Journal of Medical Ethics最新文献

Considerations of the notion of preparedness have come to the fore in the recent pandemic, highlighting a need to be better prepared to deal with sudden, unexpected and unwanted events. However, the concept of preparedness is also important in relation to planned for and desired interventions resulting from healthcare innovations. We describe ethical preparedness as a necessary component for the successful delivery of novel healthcare innovations, and use recent advances in genomic healthcare as an example. We suggest that practitioners and organisations charged with delivering innovative and ambitious healthcare programmes can only succeed if they are able to exhibit the attribute of ethical preparedness.

This paper examines the concept of 'tsunami-tendenko,' a guideline suggesting that individuals prioritise their own safety over aiding others during large-scale disasters. Kodama defends tsunami-tendenko against accusations of egoism by arguing that the principle can be justified ethically on consequentialist (or more precisely, utilitarian) grounds. Kodama asserts that attempting to assist others during such disasters heightens the risk of 'tomo-daore,' where both the rescuer and the victim may perish. He claims that having people focus solely on saving themselves can maximise the overall number of lives saved. However, we challenge Kodama's assertion that utilitarianism inherently favours tsunami-tendenko over mutual assistance during disasters. Instead, this paper proposes an alternative ethical foundation for tsunami-tendenko grounded in the 'antiextinction principle,' which prioritises minimising the potential for catastrophic outcomes. When considering the ethics of responding to disaster, it is important to distinguish between maximising the number of lives saved (utilitarianism) and minimising the risk of tomo-daore (antiextinction principle). This distinction may be overlooked if the distribution of probabilities is not considered. We conclude that the antiextinction principle aligns more naturally with tsunami-tendenko, emphasising the avoidance of catastrophic outcomes-a concern not always addressed by utilitarianism. Therefore, tsunami-tendenko should be regarded as a societal guideline aimed at preserving community sustainability by averting total destruction.

The UK government has recently committed to adopting a new policy-dubbed 'Martha's Rule'-which has been characterised as providing patients the right to rapidly access a second clinical opinion in urgent or contested cases. Support for the rule emerged following the death of Martha Mills in 2021, after doctors failed to admit her to intensive care despite concerns raised by her parents. We argue that framing this issue in terms of patient rights is not productive, and should be avoided. Insofar as the ultimate goal of Martha's Rule is the provision of a clinical service that protects patient safety, an approach that focuses on the obligations of the health system-rather than the individual rights of patients-will better serve this goal. We outline an alternative approach that situates rapid clinical review as part of a suite of services aimed at enhancing and protecting patient care. This approach would make greater progress towards addressing the difficult systemic issues that Martha's Rule does not, while also better engaging with the constraints of clinical practice.

Enduring intolerable suffering, an essential eligibility criterion in Medical Assistance in Dying (MAiD) in Canada and elsewhere, is a contradiction in terms, in that suffering must be tolerable to be endured. Cases of people who were approved for MAiD but who elected to die naturally, thus tolerating their suffering, bear out the unreliability of this central safeguard. The clinical assessment of intolerable suffering may be strengthened by adopting a definition of intolerable suffering centred on clinically evidenced physical and psychological decompensation. This argument also raises important questions about the risks of MAiD clinicians subjectively defining, approving and providing MAiD in ways that deviate from accepted legal and clinical concepts and ethics. Examples show some prolific clinicians describe MAiD in terminology that differs from such norms, as a personal mission, as personally pleasurable, and as a rights-based service. These alternative views are explored for their risks in assessing and providing MAiD for intolerable suffering. This further demonstrates the need for conceptual clarity in legislation, improved vetting and monitoring of clinicians, and a different assessment process to protect patients and clinicians.

In a recent paper, I argued that an externalist understanding of mental disorder from the philosophy of psychiatry presents an ethical challenge to the practice of medical assistance in dying (MAiD) for psychiatric illness, because it highlights the ways in which the suffering associated with psychiatric illness is sustained by features of the external environment wherein the person is embedded, including social barriers and injustices. In a response to my paper, Harry Hudson argues that addressing social inequality lacks relevance to the immediate permissibility of psychiatric MAiD and that the issue of psychiatric MAiD should be informed by 'pragmatic politics' rather than by 'obfuscatory philosophy'. Herein, I contend that Hudson's response misconstrues my position and ascribes to me views I neither express nor endorse. My paper does not claim that psychiatric MAiD should be denied to people who are presently in intolerable distress. Rather, it suggests that the provision of psychiatric MAiD comes along with social responsibilities of the state to attend to the barriers and injustices that sustain and exacerbate psychiatric illness, as well as ethical responsibilities of clinicians to consider a wider range of presently available psychological and social interventions which may have been neglected under a traditional internalist approach.