Pub Date : 2019-10-07DOI: 10.1163/18757413_022001006
C. M. Weber
Groundwater is one of the world’s most important water resources. Although it is highly susceptible for pollution and overexploitation, its extraction rate is predicted to increase over the next decades. Against this background, this article discusses the contribution of the UN International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers to the protection of this precious resource. It first provides some information on the characteristics of groundwater and aquifers, then describes briefly the existing international legal regimes addressing transboundary groundwater and the evolution of the Draft Articles, and finally analyses the main criticisms and positive aspects of the Draft Articles.
{"title":"Protection and Use of Transboundary Groundwater Resources under Public International Law—An Analysis of the UN International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers","authors":"C. M. Weber","doi":"10.1163/18757413_022001006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18757413_022001006","url":null,"abstract":"Groundwater is one of the world’s most important water resources. Although it is highly susceptible for pollution and overexploitation, its extraction rate is predicted to increase over the next decades. Against this background, this article discusses the contribution of the UN International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers to the protection of this precious resource. It first provides some information on the characteristics of groundwater and aquifers, then describes briefly the existing international legal regimes addressing transboundary groundwater and the evolution of the Draft Articles, and finally analyses the main criticisms and positive aspects of the Draft Articles.","PeriodicalId":167092,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law Online","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134335604","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-07DOI: 10.1163/18757413_022001017
Yateesh Begoore
{"title":"Andrea Bianchi, Daniel Peat and Matthew Windsor (eds), Interpretation in International Law (OUP 2015), 432 pages, ISBN 9780198725749","authors":"Yateesh Begoore","doi":"10.1163/18757413_022001017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18757413_022001017","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":167092,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law Online","volume":"74 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125490191","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-07DOI: 10.1163/18757413_022001016
A. Witte
The paper examines the system for the regulation and governance of time, both with respect to the time of day (i.e., clock readings), and calendar dates. Sub-topics of the two areas include the definition of Universal Time Coordinated (UTC), time zones, daylight saving time, and the International Date Line (IDL). The analysis begins, for both areas, by briefly sketching out the scientific background—without which the subsequent legal and institutional discussion would not be meaningful—and the historical development. It then goes on to describe the present-day mechanism for the regulation of both areas. This examination will reveal noteworthy differences: whereas the regulation of clock readings is based on a complex interplay between national statutes and government laboratories, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations, hardly any formal legal or institutional framework is in place for the regulation of calendars. An explanation for this discrepancy is suggested. The paper then proceeds to address questions of interpretation where international legal instruments make reference to time without specifying the relevant time reckoning system; a solution is proposed which builds on 19th-century domestic litigation, adapted to the context of public international law. A final paragraph draws more general conclusions and undertakes a brief outlook into the future.
{"title":"The International Regulation and Governance of Time","authors":"A. Witte","doi":"10.1163/18757413_022001016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18757413_022001016","url":null,"abstract":"The paper examines the system for the regulation and governance of time, both with respect to the time of day (i.e., clock readings), and calendar dates. Sub-topics of the two areas include the definition of Universal Time Coordinated (UTC), time zones, daylight saving time, and the International Date Line (IDL). The analysis begins, for both areas, by briefly sketching out the scientific background—without which the subsequent legal and institutional discussion would not be meaningful—and the historical development. It then goes on to describe the present-day mechanism for the regulation of both areas. This examination will reveal noteworthy differences: whereas the regulation of clock readings is based on a complex interplay between national statutes and government laboratories, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations, hardly any formal legal or institutional framework is in place for the regulation of calendars. An explanation for this discrepancy is suggested. The paper then proceeds to address questions of interpretation where international legal instruments make reference to time without specifying the relevant time reckoning system; a solution is proposed which builds on 19th-century domestic litigation, adapted to the context of public international law. A final paragraph draws more general conclusions and undertakes a brief outlook into the future.","PeriodicalId":167092,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law Online","volume":"119 8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131275578","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-07DOI: 10.1163/18757413_022001003
M. Wood
The topic Immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction has been on the programme of work of the International Law Commission since 2007. After ten reports from two Special Rapporteurs, by June 2019 it has yet to complete a first reading, not least because the topic has proved highly contentious both within the Commission and among States. The Commission could only adopt a central provision (on exceptions to immunity ratione materiae), exceptionally, having recourse to voting. There are several lessons to be learnt from the handling of the topic over the last twelve years, including for such crucial aspects of the Commission’s working methods as the choice of topics; the need for a clear view of the Commission’s aim in taking up a topic; the need for rigour in assessing the current state of international law; the importance of dialogue, within the Commission and between the Commission and States; and the utility or otherwise of voting.
{"title":"Lessons from the ILC’s Work on ‘Immunity of State Officials’: Melland Schill Lecture, 21 November 2017","authors":"M. Wood","doi":"10.1163/18757413_022001003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18757413_022001003","url":null,"abstract":"The topic Immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction has been on the programme of work of the International Law Commission since 2007. After ten reports from two Special Rapporteurs, by June 2019 it has yet to complete a first reading, not least because the topic has proved highly contentious both within the Commission and among States. The Commission could only adopt a central provision (on exceptions to immunity ratione materiae), exceptionally, having recourse to voting. There are several lessons to be learnt from the handling of the topic over the last twelve years, including for such crucial aspects of the Commission’s working methods as the choice of topics; the need for a clear view of the Commission’s aim in taking up a topic; the need for rigour in assessing the current state of international law; the importance of dialogue, within the Commission and between the Commission and States; and the utility or otherwise of voting.","PeriodicalId":167092,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law Online","volume":"51 12","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114039961","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-07DOI: 10.1163/18757413_022001013
María Carmelina LONDOÑO-LÁZARO, Nicolás Carrillo-Santarelli
The control of conventionality is a doctrine, developed by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in its case law, according to which State agents are required to strive to make sure that domestic norms and practices are consistent with what Inter-American and other human rights law standards require. The doctrine as it has been developed posits that not only judges, but also any other State authorities must take these standards into account. The Court has made clear that its own pronouncements are to be considered too, not only in contentious cases but also in advisory opinions. Some argue that the Court has gone too far; others contend that the doctrine simply reaffirms the States’ obligation to adjust domestic practices and norms to international obligations and make internationally recognized human rights effective. Moreover, as long as a multi-level dialogue is permitted and some risks of fragmentation or unreasonable impositions are avoided, the doctrine may help to achieve the objectives of preventing both the congestion of the regional system and repetitive violations, and the legitimacy of the Court may be further strengthened if it admits some latitude in State decisions. Finally, the doctrine requires State authorities to consider extra-American developments, UN developments included; and can help actors from other human rights systems identify developments and principles positively applied throughout the Americas, which may serve as examples.
{"title":"The Control of Conventionality: Developments in the Case Law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and Its Potential Expanding Effects in International Human Rights Law","authors":"María Carmelina LONDOÑO-LÁZARO, Nicolás Carrillo-Santarelli","doi":"10.1163/18757413_022001013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18757413_022001013","url":null,"abstract":"The control of conventionality is a doctrine, developed by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in its case law, according to which State agents are required to strive to make sure that domestic norms and practices are consistent with what Inter-American and other human rights law standards require. The doctrine as it has been developed posits that not only judges, but also any other State authorities must take these standards into account. The Court has made clear that its own pronouncements are to be considered too, not only in contentious cases but also in advisory opinions. Some argue that the Court has gone too far; others contend that the doctrine simply reaffirms the States’ obligation to adjust domestic practices and norms to international obligations and make internationally recognized human rights effective. Moreover, as long as a multi-level dialogue is permitted and some risks of fragmentation or unreasonable impositions are avoided, the doctrine may help to achieve the objectives of preventing both the congestion of the regional system and repetitive violations, and the legitimacy of the Court may be further strengthened if it admits some latitude in State decisions. Finally, the doctrine requires State authorities to consider extra-American developments, UN developments included; and can help actors from other human rights systems identify developments and principles positively applied throughout the Americas, which may serve as examples.","PeriodicalId":167092,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law Online","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131740202","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-07DOI: 10.1163/18757413_022001007
E. Ivanova
Cross-fertilization of international law entails interaction of norms in international law and can occur in the context of interaction between different sources of law; different branches of international law or different subject-matter areas; and interaction between a treaty norm belonging to a one area of international law and a customary norm arising from another area of international law. There are different avenues for cross-fertilization of international law: it can result from the application of Art. 31 (3) (c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)1 in the process of interpreting a particular treaty, from the application of other rules of international law together with a particular treaty or from reference to the jurisprudence of other international courts or tribunals by adhering to the approach adopted in this jurisprudence. This article examines the question of cross-fertilization of international law in the context of the jurisprudence of the courts and tribunals operating within the dispute settlement system established under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter ‘UNCLOS’ or ‘Convention’).2 It will demonstrate how these adjudicatory bodies have employed Art. 31 (3) (c) VCLT, Art. 293 UNCLOS which explicitly enables them to apply other rules of international law not incompatible with the Convention, and the international jurisprudence in order to interpret and apply the UNCLOS while situating it the broader context of international law. Note will be taken of UNCLOS provisions incorporating or referring to other rules of international law which also contribute to the cross-fertilization of international law.
{"title":"The Cross-Fertilization of UNCLOS, Custom and Principles Relating to Procedure in the Jurisprudence of UNCLOS Courts and Tribunals","authors":"E. Ivanova","doi":"10.1163/18757413_022001007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18757413_022001007","url":null,"abstract":"Cross-fertilization of international law entails interaction of norms in international law and can occur in the context of interaction between different sources of law; different branches of international law or different subject-matter areas; and interaction between a treaty norm belonging to a one area of international law and a customary norm arising from another area of international law. There are different avenues for cross-fertilization of international law: it can result from the application of Art. 31 (3) (c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)1 in the process of interpreting a particular treaty, from the application of other rules of international law together with a particular treaty or from reference to the jurisprudence of other international courts or tribunals by adhering to the approach adopted in this jurisprudence.\u0000This article examines the question of cross-fertilization of international law in the context of the jurisprudence of the courts and tribunals operating within the dispute settlement system established under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter ‘UNCLOS’ or ‘Convention’).2 It will demonstrate how these adjudicatory bodies have employed Art. 31 (3) (c) VCLT, Art. 293 UNCLOS which explicitly enables them to apply other rules of international law not incompatible with the Convention, and the international jurisprudence in order to interpret and apply the UNCLOS while situating it the broader context of international law. Note will be taken of UNCLOS provisions incorporating or referring to other rules of international law which also contribute to the cross-fertilization of international law.","PeriodicalId":167092,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law Online","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114836295","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-07DOI: 10.1163/18757413_022001010
Gautam Bhatia
The Indian Supreme Court’s judgment in Navtej Singh Johar, delivered in September 2018, decriminalizing same-sex relations in India, generated a storm of discussion and debate, in both India and in the world beyond. Apart from its clear and sharp verdict that held that the Indian Constitution protected the rights of the LGBTQ+ community, the decision was also noteworthy because it reversed the Court’s own prior judgment, delivered a mere five years before (in 2013), that had upheld the constitutional validity of the law that penalized same-sex relations. In this case comment, we set out the chronology of judicial decisions that led to the final judgment in Navtej Singh Johar: the judgment of the High Court of Delhi in 2009, which first decriminalized same-sex relations, the 2013 judgment of the Indian Supreme Court that reversed it, and the various judicial proceedings that continued to rumble on in the Court—an additional round known as the ‘curative hearing’, and separate litigation on the constitutional status of the right to privacy. Within this context, the paper then discusses the multiple opinions that were delivered by the Bench in Navtej Singh Johar, and examines the reasons on the basis of which the Court held that Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code—insofar as it criminalized same-sex relations between consenting adults—violated the fundamental rights to equality, nondiscrimination, freedom of expression, and life and personal liberty, guaranteed by the Constitution of India. The article will conclude by setting out some possibilities for the way forward, in light of the judgment.
{"title":"Case Comment: Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India: The Indian Supreme Court’s Decriminalization of Same-Sex Relations","authors":"Gautam Bhatia","doi":"10.1163/18757413_022001010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18757413_022001010","url":null,"abstract":"The Indian Supreme Court’s judgment in Navtej Singh Johar, delivered in September 2018, decriminalizing same-sex relations in India, generated a storm of discussion and debate, in both India and in the world beyond. Apart from its clear and sharp verdict that held that the Indian Constitution protected the rights of the LGBTQ+ community, the decision was also noteworthy because it reversed the Court’s own prior judgment, delivered a mere five years before (in 2013), that had upheld the constitutional validity of the law that penalized same-sex relations.\u0000In this case comment, we set out the chronology of judicial decisions that led to the final judgment in Navtej Singh Johar: the judgment of the High Court of Delhi in 2009, which first decriminalized same-sex relations, the 2013 judgment of the Indian Supreme Court that reversed it, and the various judicial proceedings that continued to rumble on in the Court—an additional round known as the ‘curative hearing’, and separate litigation on the constitutional status of the right to privacy. Within this context, the paper then discusses the multiple opinions that were delivered by the Bench in Navtej Singh Johar, and examines the reasons on the basis of which the Court held that Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code—insofar as it criminalized same-sex relations between consenting adults—violated the fundamental rights to equality, nondiscrimination, freedom of expression, and life and personal liberty, guaranteed by the Constitution of India. The article will conclude by setting out some possibilities for the way forward, in light of the judgment.","PeriodicalId":167092,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law Online","volume":"347 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133245802","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-07DOI: 10.1163/18757413_022001011
William E. Conklin
This article examines the place of Nomadic peoples in an international constitutionalism. The article claims that an important element of a Nomadic culture is its sense of law. Such a sense of law differs from a constitutionalism which has privileged fundamental principles aimed to constrain acts of the executive arm of the State. Such a constitutionalism is shared by many contemporary domestic legal orders. Public international law also takes such a constitutionalism for granted. In the focus upon rules to constrain the executive arm of the State, the sense of law in Nomadic communities has slipped through arguments which the jurist might consider inclusive of the protection of such communities. This problem is nested in a legacy which has weighted down the history of European legal thought. The article initially identifies three forms of nomadism. The social phenomenon of nomadism has been the object of juristic commentary since the Greeks and Romans. The image of Nomadic peoples in such a legacy has imagined Nomadic peoples as lawless although the article argues that a sense of law has existed in such communities. Such a sense of law contradicts a State-centric international legal order. Public international law has reserved a special legal space relating to Nomadic peoples. The article identifies four arguments which might be rendered to protect Nomadic peoples in such a State-centric international community. Problems are raised with each such argument
{"title":"The Nomadic Sense of Law in an International Constitutionalism","authors":"William E. Conklin","doi":"10.1163/18757413_022001011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18757413_022001011","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the place of Nomadic peoples in an international constitutionalism. The article claims that an important element of a Nomadic culture is its sense of law. Such a sense of law differs from a constitutionalism which has privileged fundamental principles aimed to constrain acts of the executive arm of the State. Such a constitutionalism is shared by many contemporary domestic legal orders. Public international law also takes such a constitutionalism for granted. In the focus upon rules to constrain the executive arm of the State, the sense of law in Nomadic communities has slipped through arguments which the jurist might consider inclusive of the protection of such communities. This problem is nested in a legacy which has weighted down the history of European legal thought.\u0000The article initially identifies three forms of nomadism. The social phenomenon of nomadism has been the object of juristic commentary since the Greeks and Romans. The image of Nomadic peoples in such a legacy has imagined Nomadic peoples as lawless although the article argues that a sense of law has existed in such communities. Such a sense of law contradicts a State-centric international legal order. Public international law has reserved a special legal space relating to Nomadic peoples. The article identifies four arguments which might be rendered to protect Nomadic peoples in such a State-centric international community. Problems are raised with each such argument","PeriodicalId":167092,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law Online","volume":"454 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116062064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-07DOI: 10.1163/18757413_022001014
G. Simm
Military assets, which include personnel, make an important contribution to disaster relief. However, military deployments can be politically sensitive, and the relevant international law is contested and not binding. This article compares two sets of UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) Guidelines on this issue. The 2007 Oslo Guidelines1 state that military assets should be used in disaster relief only as a last resort, while the 2014 Asia-Pacific Regional Guidelines2 acknowledge that military assets are often the first to respond to disasters in the region. Drawing on examples primarily from Asia, this article explores the apparent conflict between these two UN Guidelines and asks two questions about the deployment of foreign military assets in disaster relief. First, to what extent does international law authorize or limit the deployment of foreign military assets in disaster relief? Second, what are the politics of deploying military assets in disaster relief? This article argues that, rather than representing a global standard, the Oslo Guidelines better reflect European practice within Europe, while the Asia-Pacific Regional Guidelines are more representative of practice worldwide. It concludes that the type of military aid provided is key to its compliance with international law and its political acceptance.
{"title":"Disaster Militarism? Military Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief","authors":"G. Simm","doi":"10.1163/18757413_022001014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18757413_022001014","url":null,"abstract":"Military assets, which include personnel, make an important contribution to disaster relief. However, military deployments can be politically sensitive, and the relevant international law is contested and not binding. This article compares two sets of UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) Guidelines on this issue. The 2007 Oslo Guidelines1 state that military assets should be used in disaster relief only as a last resort, while the 2014 Asia-Pacific Regional Guidelines2 acknowledge that military assets are often the first to respond to disasters in the region. Drawing on examples primarily from Asia, this article explores the apparent conflict between these two UN Guidelines and asks two questions about the deployment of foreign military assets in disaster relief. First, to what extent does international law authorize or limit the deployment of foreign military assets in disaster relief? Second, what are the politics of deploying military assets in disaster relief? This article argues that, rather than representing a global standard, the Oslo Guidelines better reflect European practice within Europe, while the Asia-Pacific Regional Guidelines are more representative of practice worldwide. It concludes that the type of military aid provided is key to its compliance with international law and its political acceptance.","PeriodicalId":167092,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law Online","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128649919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-07DOI: 10.1163/18757413_022001004
Mohit Khubchandani
In June 2017, US President Donald Trump announced that the US ‘will withdraw from the Paris Accord’. This paper argues that the US is still a party to the Paris Agreement and that its current domestic policies, such as revocation of the Clean Power Plan and lifting the Coal Moratorium, constitute an internationally wrongful act.
{"title":"The United States and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change","authors":"Mohit Khubchandani","doi":"10.1163/18757413_022001004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18757413_022001004","url":null,"abstract":"In June 2017, US President Donald Trump announced that the US ‘will withdraw from the Paris Accord’. This paper argues that the US is still a party to the Paris Agreement and that its current domestic policies, such as revocation of the Clean Power Plan and lifting the Coal Moratorium, constitute an internationally wrongful act.","PeriodicalId":167092,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law Online","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124513557","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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