Journal of Medical Ethics最新文献

An AI-based 'patient preference predictor' (PPP) is a proposed method for guiding healthcare decisions for patients who lack decision-making capacity. The proposal is to use correlations between sociodemographic data and known healthcare preferences to construct a model that predicts the unknown preferences of a particular patient. In this paper, I highlight a distinction that has been largely overlooked so far in debates about the PPP-that between algorithmic prediction and decision-making-and argue that much of the recent philosophical disagreement stems from this oversight. I show how three prominent objections to the PPP only challenge its use as the sole determinant of a choice, and actually support its use as a source of evidence about patient preferences to inform human decision-making. The upshot is that we should adopt the evidential conception of the PPP and shift our evaluation of this technology towards the ethics of algorithmic prediction, rather than decision-making.

We recently suggested that there are both pragmatic and normative reasons to classify pregnancy as a disease. Several scholars argued against our claims. In this response, we defend the disease view of pregnancy against their criticism. We claim that the dysfunctional account of disease that some of our critics rely on has some counterintuitive results. Furthermore, we claim that our critics assume what needs to be argued that the primary function of our sexual organs is to reproduce. Since only a small percentage of sexual intercourse leads to pregnancy, it is far from obvious that reproduction is the primary biological function of our sexual organs. We also claim that while taking pregnancy itself as a reference class could avoid the conclusion that pregnancy is a disease, the strategy is problematic since it renders the Boorsean approach to disease and health circular and effectively deprives it of any utility in determining whether a particular phenomenon is a disease or not.

Hamas militants have raped and mutilated the bodies of dozens of men and women in Israel during their attack and captivity in Gaza. The exact extent of these atrocities, however, is unknown. For reasons of this sort and others, prosecuting sexual abusers during armed conflicts is notoriously difficult. In an attempt to make a legal case against Hamas militants, the Israeli authorities have recently ordered civilian hospitals to breach medical confidentiality and report unidentified data of patients who have suffered bodily mutilation and sexual abuse during the Hamas attack or during captivity in Gaza. Patients were not informed about this policy. This article first establishes a case for why medical confidentiality is such an important existential and normative value. In this light, it then argues that the Israeli policy is morally unjustified.

Deepfakes are hyper-realistic but fabricated videos created with the use of artificial intelligence. In the context of psychotherapy, the first studies on using deepfake technology are emerging, with potential applications including grief counselling and treatment for sexual violence-related trauma. This paper explores these applications from the perspective of medical ethics and health law. First, we question whether deepfake therapy can truly constitute good care. Important risks are dangerous situations or 'triggers' to the patient during data collection for the creation of a deepfake, and when deepfake therapy is started, there are risks of overattachment and blurring of reality, which can complicate the grieving process or alter perceptions of perpetrators. Therapists must mitigate these risks, but more research is needed to evaluate deepfake therapy's efficacy before it can be used at all. Second, we address the implications for the person depicted in the deepfake. We describe how privacy and portrait law apply and argue that the legitimate interests of those receiving therapy should outweigh the interests of the depicted, as long as the therapy is an effective and 'last resort' treatment option, overseen by a therapist and the deepfakes are handled carefully. We suggest specific preventative measures that can be taken to protect the depicted person's privacy. Finally, we call for qualitative research with patients and therapists to explore dependencies and other unintended consequences. In conclusion, while deepfake therapy holds promise, the competing interests and ethicolegal complexities demand careful consideration and further investigation alongside the development and implementation of this technology.

In 2021 and 2022, researchers carried out an implementation trial that considered how the capsule sponge test might be used to screen for Barrett's oesophagus using a mobile clinic in East Anglia. This paper offers insights from 15 months of ethnographic fieldwork studying the trial. It aims to highlight the value of the test in offering reassurance to worried patients, particularly to those with a family history of oesophageal adenocarcinoma. It also considers the variety of aims people held for the capsule sponge test, including the hope that it would address their symptoms of acid reflux, and the conflict that sometimes emerged as a result. The second half of the paper uses fieldwork carried out in virtual support groups for people with Barrett's oesophagus to explore experiences postdiagnosis, which sometimes were defined by fear of future cancers. It describes notable differences between the care offered to people with morphological risk conditions like Barrett's oesophagus and the care given to those with genetic risk conditions, including the provision of genetic counselling. More broadly, the paper highlights a tension between patient-centred and risk-centred medicine that is likely to grow as healthcare services continue to shift towards preventative approaches.

One argument for the permissibility of euthanasia found in the African philosophical tradition suggests that the sole goal of life is to develop one's vital force, which is done by relating harmoniously with one's community. However, this is impossible for people with certain medical conditions. If the goals of life cannot be achieved, then euthanasia is permissible. I challenge this argument by showing that it overlooks the fact that severely ill patients can still be the objects of communal relationships, in addition to a way for caregivers to strengthen their own vital force. I also suggest that usual readings of vital force imply that life itself is to be preserved at all costs and that this acts as a kind of deontological constraint.

According to the expressivist objection, laws that only allow assisted dying for those suffering from certain medical conditions express the judgement that their lives are not worth living. I have recently argued that an autonomy-based approach that legally allows assisted suicide for all who make an autonomous request is a way to avoid the expressivist objection. In response to this, Thomas Donaldson has argued that rather than avoiding the expressivist objection, an autonomy-based approach extends this objection. According to Donaldson, this is because helping a person achieve a goal requires endorsement of that goal. In this reply, I show that Donaldson misunderstands the target of the expressivist objection: it is not aimed at an individual's attitude towards another person's death but rather at a legal regulation. Moreover, helping someone end their life does not necessarily require endorsing this goal-instead, respect for a person's autonomous choice can be another reason for providing assisted suicide. Donaldson also assumes that the autonomy-based approach requires doctors to accept autonomous requests for assisted dying. Yet, this approach merely makes it legal for individuals (not necessarily only doctors) to provide assisted suicide to autonomous persons but does not require anyone to do so.