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Competition Policy and Corporate Labor Investment Efficiency: Evidence From China 竞争政策与企业劳动投资效率:来自中国的证据
IF 2.7 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-05-08 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4553
Ming Chen, Linghao Yan

Competition policy plays an important role in maintaining market competition. However, its effectiveness is not yet well understood, particularly in developing countries. China's Fair Competition Review System (FCRS) shifts the focus from correcting monopolies after the fact to preventing anti-competitive policies in advance. This approach effectively lowers administrative monopolies, thus reducing inefficient labor investments. We investigate how competition policy affects firm efficiency in developing countries, where administrative monopolies are widespread. Because labor investment efficiency is highly sensitive to regional administrative monopolies, we use it as our central outcome. Leveraging the FCRS as a quasi-natural experiment, we show that competition policy significantly improves firms' labor investment efficiency in regions with higher levels of administrative monopoly. Further analysis indicates that competition policy enhances firm efficiency by increasing market competition and reducing firms' environmental uncertainty. The effects are especially strong in state-owned enterprises. Overall, our findings underscore that managing administrative monopolies is crucial for improving labor investment efficiency.

竞争政策在维护市场竞争中起着重要的作用。然而,其有效性尚未得到充分了解,特别是在发展中国家。中国的公平竞争审查制度(FCRS)将重点从事后纠正垄断转向预先预防反竞争政策。这种方法有效地降低了行政垄断,从而减少了低效的劳动力投资。我们研究了在行政垄断普遍存在的发展中国家,竞争政策如何影响企业效率。由于劳动投资效率对区域行政垄断高度敏感,我们将其作为中心结果。利用FCRS作为准自然实验,我们发现在行政垄断程度较高的地区,竞争政策显著提高了企业的劳动投资效率。进一步分析表明,竞争政策通过增加市场竞争和降低企业环境不确定性来提高企业效率。这种影响在国有企业中尤为明显。总体而言,我们的研究结果强调,管理行政垄断对提高劳动投资效率至关重要。
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引用次数: 0
Embracing Low-Carbon Consumption With Gamification: Exploring Multiple Dimensional Interventions With a Multiagent Modeling Approach 用游戏化拥抱低碳消费:用多智能体建模方法探索多维干预
IF 2.7 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-05-07 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4554
Jingtao Yin, Helen S. Du, Xinyi Li, Pei Liang

Gamification designs and strategies to induce users' low-carbon consumption decisions (LCCDs) are attracting attention from academia and industry. Research suggests that individual decisions are often subject to joint interventions. Exploring effective intervention strategies requires constructing a systematic model with multiple dimensions and theoretical support. Drawing on goal-framing theory and social impact theory, this study develops a multiagent model in the context of gamification, examining the intervention effects of individual preferences, gamified-incentives, and social interactions on users' LCCDs. The findings contribute to achieving a low-carbon society and provide a theoretical foundation and practical guides for developing gamified platform strategies.

诱导用户做出低碳消费决策的游戏化设计和策略正受到学术界和工业界的关注。研究表明,个人决定往往受到联合干预的影响。探索有效的干预策略需要构建一个多维度的系统模型和理论支持。利用目标框架理论和社会影响理论,本研究建立了一个游戏化背景下的多智能体模型,考察了个人偏好、游戏化激励和社会互动对用户LCCDs的干预作用。研究结果有助于实现低碳社会,并为制定游戏化平台战略提供理论基础和实践指导。
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引用次数: 0
Can Bank Regulatory Technology (RegTech) Boost Corporate Investment Efficiency? Evidence From Matched Bank–Firm Loan Data 银行监管科技(RegTech)能提高企业投资效率吗?来自匹配的银行-公司贷款数据的证据
IF 2.7 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-05-07 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4552
Yawen Li, Yufei Xia, Huiyi Shi, Na Li, Zhengxu Shi

Banks are dedicated to serving the real economy. In recent years, regulatory technology (RegTech) has served as a prime focus in the banking sector and may further spillover to external parties. This paper aims to investigate whether bank RegTech enhances corporate investment efficiency (CIE) through its influence on lending activities. Using novel matched bank–firm loan data from 2013 to 2023, we empirically demonstrate that bank RegTech improves CIE. A 1% rise in the standard deviation of bank RegTech corresponds to a maximum of approximately 18.13% improvement in average CIE. Specifically, bank RegTech enhances CIE by mitigating financing constraints, strengthening governance capabilities, and reducing operational risks. The beneficial effects of bank RegTech on CIE are further amplified by information transparency and media coverage, while industry competition weakens this effect. The impact of bank RegTech on CIE exhibits heterogeneous characteristics, varying with different dimensions of bank RegTech and firm-level characteristics. Our results still hold after alleviating endogeneity concerns and performing robustness checks. Furthermore, we find that improvements in CIE enhance firm performance, stimulate innovation, and promote job creation.

银行致力于为实体经济服务。近年来,监管技术(RegTech)已成为银行业的主要焦点,并可能进一步溢出到外部各方。本文旨在探讨银行监管技术是否通过其对贷款活动的影响来提高企业投资效率(CIE)。使用2013年至2023年的新型匹配银行-公司贷款数据,我们实证证明银行监管技术改善了CIE。银行监管技术的标准偏差上升1%,相当于平均CIE的最大改善约为18.13%。具体而言,银行监管技术通过缓解融资约束、加强治理能力和降低操作风险来增强CIE。信息透明和媒体报道进一步放大了银行监管技术对CIE的有利影响,而行业竞争则削弱了这种影响。银行监管科技对CIE的影响呈现异质性特征,随银行监管科技维度和企业层面特征的不同而变化。我们的结果在缓解内生性问题和执行鲁棒性检查后仍然成立。此外,我们发现CIE的改善提高了企业绩效,刺激了创新,并促进了就业的创造。
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引用次数: 0
Optimal Product Quality and Live Streaming Introduction Strategy for Brand Owners Considering Information Interaction and Deceptive Promotion 考虑信息交互和欺骗性促销的品牌商最优产品质量与直播导入策略
IF 2.7 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-05-06 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4551
Cuihua Zhang, Xiangru Zhao, Henry Xu

The information interaction features and deceptive promotion phenomena in live streaming e-commerce significantly influence consumers' purchase decisions, directly affecting brand owners' choices regarding their live streaming strategies. In light of this, the impacts of information interaction and deceptive promotion on the purchase behavior of strategic consumers are considered, and a two-period model of consumer utility and brand owner profit is constructed under nine optional sales scenarios. By optimizing the equilibrium solutions to models and conducting a comparative analysis, this study explores the impacts of factors such as informative degree, deceptive promotion degree, and penalty costs on the brand owner's optimal strategy of product quality and the selection of live streaming modes (including whether to provide live streaming, when to introduce it, and whether to conduct deceptive promotion during live streaming) under different scenarios. Moreover, the conditions in which the brand owner is more inclined to opt for deceptive promotion strategies are revealed. These findings provide optimal operational strategies for brand owners in live streaming sales while offering support for government and regulatory agencies seeking effective measures to combat deceptive promotion.

直播电商中的信息交互特征和欺骗性促销现象显著影响消费者的购买决策,直接影响品牌商的直播策略选择。鉴于此,本文考虑了信息互动和欺骗性促销对战略消费者购买行为的影响,构建了九种可选销售场景下消费者效用与品牌商利润的两期模型。本研究通过对模型的均衡解进行优化,并进行对比分析,探讨不同场景下,信息程度、虚假推广程度、处罚成本等因素对品牌商产品质量最优策略和直播模式选择(包括是否提供直播、何时引入直播、直播中是否进行虚假推广)的影响。此外,还揭示了品牌所有者更倾向于选择欺骗性促销策略的条件。这些研究结果为品牌商在直播销售中提供了最佳运营策略,同时为政府和监管机构寻求有效措施打击欺骗性促销提供了支持。
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引用次数: 0
How Does Kantian Optimization Matter in Union Bargaining Agenda? 康德最优化理论在工会谈判议程中的作用?
IF 2.7 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-05-01 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4548
Leonard F. S. Wang, Di Wu, Can Yang

This paper examines union bargaining choices between RTM (right-to-manage) and EB (efficient bargaining) under Kantian optimization. We show that Kantian optimization constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium, yielding higher firm profits and labor benefits than Nashian equilibrium, though potentially reducing consumer surplus. In Kantian optimization, the cooperation between the owners will hold the conventional belief that profits under RTM exceed those under EB, while the outputs under EB exceed those under RTM. But the workers' wages are reversed. The endogenous choice between the Kantian and Nash principles by firms and unions leads to higher wages and improves individual worker's welfare.

本文考察了康德最优化理论下工会在经营权和有效议价之间的谈判选择。我们证明了康德最优化构成了一个子博弈完美均衡,产生了比纳什均衡更高的企业利润和劳动效益,尽管潜在地减少了消费者剩余。在康德优化中,业主之间的合作将持有传统的信念,即RTM下的利润大于EB下的利润,EB下的产出大于RTM下的产出。但是工人的工资是相反的。企业和工会在康德原则和纳什原则之间的内生选择导致了更高的工资,并改善了个体工人的福利。
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引用次数: 0
Price Discrimination and Government Supervision Under Unreliable Consumer Oversight in the Context of the Platform Economy 平台经济背景下消费者监督不可靠下的价格歧视与政府监管
IF 2.7 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-04-30 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4544
Jiaquan Yang, Yixia Huang, Yihui Zhu, Jiafu Su

We consider an evolutionary game involving an e-commerce platform (EP) and a government regulatory department (GRD), in which the EP determines whether to carry out price discrimination under unreliable consumer oversight and the GRD decides whether to monitor the EP taking into account the supervision cost. Analytical results reveal that, when consumer oversight is notably unreliable, or even when it is somewhat reliable but the conditions are not ripe for government supervision, price discrimination is inevitable. With the presence of consumer oversight, the GRD can deter the EP from engaging in price discrimination without incurring significant supervision costs, enjoying a “free ride” in maintaining market fairness. However, when the GRD's supervision cost are sufficiently low, or even if they are not low but consumer oversight remains highly unreliable, it becomes advantageous for the GRD to supervise the EP. Contrary to the prevailing notion that the GRD ought to vigorously enhance consumer oversight, our research indicates that augmenting the consumer oversight reliability may not always be in the GRD's best interest. Furthermore, as time progresses, bolstering the reliability of consumer oversight is instrumental in swiftly eradicating prevalent price discrimination, while diminishing the cost associated with supervision would facilitate the prompt initiation of government supervision.

我们考虑了一个涉及电子商务平台(EP)和政府监管部门(GRD)的进化博弈,其中EP决定是否在不可靠的消费者监督下实施价格歧视,GRD决定是否在考虑监管成本的情况下对EP进行监管。分析结果表明,当消费者监督明显不可靠时,甚至当消费者监督有些可靠但政府监管条件不成熟时,价格歧视是不可避免的。有了消费者的监督,民政事务总署可以在不产生重大监管成本的情况下,阻止环保署进行价格歧视,在维护市场公平方面“搭便车”。然而,当GRD的监管成本足够低时,或者即使成本不低,但消费者的监督仍然高度不可靠时,GRD对EP进行监管是有利的。与普遍认为GRD应该大力加强消费者监督的观点相反,我们的研究表明,增强消费者监督的可靠性可能并不总是符合GRD的最佳利益。此外,随着时间的推移,加强消费者监督的可靠性有助于迅速消除普遍存在的价格歧视,而减少与监督有关的成本将有助于迅速启动政府监督。
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引用次数: 0
Supervision Shadows and Information Silence: The Real Effect of Institutional Investor Distraction 监管阴影与信息沉默:机构投资者分散的真实效应
IF 2.7 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-04-30 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4541
Manman Li, Yong Ye

This study examines how distracted institutional investors affect corporate investment. Results show that institutional investor distraction reduces investment efficiency due to weakened supervision and information feedback to managers, evidenced by fewer site visits. Cross-sectional analyses provide additional evidence that the effect of distraction is mitigated in firms with superior alternative supervision mechanisms, less reliance on information from institutional investors, and easier access to information from other sources. We also find that corporate investment activities are particularly sensitive to the distraction of pressure-resistant institutional investors. Overall, our study demonstrates the oversight and information feedback roles of institutional investors from a limited attention perspective in emerging capital markets.

本研究考察了分散注意力的机构投资者如何影响公司投资。研究结果表明,机构投资者的分散导致了投资效率的降低,这主要是由于对管理者的监督和信息反馈减弱,实地考察次数减少。横断面分析提供了额外的证据,表明在具有优越的替代监管机制、对机构投资者信息依赖较少、更容易从其他来源获取信息的公司中,分散注意力的影响得到了缓解。我们还发现,企业投资活动对抗压力机构投资者的分散注意力特别敏感。总体而言,我们的研究从有限关注的角度展示了机构投资者在新兴资本市场中的监督和信息反馈作用。
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引用次数: 0
The Effect of ESG on Stock Mispricing: Empirical Evidence From China's A-Share Listed Companies ESG对股票错误定价的影响:来自中国a股上市公司的经验证据
IF 2.7 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-04-30 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4550
Tao Yin, Yiyun He, Han Gao, George Xianzhi Yuan

In this paper, the effect of ESG performance on stock mispricing is explored across all A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2022. The research scope consists of all A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2022, and both the effect of ESG performance and the underlying mechanisms are explored. The findings of this study indicate a negative relationship between ESG performance and stock mispricing which suggests that improved ESG performance is effective in decreasing stock price discrepancies. In addition, corporate heterogeneity was considered in additional analysis and indicates that the reducing influence of ESG performance on stock mispricing becomes more evident in specific types of companies consisting of those with weaker internal controls, non–state-owned status, operation outside of polluting industries, and those experiencing considerable financing limitations. Mechanism tests suggest that ESG performance contributes to the reduction of stock mispricing through the enhancement of digital transformation and greater transparency. Finally, the study considered conditions of low credibility in corporate information disclosure and market instability. Under these specific conditions, ESG performance demonstrates a significant negative effect on stock mispricing for companies with a smaller proportion of institutional investors. Through the insights gained from this research, companies can effectively work to lower stock mispricing. Enhancing corporate value can be achieved by companies through rigorous ESG standard disclosure and increased transparency. These actions, accordingly, promote market transparency and stability. Finally, these improvements contribute to the advancement of overall environmental and social governance. This study holds practical implications for both corporations and the financial market.

本文以2010 - 2022年a股上市公司为样本,研究了ESG绩效对股票错定价的影响。本文选取2010 - 2022年a股上市公司为研究对象,对ESG绩效的影响及影响机制进行了探讨。本研究发现,ESG绩效与股票错定价呈负相关,说明ESG绩效的改善对降低股价差异有效。此外,在附加分析中考虑了公司异质性,表明ESG绩效对股票错误定价的降低影响在特定类型的公司中更为明显,这些公司包括内部控制较弱的公司、非国有公司、非污染行业公司和融资限制较大的公司。机制测试表明,ESG绩效有助于通过加强数字化转型和提高透明度来减少股票错误定价。最后,研究考虑了企业信息披露可信度低和市场不稳定的情况。在这些特定条件下,对于机构投资者比例较小的公司,ESG绩效对股票错定价表现出显著的负向影响。通过从这项研究中获得的见解,公司可以有效地降低股票的错误定价。企业可以通过严格的ESG标准披露和提高透明度来提升企业价值。因此,这些行动促进了市场的透明度和稳定性。最后,这些改进有助于推进整体环境和社会治理。本研究对企业和金融市场都具有实际意义。
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引用次数: 0
Online Payment Technological Innovation and Changes in Household Saving Rate: Evidence From China 网络支付技术创新与居民储蓄率变化:来自中国的证据
IF 2.7 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-04-28 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4549
Anran Dai, Shaoan Huang

In light of the rapid development of online payment and the consistent decline in household saving rate in China over the past decade, this paper examines the impact of online payment on household saving rate. By conducting theoretical analyses, we find that online payment decreases household saving rate by breaking through three internal mechanisms: psychological constraints, geographic constraints and income constraints. Empirical analysis based on the China Family Panel Studies survey data (2014, 2016, and 2018) supports the theoretical conclusions, particularly highlighting that online payment is more likely to reduce saving rates among individuals in western and central regions, females, younger individuals, those with lower educational level, and lower income groups. Results remain robust after addressing endogeneity with instrumental variable method, propensity score matching (PSM), propensity score matching with difference-in-difference (PSMDID), and treatment effects model.

鉴于近十年来中国网络支付的快速发展和家庭储蓄率的持续下降,本文考察了网络支付对家庭储蓄率的影响。通过理论分析,我们发现网络支付通过突破心理约束、地理约束和收入约束三个内在机制降低了居民储蓄率。基于中国家庭面板研究调查数据(2014年、2016年和2018年)的实证分析支持了理论结论,特别强调了在线支付更有可能降低中西部地区个人、女性、年轻人、低教育水平人群和低收入群体的储蓄率。采用工具变量法、倾向得分匹配法(PSM)、倾向得分差中差匹配法(PSMDID)和治疗效果模型解决了内生性问题,结果仍然稳健。
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引用次数: 0
Tail Dependence of Liquidity and Volatility in Carbon Futures Market: Evidence From EU ETS 碳期货市场流动性和波动性的尾部依赖性:来自EU ETS的证据
IF 2.7 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-04-28 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4545
Xiaohan Cai, Bo Yan

This study constructs liquidity and volatility indicators based on the four phases of EU ETS and analyses tail dependence using Copula models. The results indicate strong tail dependence between liquidity and volatility in the fourth phase. The Amihud illiquidity ratio combined with the stochastic volatility model identifies high volatility risks during liquidity scarcity, while the Gibbs measure combined with the stochastic volatility model identifies low volatility risks. The robustness of the results is tested by classifying different periods based on structural breaks and assessing tail dependence, and by applying machine learning algorithms to remove outliers before measuring tail dependence.

本研究基于EU ETS的四个阶段构建了流动性和波动性指标,并利用Copula模型分析了尾部相关性。结果表明,在第四阶段,流动性和波动性之间存在很强的尾部依赖性。Amihud非流动性比率结合随机波动率模型识别流动性稀缺时的高波动率风险,Gibbs测度结合随机波动率模型识别低波动率风险。通过基于结构断裂和评估尾部依赖性对不同时期进行分类,以及在测量尾部依赖性之前应用机器学习算法去除异常值,测试了结果的鲁棒性。
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引用次数: 0
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Managerial and Decision Economics
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