In this research we advance a theory to explain the distributive politics under an institutionalized single-party regime. We argue that the need of support from below, and therefore the need of support-buying, varies with the degree of power concentration among the authoritarian leadership. Compared with the scenario in which a few leaders have concentrated more power in their hands, when power are dispersed more evenly among political leaders, they face more competition, more uncertainties and risks, providing them with greater incentive of dispensing benefits to their constituents in exchange of their loyalty and support. To test the theory, this study uses a provincial-year panel data spanning 2003-2012 to examine how provincial power concentration in a provincial leadership is related with land finance within its jurisdiction, a policy practice that tilts the interest distribution disproportionately towards local politicians at the costs of the marginalized and powerless groups. The empirical results robustly show the less (more) power concentrated in the provincial leaders, the greater (less) extent the province will allow the practice of land finance to please the local officials.
{"title":"Distributive Politics under Institutionalized Authoritarianism: Evidence from China's Subnational Land Finance","authors":"Qi Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2947392","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2947392","url":null,"abstract":"In this research we advance a theory to explain the distributive politics under an institutionalized single-party regime. We argue that the need of support from below, and therefore the need of support-buying, varies with the degree of power concentration among the authoritarian leadership. Compared with the scenario in which a few leaders have concentrated more power in their hands, when power are dispersed more evenly among political leaders, they face more competition, more uncertainties and risks, providing them with greater incentive of dispensing benefits to their constituents in exchange of their loyalty and support. To test the theory, this study uses a provincial-year panel data spanning 2003-2012 to examine how provincial power concentration in a provincial leadership is related with land finance within its jurisdiction, a policy practice that tilts the interest distribution disproportionately towards local politicians at the costs of the marginalized and powerless groups. The empirical results robustly show the less (more) power concentrated in the provincial leaders, the greater (less) extent the province will allow the practice of land finance to please the local officials.","PeriodicalId":132360,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: National","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126570922","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Russian Abstract: В статье рассматриваются некоторые аспекты современного правового регулирования местного самоуправления с точки зрения из соответствия конституционным принципам организации и функционирования местного самоуправления. English Abstract: The article is focused on certain aspects of contemporary legislation on local self-government from the point of its correspondence to the constitutional principals.
{"title":"Реализация Конституционно Закрепленной Модели Местного Самоуправления в России (Implementation of the Constitutional Model of Local Self-government in Russia)","authors":"Maxim Mokeev","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3085461","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3085461","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Russian Abstract:</b> В статье рассматриваются некоторые аспекты современного правового регулирования местного самоуправления с точки зрения из соответствия конституционным принципам организации и функционирования местного самоуправления. <b>English Abstract:</b> The article is focused on certain aspects of contemporary legislation on local self-government from the point of its correspondence to the constitutional principals.","PeriodicalId":132360,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: National","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128181096","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We theoretically analyse the effects of sick pay and employees' health on collective bargaining, assuming that individuals determine absence optimally. If sick pay is set by the government and not paid for by firms, it induces the trade union to lower wages. This mitigates the positive impact on absence. Moreover, a union may oppose higher sick pay if it reduces labour supply sufficiently. Better employee health tends to foster wage demands. If the union determines both wages and sick pay, we identify situations in which it will substitute wages for sick pay because adverse absence effects can be mitigated.
{"title":"Sick Pay Reforms and Health Status in a Unionised Labour Market","authors":"L. Goerke","doi":"10.1111/sjpe.12123","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.12123","url":null,"abstract":"We theoretically analyse the effects of sick pay and employees' health on collective bargaining, assuming that individuals determine absence optimally. If sick pay is set by the government and not paid for by firms, it induces the trade union to lower wages. This mitigates the positive impact on absence. Moreover, a union may oppose higher sick pay if it reduces labour supply sufficiently. Better employee health tends to foster wage demands. If the union determines both wages and sick pay, we identify situations in which it will substitute wages for sick pay because adverse absence effects can be mitigated.","PeriodicalId":132360,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: National","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127096079","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-08-26DOI: 10.4337/9781782549598.00025
E. McPhail, Vlad Tarko
The Tiebout competition model is often criticized for its unrealistic assumptions. We develop an imperfect Tiebout competition model in which households have no information about other jurisdictions (moving decisions are blind), and local jurisdictions operate as revenue-maximizing Leviathans. We show that, even under such harsh assumptions, jurisdictions will not increase taxes without also increasing the quality of their public services. The model also opens the door for understanding various possible vicious spirals, e.g. as a result of factor prices shocks, co-production problems, and income-based sorting. We also show that, in general, the model does not lead to the calculus of consent optimum, which opens the possibility for conceptualizing which constitutional rules would tend to constrain the system to evolve towards optimum levels of centralization or decentralization across all public issues. Last but not least, because the model involves positive moving costs, we explain the origins of voice, as an alternative to exit. When people do not engage in exit, either because they still hold up hope that public services will improve or because they do not have the resources to move, they increase their involvement in other activities such as voice and co-production.
{"title":"The Evolution of Governance Structures in a Polycentric System","authors":"E. McPhail, Vlad Tarko","doi":"10.4337/9781782549598.00025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781782549598.00025","url":null,"abstract":"The Tiebout competition model is often criticized for its unrealistic assumptions. We develop an imperfect Tiebout competition model in which households have no information about other jurisdictions (moving decisions are blind), and local jurisdictions operate as revenue-maximizing Leviathans. We show that, even under such harsh assumptions, jurisdictions will not increase taxes without also increasing the quality of their public services. The model also opens the door for understanding various possible vicious spirals, e.g. as a result of factor prices shocks, co-production problems, and income-based sorting. We also show that, in general, the model does not lead to the calculus of consent optimum, which opens the possibility for conceptualizing which constitutional rules would tend to constrain the system to evolve towards optimum levels of centralization or decentralization across all public issues. Last but not least, because the model involves positive moving costs, we explain the origins of voice, as an alternative to exit. When people do not engage in exit, either because they still hold up hope that public services will improve or because they do not have the resources to move, they increase their involvement in other activities such as voice and co-production.","PeriodicalId":132360,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: National","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133794345","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Efficiency measurement using stochastic frontier models is well established in applied econometrics. However, no published work seems to be available on efficiency analysis using spatial data dealing with possible spatial dependence between regions. This article considers a stochastic frontier model with decomposition of inefficiency into an idiosyncratic and a spatial, spillover component. Exact posterior distributions of parameters are derived, and computational schemes based on Gibbs sampling with data augmentation are proposed to conduct simulation-based inference and efficiency measurement. The new method is illustrated using production data for Italian regions (1970–1993). Clearly, further theoretical and empirical research on the subject would be of great interest.
{"title":"A Spatial Stochastic Frontier Model with Spillovers: Evidence for Italian Regions","authors":"M. Tsionas, P. Michaelides","doi":"10.1111/sjpe.12081","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.12081","url":null,"abstract":"Efficiency measurement using stochastic frontier models is well established in applied econometrics. However, no published work seems to be available on efficiency analysis using spatial data dealing with possible spatial dependence between regions. This article considers a stochastic frontier model with decomposition of inefficiency into an idiosyncratic and a spatial, spillover component. Exact posterior distributions of parameters are derived, and computational schemes based on Gibbs sampling with data augmentation are proposed to conduct simulation-based inference and efficiency measurement. The new method is illustrated using production data for Italian regions (1970–1993). Clearly, further theoretical and empirical research on the subject would be of great interest.","PeriodicalId":132360,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: National","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130236188","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper presents a new perspective for understanding the land sale behaviour of local governments in China, focusing on the ‘institutional trinity’ of the land market; namely, state ownership, economic performance‐based political promotion and the unbalanced fiscal structure. The paper argues that the main motivations of local government to sell land are to promote industrial growth and to enhance government fiscal capacity. These two hypotheses are tested using prefecture‐level data covering approximately 330 municipalities during the period of 1999–2007. The paper finds that industrial output and fiscal expenditure increase by approximately 1.8% and 1.0%, respectively, if the area of land sale doubles. Evidence also shows that land sale promotes industrial growth by boosting fixed asset investment and foreign direct investment. Interestingly, the paper also finds that the land‐sale strategy of local governments is more effective in the eastern provinces than in other regions.
{"title":"State Capitalism: A New Perspective on Land Sale in China","authors":"W. Tian, Liugang Sheng, Hongyan Zhao","doi":"10.1111/1468-0106.12153","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0106.12153","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents a new perspective for understanding the land sale behaviour of local governments in China, focusing on the ‘institutional trinity’ of the land market; namely, state ownership, economic performance‐based political promotion and the unbalanced fiscal structure. The paper argues that the main motivations of local government to sell land are to promote industrial growth and to enhance government fiscal capacity. These two hypotheses are tested using prefecture‐level data covering approximately 330 municipalities during the period of 1999–2007. The paper finds that industrial output and fiscal expenditure increase by approximately 1.8% and 1.0%, respectively, if the area of land sale doubles. Evidence also shows that land sale promotes industrial growth by boosting fixed asset investment and foreign direct investment. Interestingly, the paper also finds that the land‐sale strategy of local governments is more effective in the eastern provinces than in other regions.","PeriodicalId":132360,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: National","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131787752","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper proposes a regime‐switching model to examine the correlation dynamics of the mainland Chinese and Hong Kong stock markets with high‐frequency A‐, B‐, H‐shares and Red Chip indexes. We find significant evidence of volatility persistence and asymmetries in these markets. Our model further suggests all correlations are significantly time‐varying with various patterns and co‐persistence in both low‐ and high‐correlation states. Our findings have important implications for both policymakers and investors, such as understanding the extent and nature of integration between the mainland Chinese and Hong Kong stock markets over time and developing dynamic strategies for optimal hedging and portfolio management.
{"title":"It Takes Two to Tango: A Regime‐Switching Analysis of the Correlation Dynamics between the Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong Stock Markets","authors":"K. Ho, Yanlin Shi, Zhaoyong Zhang","doi":"10.1111/sjpe.12110","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.12110","url":null,"abstract":"This paper proposes a regime‐switching model to examine the correlation dynamics of the mainland Chinese and Hong Kong stock markets with high‐frequency A‐, B‐, H‐shares and Red Chip indexes. We find significant evidence of volatility persistence and asymmetries in these markets. Our model further suggests all correlations are significantly time‐varying with various patterns and co‐persistence in both low‐ and high‐correlation states. Our findings have important implications for both policymakers and investors, such as understanding the extent and nature of integration between the mainland Chinese and Hong Kong stock markets over time and developing dynamic strategies for optimal hedging and portfolio management.","PeriodicalId":132360,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: National","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130091204","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We use the variation in political incentives of state governors provided by term limits to show that the variation in the level of Old Age Assistance (OAA) benefits per recipient between 1931 and 1955 was due to governors' vote seeking behavior. Governors who faced reelection were more likely to increase benefits than "lame duck" office holders. The manipulation of OAA only occurred in states with intermediate sizes of the elderly population. In addition, this manipulation increased with the degree of political competition. This paper provides evidence that the elderly and not other vulnerable groups, were the target of politically motivated transfers in accordance with the electoral incentives of state governors.
{"title":"Taking Care of the Elderly: Political Economy of the Old Age Assistance Program, 1931-1955","authors":"Andreea Balan-Cohen, Radu Ban","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2663536","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2663536","url":null,"abstract":"We use the variation in political incentives of state governors provided by term limits to show that the variation in the level of Old Age Assistance (OAA) benefits per recipient between 1931 and 1955 was due to governors' vote seeking behavior. Governors who faced reelection were more likely to increase benefits than \"lame duck\" office holders. The manipulation of OAA only occurred in states with intermediate sizes of the elderly population. In addition, this manipulation increased with the degree of political competition. This paper provides evidence that the elderly and not other vulnerable groups, were the target of politically motivated transfers in accordance with the electoral incentives of state governors.","PeriodicalId":132360,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: National","volume":"02 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124972566","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
type="main" xml:id="sjpe12077-abs-0001"> Empirical studies on the micro-level effects of exporting on productivity pay usually little attention to the potentially heterogeneous effects of the different modes of export market entry. We show that multi-product export entry is associated with higher post-entry productivity compared to other firms. This can imply significant benefits from experimentation with different products. Our analysis is based on detailed export data from full population of firms in Estonia, disaggregated for each firm by export markets and individual products.
{"title":"Exporting and Productivity: The Effects of Multi‐Product and Multi‐Market Export Entry","authors":"J. Masso, Priit Vahter","doi":"10.1111/sjpe.12077","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.12077","url":null,"abstract":"type=\"main\" xml:id=\"sjpe12077-abs-0001\"> Empirical studies on the micro-level effects of exporting on productivity pay usually little attention to the potentially heterogeneous effects of the different modes of export market entry. We show that multi-product export entry is associated with higher post-entry productivity compared to other firms. This can imply significant benefits from experimentation with different products. Our analysis is based on detailed export data from full population of firms in Estonia, disaggregated for each firm by export markets and individual products.","PeriodicalId":132360,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: National","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122410490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we examine a causal relationship between flattening of a government hierarchy and economic performance. Exploiting a novel panel dataset on government reorganization in China from 1999 to 2012, we find that delayering has led to increases in revenue and inter-govermental transfers for county governments. However, the associated enlarged span of control of the upper-level governments, has led to a reduction in county government's total public expenditure and pro-growth expenditure. Overall, the flattening of the government hierarchy has a negative effect on economic performance.
{"title":"Does Flattening Government Improve Economic Performance?","authors":"Pei Li, Yi Lu, Jin Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2638647","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2638647","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we examine a causal relationship between flattening of a government hierarchy and economic performance. Exploiting a novel panel dataset on government reorganization in China from 1999 to 2012, we find that delayering has led to increases in revenue and inter-govermental transfers for county governments. However, the associated enlarged span of control of the upper-level governments, has led to a reduction in county government's total public expenditure and pro-growth expenditure. Overall, the flattening of the government hierarchy has a negative effect on economic performance.","PeriodicalId":132360,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: National","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134182046","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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