Lors du premier tour de l'election presidentielle du 22 avril 2017, les electeurs de trois bureaux de vote de la commune de Fort-de-France (Martinique) ont ete sollicites en vue de tester deux modes de vote : le Vote Alternatif et la regle de Borda a 4. L'objectif de ce article est de rendre compte des resultats de cette experimentation qui est la premiere du genre dans les territoires d'outre-mer. Les resultats obtenus font apparaitre des divergences avec les resultats ociels tant au niveau local que national. Sur la base des resultats bruts, en plus d'etre le vainqueur sous chacune des regles testees, J.-L. Melenchon est egalement le vainqueur de Condorcet alors que J. Cheminade est le perdant de Condorcet sous le vote Alternatif et M. Le Pen est le perdant de Condorcet sous la regle de Borda a 4. Apres correction du biais de representativite et de participation, E. Macron devient le vainqueur pour chacune des regles testees.
在2017年4月22日举行的第一轮总统选举中，法国堡(马提尼克岛)三个投票站的选民被要求测试两种投票方式:替代投票和Borda a 4规则。本文的目的是报告这一实验的结果，这是第一次在海外领土进行此类实验。结果显示，地方和国家层面的社会结果存在差异。根据原始结果，除了在每条测试规则下都是赢家，j - l。Melenchon也是孔多塞的赢家，J. Cheminade是孔多塞的输家，M. le Pen是孔多塞的输家，根据Borda a 4规则。在修正代表性和参与偏差后，E.马克龙成为每条测试规则的赢家。
{"title":"Une expérimentation de deux modes de scrutin en Martinique lors du premier tour de l’élection présidentielle de 2017","authors":"Eric Kamwa, Gilles Joseph, A. Roger","doi":"10.3917/REDP.305.0081","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.305.0081","url":null,"abstract":"Lors du premier tour de l'election presidentielle du 22 avril 2017, les electeurs de trois bureaux de vote de la commune de Fort-de-France (Martinique) ont ete sollicites en vue de tester deux modes de vote : le Vote Alternatif et la regle de Borda a 4. L'objectif de ce article est de rendre compte des resultats de cette experimentation qui est la premiere du genre dans les territoires d'outre-mer. Les resultats obtenus font apparaitre des divergences avec les resultats ociels tant au niveau local que national. Sur la base des resultats bruts, en plus d'etre le vainqueur sous chacune des regles testees, J.-L. Melenchon est egalement le vainqueur de Condorcet alors que J. Cheminade est le perdant de Condorcet sous le vote Alternatif et M. Le Pen est le perdant de Condorcet sous la regle de Borda a 4. Apres correction du biais de representativite et de participation, E. Macron devient le vainqueur pour chacune des regles testees.","PeriodicalId":129622,"journal":{"name":"Revue d'économie politique","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127368364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Property rights often emerge from adversarial interactions in which agents make claims and defend them from the appropriation efforts of others. In this paper, we first offer a survey of the theoretical literature on this issue. We systematize the existing models by classifying them into two families and show that they can explain the emergence of classic types or property rights. We then explore a new model where agents can become the sole owner of a commonly owned production resource through an exclusion contest. We show that if overexploitation under joint property is severe enough relative to the returns to scale of conflict activities, private property emerges out of conflict. Inequality makes common ownership less likely to emerge. Finally, we characterize the set of common ownership regimes which are Pareto efficient and immune to conflict. Results show that proportionality to labour inputs in output sharing makes common ownership more resilient to conflict when inequality is higher.
{"title":"Property Out of Conflict: A Survey and Some New Results","authors":"María Cubel, S. Sánchez-Pagés","doi":"10.31235/osf.io/2wgyx","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/2wgyx","url":null,"abstract":"Property rights often emerge from adversarial interactions in which agents make claims and defend them from the appropriation efforts of others. In this paper, we first offer a survey of the theoretical literature on this issue. We systematize the existing models by classifying them into two families and show that they can explain the emergence of classic types or property rights. We then explore a new model where agents can become the sole owner of a commonly owned production resource through an exclusion contest. We show that if overexploitation under joint property is severe enough relative to the returns to scale of conflict activities, private property emerges out of conflict. Inequality makes common ownership less likely to emerge. Finally, we characterize the set of common ownership regimes which are Pareto efficient and immune to conflict. Results show that proportionality to labour inputs in output sharing makes common ownership more resilient to conflict when inequality is higher.","PeriodicalId":129622,"journal":{"name":"Revue d'économie politique","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127514051","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
L’article propose une analyse theorique des programmes d’incitations financieres a la realisation d’objectifs comportementaux lies a sante en distinguant leurs effets a court terme (pendant la duree du programme) et a long terme (apres le programme). Notre modele met en evidence le fait que ces programmes conduisent a l’adoption de comportements plus sains a court terme et a long terme lorsque la richesse n’augmente pas l’utilite marginale de la qualite de vie. Dans le cas contraire, c’est-a-dire lorsque la richesse et la qualite de vie sont des arguments complementaires de la fonction d’utilite, nous montrons que ces incitations financieres peuvent engendrer, une fois le programme termine, des comportements opposes a ceux pour lesquelles elles ont ete introduites.
{"title":"Effet des préférences individuelles sur la réussite à long terme des incitations financières à la réalisation d’objectifs de santé","authors":"David Crainich","doi":"10.3917/REDP.294.0447","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.294.0447","url":null,"abstract":"L’article propose une analyse theorique des programmes d’incitations financieres a la realisation d’objectifs comportementaux lies a sante en distinguant leurs effets a court terme (pendant la duree du programme) et a long terme (apres le programme). Notre modele met en evidence le fait que ces programmes conduisent a l’adoption de comportements plus sains a court terme et a long terme lorsque la richesse n’augmente pas l’utilite marginale de la qualite de vie. Dans le cas contraire, c’est-a-dire lorsque la richesse et la qualite de vie sont des arguments complementaires de la fonction d’utilite, nous montrons que ces incitations financieres peuvent engendrer, une fois le programme termine, des comportements opposes a ceux pour lesquelles elles ont ete introduites.","PeriodicalId":129622,"journal":{"name":"Revue d'économie politique","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124005049","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper aims at quantifying the effect of healthcare programs on economic outcomes in the context of developing countries experiencing epidemiological transitions. It is widely accepted in the literature that treatment programs result in production gains among ill-health workers. However, these programs have the additional effect of modifying both the size and the composition of the working population by increasing the proportion of chronically-ill individuals. First, we define the theoretical conditions under which this macro-epidemiological phenomenon outweighs the positive effect of an increase in production. Second, we decompose the economic consequences of access to antiretroviral treatments against HIV in three sub-Saharan African countries. Forecasts of an individual’s health status, depending on whether he or she has access to medication, are generated using a microsimulation model. We use the model to generate a counterfactual (as if the adverse epidemiological effect did not exist), which allows decomposing the total impact of the HIV-medicines program into two different effects: positive and negative. We find that the positive effect of treatment procurement outweighs the negative epidemiological effect. Of course, this approach is only an indicator of economic performance and should in no way constitute a decision-making criterion about the ethical necessity of access to health care.
{"title":"Epidemiological Transition and the Wealth of Nations: the Case of HIV/AIDS in a Microsimulation Model","authors":"Y. Arrighi, B. Ventelou","doi":"10.3917/REDP.294.0591","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.294.0591","url":null,"abstract":"This paper aims at quantifying the effect of healthcare programs on economic outcomes in the context of developing countries experiencing epidemiological transitions. It is widely accepted in the literature that treatment programs result in production gains among ill-health workers. However, these programs have the additional effect of modifying both the size and the composition of the working population by increasing the proportion of chronically-ill individuals. First, we define the theoretical conditions under which this macro-epidemiological phenomenon outweighs the positive effect of an increase in production. Second, we decompose the economic consequences of access to antiretroviral treatments against HIV in three sub-Saharan African countries. Forecasts of an individual’s health status, depending on whether he or she has access to medication, are generated using a microsimulation model. We use the model to generate a counterfactual (as if the adverse epidemiological effect did not exist), which allows decomposing the total impact of the HIV-medicines program into two different effects: positive and negative. We find that the positive effect of treatment procurement outweighs the negative epidemiological effect. Of course, this approach is only an indicator of economic performance and should in no way constitute a decision-making criterion about the ethical necessity of access to health care.","PeriodicalId":129622,"journal":{"name":"Revue d'économie politique","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129601167","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we assess how the factors explaining the holdings of stocks have evolved through the financial crisis. We rely on the data collected in surveys conducted among French households during the period 2004-2014. There are three main modes for investing in stocks: buying shares directly; purchasing them through mutual funds; and finally taking out unitlinked life insurance. Obviously, these three ways to invest in stocks do not involve the same investment behaviours since, besides the risk and return characteristics, they differ in their transaction costs, management fees and taxation. As a result, there is no a priori reason to consider that portfolio choice decisions by households on these modes of stockownership are equivalent and correspond to the same individuals’ characteristics. We show that the holding of risky assets and of individual direct shares decreased during the period, and especially between 2009 and 2014. At the end of the period, the profile of direct equity holders was refocused towards profiles with greater risk tolerance. Other factors of direct stockholdings include: better education, gifts and inheritances, parents holding securities, singles, high-wealth households and high-income groups. Conditionally on holdings, the proportion of risky assets increases with risk tolerance and the holding of securities by parents. It also decreases at the end of the period. Our paper also shows that shareholders have gradually moved towards preferential ownership of shares in life insurance rather than direct share ownership, especially between 2009 and 2014. The estimation of a simultaneous model shows the specific characteristics of stockholders depending on the chosen support (direct, indirect or on life insurance): those who invest directly in stocks are richer, more educated and less risk averse; those who hold mutual funds are a little richer but more risk averse and do not appear the most educated; finally, for ownership in stocks on life insurance contracts, the position in the life cycle plays an important role as well as the social category.
{"title":"Household preferences and demand for stocks in the Crisis: France 2004-2014","authors":"Luc Arrondel, J. Coffinet","doi":"10.3917/REDP.293.0391","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.293.0391","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we assess how the factors explaining the holdings of stocks have evolved through the financial crisis. We rely on the data collected in surveys conducted among French households during the period 2004-2014. There are three main modes for investing in stocks: buying shares directly; purchasing them through mutual funds; and finally taking out unitlinked life insurance. Obviously, these three ways to invest in stocks do not involve the same investment behaviours since, besides the risk and return characteristics, they differ in their transaction costs, management fees and taxation. As a result, there is no a priori reason to consider that portfolio choice decisions by households on these modes of stockownership are equivalent and correspond to the same individuals’ characteristics. \u0000We show that the holding of risky assets and of individual direct shares decreased during the period, and especially between 2009 and 2014. At the end of the period, the profile of direct equity holders was refocused towards profiles with greater risk tolerance. Other factors of direct stockholdings include: better education, gifts and inheritances, parents holding securities, singles, high-wealth households and high-income groups. Conditionally on holdings, the proportion of risky assets increases with risk tolerance and the holding of securities by parents. It also decreases at the end of the period. Our paper also shows that shareholders have gradually moved towards preferential ownership of shares in life insurance rather than direct share ownership, especially between 2009 and 2014. \u0000The estimation of a simultaneous model shows the specific characteristics of stockholders depending on the chosen support (direct, indirect or on life insurance): those who invest directly in stocks are richer, more educated and less risk averse; those who hold mutual funds are a little richer but more risk averse and do not appear the most educated; finally, for ownership in stocks on life insurance contracts, the position in the life cycle plays an important role as well as the social category.","PeriodicalId":129622,"journal":{"name":"Revue d'économie politique","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115585268","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper analyzes the impact of several trade policy instruments on product Research and Development (R&D) investment in a North-South duopoly where a Northern firm competes in prices with a Southern firm on both markets. The Northern firm invests in product R&D owing to a competitive disadvantage compared to the Southern firm which benefits from a lower labor cost. The outcome of the R&D activity is uncertain. If successful, vertical differentiation occurs in both markets. The Northern country’s government is the only one policy active and may implement the following trade policy instruments: an import tariff, a production subsidy, an R&D subsidy, a standard of quality, a minimum-price, and an import quota. The results show that the Northern firm’s R&D expenditures increase with each policy instrument except for the import quota. The paper also provides a welfare analysis in order to verify whether or not the Northern government is encouraged to implement these policy instruments.
{"title":"Vertical Differentiation, Uncertainty, Product R & D and Policy Instruments in a North-South Duopoly","authors":"J. Berthoumieu, Viola Lamani","doi":"10.3917/redp.303.0441","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/redp.303.0441","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes the impact of several trade policy instruments on product Research and Development (R&D) investment in a North-South duopoly where a Northern firm competes in prices with a Southern firm on both markets. The Northern firm invests in product R&D owing to a competitive disadvantage compared to the Southern firm which benefits from a lower labor cost. The outcome of the R&D activity is uncertain. If successful, vertical differentiation occurs in both markets. The Northern country’s government is the only one policy active and may implement the following trade policy instruments: an import tariff, a production subsidy, an R&D subsidy, a standard of quality, a minimum-price, and an import quota. The results show that the Northern firm’s R&D expenditures increase with each policy instrument except for the import quota. The paper also provides a welfare analysis in order to verify whether or not the Northern government is encouraged to implement these policy instruments.","PeriodicalId":129622,"journal":{"name":"Revue d'économie politique","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116252561","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The impact of the safety-net use of Common-pool resources (CPR) on the individual investment into and extraction from the commons is analyzed in this paper. Agents of the community first choose to invest in their private project and in the CPR; second, they choose how much to extract from their private project and the commons. The model compares two types of risk management tool: CPR as risk-coping and risk-diversification mechanisms. It also compares two types of risk: risk on a private project and risk on CPR investment by other community members. The theoretical predictions are empirically tested with experimental economics. In this view, we propose an original CPR game composed of two periods, an investment one and an extraction one. Our result clearly shows that risk reduction in the private project unambiguously decreases investment in the CPR, while it does not impact CPR extraction. We also show that a risk-coping strategy is well understood as more flexible and influenced by the outcome in terms of private project yield.
{"title":"Commons as a Risk-Management Tool: Theoretical Predictions and an Experimental Test","authors":"M. Brunette, P. Delacote, S. Garcia, J. Rousselle","doi":"10.3917/REDP.303.0405","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.303.0405","url":null,"abstract":"The impact of the safety-net use of Common-pool resources (CPR) on the individual investment into and extraction from the commons is analyzed in this paper. Agents of the community first choose to invest in their private project and in the CPR; second, they choose how much to extract from their private project and the commons. The model compares two types of risk management tool: CPR as risk-coping and risk-diversification mechanisms. It also compares two types of risk: risk on a private project and risk on CPR investment by other community members. The theoretical predictions are empirically tested with experimental economics. In this view, we propose an original CPR game composed of two periods, an investment one and an extraction one. Our result clearly shows that risk reduction in the private project unambiguously decreases investment in the CPR, while it does not impact CPR extraction. We also show that a risk-coping strategy is well understood as more flexible and influenced by the outcome in terms of private project yield.","PeriodicalId":129622,"journal":{"name":"Revue d'économie politique","volume":"80 1-2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126948900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We find the optimal capital income tax rate in an imperfectly competitive economy, where some part of recourses is devoted to rent-seeking activity. Optimal tax offsets the difference between marginal social and marginal private return to capital, which is a result of rent seeking, and the difference between the before tax interest rate and the marginal productivity of capital, which arises from imperfect competition. Optimal capital income tax rate depends neither on other tax rates nor on overall tax burden. Numerically it is close to zero.
{"title":"Capital Taxation and Rent Seeking","authors":"Nikolay Arefiev, T. Baron","doi":"10.3917/redp.295.0815","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/redp.295.0815","url":null,"abstract":"We find the optimal capital income tax rate in an imperfectly competitive economy, where some part of recourses is devoted to rent-seeking activity. Optimal tax offsets the difference between marginal social and marginal private return to capital, which is a result of rent seeking, and the difference between the before tax interest rate and the marginal productivity of capital, which arises from imperfect competition. Optimal capital income tax rate depends neither on other tax rates nor on overall tax burden. Numerically it is close to zero.","PeriodicalId":129622,"journal":{"name":"Revue d'économie politique","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123396140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Le 16 septembre 2020 on celebrera le 40eme anniversaire de la mort de Jean Piaget (1896-1980). Cette contribution rend hommage a l’epistemologue, biologiste et psychologue, a son analyse systemique, a sa classification hierarchique des differents niveaux de regulation comme source d’inspiration originale pour mes propres travaux en cliometrie de la croissance et des cycles economiques. Codes JEL : A12, B25, B31, B41, N00
{"title":"L’idée de régulation dans les sciences : hommage à l’épistémologue Jean Piaget","authors":"C. Diebolt","doi":"10.3917/redp.304.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/redp.304.0005","url":null,"abstract":"Le 16 septembre 2020 on celebrera le 40eme anniversaire de la mort de Jean Piaget\u0000(1896-1980). Cette contribution rend hommage a l’epistemologue, biologiste et psychologue, a son analyse systemique, a sa classification hierarchique des differents niveaux\u0000de regulation comme source d’inspiration originale pour mes propres travaux en cliometrie de la croissance et des cycles economiques.\u0000Codes JEL : A12, B25, B31, B41, N00","PeriodicalId":129622,"journal":{"name":"Revue d'économie politique","volume":"123 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123141782","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Cet article propose une discussion sur l’alimentation vegetale et la condition animale comme objets d’etude pour la science economique. Il repond a trois questions : Pourquoi les economistes devraient-ils s’interesser a la question de la consommation de produits d’origine animale ? Quelle peut etre la contribution de l’economie aux discussions academiques existantes ? Quelles raisons peuvent expliquer le peu d’interet porte jusque-la par les economistes a cette problematique ? Ce travail expose tout d’abord trois arguments pour lesquels la science economique devrait prendre en compte la consommation de produits d’origine animale : une raison environnementale, une raison sanitaire et une raison ethique. Il presente ensuite l’analyse comportementale de la consommation de viande developpee en psychologie, puis discute comment l’economie pourrait contribuer a ce champ de recherche (economie comportementale, economie des politiques publiques, economie industrielle et economie politique). La derniere partie propose une discussion plus exploratoire sur le faible interet porte jusqu’a aujourd’hui par les economistes a ces questions. Classification JEL : D60, Q50, Q18
{"title":"L’éléphant dans la pièce. Pour une approche économique de l’alimentation végétale et de la condition animale","authors":"R. Espinosa","doi":"10.3917/REDP.293.0287","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.293.0287","url":null,"abstract":"Cet article propose une discussion sur l’alimentation vegetale et la condition animale\u0000comme objets d’etude pour la science economique. Il repond a trois questions : Pourquoi les economistes devraient-ils s’interesser a la question de la consommation de\u0000produits d’origine animale ? Quelle peut etre la contribution de l’economie aux discussions academiques existantes ? Quelles raisons peuvent expliquer le peu d’interet porte\u0000jusque-la par les economistes a cette problematique ?\u0000 Ce travail expose tout d’abord trois arguments pour lesquels la science economique\u0000devrait prendre en compte la consommation de produits d’origine animale : une raison\u0000environnementale, une raison sanitaire et une raison ethique. Il presente ensuite l’analyse comportementale de la consommation de viande developpee en psychologie, puis\u0000discute comment l’economie pourrait contribuer a ce champ de recherche (economie\u0000comportementale, economie des politiques publiques, economie industrielle et economie politique). La derniere partie propose une discussion plus exploratoire sur le faible\u0000interet porte jusqu’a aujourd’hui par les economistes a ces questions.\u0000 Classification JEL : D60, Q50, Q18","PeriodicalId":129622,"journal":{"name":"Revue d'économie politique","volume":"6 3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126095449","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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