Journal of Medical Ethics最新文献

The advances in machine learning (ML)-based systems in medicine give rise to pressing epistemological and ethical questions. Clinical decisions are increasingly taken in highly digitised work environments, which we call artificial epistemic niches. By considering the case of ML systems in life-critical healthcare settings, we investigate (1) when users' reliance on these systems can be characterised as epistemic dependence and (2) how this dependence turns into what we refer to as harmful epistemic dependence of clinical professionals on medical ML. The latter occurs when the impossibility of critically assessing the soundness of a system's output in situ implies a moral obligation to comply with its recommendation since a failure to do so constitutes a moral risk that cannot be justified then and there. We analyse the epistemic and moral consequences of harmful epistemic dependence on the status of medical professionals. We conclude by assessing how a suitable design of the epistemic niche can address the problem.

While artificial intelligence's (AI's) potential role in enhancing diagnostic accuracy and personalising treatment is well-recognised, its application in evaluating physicians raises critical ethical concerns as well. The paper examines the impact of AI on the 'comparative abilities' exception to informed consent, which currently exempts physicians from disclosing information about the performance of other providers. With AI's ability to generate granular, accurate comparisons of physician metrics, this exception will be challenged, potentially empowering patients to make more informed decisions. However, AI's use in disclosing physician success rates may exacerbate healthcare disparities, as wealthier patients may have more access to higher-skilled providers. Policymakers and ethicists must proactively address these concerns to ensure equitable access to care as AI technologies advance.

What does it mean to be a bioethicist? How should the role(s) of bioethics be understood in the context of a world of intense value conflict and polarisation? Bioethics is-in all its various forms and traditions-potentially well-positioned to contribute to addressing many of the most pressing challenges of value polarisation and conflict in diverse societies. However, realising this potential is going to require moving beyond currently foregrounded methods and developing new models for engaging with moral disagreement. This paper proposes an approach, 'adversarial cooperation,' drawing on the concepts of 'adversarial collaboration' from the sciences and 'antagonistic cooperation' from the humanities. Adversarial cooperation aims to combine the rigour and structured methodology of adversarial collaboration with the cultural sensitivity and expansive vision of antagonistic cooperation. The paper also addresses key challenges to adversarial cooperation, including ethical considerations, tensions between substantive and procedural values, the problem of misinformation and the need for decision-making amidst ongoing disagreement. Ultimately, adversarial cooperation suggests a reimagining of bioethical expertise, emphasising skills in mediation, the arts and humanities and participatory decision-making alongside established philosophical competencies. This implies a model of normative bioethical authority grounded in the ability to facilitate inclusive and trustworthy processes of moral deliberation. Realising the potential of adversarial cooperation will require significant changes in bioethics training and practice, as well as a commitment to reflexivity, humility and the amplification of marginalised voices. By embracing this approach, bioethics can play a vital role in navigating the complex moral landscapes of pluralistic societies.

Background: Clinical ethics reasoning is one of the unique contributions of clinical ethicists to healthcare, and is common to all models of clinical ethics support and methods of case analysis. Despite being a fundamental aspect of clinical ethics practice, the phenomenon of clinical ethics reasoning is not well understood. There are no formal definitions or models of clinical ethics reasoning, and it is unclear whether there is a shared understanding of this phenomenon among those who perform and encounter it.

Methods: A scoping review of empirical literature was conducted across four databases in July 2024 to capture papers that shed light on how clinical ethicists undertake or facilitate clinical ethics reasoning in practice in individual patient cases. The review process was guided by the Arksey and O'Malley framework for scoping reviews.

Results: 16 publications were included in this review. These publications reveal four thinking strategies used to advance ethical thinking, and three strategies for resolving clinical ethics challenges in individual patient cases. The literature also highlights a number of other influences on clinical ethics reasoning in practice.

Conclusion: While this review has allowed us to start sketching the outlines of an account of clinical ethics reasoning in practice, the body of relevant literature is limited in quantity and in specificity. Further work is needed to better understand and evaluate the complex phenomenon of clinical ethics reasoning as it is done in clinical ethics practice.