Pub Date : 2012-05-31DOI: 10.4324/9780203116050-11
Ross P. Buckley
This paper outlines the contemporary challenges for International Monetary Fund (IMF) reform. The chapter argues that market principles and disciplines have been abrogated systematically by IMF policy makers whenever the unimpeded operation of markets has failed to deliver profits to the international banks and the elites in the developing countries. In this sense, the IMF should be understood as behaving most consistently not in its commitment to the allocative efficiency of markets, but rather in its commitment to furthering the interests of key groups of economic and political elites. One of the principal challenges in reforming the IMF and the World Bank is therefore to embed, not to re-embed, important market principles and practices; specifically, to let the market allocate losses among borrowers and lenders when loans go sour – a market discipline that has been notably absent from our system of global financial governance for several decades at least. The paper proposes a number of reforms of the IMF which would increase its legitimacy and representativeness.
{"title":"Reforming International Financial Governance","authors":"Ross P. Buckley","doi":"10.4324/9780203116050-11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203116050-11","url":null,"abstract":"This paper outlines the contemporary challenges for International Monetary Fund (IMF) reform. The chapter argues that market principles and disciplines have been abrogated systematically by IMF policy makers whenever the unimpeded operation of markets has failed to deliver profits to the international banks and the elites in the developing countries. In this sense, the IMF should be understood as behaving most consistently not in its commitment to the allocative efficiency of markets, but rather in its commitment to furthering the interests of key groups of economic and political elites. One of the principal challenges in reforming the IMF and the World Bank is therefore to embed, not to re-embed, important market principles and practices; specifically, to let the market allocate losses among borrowers and lenders when loans go sour – a market discipline that has been notably absent from our system of global financial governance for several decades at least. The paper proposes a number of reforms of the IMF which would increase its legitimacy and representativeness.","PeriodicalId":165404,"journal":{"name":"International Institutions: Politics of International Institutions & Global Governance eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129987105","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The main strength of today’s international monetary system – its flexibility and adaptability to the different needs of its users – can also become its weakness, as it may contribute to unsustainable growth models and imbalances. The global financial crisis has shown that the system cannot afford a benign neglect of the global public good of external stability, and that multilateral institutions and fora such as the IMF and the G20 need to take the initiative to set incentives for systemically important economies to address real and financial imbalances which impair stability. We draw this core conclusion from a systematic review of the literature on the current international monetary system, in particular its functioning and vulnerabilities prior to the global financial crisis. Drawing from this analysis, we assess the existing and potential avenues, driven partly by policy initiatives and partly by market forces, through which the system may be improved. JEL Classification: C21, C51, G15, G21, G28
{"title":"The International Monetary System After the Financial Crisis","authors":"Ettore Dorrucci, J. McKay","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1646277","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1646277","url":null,"abstract":"The main strength of today’s international monetary system – its flexibility and adaptability to the different needs of its users – can also become its weakness, as it may contribute to unsustainable growth models and imbalances. The global financial crisis has shown that the system cannot afford a benign neglect of the global public good of external stability, and that multilateral institutions and fora such as the IMF and the G20 need to take the initiative to set incentives for systemically important economies to address real and financial imbalances which impair stability. We draw this core conclusion from a systematic review of the literature on the current international monetary system, in particular its functioning and vulnerabilities prior to the global financial crisis. Drawing from this analysis, we assess the existing and potential avenues, driven partly by policy initiatives and partly by market forces, through which the system may be improved. JEL Classification: C21, C51, G15, G21, G28","PeriodicalId":165404,"journal":{"name":"International Institutions: Politics of International Institutions & Global Governance eJournal","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125041572","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Media accounts of presidential appointments have often characterized the ambassadorial appointments process as overtaken by patronage concerns, with the most attractive posts set aside for those responsible for the president’s election, few of whom have diplomatic experience. Here, using original data on all ambassadors, envoys, and other chiefs of mission appointed during the 68th through 112th Congresses, I leverage the credentialing process of the Foreign Service to conduct an empirical test of the determinants of professional versus nonprofessional appointments. I find that Foreign Service appointments are more likely when there exists significant ideological distance between the appointing president and the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, when the difficulty of the posting is high, and when the attractiveness of the posting is low.
{"title":"The Political Determinants of Ambassadorial Appointments","authors":"Gary E. Hollibaugh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2405141","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2405141","url":null,"abstract":"Media accounts of presidential appointments have often characterized the ambassadorial appointments process as overtaken by patronage concerns, with the most attractive posts set aside for those responsible for the president’s election, few of whom have diplomatic experience. Here, using original data on all ambassadors, envoys, and other chiefs of mission appointed during the 68th through 112th Congresses, I leverage the credentialing process of the Foreign Service to conduct an empirical test of the determinants of professional versus nonprofessional appointments. I find that Foreign Service appointments are more likely when there exists significant ideological distance between the appointing president and the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, when the difficulty of the posting is high, and when the attractiveness of the posting is low.","PeriodicalId":165404,"journal":{"name":"International Institutions: Politics of International Institutions & Global Governance eJournal","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132431294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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