Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/24730580.2020.1728640
Robi Rado
ABSTRACT In this article, I consider how the Indian state approaches the relationship between India’s development and the Indian diaspora by analysing the discourse that emerges from a key Indian government report. I argue that the Indian state uses the idea of development to support the way it governs Indians abroad. At the same time, the Indian state uses its relationship with Indians abroad to support particular policies being pursued in the name of India’s development. These policies require economic “liberalization”, including by freeing up the movement of capital and reducing rates of corporate taxation. While invoking Indians abroad to shape the governance of Indians inside of India appears counterintuitive, I argue that it reflects the way that particular notions of “overseas Indians” and “development” are being simultaneously shaped by the Indian state, and the way that the authority of the Indian state to pursue particular “development policies” is being grounded.
{"title":"A tale of India, diaspora and development","authors":"Robi Rado","doi":"10.1080/24730580.2020.1728640","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24730580.2020.1728640","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this article, I consider how the Indian state approaches the relationship between India’s development and the Indian diaspora by analysing the discourse that emerges from a key Indian government report. I argue that the Indian state uses the idea of development to support the way it governs Indians abroad. At the same time, the Indian state uses its relationship with Indians abroad to support particular policies being pursued in the name of India’s development. These policies require economic “liberalization”, including by freeing up the movement of capital and reducing rates of corporate taxation. While invoking Indians abroad to shape the governance of Indians inside of India appears counterintuitive, I argue that it reflects the way that particular notions of “overseas Indians” and “development” are being simultaneously shaped by the Indian state, and the way that the authority of the Indian state to pursue particular “development policies” is being grounded.","PeriodicalId":13511,"journal":{"name":"Indian Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90277925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/24730580.2019.1709774
M. R. Ram Mohan, Promode Murugavelu, Gaurav Ray, Kritika Parakh
ABSTRACT The performance of obligations under a contract may be hindered by unexpected supervening events, leading to contractual uncertainties. The doctrine of frustration paves the way for a just consequence of such an unfortunate event, which has happened without any fault of the contracting parties. The doctrine fills the void in a contract regarding supervening events, based on principles of fairness and equity. Considering the large implications on the obligatory and binding nature of a valid contract, it becomes important to analyse the factors that guide the courts to determine its application. Unlike common law, the Indian Contract law explicitly incorporates the doctrine of frustration under section 56 of the Contract Act. However, the evolution of this doctrine in India has been greatly influenced by English law. This paper attempts to restate the law on the doctrine of frustration as applicable in India.
{"title":"The doctrine of frustration under section 56 of the Indian Contract Act","authors":"M. R. Ram Mohan, Promode Murugavelu, Gaurav Ray, Kritika Parakh","doi":"10.1080/24730580.2019.1709774","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24730580.2019.1709774","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The performance of obligations under a contract may be hindered by unexpected supervening events, leading to contractual uncertainties. The doctrine of frustration paves the way for a just consequence of such an unfortunate event, which has happened without any fault of the contracting parties. The doctrine fills the void in a contract regarding supervening events, based on principles of fairness and equity. Considering the large implications on the obligatory and binding nature of a valid contract, it becomes important to analyse the factors that guide the courts to determine its application. Unlike common law, the Indian Contract law explicitly incorporates the doctrine of frustration under section 56 of the Contract Act. However, the evolution of this doctrine in India has been greatly influenced by English law. This paper attempts to restate the law on the doctrine of frustration as applicable in India.","PeriodicalId":13511,"journal":{"name":"Indian Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83687450","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/24730580.2019.1703490
Malika Shah
ABSTRACT Due to a long history of conflict in the state of J&K, children have fallen prey to the defective law and order machinery. Through this essay, the author aims to critically study the J&K Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act 2013 (‘J&K JJ Act, 2013ʹ). Part I analyses the shortcomings in the text of the law itself. Part II focuses on the implementation of the law on the ground. Due to the non-implementation of the Juvenile Justice System, children have become victims of illegal detentions in jails, torture, physical and mental ailments. Lastly, Part III makes a comparison between the State law and the Central law on the matter. Considering the compelling arguments drawn in Part II and III of the essay, the conclusion points out the need for proper implementation of the JJ Act, 2013 and its remodelling, in certain matters, on the Central legislation.
{"title":"Children of conflict: an analysis of the Jammu and Kashmir Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2013","authors":"Malika Shah","doi":"10.1080/24730580.2019.1703490","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24730580.2019.1703490","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Due to a long history of conflict in the state of J&K, children have fallen prey to the defective law and order machinery. Through this essay, the author aims to critically study the J&K Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act 2013 (‘J&K JJ Act, 2013ʹ). Part I analyses the shortcomings in the text of the law itself. Part II focuses on the implementation of the law on the ground. Due to the non-implementation of the Juvenile Justice System, children have become victims of illegal detentions in jails, torture, physical and mental ailments. Lastly, Part III makes a comparison between the State law and the Central law on the matter. Considering the compelling arguments drawn in Part II and III of the essay, the conclusion points out the need for proper implementation of the JJ Act, 2013 and its remodelling, in certain matters, on the Central legislation.","PeriodicalId":13511,"journal":{"name":"Indian Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73141686","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/24730580.2020.1730543
Tarunabh Khaitan
ABSTRACT This article presents an empirical analysis of the Supreme Court’s discretionary appellate jurisdiction (triggered by a “special leave petition” or “SLP”). Based on an analysis of 1100 randomly selected civil SLP cases spread over 11 years, it argues that its expansive SLP docket has cannibalized the Court’s role as an effective constitutional court. It reveals that the admissibility of special leave petitions has a statistically significant relationship with the presence of a “senior advocate” during the admissions hearing. The article emphasizes the need for an institutional separation of the appellate and constitutional functions of the Supreme Court: either as two separate courts or as two separate divisions within a single Supreme Court. It also suggests reducing or eliminating the docket-distorting role of senior advocates – either by taking admission decisions on civil SLPs largely based on written briefs or barring senior advocates from appearing in oral admission hearings for civil SLPs.
{"title":"The Indian Supreme Court’s identity crisis: a constitutional court or a court of appeals?","authors":"Tarunabh Khaitan","doi":"10.1080/24730580.2020.1730543","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24730580.2020.1730543","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article presents an empirical analysis of the Supreme Court’s discretionary appellate jurisdiction (triggered by a “special leave petition” or “SLP”). Based on an analysis of 1100 randomly selected civil SLP cases spread over 11 years, it argues that its expansive SLP docket has cannibalized the Court’s role as an effective constitutional court. It reveals that the admissibility of special leave petitions has a statistically significant relationship with the presence of a “senior advocate” during the admissions hearing. The article emphasizes the need for an institutional separation of the appellate and constitutional functions of the Supreme Court: either as two separate courts or as two separate divisions within a single Supreme Court. It also suggests reducing or eliminating the docket-distorting role of senior advocates – either by taking admission decisions on civil SLPs largely based on written briefs or barring senior advocates from appearing in oral admission hearings for civil SLPs.","PeriodicalId":13511,"journal":{"name":"Indian Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75092438","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/24730580.2020.1711498
Shivaraj S. Huchhanavar
ABSTRACT The paper examines regulatory mechanisms for combating judicial corruption and misconduct in India. It aims at a critical analysis of the regulatory mechanisms for both subordinate and higher courts. The study, inter alia, concludes that the regulatory mechanisms for subordinate courts lack conceptual clarity, suffer role ambiguity, and are bereft of functional autonomy; the powers and functions of these mechanisms are not clearly prescribed, and the procedures concerning complaints, inquiries and disciplinary actions are ad hoc. The mechanisms for subordinate courts are opaque, inaccessible, slow and ineffective. The paper also argues that the “in-house procedure” in the higher judiciary is inadequate, opaque, informal and judge-centric; it terms the “removal procedure” as rigid and ineffective. This paper recommends structural, organizational and functional reforms to strengthen regulatory mechanisms for the subordinate judiciary. For the higher judiciary, it proposes a constitutional body having adequate representation from a broad spectrum of the population.
{"title":"Regulatory mechanisms combating judicial corruption and misconduct in India: a critical analysis","authors":"Shivaraj S. Huchhanavar","doi":"10.1080/24730580.2020.1711498","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24730580.2020.1711498","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The paper examines regulatory mechanisms for combating judicial corruption and misconduct in India. It aims at a critical analysis of the regulatory mechanisms for both subordinate and higher courts. The study, inter alia, concludes that the regulatory mechanisms for subordinate courts lack conceptual clarity, suffer role ambiguity, and are bereft of functional autonomy; the powers and functions of these mechanisms are not clearly prescribed, and the procedures concerning complaints, inquiries and disciplinary actions are ad hoc. The mechanisms for subordinate courts are opaque, inaccessible, slow and ineffective. The paper also argues that the “in-house procedure” in the higher judiciary is inadequate, opaque, informal and judge-centric; it terms the “removal procedure” as rigid and ineffective. This paper recommends structural, organizational and functional reforms to strengthen regulatory mechanisms for the subordinate judiciary. For the higher judiciary, it proposes a constitutional body having adequate representation from a broad spectrum of the population.","PeriodicalId":13511,"journal":{"name":"Indian Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76608734","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-02DOI: 10.1080/24730580.2019.1698279
Arushi Gupta
ABSTRACT In recent years, we have seen a rise in digital technology. In response to the tempestuous nature of technology and its manifold “threats”, the State has adopted fresh armoury. It has inducted mass surveillance programmes, which collect information on every citizen. In India, these measures were adopted in 2007. India’s bulk phone metadata collection programme, equivalent to the National Security Agency is called the Central Monitoring System. Additionally, India has created the Crime and Criminal Tracking and Network System, a nation-wide reposity of criminal data. This paper delves into a constitutional analysis of the validity of these programmes by identifying the key constitutional concerns and reviewing whether these programmes satisfy the test of proportionality. Finally, this paper critiques the ramifications of these measures on democracy. It argues that these measures stifle the exchange of information in the public sphere and reduce public space for reasoning.
{"title":"The case against the constitutional validity of mass surveillance programmes","authors":"Arushi Gupta","doi":"10.1080/24730580.2019.1698279","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24730580.2019.1698279","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In recent years, we have seen a rise in digital technology. In response to the tempestuous nature of technology and its manifold “threats”, the State has adopted fresh armoury. It has inducted mass surveillance programmes, which collect information on every citizen. In India, these measures were adopted in 2007. India’s bulk phone metadata collection programme, equivalent to the National Security Agency is called the Central Monitoring System. Additionally, India has created the Crime and Criminal Tracking and Network System, a nation-wide reposity of criminal data. This paper delves into a constitutional analysis of the validity of these programmes by identifying the key constitutional concerns and reviewing whether these programmes satisfy the test of proportionality. Finally, this paper critiques the ramifications of these measures on democracy. It argues that these measures stifle the exchange of information in the public sphere and reduce public space for reasoning.","PeriodicalId":13511,"journal":{"name":"Indian Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85987592","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-02DOI: 10.1080/24730580.2019.1700592
Balu G. Nair
ABSTRACT Article 370 of the Constitution of India 1950, as it stood till recently, restricted the Parliament’s legislative powers over the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir (“J&K”). The provision, which was recently abrogated was under challenge even prior to that. In 2018, a challenge to its constitutionality was mounted on the ground that it was meant to be a temporary arrangement. In this paper, it is argued that the attempts to abrogate the provision without the recommendation of a constituent assembly for J&K is constitutionally suspect. This has both textual and normative support. Textually, the asymmetrical federal arrangement embodied in Article 370 as well as the procedural limitations mean that it is not open to the Union to abrogate it unilaterally. Normatively too, a temporary provision such as Article 370 may only be abrogated if its detractors can garner sufficient political support in the form of a constituent assembly, which has not yet been achieved.
{"title":"Abrogation of Article 370: can the president act without the recommendation of the constituent assembly?","authors":"Balu G. Nair","doi":"10.1080/24730580.2019.1700592","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24730580.2019.1700592","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Article 370 of the Constitution of India 1950, as it stood till recently, restricted the Parliament’s legislative powers over the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir (“J&K”). The provision, which was recently abrogated was under challenge even prior to that. In 2018, a challenge to its constitutionality was mounted on the ground that it was meant to be a temporary arrangement. In this paper, it is argued that the attempts to abrogate the provision without the recommendation of a constituent assembly for J&K is constitutionally suspect. This has both textual and normative support. Textually, the asymmetrical federal arrangement embodied in Article 370 as well as the procedural limitations mean that it is not open to the Union to abrogate it unilaterally. Normatively too, a temporary provision such as Article 370 may only be abrogated if its detractors can garner sufficient political support in the form of a constituent assembly, which has not yet been achieved.","PeriodicalId":13511,"journal":{"name":"Indian Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79668738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-02DOI: 10.1080/24730580.2019.1699312
S. Swaminathan
ABSTRACT In Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. v Govindan Raghavan [2019] 5 SCC 725, the Supreme Court of India excised an onerous term in a housing construction contract as “wholly one-sided, unfair and unreasonable”. This note examines the doctrinal basis for the exercise of such power. Common law courts have, for long, sought to relieve the weaker party to a bargain against contractual unfairness, but locating the basis of this power has proved elusive. The traditional categories of duress (or coercion) and undue influence have been of limited help here. And since scholarly and judicial treatment alike have read s 16 of the Indian Contract Act as dealing with undue influence, it has been passed over in debates on unfairness. However, it is argued that a closer study of the legislative design of s 16 reveals that it was meant by Mackenzie Chalmers (the architect of the 1899 amendment) to incorporate a “general principle” of contractual fairness which empowered courts to determine whether a transaction was “fair and reasonable”.
{"title":"Contractual unfairness: another way of skinning the cat","authors":"S. Swaminathan","doi":"10.1080/24730580.2019.1699312","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24730580.2019.1699312","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. v Govindan Raghavan [2019] 5 SCC 725, the Supreme Court of India excised an onerous term in a housing construction contract as “wholly one-sided, unfair and unreasonable”. This note examines the doctrinal basis for the exercise of such power. Common law courts have, for long, sought to relieve the weaker party to a bargain against contractual unfairness, but locating the basis of this power has proved elusive. The traditional categories of duress (or coercion) and undue influence have been of limited help here. And since scholarly and judicial treatment alike have read s 16 of the Indian Contract Act as dealing with undue influence, it has been passed over in debates on unfairness. However, it is argued that a closer study of the legislative design of s 16 reveals that it was meant by Mackenzie Chalmers (the architect of the 1899 amendment) to incorporate a “general principle” of contractual fairness which empowered courts to determine whether a transaction was “fair and reasonable”.","PeriodicalId":13511,"journal":{"name":"Indian Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79227330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-02DOI: 10.1080/24730580.2019.1694467
K. Gauba
ABSTRACT Iterations of Law is a valuable resource on the legal history of colonial India. The essays in this edited volume uncover the lived experience of law in the tradition of social history. The contributors discuss and rework ideas of legal pluralism, law’s violence, and the legacy of colonial law. Their embrace of legal archives other than the judgment, such as the stamp paper, and political and bureaucratic speeches is a welcome methodological intervention in the field. This review examines the volume’s contribution to two persistent debates in legal history: the perceived continuity of the colonial law and legal system, and the agency of the colonial subject vis-à-vis law. Read this way, the contributions emphasise several points of contact between subject and government that allowed the consolidation and legitimisation of colonial rule. Though greater engagement with law and a South Asian emphasis would have added much value, the review concludes that the volume is essential reading for legal historians as well as scholars analysing the conditions of authority and legitimacy of law.
{"title":"Iterations of law: legal histories from India, edited by Aparna Balachandran, Rashmi Pant and Bhavani Raman, New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2018, viii + 302pp., INR 950 (hardback), ISBN 9780199477791","authors":"K. Gauba","doi":"10.1080/24730580.2019.1694467","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24730580.2019.1694467","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Iterations of Law is a valuable resource on the legal history of colonial India. The essays in this edited volume uncover the lived experience of law in the tradition of social history. The contributors discuss and rework ideas of legal pluralism, law’s violence, and the legacy of colonial law. Their embrace of legal archives other than the judgment, such as the stamp paper, and political and bureaucratic speeches is a welcome methodological intervention in the field. This review examines the volume’s contribution to two persistent debates in legal history: the perceived continuity of the colonial law and legal system, and the agency of the colonial subject vis-à-vis law. Read this way, the contributions emphasise several points of contact between subject and government that allowed the consolidation and legitimisation of colonial rule. Though greater engagement with law and a South Asian emphasis would have added much value, the review concludes that the volume is essential reading for legal historians as well as scholars analysing the conditions of authority and legitimacy of law.","PeriodicalId":13511,"journal":{"name":"Indian Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91340463","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-02DOI: 10.1080/24730580.2019.1667945
J. Hepburn
The international law of investment protection is currently at a turning point. Since the first bilateral investment treaty (BIT) was concluded in 1959, states have concluded thousands more such tr...
{"title":"India and bilateral investment treaties: refusal, acceptance, backlash","authors":"J. Hepburn","doi":"10.1080/24730580.2019.1667945","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24730580.2019.1667945","url":null,"abstract":"The international law of investment protection is currently at a turning point. Since the first bilateral investment treaty (BIT) was concluded in 1959, states have concluded thousands more such tr...","PeriodicalId":13511,"journal":{"name":"Indian Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90702578","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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