Pub Date : 2022-02-15DOI: 10.1080/03155986.2022.2036034
Zhongmiao Sun, Qi Xu, Guoqing Zhang, Jinrong Liu
Abstract Queuing on an on-demand platform may make some customers disgust and give up using it, and the customers who have confirmed the orders may also cancel the orders due to some uncertain factors, which causes certain opportunity loss to the platform. This article considers both customer queuing and order cancellation (COC) behaviour, and studies optimal pricing and matching of the profit-maximizing platform. We first construct models without and with COC behaviour (cases N and C), and then propose two strategies of the platform to deal with COC behaviour, including the penalty strategy (case PC) and the penalty-subsidy strategy (case PSC). By solving these models and analysing, we find that although the penalty strategy intuitively discourages some customers from using on-demand services, the platform reduces the service price because of penalty fee, which indirectly encourages more customers who may not cancel orders to request services. We also find that when the COCR is greater than a certain critical point, both the penalty strategy and penalty-subsidy strategy are advantageous, while the penalty strategy is the best. However, when the COCR is less than the critical point, the penalty strategy is unfavourable, while the penalty-subsidy strategy is advantageous. Abbreviations: COC: customer queuing and order cancellation; COCR: customer order cancellation rate.
{"title":"Pricing and matching for on-demand platform considering customer queuing and order cancellation","authors":"Zhongmiao Sun, Qi Xu, Guoqing Zhang, Jinrong Liu","doi":"10.1080/03155986.2022.2036034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03155986.2022.2036034","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Queuing on an on-demand platform may make some customers disgust and give up using it, and the customers who have confirmed the orders may also cancel the orders due to some uncertain factors, which causes certain opportunity loss to the platform. This article considers both customer queuing and order cancellation (COC) behaviour, and studies optimal pricing and matching of the profit-maximizing platform. We first construct models without and with COC behaviour (cases N and C), and then propose two strategies of the platform to deal with COC behaviour, including the penalty strategy (case PC) and the penalty-subsidy strategy (case PSC). By solving these models and analysing, we find that although the penalty strategy intuitively discourages some customers from using on-demand services, the platform reduces the service price because of penalty fee, which indirectly encourages more customers who may not cancel orders to request services. We also find that when the COCR is greater than a certain critical point, both the penalty strategy and penalty-subsidy strategy are advantageous, while the penalty strategy is the best. However, when the COCR is less than the critical point, the penalty strategy is unfavourable, while the penalty-subsidy strategy is advantageous. Abbreviations: COC: customer queuing and order cancellation; COCR: customer order cancellation rate.","PeriodicalId":13645,"journal":{"name":"Infor","volume":"59 1","pages":"244 - 282"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78164299","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-22DOI: 10.1080/03155986.2021.2012403
I. D. Wangsa, H. Wee, Y. Hsiao, Novrianty Rizky
Abstract In this study, we have developed an integrated inventory model for the last-mile delivery where the distributer supplies goods to his customers. Two services based on the type of deliveries are investigated, namely: 1) motorcycle delivery service, and 2) drone delivery service. The objective of this study is to identify an effective last-mile delivery option, considering both cost and eco-friendly factors. An algorithm is formulated to determine the optimal order quantity, safety factor, lead-time, total emission and the number of deliveries. The implication derived from our investigation is that: using motorcycle for the last-mile delivery may be faster than using drone, it is not as environmentally friendly. One of the disadvantages of using drone is the fact that current drone cannot carry too heavy loads or travel very long distances; we hope in the future more advanced drone will be able to overcome the disadvantage. Numerical examples and sensitivity analyses are provided to illustrate the proposed model. Finally, closing remarks and future research are given in the conclusion. From the comparison analysis, besides eco-friendly, the integrated total cost using drone is lower than motorcycle, with a cost-saving around 3-4%.
{"title":"Identifying an effective last-mile customer delivery option with an integrated eco-friendly inventory model","authors":"I. D. Wangsa, H. Wee, Y. Hsiao, Novrianty Rizky","doi":"10.1080/03155986.2021.2012403","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03155986.2021.2012403","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this study, we have developed an integrated inventory model for the last-mile delivery where the distributer supplies goods to his customers. Two services based on the type of deliveries are investigated, namely: 1) motorcycle delivery service, and 2) drone delivery service. The objective of this study is to identify an effective last-mile delivery option, considering both cost and eco-friendly factors. An algorithm is formulated to determine the optimal order quantity, safety factor, lead-time, total emission and the number of deliveries. The implication derived from our investigation is that: using motorcycle for the last-mile delivery may be faster than using drone, it is not as environmentally friendly. One of the disadvantages of using drone is the fact that current drone cannot carry too heavy loads or travel very long distances; we hope in the future more advanced drone will be able to overcome the disadvantage. Numerical examples and sensitivity analyses are provided to illustrate the proposed model. Finally, closing remarks and future research are given in the conclusion. From the comparison analysis, besides eco-friendly, the integrated total cost using drone is lower than motorcycle, with a cost-saving around 3-4%.","PeriodicalId":13645,"journal":{"name":"Infor","volume":"24 1","pages":"165 - 200"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73984717","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-06DOI: 10.1080/03155986.2021.2004636
Lucy Fountain, Kourosh Khedriliraviasl, S. Mahmoudzadeh, H. Mahmoudzadeh
Abstract Intensity-modulated radiation therapy (IMRT) is a commonly-used method for treating cancer. To develop a treatment plan, an optimization problem is formulated to find the optimal radiation intensities to ensure that the cancerous region receives the required prescribed radiation dose while limiting the excess radiation to the surrounding healthy organs. Due to the granularity of the discretization of the body into numerous three-dimensional pixels, the resulting optimization problem is often extremely large-scale and can include tens of thousands of constraints. This paper presents an exact dose-based constraint generation technique to solve large-scale linear problems in IMRT. We first use specific characteristics of the IMRT problem to cluster the voxels based on how they are influenced per unit intensity of each part of the radiation beams and then use these clusters in a specialized constraint generation algorithm. We demonstrate the applicability of the proposed approach using several retrospective patient data sets and discuss the computational efficiency and solution quality of the proposed approach for different cases of the algorithm. Our results show that the proposed method decreases the solution time by 75% to 98% for all patients, without affecting the treatment quality compared to the original full-scale IMRT problem.
{"title":"Dose-based constraint generation for large-scale IMRT optimization","authors":"Lucy Fountain, Kourosh Khedriliraviasl, S. Mahmoudzadeh, H. Mahmoudzadeh","doi":"10.1080/03155986.2021.2004636","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03155986.2021.2004636","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Intensity-modulated radiation therapy (IMRT) is a commonly-used method for treating cancer. To develop a treatment plan, an optimization problem is formulated to find the optimal radiation intensities to ensure that the cancerous region receives the required prescribed radiation dose while limiting the excess radiation to the surrounding healthy organs. Due to the granularity of the discretization of the body into numerous three-dimensional pixels, the resulting optimization problem is often extremely large-scale and can include tens of thousands of constraints. This paper presents an exact dose-based constraint generation technique to solve large-scale linear problems in IMRT. We first use specific characteristics of the IMRT problem to cluster the voxels based on how they are influenced per unit intensity of each part of the radiation beams and then use these clusters in a specialized constraint generation algorithm. We demonstrate the applicability of the proposed approach using several retrospective patient data sets and discuss the computational efficiency and solution quality of the proposed approach for different cases of the algorithm. Our results show that the proposed method decreases the solution time by 75% to 98% for all patients, without affecting the treatment quality compared to the original full-scale IMRT problem.","PeriodicalId":13645,"journal":{"name":"Infor","volume":"37 11-12","pages":"1 - 19"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72591986","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-29DOI: 10.1080/03155986.2021.2006523
Renbang Shan, Li Luo, Bowen Xiang
Abstract With the development and promotion of remanufacturing, remanufactured products have gradually become popular. And the production of remanufactured products cannot be separated from the support of remanufacturing technology. However, it is not clear whether the implementation of remanufacturing technological innovation can benefit enterprises. Moreover, the evidence from industry practice shows that the power structure has a substantial influence on the decision-making behavior of enterprises. Therefore, we combined remanufacturing technological innovation and three power structures and constructed six models to analyze the effects of remanufacturing technological innovation and power structures on supply chain decisions in the competitive environment of new and remanufactured products. The results show that under a certain power structure, remanufacturing technological innovation can make supply chain members obtain higher profits. In the case of remanufacturing technological innovation, there is less investment in remanufacturing technological innovation under the manufacturer-led structure. At this time, when consumers are not sufficiently sensitive to remanufacturing technological innovation, the manufacturer will try to dominate as much as possible in pursuit of their interests. However, the supply chain system profit and social welfare under the manufacturer-led structure are not dominant. The Vertical Nash structure is more beneficial to the system profit and social welfare under this condition. When consumers are sufficiently sensitive to remanufacturing technological innovation, member profits, system profit, and social welfare can benefit from the retailer-led structure. In addition, changes in consumers’ sensitivity to remanufacturing technological innovation will not affect the retailer’s pursuit of more profits. The retailer-led is always the best choice for the retailer. This research result fills in the blank of the impact of remanufacturing technological innovation on supply chain decision-making in the competitive environment of new products and remanufactured products and can provide decision-making references for manufacturers, remanufacturers, retailers, and the government.
{"title":"Optimal pricing strategies with remanufacturing technological innovation under different power structures","authors":"Renbang Shan, Li Luo, Bowen Xiang","doi":"10.1080/03155986.2021.2006523","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03155986.2021.2006523","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract With the development and promotion of remanufacturing, remanufactured products have gradually become popular. And the production of remanufactured products cannot be separated from the support of remanufacturing technology. However, it is not clear whether the implementation of remanufacturing technological innovation can benefit enterprises. Moreover, the evidence from industry practice shows that the power structure has a substantial influence on the decision-making behavior of enterprises. Therefore, we combined remanufacturing technological innovation and three power structures and constructed six models to analyze the effects of remanufacturing technological innovation and power structures on supply chain decisions in the competitive environment of new and remanufactured products. The results show that under a certain power structure, remanufacturing technological innovation can make supply chain members obtain higher profits. In the case of remanufacturing technological innovation, there is less investment in remanufacturing technological innovation under the manufacturer-led structure. At this time, when consumers are not sufficiently sensitive to remanufacturing technological innovation, the manufacturer will try to dominate as much as possible in pursuit of their interests. However, the supply chain system profit and social welfare under the manufacturer-led structure are not dominant. The Vertical Nash structure is more beneficial to the system profit and social welfare under this condition. When consumers are sufficiently sensitive to remanufacturing technological innovation, member profits, system profit, and social welfare can benefit from the retailer-led structure. In addition, changes in consumers’ sensitivity to remanufacturing technological innovation will not affect the retailer’s pursuit of more profits. The retailer-led is always the best choice for the retailer. This research result fills in the blank of the impact of remanufacturing technological innovation on supply chain decision-making in the competitive environment of new products and remanufactured products and can provide decision-making references for manufacturers, remanufacturers, retailers, and the government.","PeriodicalId":13645,"journal":{"name":"Infor","volume":"32 1","pages":"201 - 243"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86968701","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-23DOI: 10.1080/03155986.2021.2004056
S. Jena, C. Behera
Abstract Tourism Supply chain (TSC) refers to techniques aimed at facilitating the sustainable development of tourist destinations through purchasing policies and practices. Sustainability is of particular importance to tour operators because their products are dependent on local operators, including accommodations, transportation, and activities. When a tour operator uses a local operator as a channel for reaching tourists, the ecotourism strategies takes on an additional dimension: which party will perform the ecotourism effort to end tourists. Cost sharing arrangement expands the option by decoupling the execution of ecotourism strategies from its funding. However, tourism is typically described as various supply chains in research, yet little is known about their ecotourism effort when considering cost-sharing. We develop a mathematical model for a tourism supply chain under two scenarios: (i) ecotourism effort without cost-sharing and (ii) ecotourism effort with cost-sharing. Using game theoretic models, we compare equilibrium outcomes under cost sharing and without cost sharing scenarios. The results show that the tourism supply chain generate more profit in without cost-sharing compare to with cost-sharing. The results of our study also indicate that the total profit is higher when the local operator performs the sustainability and a portion of the cost of the ecotourism effort is shared by the tour operator. The economic benefit to the tour operator and local operator is higher when both players dedicate their effort to ecotourism individually. A numerical example is provided to further illustrate our numerical analytical finding and gain more managerial insights.
{"title":"Mathematical modelling for tourism supply chain considering sustainable effort","authors":"S. Jena, C. Behera","doi":"10.1080/03155986.2021.2004056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03155986.2021.2004056","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Tourism Supply chain (TSC) refers to techniques aimed at facilitating the sustainable development of tourist destinations through purchasing policies and practices. Sustainability is of particular importance to tour operators because their products are dependent on local operators, including accommodations, transportation, and activities. When a tour operator uses a local operator as a channel for reaching tourists, the ecotourism strategies takes on an additional dimension: which party will perform the ecotourism effort to end tourists. Cost sharing arrangement expands the option by decoupling the execution of ecotourism strategies from its funding. However, tourism is typically described as various supply chains in research, yet little is known about their ecotourism effort when considering cost-sharing. We develop a mathematical model for a tourism supply chain under two scenarios: (i) ecotourism effort without cost-sharing and (ii) ecotourism effort with cost-sharing. Using game theoretic models, we compare equilibrium outcomes under cost sharing and without cost sharing scenarios. The results show that the tourism supply chain generate more profit in without cost-sharing compare to with cost-sharing. The results of our study also indicate that the total profit is higher when the local operator performs the sustainability and a portion of the cost of the ecotourism effort is shared by the tour operator. The economic benefit to the tour operator and local operator is higher when both players dedicate their effort to ecotourism individually. A numerical example is provided to further illustrate our numerical analytical finding and gain more managerial insights.","PeriodicalId":13645,"journal":{"name":"Infor","volume":"25 1","pages":"20 - 51"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79281418","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-21DOI: 10.1080/03155986.2021.1998951
Subrata Saha, I. Nielsen, S. P. Sarmah
Abstract In this article, the influence of using strategic inventory and forming collusion between upstream manufacturers and downstream retailers is studied when two competing supply chains offer substitutable products in a common market through exclusive retailers. The optimal pricing decisions are explored in five different scenarios. It is found that with a specific limit of holding cost, the retailer can carry inventory strategically for the benefit of each member when upstream manufacturers have a first-mover advantage. Two-period planning can outperform a single-period decision. However, if two downstream retailers form collusion and uphold strategic inventory, the profit share of upstream manufacturers can reduce considerably, but the sales volume of both supply chains increased. In that circumstance, retailers rely upon more strategic inventory, and manufacturers need to drop their respective wholesale prices considerably in the second period. A long-term wholesale price commitment contract is used to safeguard the interest of upstream manufacturers. We find that the proposed mechanism can improve the performance of all the members. Numerical experiments provide valuable managerial insights regarding the supply chain members’ strategic decisions under competition.
{"title":"Influence of strategic inventory on the equilibrium of two competing supply chains","authors":"Subrata Saha, I. Nielsen, S. P. Sarmah","doi":"10.1080/03155986.2021.1998951","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03155986.2021.1998951","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this article, the influence of using strategic inventory and forming collusion between upstream manufacturers and downstream retailers is studied when two competing supply chains offer substitutable products in a common market through exclusive retailers. The optimal pricing decisions are explored in five different scenarios. It is found that with a specific limit of holding cost, the retailer can carry inventory strategically for the benefit of each member when upstream manufacturers have a first-mover advantage. Two-period planning can outperform a single-period decision. However, if two downstream retailers form collusion and uphold strategic inventory, the profit share of upstream manufacturers can reduce considerably, but the sales volume of both supply chains increased. In that circumstance, retailers rely upon more strategic inventory, and manufacturers need to drop their respective wholesale prices considerably in the second period. A long-term wholesale price commitment contract is used to safeguard the interest of upstream manufacturers. We find that the proposed mechanism can improve the performance of all the members. Numerical experiments provide valuable managerial insights regarding the supply chain members’ strategic decisions under competition.","PeriodicalId":13645,"journal":{"name":"Infor","volume":"23 1","pages":"52 - 83"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86571922","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-28DOI: 10.1080/03155986.2021.1991753
J. Oh, J. Choi
Abstract We investigate how supplier performance is influenced by the behaviors (self-interested behaviors and gatekeeping actions) of a supplier’s salesperson and engineer, and how such behaviors affect a performance-based contract design to ensure the desired performance from the supplier. This article develops a incentive contract that proves how such behaviors affect supplier performance, elucidating how agents’ behaviors influence a buyer’s incentive contract form for collaboration with the supplier. Our study found that in general, the behaviors of salespeople and engineers can damage supplier performance. Their impact changes depending on some contingent factors, proposing incentive contract forms that can mitigate the negative consequences of the behaviors on supplier and buyer performance. This paper takes multiple agents’ behaviors and their behavioral disutility into consideration when developing an incentive contract.
{"title":"Inter-organizational purchasing contracts: the effects of multi-agents in a supplying firm","authors":"J. Oh, J. Choi","doi":"10.1080/03155986.2021.1991753","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03155986.2021.1991753","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We investigate how supplier performance is influenced by the behaviors (self-interested behaviors and gatekeeping actions) of a supplier’s salesperson and engineer, and how such behaviors affect a performance-based contract design to ensure the desired performance from the supplier. This article develops a incentive contract that proves how such behaviors affect supplier performance, elucidating how agents’ behaviors influence a buyer’s incentive contract form for collaboration with the supplier. Our study found that in general, the behaviors of salespeople and engineers can damage supplier performance. Their impact changes depending on some contingent factors, proposing incentive contract forms that can mitigate the negative consequences of the behaviors on supplier and buyer performance. This paper takes multiple agents’ behaviors and their behavioral disutility into consideration when developing an incentive contract.","PeriodicalId":13645,"journal":{"name":"Infor","volume":"249 1","pages":"84 - 108"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82907409","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-02DOI: 10.1080/03155986.2021.1971594
M. Taghavi, Kai Huang, A. Golmohammadi
Abstract In this paper, we consider multi-period single resource stochastic capacity expansion problems with lost sales. We study two models. The first model does not consider fixed-charge for capacity purchases, while the second one incorporates fixed-charges. We use multi-stage stochastic integer programs to present both models and show how adding the fixed-charge cost changes the structure of the mathematical models. For both models, we study their structures and design polynomial-time algorithms to solve them. We present computational results to show the performance of the designed algorithms.
{"title":"Polynomial-time algorithms for single resource stochastic capacity expansion models with lost sales","authors":"M. Taghavi, Kai Huang, A. Golmohammadi","doi":"10.1080/03155986.2021.1971594","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03155986.2021.1971594","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, we consider multi-period single resource stochastic capacity expansion problems with lost sales. We study two models. The first model does not consider fixed-charge for capacity purchases, while the second one incorporates fixed-charges. We use multi-stage stochastic integer programs to present both models and show how adding the fixed-charge cost changes the structure of the mathematical models. For both models, we study their structures and design polynomial-time algorithms to solve them. We present computational results to show the performance of the designed algorithms.","PeriodicalId":13645,"journal":{"name":"Infor","volume":"18 1","pages":"572 - 591"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78674163","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-02DOI: 10.1080/03155986.2021.1985903
You Zhao, Rui Hou, Xinggang Luo
Abstract In practice, before purchasing products, customers would compare the current price with past observed prices (referred to as the intertemporal reference price effect) and retail prices of other sellers (referred to as the horizontal reference price effect). This study considers a two-period supply chain with one manufacturer who sells a product through two competing retailers. We assume that the manufacturer acts as the Stackelberg game leader, and both retailers act as followers. The manufacturer can quote the same or different wholesale prices for the two retailers, whereas both retailers can employ a pre-announced or responsive pricing strategy. We study the impact of intertemporal and horizontal reference price effects on the selection of pricing formats. Our results show that both retailers and manufacturers can benefit from intertemporal effects. However, the horizontal effect hurts the retailer’s profit, but still improves that of the manufacturer. In equilibrium, the manufacturer sets different wholesale prices to retailers who would employ the pre-announced pricing strategy. Finally, we find that the intertemporal reference price effect plays a key role in the pricing strategy equilibrium of the manufacturer and retailers. Our results complement the dynamic pricing strategy literature and provide new managerial implications for supply chain management. Highlights Pricing format selection problems with IRPE and HRPE are investigated. IRPE hurts the payoff of both retailers but improves the manufacturer. In equilibrium, the manufacturer prefers the strategy “DP”. IRPE plays an important role in pricing format selecting than HRPE.
{"title":"Two-period pricing strategy in a supply chain with intertemporal and horizontal reference price effects","authors":"You Zhao, Rui Hou, Xinggang Luo","doi":"10.1080/03155986.2021.1985903","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03155986.2021.1985903","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In practice, before purchasing products, customers would compare the current price with past observed prices (referred to as the intertemporal reference price effect) and retail prices of other sellers (referred to as the horizontal reference price effect). This study considers a two-period supply chain with one manufacturer who sells a product through two competing retailers. We assume that the manufacturer acts as the Stackelberg game leader, and both retailers act as followers. The manufacturer can quote the same or different wholesale prices for the two retailers, whereas both retailers can employ a pre-announced or responsive pricing strategy. We study the impact of intertemporal and horizontal reference price effects on the selection of pricing formats. Our results show that both retailers and manufacturers can benefit from intertemporal effects. However, the horizontal effect hurts the retailer’s profit, but still improves that of the manufacturer. In equilibrium, the manufacturer sets different wholesale prices to retailers who would employ the pre-announced pricing strategy. Finally, we find that the intertemporal reference price effect plays a key role in the pricing strategy equilibrium of the manufacturer and retailers. Our results complement the dynamic pricing strategy literature and provide new managerial implications for supply chain management. Highlights Pricing format selection problems with IRPE and HRPE are investigated. IRPE hurts the payoff of both retailers but improves the manufacturer. In equilibrium, the manufacturer prefers the strategy “DP”. IRPE plays an important role in pricing format selecting than HRPE.","PeriodicalId":13645,"journal":{"name":"Infor","volume":"41 1","pages":"639 - 667"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83964225","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-02DOI: 10.1080/03155986.2021.1985902
D. Bulck, Dries R. Goossens
Abstract Time-relaxed sports timetables utilize (many) more time slots than there are games per team, and therefore offer the flexibility to take into account player and venue availability. However, time-relaxed tournaments also have the drawback that the difference in games played per team and the rest period between teams’ consecutive games can vary considerably. In addition, organisers may want to avoid consecutive home and away games (i.e. breaks). To construct fair timetables, we propose relax-and-fix (R&F) and fix-and-optimize (F&O) heuristics that make use of team- and time-based variable partitioning schemes. While the team-based R&F constructs a timetable by gradually taking into account the integrality constraints related to all home games of a subset of teams, the time-based R&F maintains a rolling horizon of time intervals in which the integrality constraints of all games scheduled within the time interval are activated. The F&O heuristics use the same variable partitioning schemes, but they never relax the integrality constraints and allow to recover from mistakes by making a small number of changes with respect to the variables optimized in previous iterations. For numerous real-life instances, our heuristics generate high-quality timetables using only a fraction of the computational resources used by monolithic integer programming solvers.
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