Like Markowitsch and Staniloiu (this issue), Otgaar et al. do not directly deal with issues associated with the concept of recovered memories. Their paper consists of a critical review of neuroimaging studies on dissociative amnesia, or memory repression. A finding of positive correlations between symptoms of dissociative amnesia and specific electrophysiological processes in the brain might have suggested a biological substrate for repression, which is a key concept in debate regarding the validity of recovered memories.
However, analysis of the data reviewed by the authors shows that the correlations between the functions of given brain areas and dissociative amnesia are both, weak and inconsistent. Furthermore, they are conceivable in terms of malingering, intentional suppression, metamemory beliefs, organic amnesia, and the like—without invoking the concept of repression. Many studies also suffer from methodological shortcomings, including misdiagnosis of dissociative amnesia. The authors therefore conclude that ‘conceptual and methodological issues strongly limit the interpretation of neuroscientific investigations of dissociative amnesia and repressed memory… [they] tell us little about whether traumatic memories can be unconsciously blocked… [and therefore] none of the proposed biomarkers are sufficiently reliable for diagnosis in clinics or legal arenas’. Consequently, they suggest that the term ‘dissociative amnesia’ be replaced by ‘amnesia of uncertain etiology’.
Since biological correlates of dissociative amnesia are discussed in two papers, the present one and the one written by Markowitsch and Staniloiu, it seems desirable to compare the two. Clearly, they lead to opposite views concerning the validity of the concept of repression. Since the two reviews are based on differential data bases, they do not factually contradict each other. Nonetheless, the implications of their reviews are contradictory in the sense that according to Markowitsch and Staniloiu the psychological concepts of repression and recovery of traumatic memories have a solid biological underpinning, whereas according to Otgaar et al. no biological foundation for these concepts has been found. Thus, Markowitsch and Staniloiu, but not Otgaar et al., consider repression biologically feasible.
Taken together, it is quite possible, of course, that some biological processes (such as those reviewed by the former) are correlated with specific behavioural manifestations, while others (such as those reviewed by the latter) are not. However, this concluding remark sounds more like a mediation between the two groups of reviewers, rather than between those arguing for or against the ‘recovered memory hypothesis’.
The British False Memory Society (BFMS) is a registered charity founded in 1993 following an epidemic of false-memory type allegations by adult accusers who claimed to have remembered childhood sexual abuse for which they previously had no cognitive recollection. Many of these accusers had entered counselling after typically suffering from anxiety, depression, and relationship problems. Many came out of therapy with what appeared to be false memories, and the accused sometimes contacted the BFMS for advice. Since its inception, the BFMS has kept a record of all calls to its telephone helpline.
In this article, we document several caseload details by year from 1993 onwards.
In the peak year of 1994, 268 cases were taken up by the BFMS. During recent years in the last 10 years the number of cases taken on by the BFMS oscillated around about 40 each year. The 2010s had just 3% of the total cases leading to a guilty verdict (1990s = 8%; 2000s = 17%). We found the 2000 decade to be the most likely for those accused to be imprisoned, and the most recent years the least.
We conclude that although the numbers have lessened since the 1994 peak, there are still today a number of individuals being affected by allegations stemming from recovered memories.
The two comments on my paper highlight the need to clarify the concept of “alternative truths” which might be misconceived by some readers. As it is readily noticeable, the concepts of legal and therapeutic “truths” are written within quotation marks, thus indicating that they are seemingly, but not actually, true. The only unequivocal truth is, of course, the factual truth (without quotation marks) that refers to whatever actually took place. I used the term “truth,” rather than, say, narrative, in order to indicate that for legal and therapeutic purposes a given narrative may be treated as if it is the truth.
For example, the judges may or may not have a hunch as to what the factual truth in a given case is. Yet, they must abide by the rules of evidence, and issue a verdict based on the “legal truth” (in quotation marks) which may or may not correspond to the factual truth.
Similarly, the term “therapeutic truth” means that for psychotherapy to succeed, the therapist should relate to the client's version of the past traumatic events as veridical (“truth”) in her eyes.
That means that there is only one truthful narrative of the event under consideration. All other narratives are conveniently considered “truths” in specific contexts for particular purposes. This reasoning excludes cases where the factual truth cannot be definitely determined, and the people involved provide differential reports of the controversial course of events. In these cases, the “truth” is “in the eye of the beholder,” and consequently it might be either partial or multiple. This is clearly not the case in recovered memories where whenever there is no corroborative evidence, the factual truth cannot be determined, and one is left with the plaintiff's narrative, which is her “truth” (and should be treated by the therapist as such), and the court's verdict, the “legal truth,” as based on the evidence provided by the prosecution. In short, while there is only a single truth, there may be multiple alternative “truths.” In my paper I call for increased awareness among the judges of the problematic nature of the alternative “truths,” in order to enhance the correspondence between the “legal truth” and the factual truth, which can be solely achieved by corroborating evidence.
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