This case comment offers a new perspective on the Bank Melli decision of the CJEU by integrating the missing discussions on SWIFT. This is a crucial element that was merely referred to in the Opinion of the Advocate General as oppose to full ruling by the CJEU. A crucial part of the comment is the role of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (US) and how it enfolden SWIFT and therefore the implications in other legislations that are used to apply secondary sanctions. The comment also use material from the US Treasury to add context in terms of the Bank Melli decision and how international law underperforms when financial sanctions touches and concerns the United States. Bank Melli, SWIFT, Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act 2012, Financial Sanctions, Financial Messaging
{"title":"SWIFT Clouds Between International Legal Storms? Bank Melli, the CJEU and Secondary Sanctions","authors":"P. Morris","doi":"10.54648/gtcj2022056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/gtcj2022056","url":null,"abstract":"This case comment offers a new perspective on the Bank Melli decision of the CJEU by integrating the missing discussions on SWIFT. This is a crucial element that was merely referred to in the Opinion of the Advocate General as oppose to full ruling by the CJEU. A crucial part of the comment is the role of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (US) and how it enfolden SWIFT and therefore the implications in other legislations that are used to apply secondary sanctions. The comment also use material from the US Treasury to add context in terms of the Bank Melli decision and how international law underperforms when financial sanctions touches and concerns the United States.\u0000Bank Melli, SWIFT, Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act 2012, Financial Sanctions, Financial Messaging","PeriodicalId":12728,"journal":{"name":"Global Trade and Customs Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41377514","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The ‘problem’ of economic sanctions that restricted trade has vexed the Russian community for the past several years and seemingly only tends to worsen. At the same time, the European Union (the EU) developed a Special Purpose Vehicle (the SPV) (known as Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (the INSTEX) for Iran to continue trade without accessing the United States financial system and avoid violating the United States of America (the US) sanctions. In this respect, one might argue that Russia, in general, might consider a similar option by creating an INSTEX like SPV to circumvent the imposed economic sanctions. At first glance, such SPV seems like a working mechanism to continue the trade in goods and services and to preserve trade flows in case Russia is fully disconnected from the SWIFT) or if ‘maximum’ sanctions are imposed against Russia. This article provides a general overview of how Russia deals with trading under the pressure of economic sanctions and how the hypothetical SPV may assist Russia in maintaining stable trade relations despite the sanctions. The article further discusses how the hypothetical SPV may resort to investment arbitration in order to protect its rights and interests and challenge the imposed sanctions and the risks it may face in this respect. The study reveals that creating such SPV to avoid anti-Russian sanctions might assist with humanitarian need, while the potential to restore normal trade flows is quite doubtful. Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), Economic Sanctions, Investment Arbitration, Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX), Counter-sanctions, Circumventing sanctions
{"title":"Is a Special Purpose Vehicle a Way to Circumvent Western Economic Sanctions Imposed on Russia or Only Pitfalls Lie Ahead?","authors":"N. Sinitsin, Elena Murashko","doi":"10.54648/gtcj2022054","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/gtcj2022054","url":null,"abstract":"The ‘problem’ of economic sanctions that restricted trade has vexed the Russian community for the past several years and seemingly only tends to worsen. At the same time, the European Union (the EU) developed a Special Purpose Vehicle (the SPV) (known as Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (the INSTEX) for Iran to continue trade without accessing the United States financial system and avoid violating the United States of America (the US) sanctions. In this respect, one might argue that Russia, in general, might consider a similar option by creating an INSTEX like SPV to circumvent the imposed economic sanctions. At first glance, such SPV seems like a working mechanism to continue the trade in goods and services and to preserve trade flows in case Russia is fully disconnected from the SWIFT) or if ‘maximum’ sanctions are imposed against Russia. This article provides a general overview of how Russia deals with trading under the pressure of economic sanctions and how the hypothetical SPV may assist Russia in maintaining stable trade relations despite the sanctions. The article further discusses how the hypothetical SPV may resort to investment arbitration in order to protect its rights and interests and challenge the imposed sanctions and the risks it may face in this respect. The study reveals that creating such SPV to avoid anti-Russian sanctions might assist with humanitarian need, while the potential to restore normal trade flows is quite doubtful.\u0000Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), Economic Sanctions, Investment Arbitration, Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX), Counter-sanctions, Circumventing sanctions","PeriodicalId":12728,"journal":{"name":"Global Trade and Customs Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42252645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Book Review: The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War, by Nicholas Mulder. New Haven and London. Yale University Press. 2022","authors":"P. Morris","doi":"10.54648/gtcj2022057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/gtcj2022057","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":12728,"journal":{"name":"Global Trade and Customs Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44772693","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In recent years, the United States has increasingly reverted to imposing secondary sanctions on friends and foes alike. Realizing that other major economic actors, such as the European Union, China and India, are very often unwilling to follow the United States’ foreign policy dictum, and exploiting its position as a major economic power and holder of the world’s reserve currency, the United States has begun penalizing third state actors that continue trading with US primary sanction targets. In some cases, that has gone so far as to lead to the issuance of US arrest warrants and the subsequent arrest of third state citizens for violating US sanction laws while engaged in transactions that took place outside of the US. Seen from an international law perspective, such conduct raises jurisdictional issues. I will explain that the US cannot rely on any jurisdictional principle recognized by the international community to justify its approach to secondary sanctions. In fact, the international community has come to reject the US modus operandi of imposing secondary sanctions as unlawful, creating a customary international law prohibition. I will then examine the European Union’s ineffective response by imposing a Blocking Statute and, in the case of Iran, by creating a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV). Secondary Sanctions, Customary International Law, Jurisdiction, Blocking Statute, Special Purpose Vehicle
{"title":"Secondary Sanctions: Why the US Approach Is Unlawful and the EU’s Response Is Ineffective","authors":"Patrick C. R. Terry","doi":"10.54648/gtcj2022052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/gtcj2022052","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years, the United States has increasingly reverted to imposing secondary sanctions on friends and foes alike. Realizing that other major economic actors, such as the European Union, China and India, are very often unwilling to follow the United States’ foreign policy dictum, and exploiting its position as a major economic power and holder of the world’s reserve currency, the United States has begun penalizing third state actors that continue trading with US primary sanction targets. In some cases, that has gone so far as to lead to the issuance of US arrest warrants and the subsequent arrest of third state citizens for violating US sanction laws while engaged in transactions that took place outside of the US. Seen from an international law perspective, such conduct raises jurisdictional issues. I will explain that the US cannot rely on any jurisdictional principle recognized by the international community to justify its approach to secondary sanctions. In fact, the international community has come to reject the US modus operandi of imposing secondary sanctions as unlawful, creating a customary international law prohibition. I will then examine the European Union’s ineffective response by imposing a Blocking Statute and, in the case of Iran, by creating a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV).\u0000Secondary Sanctions, Customary International Law, Jurisdiction, Blocking Statute, Special Purpose Vehicle","PeriodicalId":12728,"journal":{"name":"Global Trade and Customs Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46351383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
US policymakers have said little in response to the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) and its efforts to seemingly undermine US economic sanctions by downplaying its significance and making a single threat of severing European access to the US financial system. Should INSTEX be feared? INSTEX, which currently has ten European members, has been marketed as a humanitarian mechanism largely directed toward Iran to preserve the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and mitigate the impact of US economic sanctions by helping to facilitate trade in medicines, medical devices, food, and other humanitarian goods. I argue that US efforts to quash or undermine INSTEX are counterproductive to US interests and US foreign policy and that the US should work collaboratively with Europe in both the development of INSTEX and, ultimately, through participation in it. I discuss how INSTEX’s commitment to Financial Action Task Force (FATF) principles makes it an important outlet through which the US can not only shape its development and implementation but also in helping to generate goodwill throughout the international community by permitting trade in humanitarian goods through reliable channels. Failure to address the development of this nascent special purpose vehicle has long-term implications for US foreign policy by weakening the effectiveness of economic sanctions and US financial dominance.
{"title":"‘If You Can’t Beat ’em, Join ’em’: An Argument for US Support of and Participation in INSTEX","authors":"Keith A. Preble","doi":"10.54648/gtcj2022051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/gtcj2022051","url":null,"abstract":"US policymakers have said little in response to the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) and its efforts to seemingly undermine US economic sanctions by downplaying its significance and making a single threat of severing European access to the US financial system. Should INSTEX be feared? INSTEX, which currently has ten European members, has been marketed as a humanitarian mechanism largely directed toward Iran to preserve the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and mitigate the impact of US economic sanctions by helping to facilitate trade in medicines, medical devices, food, and other humanitarian goods. I argue that US efforts to quash or undermine INSTEX are counterproductive to US interests and US foreign policy and that the US should work collaboratively with Europe in both the development of INSTEX and, ultimately, through participation in it. I discuss how INSTEX’s commitment to Financial Action Task Force (FATF) principles makes it an important outlet through which the US can not only shape its development and implementation but also in helping to generate goodwill throughout the international community by permitting trade in humanitarian goods through reliable channels. Failure to address the development of this nascent special purpose vehicle has long-term implications for US foreign policy by weakening the effectiveness of economic sanctions and US financial dominance.","PeriodicalId":12728,"journal":{"name":"Global Trade and Customs Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41921197","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The trade conflict between China and the US has an impact on many levels. The initial discussion was focused on the economic effects both feared and caused by the trade restrictions. This study, however, will go further than an economic-empirical analysis. Rather, it addresses the structural implications of the conflict: as a result of the US blockade of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Appellate Body, the functioning of the world trade system remains in question. Even though a number of Member States currently participate in a substitute interim dispute settlement system outside the WTO, the future of the world trade system is nonetheless closely tied to a functioning dispute settlement process. For that is the only means by which to guarantee that the contracting parties can trust that their mutually agreed rights and obligations will be respected – and that how dispute settlement will ensure trust in the world trade system as a whole. But what are the prospects for dispute settlement in a situation that is characterized not only by stagnation, but above all by open trade disputes, and for which there is no foreseeable resolution? Are we now witnessing not only a crisis of dispute settlement, but more so, an inability for dispute settlement to function in a multilateral arrangement that lacks a perspective? The author considers the US blockade to be a consequence of the increasing intensification of the global competitive situation, within which the liberalization interests of key actors are going through a transformation. The study will demonstrate how this is leading to more differentiated forms of trade policy, economic and geopolitical integration that operate beyond the previous multilateral liberalization concepts. Nevertheless, the world trade system has an undeniably central role to play in addressing urgent issues of our common future. The author discusses the challenges that lie ahead and asks how further developments can be achieved. World Trade System, Appellate Body, Dispute Settlement, China-US Trade Conflict, Delegation Sovereign Rights, Sovereignty, Decision Making Practice, US Trade Representative, Non-Market Economy, State-Led Economy, Governance, Trade Liberalization, Blockade, Multilateralism, Global Competition
{"title":"The China-US Trade Conflict and Its Impact on the World Trade System and the Future of Multilateralism","authors":"Frank Altemöller","doi":"10.54648/gtcj2022039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/gtcj2022039","url":null,"abstract":"The trade conflict between China and the US has an impact on many levels. The initial discussion was focused on the economic effects both feared and caused by the trade restrictions. This study, however, will go further than an economic-empirical analysis. Rather, it addresses the structural implications of the conflict: as a result of the US blockade of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Appellate Body, the functioning of the world trade system remains in question. Even though a number of Member States currently participate in a substitute interim dispute settlement system outside the WTO, the future of the world trade system is nonetheless closely tied to a functioning dispute settlement process. For that is the only means by which to guarantee that the contracting parties can trust that their mutually agreed rights and obligations will be respected – and that how dispute settlement will ensure trust in the world trade system as a whole.\u0000But what are the prospects for dispute settlement in a situation that is characterized not only by stagnation, but above all by open trade disputes, and for which there is no foreseeable resolution? Are we now witnessing not only a crisis of dispute settlement, but more so, an inability for dispute settlement to function in a multilateral arrangement that lacks a perspective? The author considers the US blockade to be a consequence of the increasing intensification of the global competitive situation, within which the liberalization interests of key actors are going through a transformation. The study will demonstrate how this is leading to more differentiated forms of trade policy, economic and geopolitical integration that operate beyond the previous multilateral liberalization concepts. Nevertheless, the world trade system has an undeniably central role to play in addressing urgent issues of our common future. The author discusses the challenges that lie ahead and asks how further developments can be achieved.\u0000World Trade System, Appellate Body, Dispute Settlement, China-US Trade Conflict, Delegation Sovereign Rights, Sovereignty, Decision Making Practice, US Trade Representative, Non-Market Economy, State-Led Economy, Governance, Trade Liberalization, Blockade, Multilateralism, Global Competition","PeriodicalId":12728,"journal":{"name":"Global Trade and Customs Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42511130","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The inclusion of labour provisions in trade agreements which commenced with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the 1990s and other developed countries such as Canada and the EU saw the reaffirmation and implementation of commitments undertaken as part of the International Labour Organization (ILO) Conventions that these countries have ratified – with specific emphasis on respecting, promoting and realizing the core labour standards. While the general commitments and the nature of labour standards included in different agreements are largely similar, the approaches to enforce these standards under various agreements have differed widely. While the major developed economies (US, Canada and the EU) all include substantive labour provisions in their trade agreements as a standard practice now, their approaches to enforcement of these provisions are strikingly different (with US-Canada approach largely similar). These two contrasting approaches are – (1) that entails a possibility of monetary assessment, countermeasures or suspension of preferential benefits (sanctions based) and (2) that is based exclusively on recommendations and directions by a Panel of Experts as part of the dispute resolution process without any possibility of economic assessment (non-sanctions-based). This article provides an overview of these two main approaches towards enforcement of labour provisions in trade agreements. In light of the recent emphasis placed on including stronger enforcement mechanisms within the Free Trade Agreements (FTAs’) on sustainability, specifically in the EU this article examines the two approaches and highlights the approach which would be better suited for enforcing labour standards. Labour Standards, occupational safety and health, TSD, Dispute Settlement, Enforcement, NAFTA, NAALC, USMCA, Labour Provisions in FTAs’, Rapid Response Labour Mechanism, ILO Conventions, EU-Korea Labour Dispute, countermeasures, monetary assessment, suspension of benefits.
{"title":"Sanctions or No Sanctions: Enforcing Labour Provisions in Free Trade Agreements","authors":"Shiny Pradeep, Achyuth A","doi":"10.54648/gtcj2022045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/gtcj2022045","url":null,"abstract":"The inclusion of labour provisions in trade agreements which commenced with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the 1990s and other developed countries such as Canada and the EU saw the reaffirmation and implementation of commitments undertaken as part of the International Labour Organization (ILO) Conventions that these countries have ratified – with specific emphasis on respecting, promoting and realizing the core labour standards.\u0000While the general commitments and the nature of labour standards included in different agreements are largely similar, the approaches to enforce these standards under various agreements have differed widely. While the major developed economies (US, Canada and the EU) all include substantive labour provisions in their trade agreements as a standard practice now, their approaches to enforcement of these provisions are strikingly different (with US-Canada approach largely similar). These two contrasting approaches are – (1) that entails a possibility of monetary assessment, countermeasures or suspension of preferential benefits (sanctions based) and (2) that is based exclusively on recommendations and directions by a Panel of Experts as part of the dispute resolution process without any possibility of economic assessment (non-sanctions-based). This article provides an overview of these two main approaches towards enforcement of labour provisions in trade agreements.\u0000In light of the recent emphasis placed on including stronger enforcement mechanisms within the Free Trade Agreements (FTAs’) on sustainability, specifically in the EU this article examines the two approaches and highlights the approach which would be better suited for enforcing labour standards.\u0000Labour Standards, occupational safety and health, TSD, Dispute Settlement, Enforcement, NAFTA, NAALC, USMCA, Labour Provisions in FTAs’, Rapid Response Labour Mechanism, ILO Conventions, EU-Korea Labour Dispute, countermeasures, monetary assessment, suspension of benefits.","PeriodicalId":12728,"journal":{"name":"Global Trade and Customs Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48054438","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
India should negotiate robust dispute settlement chapters in its free trade agreements (FTAs). Through appropriate specific provisions in those chapters, India should pursue three goals, namely, the swift, just resolution of disputes, development of a common law on international trade, and enhancement of the rule of law in the Indo-Pacific region. India’s pursuit of these goals will help it expand its influence across the region, and counter the prospect of an authoritarian Chinese Communist Party (CCP) essentially dictating how trade and investment disputes are to be resolved. However, for India to pursue such negotiations, it must first resolve its bipolar approach to trade policy, between Nehruvian Socialism and Market-Oriented Reformism, which has paralysed it from pursuing an aggressive FTA agenda amidst understandable concerns about the nexus among trade, growth, and poverty alleviation. That means it will have to de-emphasize its current – and quixotic – policy of Atmanirbhar Bharat (Self-Reliant India). dispute settlement, adjudication, arbitration, WTO, USMCA, FTA, CPTPP, judicial interpretation, textualism, negotiations, binding, blockage, panel, appellate, procedures, deadlines, subject matter jurisdiction, transparency, precedent, stare decisis, common law, rule of law
{"title":"Writing a Script for India’s FTA Dispute Settlement Chapters","authors":"R. Bhala","doi":"10.54648/gtcj2022043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/gtcj2022043","url":null,"abstract":"India should negotiate robust dispute settlement chapters in its free trade agreements (FTAs). Through appropriate specific provisions in those chapters, India should pursue three goals, namely, the swift, just resolution of disputes, development of a common law on international trade, and enhancement of the rule of law in the Indo-Pacific region. India’s pursuit of these goals will help it expand its influence across the region, and counter the prospect of an authoritarian Chinese Communist Party (CCP) essentially dictating how trade and investment disputes are to be resolved. However, for India to pursue such negotiations, it must first resolve its bipolar approach to trade policy, between Nehruvian Socialism and Market-Oriented Reformism, which has paralysed it from pursuing an aggressive FTA agenda amidst understandable concerns about the nexus among trade, growth, and poverty alleviation. That means it will have to de-emphasize its current – and quixotic – policy of Atmanirbhar Bharat (Self-Reliant India).\u0000dispute settlement, adjudication, arbitration, WTO, USMCA, FTA, CPTPP, judicial interpretation, textualism, negotiations, binding, blockage, panel, appellate, procedures, deadlines, subject matter jurisdiction, transparency, precedent, stare decisis, common law, rule of law","PeriodicalId":12728,"journal":{"name":"Global Trade and Customs Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46111962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Dispute Settlement in International Trade Agreements: Prospective Pathways","authors":"J. Nedumpara","doi":"10.54648/gtcj2022036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/gtcj2022036","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":12728,"journal":{"name":"Global Trade and Customs Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43191616","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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