This study considers the ways in which government, whether through spending programs or regulations, has made it more difficult for people to find their way out of poverty. It argues that when considering new regulations or eliminating existing ones, policymakers should pay more attention to the regressive effects of government, from the way in which it prevents upward mobility to the way in which some policies and programs burden the poor more than other groups. Specifically, it explores the regressive effects of occupational licensure, zoning laws, and other restrictions on operating businesses, as well as the effects of sin taxes. The discussion of occupational licensure includes a small case study of Uber, the ride-sharing platform. If government policy is restricting upward mobility, then policymakers should look more seriously at ways to stop government from harming those seeking to escape poverty.
{"title":"Breaking Down the Barriers: Three Ways State and Local Governments Can Improve the Lives of the Poor","authors":"S. Horwitz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3191384","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3191384","url":null,"abstract":"This study considers the ways in which government, whether through spending programs or regulations, has made it more difficult for people to find their way out of poverty. It argues that when considering new regulations or eliminating existing ones, policymakers should pay more attention to the regressive effects of government, from the way in which it prevents upward mobility to the way in which some policies and programs burden the poor more than other groups. Specifically, it explores the regressive effects of occupational licensure, zoning laws, and other restrictions on operating businesses, as well as the effects of sin taxes. The discussion of occupational licensure includes a small case study of Uber, the ride-sharing platform. If government policy is restricting upward mobility, then policymakers should look more seriously at ways to stop government from harming those seeking to escape poverty.","PeriodicalId":132360,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: National","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134387188","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Measures of governance and stateness have grown substantially in number over recent decade, and gained also greater importance in building public discourses and orienting decision-making processes. Yet there seems to be little agreement on what exactly these measures represent. This paper claims that the proliferation of metrics can only be understood against the conceptual hybridity and indeterminacy in which the notions of governance and stateness have entangled. To frame this ‘creative disorder’, the first part of the paper introduces the current debate on measuring governance and stateness. The second explores the sematic fields of the two concepts, while the third one provides an overview on existing measures and methodological questions. The fourth part explores normative demands and policy prescriptions linked to this production and the fifth section analyses in depth three different measures: The Rule of Law Index, the Sustainable Governance Indicators and the State Fragility Index. The sixth part concludes by summarising the relevance of exploring both conceptual and normative challenges in the use and production of these measures.
{"title":"The Difficulty of Measuring Governance and Stateness","authors":"D. Malito","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2631120","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2631120","url":null,"abstract":"Measures of governance and stateness have grown substantially in number over recent decade, and gained also greater importance in building public discourses and orienting decision-making processes. Yet there seems to be little agreement on what exactly these measures represent. This paper claims that the proliferation of metrics can only be understood against the conceptual hybridity and indeterminacy in which the notions of governance and stateness have entangled. To frame this ‘creative disorder’, the first part of the paper introduces the current debate on measuring governance and stateness. The second explores the sematic fields of the two concepts, while the third one provides an overview on existing measures and methodological questions. The fourth part explores normative demands and policy prescriptions linked to this production and the fifth section analyses in depth three different measures: The Rule of Law Index, the Sustainable Governance Indicators and the State Fragility Index. The sixth part concludes by summarising the relevance of exploring both conceptual and normative challenges in the use and production of these measures.","PeriodicalId":132360,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: National","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132173849","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-06-21DOI: 10.17573/IPAR.2015.3-4.07
Frans Jorna
Local government political leaders have a hard job these days. More and more they are confronted by citizens demanding transparency and a say in the production of social goods. Challenging the hegemony of local government, they connect their resources to come up with grass roots solutions. Fear of litigation claims and an increase in the complexity of policymaking and administration and fiscal scarcity render local administrations risk averse. How to effectively structure the frontline between local government and local communities? Open and collaborative governance approaches hold the promise of developing to mediate these tensions, but what are the implications for the way local democracy, local government and local administration work? This article looks at the ugly face of trust in collaborative and open governance on the basis of a comparative casestudy from Apeldoorn (The Netherlands). The article identifies and analyses patterns of (a lack of) open governance and offers alternative models to the organization of the frontline between local government and society.
{"title":"Openness and Urban Governance: How Transparency Erodes Local Government","authors":"Frans Jorna","doi":"10.17573/IPAR.2015.3-4.07","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17573/IPAR.2015.3-4.07","url":null,"abstract":"Local government political leaders have a hard job these days. More and more they are confronted by citizens demanding transparency and a say in the production of social goods. Challenging the hegemony of local government, they connect their resources to come up with grass roots solutions. Fear of litigation claims and an increase in the complexity of policymaking and administration and fiscal scarcity render local administrations risk averse. How to effectively structure the frontline between local government and local communities? Open and collaborative governance approaches hold the promise of developing to mediate these tensions, but what are the implications for the way local democracy, local government and local administration work? This article looks at the ugly face of trust in collaborative and open governance on the basis of a comparative casestudy from Apeldoorn (The Netherlands). The article identifies and analyses patterns of (a lack of) open governance and offers alternative models to the organization of the frontline between local government and society.","PeriodicalId":132360,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: National","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115449841","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Local governments are important to the provision of public goods. Budgetary initiatives at the state level often trap local governments in a fiscal vise, squeezed on one side by the desires of their citizens for public and club goods and on the other side by declining state revenue sharing. As a result, many municipalities have turned to alternative methods of financing, such as implementing special taxing districts at neighborhood levels. These special taxing districts have unique democratic features, such as first mover agenda setting and weighted voting and their implementing legislation often allows governments to act as perfect price discriminating monopolists when setting tax levels. In the end, these changes have enabled savvy political actors to fracture cities into many mutable and often overlapping districts by taxing individuals to maximum allowable levels and jury-rigging elections to ensure that these districts are passed through popular vote. This results in gentrification and differentiation in demographics and a general increase in the provision of select public and club goods for certain affluent subsections of the population.
{"title":"Local Government Fragmentation, Finance, and Accountability","authors":"Colin H. McCubbins","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2632764","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2632764","url":null,"abstract":"Local governments are important to the provision of public goods. Budgetary initiatives at the state level often trap local governments in a fiscal vise, squeezed on one side by the desires of their citizens for public and club goods and on the other side by declining state revenue sharing. As a result, many municipalities have turned to alternative methods of financing, such as implementing special taxing districts at neighborhood levels. These special taxing districts have unique democratic features, such as first mover agenda setting and weighted voting and their implementing legislation often allows governments to act as perfect price discriminating monopolists when setting tax levels. In the end, these changes have enabled savvy political actors to fracture cities into many mutable and often overlapping districts by taxing individuals to maximum allowable levels and jury-rigging elections to ensure that these districts are passed through popular vote. This results in gentrification and differentiation in demographics and a general increase in the provision of select public and club goods for certain affluent subsections of the population.","PeriodicalId":132360,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: National","volume":"174 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122437420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Is there a "winner-take-all" politics in the affluent democracies of Northern Europe? We explore this question through a comparison of two cases of "regulated capitalism," Sweden and Germany, asking whether these institutions continue to produce equitable outcomes in the face of globalization and financial crisis. Both countries have experienced significant increases in income inequality since 1990, and their labor markets have begun to display signs of dualism, demonstrating the weakened capacity of regulated capitalism to secure equality. Despite these broad similarities, inequality and labor market dualism have increased more in Germany than in Sweden. We argue that the shift to the right, even among social democratic parties, is an important cause of increased inequality in both countries. Our analysis also emphasizes the political effects of decades of welfare state building in both countries: the popularity of the welfare state and other institutions of regulated capitalism among the electorate constrain the ability of governments to pursue a radical liberalization agenda. We attribute Sweden’s superior performance relative to Germany in protecting low income groups to the interaction of industrial relations institutions and the electoral system. Swedish corporatism has retained much of its encompassingness compared to Germany, and proportional representation in Sweden creates incentives for the Center-Left to include the interests of low-income groups in their electoral and governing strategies. In contrast, German industrial relations are increasingly marked by segmentalism, and the electoral system generates few incentives for the Center-Left to include low income groups in their electoral coalition.
{"title":"Winner-Take-All Politics in Europe? The Political Economy of Rising Inequality in Germany and Sweden","authors":"K. Anderson, Anke Hassel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2610653","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2610653","url":null,"abstract":"Is there a \"winner-take-all\" politics in the affluent democracies of Northern Europe? We explore this question through a comparison of two cases of \"regulated capitalism,\" Sweden and Germany, asking whether these institutions continue to produce equitable outcomes in the face of globalization and financial crisis. Both countries have experienced significant increases in income inequality since 1990, and their labor markets have begun to display signs of dualism, demonstrating the weakened capacity of regulated capitalism to secure equality. Despite these broad similarities, inequality and labor market dualism have increased more in Germany than in Sweden. We argue that the shift to the right, even among social democratic parties, is an important cause of increased inequality in both countries. Our analysis also emphasizes the political effects of decades of welfare state building in both countries: the popularity of the welfare state and other institutions of regulated capitalism among the electorate constrain the ability of governments to pursue a radical liberalization agenda. We attribute Sweden’s superior performance relative to Germany in protecting low income groups to the interaction of industrial relations institutions and the electoral system. Swedish corporatism has retained much of its encompassingness compared to Germany, and proportional representation in Sweden creates incentives for the Center-Left to include the interests of low-income groups in their electoral and governing strategies. In contrast, German industrial relations are increasingly marked by segmentalism, and the electoral system generates few incentives for the Center-Left to include low income groups in their electoral coalition.","PeriodicalId":132360,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: National","volume":"96 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123035280","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
type="main" xml:id="sjpe12062-abs-0001"> Beside the competitive balance or the relative quality of teams in a sports league, also a league's absolute quality matters to attract spectators. If the absolute quality depends among other variables, on the total budget of the league, it can be shown that that revenue sharing enhances the absolute quality by improving the allocation of talent over the teams in both a profit- and a win-maximisation league, even if it worsens the competitive balance.
{"title":"Revenue Sharing and Absolute League Quality; Talent Investment and Talent Allocation","authors":"S. Késenne","doi":"10.1111/sjpe.12062","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.12062","url":null,"abstract":"type=\"main\" xml:id=\"sjpe12062-abs-0001\"> Beside the competitive balance or the relative quality of teams in a sports league, also a league's absolute quality matters to attract spectators. If the absolute quality depends among other variables, on the total budget of the league, it can be shown that that revenue sharing enhances the absolute quality by improving the allocation of talent over the teams in both a profit- and a win-maximisation league, even if it worsens the competitive balance.","PeriodicalId":132360,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: National","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123466521","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
D. Ballanti, Roberto Dispotico, F. Porcelli, F. Vidoli
This paper, conducted as part of the research activities of SOSE S.p.A., develops a simple and innovative model to evaluate the performance of local government in the provision of local public services. The model employs a reduced set of information and fewer assumptions than traditional techniques such as Data Envelopment Analysis and Stochastic Frontier Analysis. The main idea is to base the model on the joint graphical analysis of standard expenditures needs and standard level of services both estimated using a reduced form approach derived from a general theoretical framework based on the interaction between the demand and the supply for local public services. Data about social care services provided by Italian municipalities in 2010 are used to test the model.
{"title":"A Simple Four Quadrants Model to Monitor the Performance of Local Governments","authors":"D. Ballanti, Roberto Dispotico, F. Porcelli, F. Vidoli","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2529901","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2529901","url":null,"abstract":"This paper, conducted as part of the research activities of SOSE S.p.A., develops a simple and innovative model to evaluate the performance of local government in the provision of local public services. The model employs a reduced set of information and fewer assumptions than traditional techniques such as Data Envelopment Analysis and Stochastic Frontier Analysis. The main idea is to base the model on the joint graphical analysis of standard expenditures needs and standard level of services both estimated using a reduced form approach derived from a general theoretical framework based on the interaction between the demand and the supply for local public services. Data about social care services provided by Italian municipalities in 2010 are used to test the model.","PeriodicalId":132360,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: National","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132110186","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We analyse a labour matching model with wage posting, where re flecting institutional constraints firms cannot differentiate their wage offers within certain subsets of workers. Inter alia, we find that the presence of impersonal wage offers leads to wage compression, which propagates to the wages for high productivity workers who receive personalised offers.
{"title":"Spillovers of Equal Treatment in Wage Offers","authors":"Kohei Kawamura, J. Sákovics","doi":"10.1111/sjpe.12054","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.12054","url":null,"abstract":"We analyse a labour matching model with wage posting, where re flecting institutional constraints firms cannot differentiate their wage offers within certain subsets of workers. Inter alia, we find that the presence of impersonal wage offers leads to wage compression, which propagates to the wages for high productivity workers who receive personalised offers.","PeriodicalId":132360,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: National","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121033042","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
type="main" xml:id="sjpe12045-abs-0001"> This article sets forth a theory of competition between exclusive religions as an entry deterrence game, in which the incumbent may find it profitable not to accommodate but to deter the competitor's entry by precommitting to sufficient capacity expansion in the event of entry. If entry costs are high enough, deterrence is optimal and the incumbent remains a monopolist, although the entry threat distorts its effort upward. The model is then applied to the Catholic Church's reaction to the Protestant Reformation. It is argued that the model provides a better fit to the historical data of the Counter-Reformation than the price-cutting model proposed by economists Ekelund, Hebert and Tollison ([Ekelund, R. B., 2004], [Ekelund, R. B., 2006]).
本文提出了一种理论，将排他性宗教之间的竞争作为一种进入威慑游戏，在这种游戏中，在位者可能会发现，在进入的情况下，通过预先承诺充分的产能扩张来阻止竞争对手的进入，而不是容纳竞争对手，这是有利可图的。如果进入成本足够高，威慑是最优的，在位者仍然是垄断者，尽管进入威胁扭曲了其向上的努力。这一模式随后被应用于天主教会对新教改革的反应。有人认为，该模型比经济学家Ekelund、Hebert和Tollison提出的降价模型([Ekelund, R. B.， 2004]、[Ekelund, R. B.， 2006])更适合反改革的历史数据。
{"title":"Competition between Exclusive Religions: The Counter‐Reformation as Entry Deterrence","authors":"Mario Ferrero","doi":"10.1111/sjpe.12045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.12045","url":null,"abstract":"type=\"main\" xml:id=\"sjpe12045-abs-0001\"> This article sets forth a theory of competition between exclusive religions as an entry deterrence game, in which the incumbent may find it profitable not to accommodate but to deter the competitor's entry by precommitting to sufficient capacity expansion in the event of entry. If entry costs are high enough, deterrence is optimal and the incumbent remains a monopolist, although the entry threat distorts its effort upward. The model is then applied to the Catholic Church's reaction to the Protestant Reformation. It is argued that the model provides a better fit to the historical data of the Counter-Reformation than the price-cutting model proposed by economists Ekelund, Hebert and Tollison ([Ekelund, R. B., 2004], [Ekelund, R. B., 2006]).","PeriodicalId":132360,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: National","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128316973","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
PNG is pursuing sustained, broad-based economic development through land reforms within the framework of its National Land Development Program. This paper argues however, that land reforms alone cannot achieve the aspired development, particularly for the growth of land-based private enterprises as other business-related reforms are necessary. Using secondary World Bank Doing Business data for PNG, this study examines the country’s regulatory practices for Starting a Business and Registering Property. The study finds that despite high-level government commitments to improve the overall business climate, the country still suffers from a high-cost business environment including at the Local-Level Government level, where enterprise growth is hampered by inconsistent, opaque and archaic regulations. Some lessons on business regulatory experiences from Fiji are drawn to help enlighten the policy reform process in PNG. The study also provides a breakthrough for the coverage of Pacific small island states in Doing Business-related research.
{"title":"Supporting the Growth of Private Enterprise: The Role of Sub-National Governments in Papua New Guinea","authors":"H. Sanday","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2633189","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2633189","url":null,"abstract":"PNG is pursuing sustained, broad-based economic development through land reforms within the framework of its National Land Development Program. This paper argues however, that land reforms alone cannot achieve the aspired development, particularly for the growth of land-based private enterprises as other business-related reforms are necessary. Using secondary World Bank Doing Business data for PNG, this study examines the country’s regulatory practices for Starting a Business and Registering Property. The study finds that despite high-level government commitments to improve the overall business climate, the country still suffers from a high-cost business environment including at the Local-Level Government level, where enterprise growth is hampered by inconsistent, opaque and archaic regulations. Some lessons on business regulatory experiences from Fiji are drawn to help enlighten the policy reform process in PNG. The study also provides a breakthrough for the coverage of Pacific small island states in Doing Business-related research.","PeriodicalId":132360,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: National","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130342972","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：