Pub Date : 2021-08-04DOI: 10.1080/24730580.2021.1963612
Dhruv Gandhi, Unnati Ghia
ABSTRACT The Supreme Court of India in two landmark decisions – Secretary, Ministry of Defence v. Babita Puniya and Union of India v. Annie Nagaraja – emphatically struck down subordinate legislation governing defence forces on the basis of an anti-stereotyping principle. While these decisions have furthered Indian discrimination law by finding the use of gender stereotypes to be constitutionally impermissible, they have also left certain important questions unanswered. The interplay between Articles 15 and 33 of the Constitution remains unexplored, leaving open the possibility of the prohibition against gender discrimination being abrogated by laws pertaining to armed forces. Moreover, the scope and application of the anti-stereotyping principle are yet to be ascertained. Finally, the principle as it stands may meet with considerable difficulty if and when applied to cases outside Article 15(1), specifically those falling under Article 15(3). We argue that a different approach to the principle is warranted to accommodate such concerns.
{"title":"Analysing the stereotypical sailor and soldier in Indian constitutional law","authors":"Dhruv Gandhi, Unnati Ghia","doi":"10.1080/24730580.2021.1963612","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24730580.2021.1963612","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The Supreme Court of India in two landmark decisions – Secretary, Ministry of Defence v. Babita Puniya and Union of India v. Annie Nagaraja – emphatically struck down subordinate legislation governing defence forces on the basis of an anti-stereotyping principle. While these decisions have furthered Indian discrimination law by finding the use of gender stereotypes to be constitutionally impermissible, they have also left certain important questions unanswered. The interplay between Articles 15 and 33 of the Constitution remains unexplored, leaving open the possibility of the prohibition against gender discrimination being abrogated by laws pertaining to armed forces. Moreover, the scope and application of the anti-stereotyping principle are yet to be ascertained. Finally, the principle as it stands may meet with considerable difficulty if and when applied to cases outside Article 15(1), specifically those falling under Article 15(3). We argue that a different approach to the principle is warranted to accommodate such concerns.","PeriodicalId":13511,"journal":{"name":"Indian Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88777124","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-12DOI: 10.1080/24730580.2021.1952376
Gaurav Bhawnani
ABSTRACT In response to the use of sexual history in rape trials to characterize the victim as untrustworthy, “rape shield” laws, limiting the use of evidence of the victim’s sexual history, have been introduced in India. Through a series of trial court decisions, this paper shows that in child sexual abuse cases, the victim’s mother’s “character” is scrutinized in a manner similar to the victim’s character in (adult) rape trials to argue that the accused has been falsely implicated. This issue has received limited attention in academic literature and has gone unnoticed by appellate courts. An analysis of the reasoning in these trial court judgements shows that the rules of evidence not only sanction this line of defence, but also that traditions of rape trials encourage its use. There is thus a need for a re-look at the existing rape shield provisions and the mindset of the Indian legal community.
{"title":"The mother’s “character” on trial in child sexual abuse cases","authors":"Gaurav Bhawnani","doi":"10.1080/24730580.2021.1952376","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24730580.2021.1952376","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In response to the use of sexual history in rape trials to characterize the victim as untrustworthy, “rape shield” laws, limiting the use of evidence of the victim’s sexual history, have been introduced in India. Through a series of trial court decisions, this paper shows that in child sexual abuse cases, the victim’s mother’s “character” is scrutinized in a manner similar to the victim’s character in (adult) rape trials to argue that the accused has been falsely implicated. This issue has received limited attention in academic literature and has gone unnoticed by appellate courts. An analysis of the reasoning in these trial court judgements shows that the rules of evidence not only sanction this line of defence, but also that traditions of rape trials encourage its use. There is thus a need for a re-look at the existing rape shield provisions and the mindset of the Indian legal community.","PeriodicalId":13511,"journal":{"name":"Indian Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74054128","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-06DOI: 10.1080/24730580.2021.1950338
T. K. Raj
ABSTRACT This paper enquires into the scope of protection against private discrimination under the Indian Constitution. I study three arguments on how to interpret Article 15(2). I consider the plain linguistic argument and reject it, since it has been abandoned by the Supreme Court to interpret provisions on discrimination. I then apply the “public actor” principle to Article 15(2) and argue that it is vulnerable to objections. Thirdly, I consider the “economic goods” principle by Gautam Bhatia and argue that it too is unsuitable. I then develop my positive proposal of “public service” introduced by the Supreme Court in the IMA case and discuss its components. For a service to qualify as public service, it must both be vital to social life and capable of securing dignity to the individual. I argue that this is the best interpretation of Article 15(2) and deserves to be treated as such.
{"title":"Private discrimination, public service and the constitution","authors":"T. K. Raj","doi":"10.1080/24730580.2021.1950338","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24730580.2021.1950338","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper enquires into the scope of protection against private discrimination under the Indian Constitution. I study three arguments on how to interpret Article 15(2). I consider the plain linguistic argument and reject it, since it has been abandoned by the Supreme Court to interpret provisions on discrimination. I then apply the “public actor” principle to Article 15(2) and argue that it is vulnerable to objections. Thirdly, I consider the “economic goods” principle by Gautam Bhatia and argue that it too is unsuitable. I then develop my positive proposal of “public service” introduced by the Supreme Court in the IMA case and discuss its components. For a service to qualify as public service, it must both be vital to social life and capable of securing dignity to the individual. I argue that this is the best interpretation of Article 15(2) and deserves to be treated as such.","PeriodicalId":13511,"journal":{"name":"Indian Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75509683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-30DOI: 10.1080/24730580.2021.1941689
Nihal Sahu, Sheerene Mohamed
ABSTRACT For religious disputes, Indian courts apply the essential practices doctrine, granting constitutional protection only to practices that are “essential to the religion.” This test soon acquired a normative character, sometimes excluding “superstitious” practices. However, some scholars believe that courts can evaluate essentiality without making normative judgements. We suggest that this distinction between descriptive and normative essentiality tests is deceptive. Instead, we argue that evaluations of essentiality are cryptonormative (i.e. even evaluations that are not facially normative possess a normative character). Recent Supreme Court judgements indicate that it might depart from the essential practices doctrine. If it does, courts should instead evaluate the sincerity of the claimant and the plausibility of the claim and then balance religious freedom against the state interest. However, adjudicative norms, including limitations posed by public interest litigation, impede a non-normative inquiry. We suggest the beginnings of an alternate approach that might help overcome those challenges.
{"title":"Inessential practices: charting a non-normative future for Indian religion jurisprudence","authors":"Nihal Sahu, Sheerene Mohamed","doi":"10.1080/24730580.2021.1941689","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24730580.2021.1941689","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT For religious disputes, Indian courts apply the essential practices doctrine, granting constitutional protection only to practices that are “essential to the religion.” This test soon acquired a normative character, sometimes excluding “superstitious” practices. However, some scholars believe that courts can evaluate essentiality without making normative judgements. We suggest that this distinction between descriptive and normative essentiality tests is deceptive. Instead, we argue that evaluations of essentiality are cryptonormative (i.e. even evaluations that are not facially normative possess a normative character). Recent Supreme Court judgements indicate that it might depart from the essential practices doctrine. If it does, courts should instead evaluate the sincerity of the claimant and the plausibility of the claim and then balance religious freedom against the state interest. However, adjudicative norms, including limitations posed by public interest litigation, impede a non-normative inquiry. We suggest the beginnings of an alternate approach that might help overcome those challenges.","PeriodicalId":13511,"journal":{"name":"Indian Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85390802","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-28DOI: 10.1080/24730580.2021.1937893
S. Uma
ABSTRACT The central concern of the case was the constitutional validity of a long-enforced prohibition on women aged 10–50 from entering the Hindu temple at Sabarimala, Kerala, with the intersection of freedom of religion and equality rights of women as its backdrop. The Kerala High Court’s judgement of 1991, which upheld its validity, was followed by a complex web of litigation and protests, culminating in the Supreme Court judgement of 2018 in Indian Young Lawyers’ Association v. State of Kerala. The 2018 judgement, with a majority of 4:1, held that the prohibition was unconstitutional and discriminatory against women. However, by adopting a feminist analysis, I demonstrate not only that the Kerala High Court judgement overlooked women’s right to freedom of religion, but that the tools to deliver a more gender-equal judgement were fully available to the High Court in 1991, and had the potential to be applied to the issue.
{"title":"Menstrual “impurity”, women’s access to public worship and the law: a feminist re-writing of the Sabarimala judgement S. Mahendran v The Secretary, Travancore Devaswom Board AIR 1993 Ker 42","authors":"S. Uma","doi":"10.1080/24730580.2021.1937893","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24730580.2021.1937893","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The central concern of the case was the constitutional validity of a long-enforced prohibition on women aged 10–50 from entering the Hindu temple at Sabarimala, Kerala, with the intersection of freedom of religion and equality rights of women as its backdrop. The Kerala High Court’s judgement of 1991, which upheld its validity, was followed by a complex web of litigation and protests, culminating in the Supreme Court judgement of 2018 in Indian Young Lawyers’ Association v. State of Kerala. The 2018 judgement, with a majority of 4:1, held that the prohibition was unconstitutional and discriminatory against women. However, by adopting a feminist analysis, I demonstrate not only that the Kerala High Court judgement overlooked women’s right to freedom of religion, but that the tools to deliver a more gender-equal judgement were fully available to the High Court in 1991, and had the potential to be applied to the issue.","PeriodicalId":13511,"journal":{"name":"Indian Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80806771","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-06DOI: 10.1080/24730580.2021.1937864
Manwendra K. Tiwari
Adjudication of disputes in any legal system does not contemplate the instant culmination of the process, and ordinary delay is therefore obvious. However, the delays contemplated by the system are structural and not inordinate and endemic. For instance, a criminal trial does not envisage an instant culmination of the process and makes provision for bail for the accused, while the trial is yet to commence or conclude. The provisions of bail, in fact, take into account delays in the appellate courts and therefore, a convict can also be released on bail. This reflects acknowledgement by the legal system of the ordinary delays that occur. It is when delays are inordinate that they become a matter of concern and it is this problem that plagues the Indian legal system. Scholarship on judicial delays attempts to mainstream the most pressing concern faced by the Indian legal system at present. Scholarship on doctrinal principles of law and examination of its effects is desirable but if the actual operation of those principles is marred by delay, the discourse on principles borders on becoming irrelevant. Contemporary scholarship debates the disturbing trend of the process itself being the punishment and the inevitability of delay in the process being used to assuage the vindictive aspirations of people in power who misuse the powers of State. Justice Frustrated: The Systemic Impact of Delays in Indian Courts, based on a study by the research organization Daksh, portrays how the information available in the public domain through the means of the internet, made accessible by the state itself, can provide much information about the working of the different courts, especially in terms of handling of the caseload. The information about District Court cases, having received relatively less focus by scholars, is significant for the right of ordinary citizens to access to justice. Justice Frustrated brings on board innovative ways of addressing the problem of delay beyond the relevant but cliché arguments of filling vacancies amongst judges, increasing the number of judges along with the support staff and cautioning against unwarranted adjournments.
{"title":"Justice Frustrated: the systemic impact of delays in Indian courts","authors":"Manwendra K. Tiwari","doi":"10.1080/24730580.2021.1937864","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24730580.2021.1937864","url":null,"abstract":"Adjudication of disputes in any legal system does not contemplate the instant culmination of the process, and ordinary delay is therefore obvious. However, the delays contemplated by the system are structural and not inordinate and endemic. For instance, a criminal trial does not envisage an instant culmination of the process and makes provision for bail for the accused, while the trial is yet to commence or conclude. The provisions of bail, in fact, take into account delays in the appellate courts and therefore, a convict can also be released on bail. This reflects acknowledgement by the legal system of the ordinary delays that occur. It is when delays are inordinate that they become a matter of concern and it is this problem that plagues the Indian legal system. Scholarship on judicial delays attempts to mainstream the most pressing concern faced by the Indian legal system at present. Scholarship on doctrinal principles of law and examination of its effects is desirable but if the actual operation of those principles is marred by delay, the discourse on principles borders on becoming irrelevant. Contemporary scholarship debates the disturbing trend of the process itself being the punishment and the inevitability of delay in the process being used to assuage the vindictive aspirations of people in power who misuse the powers of State. Justice Frustrated: The Systemic Impact of Delays in Indian Courts, based on a study by the research organization Daksh, portrays how the information available in the public domain through the means of the internet, made accessible by the state itself, can provide much information about the working of the different courts, especially in terms of handling of the caseload. The information about District Court cases, having received relatively less focus by scholars, is significant for the right of ordinary citizens to access to justice. Justice Frustrated brings on board innovative ways of addressing the problem of delay beyond the relevant but cliché arguments of filling vacancies amongst judges, increasing the number of judges along with the support staff and cautioning against unwarranted adjournments.","PeriodicalId":13511,"journal":{"name":"Indian Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72579294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-24DOI: 10.1080/24730580.2021.1911475
Shreya Atrey, Gauri Pillai
ABSTRACT Nergesh Meerza is one of the earliest and most grave failures of the Supreme Court of India in the field of discrimination law. In a single stroke, not only did the Court drive a wedge between sex and gender to protect only the former from discrimination, it also debarred indirect and intersectional discrimination from the purview of the Constitution. This article presents a feminist judgment in this case which dissents from the original decision of the Court. It develops a version of constitutional protection from sex discrimination which embodies gender, indirect and intersectional discrimination. Importantly, it ventures into the hitherto neglected field of non-discrimination under Articles 15(1) and 16(2), and develops a substantive test for violations. Nergesh Meerza makes clear that without such a test, judges inevitably fail to give any meaning to the non-discrimination guarantees as part of the equality code of the Constitution.
{"title":"A feminist rewriting of Air India v Nergesh Meerza AIR 1981 SC 1829: proposal for a test of discrimination under Article 15(1)","authors":"Shreya Atrey, Gauri Pillai","doi":"10.1080/24730580.2021.1911475","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24730580.2021.1911475","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Nergesh Meerza is one of the earliest and most grave failures of the Supreme Court of India in the field of discrimination law. In a single stroke, not only did the Court drive a wedge between sex and gender to protect only the former from discrimination, it also debarred indirect and intersectional discrimination from the purview of the Constitution. This article presents a feminist judgment in this case which dissents from the original decision of the Court. It develops a version of constitutional protection from sex discrimination which embodies gender, indirect and intersectional discrimination. Importantly, it ventures into the hitherto neglected field of non-discrimination under Articles 15(1) and 16(2), and develops a substantive test for violations. Nergesh Meerza makes clear that without such a test, judges inevitably fail to give any meaning to the non-discrimination guarantees as part of the equality code of the Constitution.","PeriodicalId":13511,"journal":{"name":"Indian Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89341712","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT The Indian Constitution obligates the Governors to act with the aid and advise of their Council of Ministers except in those matters where discretionary powers have been explicitly conferred upon them. Despite the absence of an explicit power to order a state government to face a floor test before the House, Governors have been using their discretion to make such directions. While defining the ambit of this discretion, several Inter-State Council reports and judicial pronouncements have assented to this practice. This paper argues against this trend and asserts that the process of summoning the assembly for a “floor test” must be driven by the choice of elected legislators rather than the Governors’ subjective satisfaction. Towards this end, this paper proposes a four-level formula, with certain rights for the opposition parties, which must be followed by the Governors when the confidence of the House in the incumbent government is questioned.
{"title":"Marking the imprecise territory of gubernatorial discretion to call for a trust vote","authors":"Anmol Jain, Sayantani Bagchi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3849279","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3849279","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The Indian Constitution obligates the Governors to act with the aid and advise of their Council of Ministers except in those matters where discretionary powers have been explicitly conferred upon them. Despite the absence of an explicit power to order a state government to face a floor test before the House, Governors have been using their discretion to make such directions. While defining the ambit of this discretion, several Inter-State Council reports and judicial pronouncements have assented to this practice. This paper argues against this trend and asserts that the process of summoning the assembly for a “floor test” must be driven by the choice of elected legislators rather than the Governors’ subjective satisfaction. Towards this end, this paper proposes a four-level formula, with certain rights for the opposition parties, which must be followed by the Governors when the confidence of the House in the incumbent government is questioned.","PeriodicalId":13511,"journal":{"name":"Indian Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72712917","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-05DOI: 10.1080/24730580.2021.1922032
Sannoy Das, A. Mazumdar
ABSTRACT In this contribution, as part of the Indian Feminist Judgement Project, we reconsider the decision of the Supreme Court of India in the Charan Lal Sahu case that followed the Bhopal gas leak tragedy. We present a dissenting opinion on the case, finding that the law empowering the State to supplant the victim-survivors as plaintiffs was unconstitutional. Alongside, we offer a brief commentary on why this finding comports with what a feminist judge on the bench might have decided. We consider a variety of ways in which feminist criticism of the majority decision might proceed, and how this criticism informs our rewriting. We also consider a set of persistent questions about feminist judging, and ways in which our rewriting, in turn, might be subject to further feminist objections.
{"title":"The state and the patriarch: rewriting Charan Lal Sahu, Rakesh Shrouti, Rajkumar Keswani, Nasrin Bi and others v. Union of India (1990) 1 SCC 613","authors":"Sannoy Das, A. Mazumdar","doi":"10.1080/24730580.2021.1922032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24730580.2021.1922032","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this contribution, as part of the Indian Feminist Judgement Project, we reconsider the decision of the Supreme Court of India in the Charan Lal Sahu case that followed the Bhopal gas leak tragedy. We present a dissenting opinion on the case, finding that the law empowering the State to supplant the victim-survivors as plaintiffs was unconstitutional. Alongside, we offer a brief commentary on why this finding comports with what a feminist judge on the bench might have decided. We consider a variety of ways in which feminist criticism of the majority decision might proceed, and how this criticism informs our rewriting. We also consider a set of persistent questions about feminist judging, and ways in which our rewriting, in turn, might be subject to further feminist objections.","PeriodicalId":13511,"journal":{"name":"Indian Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80982928","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-04DOI: 10.1080/24730580.2021.1946267
Meghana Rao
ABSTRACT Public and legal discussion to decriminalize suicide attempts has existed in India for almost four decades. The passing of the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017 has resulted in alterations to Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which had until then criminalized all suicide attempts. In this context, this article explores two questions: How is suicide conceptualized within criminal law? And what are the knowledges that inform the complex and shifting views, claims, and legal decisions that constitute the legal regulation of suicide in India today? This article studies law reform efforts, key High Court and Supreme Court of India judgements on cases relating to suicide attempts to demonstrate the eclectic nature of definitions of suicide within Indian law. Concurrently, it highlights a characteristic of law – its ability to juggle multiple knowledges, thereby constantly (re)defining the concepts or actions it adjudicates.
{"title":"A multifarious law: heterogeneous meanings of suicide in Indian law","authors":"Meghana Rao","doi":"10.1080/24730580.2021.1946267","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24730580.2021.1946267","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Public and legal discussion to decriminalize suicide attempts has existed in India for almost four decades. The passing of the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017 has resulted in alterations to Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which had until then criminalized all suicide attempts. In this context, this article explores two questions: How is suicide conceptualized within criminal law? And what are the knowledges that inform the complex and shifting views, claims, and legal decisions that constitute the legal regulation of suicide in India today? This article studies law reform efforts, key High Court and Supreme Court of India judgements on cases relating to suicide attempts to demonstrate the eclectic nature of definitions of suicide within Indian law. Concurrently, it highlights a characteristic of law – its ability to juggle multiple knowledges, thereby constantly (re)defining the concepts or actions it adjudicates.","PeriodicalId":13511,"journal":{"name":"Indian Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89361307","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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