robust to the inclusion of other regressors like differences in income per capita, stock market capitalizations, measures of institutions, as well as various fixed time, country and country-pair effects. We also find that differences in the structure of exports explain stock market correlations quite well. Our results are consistent with models in which the impact of each industry-specific shock is proportional to the share of this industry in the overall industrial output of the country. We also show that differences in production structures have higher explanatory power for segmented markets rather than for markets that are integrated.","PeriodicalId":122208,"journal":{"name":"INSEAD Working Paper Series","volume":"76 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127499607","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The diffusion of new technology among competing firms is of long-standing interest in industrial organization. There is an extensive theoretical literature on technology adoption in which firms can instantaneously deploy a new technology in the market at a cost that is exogenously falling over time. While such models explain diffusion (firms adopt asynchronously), Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) show that the incentives to preemptively adopt in sub-game perfect equilibria can cause rents to be equalized across firms. In contrast, we study technology development where costly and time consuming effort is required to deploy a new technology. With diminishing returns to instantaneous effort, delaying deployment reduces the firm's cost, as in adoption models. However, the incentive to preempt is lower: with its development already partially complete, a preempted firm delays deployment less than with adoption. We provide reasonable conditions under which the sub-game perfect equilibrium outcome corresponds that in the pre-commitment equilibrium first proposed by Reinganum (1981a, 1981b), yielding both diffusion and first mover advantages for the case of technology development.
{"title":"Adoption is Not Development: First Mover Advantages in the Diffusion of New Technology","authors":"Francisco Ruiz-Aliseda, Peter Zemsky","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.957236","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.957236","url":null,"abstract":"The diffusion of new technology among competing firms is of long-standing interest in industrial organization. There is an extensive theoretical literature on technology adoption in which firms can instantaneously deploy a new technology in the market at a cost that is exogenously falling over time. While such models explain diffusion (firms adopt asynchronously), Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) show that the incentives to preemptively adopt in sub-game perfect equilibria can cause rents to be equalized across firms. In contrast, we study technology development where costly and time consuming effort is required to deploy a new technology. With diminishing returns to instantaneous effort, delaying deployment reduces the firm's cost, as in adoption models. However, the incentive to preempt is lower: with its development already partially complete, a preempted firm delays deployment less than with adoption. We provide reasonable conditions under which the sub-game perfect equilibrium outcome corresponds that in the pre-commitment equilibrium first proposed by Reinganum (1981a, 1981b), yielding both diffusion and first mover advantages for the case of technology development.","PeriodicalId":122208,"journal":{"name":"INSEAD Working Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128461483","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2002-10-15DOI: 10.1287/msom.4.4.313.5728
J. V. Mieghem, N. Rudi
We introduce a class of models, callednewsvendor networks, that allow for multiple products and multiple processing and storage points and investigate how their single-period properties extend to dynamic settings. Such models provide a parsimonious framework to study various problems of stochastic capacity investment and inventory management, including assembly, commonality, distribution, flexibility, substitution and transshipment. Newsvendor networks are stochastic models with recourse that are characterized by linear revenue and cost structures and a linear input-output transformation. While capacity and inventory decisions are locked in before uncertainty is resolved, some managerial discretion remains via ex-post input-output activity decisions. Ex-post decisions involve both the choice of activities and their levels and can result in subtle benefits. This discretion in choice is captured through alternate or "nonbasic" activities that can redeploy inputs and resources to best respond to resolved uncertain events. Nonbasic activities are never used in a deterministic environment; their value stems from discretionary flexibility to meet stochastic demand deviations from the operating point.The optimal capacity and inventory decisions balance overages with underages. Continuing the classic newsvendor analogy, the optimal balancing conditions can be interpreted as specifying multiple "critical fractiles" of the multivariate demand distribution; they also suggest appropriate measures for and trade-offs between product service levels. This paper shows that the properties of optimal newsvendor network solutions extend to a dynamic setting under plausible conditions. Indeed, we establish dynamic optimality of inventory and capacity policies for the lost sales case. Depending on the nonbasic activities, this also extends to the backordering case. Analytic- and simulation-based solution techniques and graphical interpretations are presented and illustrated by a comprehensive example that features discretionary input commonality and a flexible processing resource.
{"title":"Newsvendor Networks: Inventory Management and Capacity Investment with Discretionary Activities","authors":"J. V. Mieghem, N. Rudi","doi":"10.1287/msom.4.4.313.5728","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.4.4.313.5728","url":null,"abstract":"We introduce a class of models, callednewsvendor networks, that allow for multiple products and multiple processing and storage points and investigate how their single-period properties extend to dynamic settings. Such models provide a parsimonious framework to study various problems of stochastic capacity investment and inventory management, including assembly, commonality, distribution, flexibility, substitution and transshipment. Newsvendor networks are stochastic models with recourse that are characterized by linear revenue and cost structures and a linear input-output transformation. While capacity and inventory decisions are locked in before uncertainty is resolved, some managerial discretion remains via ex-post input-output activity decisions. Ex-post decisions involve both the choice of activities and their levels and can result in subtle benefits. This discretion in choice is captured through alternate or \"nonbasic\" activities that can redeploy inputs and resources to best respond to resolved uncertain events. Nonbasic activities are never used in a deterministic environment; their value stems from discretionary flexibility to meet stochastic demand deviations from the operating point.The optimal capacity and inventory decisions balance overages with underages. Continuing the classic newsvendor analogy, the optimal balancing conditions can be interpreted as specifying multiple \"critical fractiles\" of the multivariate demand distribution; they also suggest appropriate measures for and trade-offs between product service levels. This paper shows that the properties of optimal newsvendor network solutions extend to a dynamic setting under plausible conditions. Indeed, we establish dynamic optimality of inventory and capacity policies for the lost sales case. Depending on the nonbasic activities, this also extends to the backordering case. Analytic- and simulation-based solution techniques and graphical interpretations are presented and illustrated by a comprehensive example that features discretionary input commonality and a flexible processing resource.","PeriodicalId":122208,"journal":{"name":"INSEAD Working Paper Series","volume":"74 11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128987861","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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