This paper analyzes the roots of variation in de facto institutions, within a constant de jure institutional setting. We explore the role of rent-seeking episodes in colonial Brazil as determinants of the quality of current local institutions, and argue that this variation reveals a de facto dimension of institutional quality. We show that municipalities with origins tracing back to the sugar-cane colonial cycle -- characterized by a polarized and oligarchic socioeconomic structure -- display today more inequality in the distribution of land. Municipalities with origins tracing back to the gold colonial cycle -- characterized by an over-bureaucratic and heavily intervening presence of the Portuguese state -- display today worse governance practices and less access to justice. The colonial rent-seeking episodes are also correlated with lower provision of public goods and lower income per capita today, and the latter correlation seems to work partly through worse institutional quality at the local level.
{"title":"Rent Seeking and the Unveiling of &Apos;De Facto&Apos; Institutions: Development and Colonial Heritage within Brazil","authors":"Joana Naritomi, R. Soares, J. Assunção","doi":"10.3386/W13545","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W13545","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes the roots of variation in de facto institutions, within a constant de jure institutional setting. We explore the role of rent-seeking episodes in colonial Brazil as determinants of the quality of current local institutions, and argue that this variation reveals a de facto dimension of institutional quality. We show that municipalities with origins tracing back to the sugar-cane colonial cycle -- characterized by a polarized and oligarchic socioeconomic structure -- display today more inequality in the distribution of land. Municipalities with origins tracing back to the gold colonial cycle -- characterized by an over-bureaucratic and heavily intervening presence of the Portuguese state -- display today worse governance practices and less access to justice. The colonial rent-seeking episodes are also correlated with lower provision of public goods and lower income per capita today, and the latter correlation seems to work partly through worse institutional quality at the local level.","PeriodicalId":163698,"journal":{"name":"Institutional & Transition Economics eJournal","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130499702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Each year the Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal publish the Index of Economic Freedom. This major study compiles economic data on more than 150 countries. The compilers divide the data into ten categories, ranging from business freedom to labor freedom. One of the ten categories is fiscal freedom. The variables for fiscal freedom include individual income and corporate income taxation and tax revenues as a percentage of GDP. These three variables are weighted equally. The range for each variable is 0 to 100. Table 1 shows the extent of fiscal freedom for the transition economies that were included in the study. The figures are for the 2007 study. The perfect score is 100. The scoring of fiscal freedom is computed using a quadratic cost function where each component is converted to a 100-point scale, using the following equation: FFij = 100 - 200(Componentij)2 where FFij represents fiscal freedom in country i for component j and Componentij represents the raw percentage value, which is between 0 and 1, in country i for component j. The present study analyzes the scores and compares them between countries and between years for 28 transition countries. A comparison is also made with OECD countries to determine how well or how poorly transition economies are doing in the total scheme of things.
{"title":"Fiscal Freedom in Transition Economies and the OECD: A Comparative Study","authors":"Robert W. McGee","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1019120","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1019120","url":null,"abstract":"Each year the Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal publish the Index of Economic Freedom. This major study compiles economic data on more than 150 countries. The compilers divide the data into ten categories, ranging from business freedom to labor freedom. One of the ten categories is fiscal freedom. The variables for fiscal freedom include individual income and corporate income taxation and tax revenues as a percentage of GDP. These three variables are weighted equally. The range for each variable is 0 to 100. Table 1 shows the extent of fiscal freedom for the transition economies that were included in the study. The figures are for the 2007 study. The perfect score is 100. The scoring of fiscal freedom is computed using a quadratic cost function where each component is converted to a 100-point scale, using the following equation: FFij = 100 - 200(Componentij)2 where FFij represents fiscal freedom in country i for component j and Componentij represents the raw percentage value, which is between 0 and 1, in country i for component j. The present study analyzes the scores and compares them between countries and between years for 28 transition countries. A comparison is also made with OECD countries to determine how well or how poorly transition economies are doing in the total scheme of things.","PeriodicalId":163698,"journal":{"name":"Institutional & Transition Economics eJournal","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125273703","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Financial intermediaries worldwide are seeking mechanisms for participating in micro lending. We consider a simple model where a bank may use informed local capitalists as intermediaries for on-lending. But the availability of multiple credit sources provides borrowers with an incentive to default voluntarily, making the bank's on-lending mechanism a non-starter. We explore whether a coalition of local capitalists, effectively limiting borrower's opportunity for defaulting multiple times, might be sufficient to facilitate on-lending. Instead, we find that a monopoly moneylender with superior enforcement technology can out-compete the local capitalist coalition if the moneylender also enjoys the smallest transactions costs of lending. We how that a credible competitive threat to the monopoly moneylender can only arise if the local capitalist coalition can also be made cost-effective either by direct subsidies or by measures such as standardization, economies of scale and implementation of best practices. We argue that Franchising is one potential mechanism that could deliver both cost-efficiencies as well as ability for local capitalists to form a coalition.
{"title":"Franchising Microfinance","authors":"Amit Bubna, B. Chowdhry","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.890667","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.890667","url":null,"abstract":"Financial intermediaries worldwide are seeking mechanisms for participating in micro lending. We consider a simple model where a bank may use informed local capitalists as intermediaries for on-lending. But the availability of multiple credit sources provides borrowers with an incentive to default voluntarily, making the bank's on-lending mechanism a non-starter. We explore whether a coalition of local capitalists, effectively limiting borrower's opportunity for defaulting multiple times, might be sufficient to facilitate on-lending. Instead, we find that a monopoly moneylender with superior enforcement technology can out-compete the local capitalist coalition if the moneylender also enjoys the smallest transactions costs of lending. We how that a credible competitive threat to the monopoly moneylender can only arise if the local capitalist coalition can also be made cost-effective either by direct subsidies or by measures such as standardization, economies of scale and implementation of best practices. We argue that Franchising is one potential mechanism that could deliver both cost-efficiencies as well as ability for local capitalists to form a coalition.","PeriodicalId":163698,"journal":{"name":"Institutional & Transition Economics eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134287728","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2007-09-26DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0351.2007.00310.x
José De Sousa, Olivier Lamotte
Recent studies have found that political disintegration is a cause of severe and rapid trade disintegration in former Eastern European countries. This finding somewhat conflicts with another strand of the literature highlighting the fact that trade patterns change relatively slowly. This article aims at reconciling the apparent inconsistency between these two results. Using a theoretically grounded gravity equation, we evaluate the intensity of trade between successor states of three former countries (Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia) in the period 1993–2001. We find no clear evidence that political disintegration leads to systematic and severe trade disintegration. This result is consistent with the patterns displayed by using simple descriptive statistics, is robust to sensitivity checks, and supports the idea of hysteresis in trade.
{"title":"Does Political Disintegration Lead to Trade Disintegration? Evidence from Transition Countries","authors":"José De Sousa, Olivier Lamotte","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-0351.2007.00310.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0351.2007.00310.x","url":null,"abstract":"Recent studies have found that political disintegration is a cause of severe and rapid trade disintegration in former Eastern European countries. This finding somewhat conflicts with another strand of the literature highlighting the fact that trade patterns change relatively slowly. This article aims at reconciling the apparent inconsistency between these two results. Using a theoretically grounded gravity equation, we evaluate the intensity of trade between successor states of three former countries (Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia) in the period 1993–2001. We find no clear evidence that political disintegration leads to systematic and severe trade disintegration. This result is consistent with the patterns displayed by using simple descriptive statistics, is robust to sensitivity checks, and supports the idea of hysteresis in trade.","PeriodicalId":163698,"journal":{"name":"Institutional & Transition Economics eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121884083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2007-09-26DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0351.2007.00298.x
Anete Pajuste
This paper studies how the Russian crisis of 1998 affected listed firms in transition economies. The data cover 394 companies that were listed before the Russian crisis, and include financial, industry, ownership and stock market information. Results show that in the short term (within one month of the crisis) good governance did not shelter investors from contagion. On the contrary, stock returns during the crisis period were lower for the largest and most liquid stocks and markets in the region irrespective of their direct exposure to Russia. The paper also documents that in the longer term (one year after the crisis) recovery was faster in firms without direct trade exposure to Russia, as well as in firms with better firm-level governance as proxied by the presence of a foreign blockholder. The paper presents evidence that both firm- and country-level characteristics are important in overcoming the effects of a crisis. Firm-specific characteristics, however, play a bigger role for companies operating in countries with weaker corporate governance.
{"title":"Good Governance Provisions Shelter Investors from Contagion? Evidence from the Russian Crisisdo","authors":"Anete Pajuste","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-0351.2007.00298.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0351.2007.00298.x","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies how the Russian crisis of 1998 affected listed firms in transition economies. The data cover 394 companies that were listed before the Russian crisis, and include financial, industry, ownership and stock market information. Results show that in the short term (within one month of the crisis) good governance did not shelter investors from contagion. On the contrary, stock returns during the crisis period were lower for the largest and most liquid stocks and markets in the region irrespective of their direct exposure to Russia. The paper also documents that in the longer term (one year after the crisis) recovery was faster in firms without direct trade exposure to Russia, as well as in firms with better firm-level governance as proxied by the presence of a foreign blockholder. The paper presents evidence that both firm- and country-level characteristics are important in overcoming the effects of a crisis. Firm-specific characteristics, however, play a bigger role for companies operating in countries with weaker corporate governance.","PeriodicalId":163698,"journal":{"name":"Institutional & Transition Economics eJournal","volume":"76 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130871239","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We consider the likely economic impact and prospects for monetary integration among Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine as part of the Single Economic Space they have agreed to set up. A monetary union among these countries poses three interesting issues for the structure and process of integration: they have already been members of a wider currency union that collapsed, so it is necessary to handle the problems of history; secondly the union would be of very unequal size with the Russian Federation outweighing the others taken together, so we must consider how the national interests would be balanced; lastly natural resources, particularly oil and gas pose problems for dependence and for the determination of the external exchange rate.
{"title":"The CIS - Does the Regional Hegemon Facilitate Monetary Integration?","authors":"D. Mayes, V. Korhonen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1002574","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1002574","url":null,"abstract":"We consider the likely economic impact and prospects for monetary integration among Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine as part of the Single Economic Space they have agreed to set up. A monetary union among these countries poses three interesting issues for the structure and process of integration: they have already been members of a wider currency union that collapsed, so it is necessary to handle the problems of history; secondly the union would be of very unequal size with the Russian Federation outweighing the others taken together, so we must consider how the national interests would be balanced; lastly natural resources, particularly oil and gas pose problems for dependence and for the determination of the external exchange rate.","PeriodicalId":163698,"journal":{"name":"Institutional & Transition Economics eJournal","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122502817","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper documents the large cross-country differences in labor institutions that make them a candidate explanatory factor for the divergent economic performance of countries and reviews what economists have learned about the effects of these institutions on economic outcomes. It identifies three ways in which institutions affect economic performance: by altering incentives, by facilitating efficient bargaining, and by increasing information, communication, and trust. The evidence shows that labor institutions reduce the dispersion of earnings and income inequality, which alters incentives, but finds equivocal effects on other aggregate outcomes, such as employment and unemployment. Given weaknesses in the cross-country data on which most studies focus, the paper argues for increased use of micro-data, simulations, and experiments to illuminate how labor institutions operate and affect outcomes.
{"title":"Labor Market Institutions Around the World","authors":"R. Freeman","doi":"10.3386/W13242","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W13242","url":null,"abstract":"The paper documents the large cross-country differences in labor institutions that make them a candidate explanatory factor for the divergent economic performance of countries and reviews what economists have learned about the effects of these institutions on economic outcomes. It identifies three ways in which institutions affect economic performance: by altering incentives, by facilitating efficient bargaining, and by increasing information, communication, and trust. The evidence shows that labor institutions reduce the dispersion of earnings and income inequality, which alters incentives, but finds equivocal effects on other aggregate outcomes, such as employment and unemployment. Given weaknesses in the cross-country data on which most studies focus, the paper argues for increased use of micro-data, simulations, and experiments to illuminate how labor institutions operate and affect outcomes.","PeriodicalId":163698,"journal":{"name":"Institutional & Transition Economics eJournal","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128337953","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Joanna M. Shepherd, Frederick Tung, Albert H. Yoon
We take the view that corporate governance must involve more than corporate law. Despite corporate scholars' nearly exclusive focus on corporate law mechanisms for controlling managerial agency costs, shareholders are not the only constituency concerned with such costs. Given the thick web of firms' contractual commitments, it should not be a surprise that other financial claimants may also attempt to control agency costs in their contracts with the firm. We hypothesize that this cross-monitoring by other claimants has value for shareholders. We examine bank loans for empirical evidence of the value of cross-monitoring. Our approach builds on prior empirical work on the value of good corporate governance, to which we add data on the presence of bank loans and their interactions with free cash flow, governance indices, and individual corporate governance provisions. To our knowledge, ours is the first study to measure the performance effects of bank debt as a device for reducing managerial agency costs, and the first study on the interaction of ongoing bank monitoring with corporate governance arrangements. We find strong evidence that bank monitoring adds value. In effect, bank monitoring can counteract somewhat the value-decreasing effects of managerial entrenchment. Bank monitoring may substitute for good corporate governance.
{"title":"Cross-Monitoring and Corporate Governance","authors":"Joanna M. Shepherd, Frederick Tung, Albert H. Yoon","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.914229","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.914229","url":null,"abstract":"We take the view that corporate governance must involve more than corporate law. Despite corporate scholars' nearly exclusive focus on corporate law mechanisms for controlling managerial agency costs, shareholders are not the only constituency concerned with such costs. Given the thick web of firms' contractual commitments, it should not be a surprise that other financial claimants may also attempt to control agency costs in their contracts with the firm. We hypothesize that this cross-monitoring by other claimants has value for shareholders. We examine bank loans for empirical evidence of the value of cross-monitoring. Our approach builds on prior empirical work on the value of good corporate governance, to which we add data on the presence of bank loans and their interactions with free cash flow, governance indices, and individual corporate governance provisions. To our knowledge, ours is the first study to measure the performance effects of bank debt as a device for reducing managerial agency costs, and the first study on the interaction of ongoing bank monitoring with corporate governance arrangements. We find strong evidence that bank monitoring adds value. In effect, bank monitoring can counteract somewhat the value-decreasing effects of managerial entrenchment. Bank monitoring may substitute for good corporate governance.","PeriodicalId":163698,"journal":{"name":"Institutional & Transition Economics eJournal","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125638428","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper analyzes German and Spanish fiscal policy using simple policy rules. We choose Germany and Spain, as both are Member States in the European Monetary Union (EMU) and underwent considerable increases in public debt in the early 1990s. We focus on the question, how fiscal policy behaves under rising public debt ratios. It is found that both Germany and Spain generally exhibit a positive relationship between government revenues and debt. Using Markov-switching techniques, we show that both countries underwent a change in policy behavior in the light of rising debt/output ratios at the end of the 1990s. Interestingly, this change in policy behavior differs in its characteristics across the two countries and seems to be non-permanent in the case of Germany.
{"title":"Fiscal Policy Rules in Practice","authors":"Andreas Thams","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.977971","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.977971","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes German and Spanish fiscal policy using simple policy rules. We choose Germany and Spain, as both are Member States in the European Monetary Union (EMU) and underwent considerable increases in public debt in the early 1990s. We focus on the question, how fiscal policy behaves under rising public debt ratios. It is found that both Germany and Spain generally exhibit a positive relationship between government revenues and debt. Using Markov-switching techniques, we show that both countries underwent a change in policy behavior in the light of rising debt/output ratios at the end of the 1990s. Interestingly, this change in policy behavior differs in its characteristics across the two countries and seems to be non-permanent in the case of Germany.","PeriodicalId":163698,"journal":{"name":"Institutional & Transition Economics eJournal","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124016108","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper presents a model of campaign contributions where a special interest group can condition its contributions not only on the receiving candidate's support but also on that of her opponent. This allows the interest group to obtain support both from contributions as well as from the implicit threat of contributing to the opponent. These out-of-equilibrium contributions can help explain the "missing money" puzzle in the empirical literature. Our framework contradicts standard models in predicting that interest groups do not give to both sides of a same race. It also predicts that stronger candidates get more money from special interest groups primarily because more contributors give to lop-sided winners, not because more money is given per contribution. Both of these predictions are strongly supported in FEC data for U.S. House Elections from 1984-2004. Our theory also predicts that special interest groups will mainly target lop-sided winners whereas general (partisan) interest groups will contribute mainly to candidates in close races. This is also verified empirically. Finally, our framework implies that stricter campaign finance rules will always lower special interest influence but may lead to an increase in equilibrium contributions, making the latter a poor measure of effectiveness.
{"title":"The Iceberg Theory of Campaign Contributions: Political Threats and Interest Group Behavior","authors":"E. Kaplan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.978508","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.978508","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents a model of campaign contributions where a special interest group can condition its contributions not only on the receiving candidate's support but also on that of her opponent. This allows the interest group to obtain support both from contributions as well as from the implicit threat of contributing to the opponent. These out-of-equilibrium contributions can help explain the \"missing money\" puzzle in the empirical literature. Our framework contradicts standard models in predicting that interest groups do not give to both sides of a same race. It also predicts that stronger candidates get more money from special interest groups primarily because more contributors give to lop-sided winners, not because more money is given per contribution. Both of these predictions are strongly supported in FEC data for U.S. House Elections from 1984-2004. Our theory also predicts that special interest groups will mainly target lop-sided winners whereas general (partisan) interest groups will contribute mainly to candidates in close races. This is also verified empirically. Finally, our framework implies that stricter campaign finance rules will always lower special interest influence but may lead to an increase in equilibrium contributions, making the latter a poor measure of effectiveness.","PeriodicalId":163698,"journal":{"name":"Institutional & Transition Economics eJournal","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125370108","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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