Journal of Medical Ethics最新文献

After achieving sustained graft functioning in animal studies, the next step in the progression of xenotransplantation towards clinical application is the initiation of the first clinical trials. This raises the question according to which criteria patients shall be selected for these trials. While the discussion regarding medical criteria has already commenced, ethical considerations must also be taken into account. This is essential, first, to establish a procedure that is ethically reasonable and justified. Second, it is a prerequisite for a publicly acceptable and comprehensible implementation. This paper outlines a multicriteria approach for the selection of patients in first-in-human clinical trials of cardiac xenotransplantation with four ethical criteria: medical need, capacity to benefit, patient choice and compliance (as an exclusion criterion). Consequently, these criteria identify a primary target group of patients who exhibit a high medical need for cardiac xenotransplantation, face a high risk of morbidity and mortality without an organ replcaement therapy, have a substantial chance of benefiting from xenotransplantation, thereby also enhancing the scientific value of the trial, and qualify for an allotransplant to have a real choice between participating in a first-in-human xenotransplantation trial and waiting for a human organ. A secondary group would include patients for whom only the first two criteria are met, that is, who have a high medical need and a good capacity to benefit from xenotransplantation but who have a restricted choice because they do not qualify for an allotransplant.

What does it mean to be a bioethicist? How should the role(s) of bioethics be understood in the context of a world of intense value conflict and polarisation? Bioethics is-in all its various forms and traditions-potentially well-positioned to contribute to addressing many of the most pressing challenges of value polarisation and conflict in diverse societies. However, realising this potential is going to require moving beyond currently foregrounded methods and developing new models for engaging with moral disagreement. This paper proposes an approach, 'adversarial cooperation,' drawing on the concepts of 'adversarial collaboration' from the sciences and 'antagonistic cooperation' from the humanities. Adversarial cooperation aims to combine the rigour and structured methodology of adversarial collaboration with the cultural sensitivity and expansive vision of antagonistic cooperation. The paper also addresses key challenges to adversarial cooperation, including ethical considerations, tensions between substantive and procedural values, the problem of misinformation and the need for decision-making amidst ongoing disagreement. Ultimately, adversarial cooperation suggests a reimagining of bioethical expertise, emphasising skills in mediation, the arts and humanities and participatory decision-making alongside established philosophical competencies. This implies a model of normative bioethical authority grounded in the ability to facilitate inclusive and trustworthy processes of moral deliberation. Realising the potential of adversarial cooperation will require significant changes in bioethics training and practice, as well as a commitment to reflexivity, humility and the amplification of marginalised voices. By embracing this approach, bioethics can play a vital role in navigating the complex moral landscapes of pluralistic societies.

In his recent paper Hatherley discusses four reasons given to support mandatory disclosure of the use of machine learning technologies in healthcare, and provides counters to each of these reasons. While I agree with Hatherley's conclusion that such disclosures should not be mandatory (at least not in an upfront fashion), I raise some problems with his counters to the materiality argument. Finally, I raise another potential problem that exists in a democratic society: that even if Hatherley's (and other authors who share his conclusions) arguments are sound, in a democratic society the simple fact that most people might wish for such disclosures to be made might be an enough compelling reason to make such disclosures mandatory.

Some bioethicists argue that a doctor may frame treatment options in terms of effects on survival rather than on mortality in order to influence patients to choose the better option. The debate over such framing typically assumes that the survival and mortality frames convey the same numerical information. However, certain empirical findings contest this numerical equivalence assumption, demonstrating that framing effects may in fact be due to the two frames implying different information about the numerical bounds of survival and mortality rates. In this paper, I use these findings to argue that framing is presumptively wrong because it violates the duty of proper disclosure. Along the way, I highlight morally relevant features affecting the permissibility of framing, tackle three objections and draw some general lessons for the ethics of nudging.