How do managerial decisions influence team performance? Using tournament data from four sources on 76 managers coaching 34 teams in 1580 matches covering 10 seasons of the Italian male soccer premier league, we provide field evidence on the impact of managerial perseverance in playing style and risk aversion on team performance. We document that managers' perseverance is positively related to team outcomes. Our core findings are robust to a battery of checks. By shedding light on key features of decision-making in a high-powered incentives industry with frequent feedback, our results help qualify the “managers matter” view advanced in prior research.
{"title":"Managerial decisions and team performance: Evidence from professional elite soccer","authors":"David Boto-García, Alessandro Bucciol, Luca Zarri","doi":"10.1002/mde.4354","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4354","url":null,"abstract":"<p>How do managerial decisions influence team performance? Using tournament data from four sources on 76 managers coaching 34 teams in 1580 matches covering 10 seasons of the Italian male soccer premier league, we provide field evidence on the impact of managerial perseverance in playing style and risk aversion on team performance. We document that managers' perseverance is positively related to team outcomes. Our core findings are robust to a battery of checks. By shedding light on key features of decision-making in a high-powered incentives industry with frequent feedback, our results help qualify the “managers matter” view advanced in prior research.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/mde.4354","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142224849","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Alain Balaguer-Mercado, Samuel N. Kirshner, Chung-Li Tseng
We explored the influence of temporal distances on order allocation between a low-cost, less reliable supplier and a reliable, high-cost supplier. We posited that a far temporal distance increases the preference for the unreliable, low-cost supplier. We conducted a vignette-based experiment where participants placed orders between the suppliers with different reliability and cost levels. Our experiment showed that a longer lead time led to larger orders for the low-cost unreliable supplier. Our insights help explain how temporal distances inherent in supply chains can elicit differing evaluations of suppliers, altering ordering decisions.
{"title":"Temporal distance in dual sourcing: A behavioural investigation","authors":"Alain Balaguer-Mercado, Samuel N. Kirshner, Chung-Li Tseng","doi":"10.1002/mde.4353","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4353","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We explored the influence of temporal distances on order allocation between a low-cost, less reliable supplier and a reliable, high-cost supplier. We posited that a far temporal distance increases the preference for the unreliable, low-cost supplier. We conducted a vignette-based experiment where participants placed orders between the suppliers with different reliability and cost levels. Our experiment showed that a longer lead time led to larger orders for the low-cost unreliable supplier. Our insights help explain how temporal distances inherent in supply chains can elicit differing evaluations of suppliers, altering ordering decisions.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/mde.4353","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142224848","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper studies strategic demand information sharing on online retail platforms and explores how it is influenced by the wholesale pricing timing. The supplier sells the product under a wholesale price contract indirectly and by paying a proportional commission fee directly. We investigate both ex ante and ex post information sharing arrangements. Under each arrangement, the supplier needs to determine the sequence of the wholesale price setting and the information sharing stage. We find that (1) under ex ante information sharing, if the supplier sets the wholesale price before, the online platform always shares private information; otherwise, it prefers to share only when the commission fee is large. Interestingly, the online platform's information sharing incentive is independent of signal accuracy and market variability. (2) Under ex post information sharing, the online platform may manipulate the signal shared with the supplier. We characterize the conditions and influencing factors of truthful information sharing. (3) If the conditions for information sharing can be achieved, the supplier prefers to set the wholesale price later. Otherwise, the supplier sets the wholesale price before inducing the online platform to share information.
{"title":"Strategic demand information sharing in an e-commerce supply chain: The effect of the supplier's pricing timing","authors":"Jingru Wang, Jiawu Peng, Kuanyun Zhu, Wenyan Zhuo","doi":"10.1002/mde.4350","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4350","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The paper studies strategic demand information sharing on online retail platforms and explores how it is influenced by the wholesale pricing timing. The supplier sells the product under a wholesale price contract indirectly and by paying a proportional commission fee directly. We investigate both ex ante and ex post information sharing arrangements. Under each arrangement, the supplier needs to determine the sequence of the wholesale price setting and the information sharing stage. We find that (1) under ex ante information sharing, if the supplier sets the wholesale price before, the online platform always shares private information; otherwise, it prefers to share only when the commission fee is large. Interestingly, the online platform's information sharing incentive is independent of signal accuracy and market variability. (2) Under ex post information sharing, the online platform may manipulate the signal shared with the supplier. We characterize the conditions and influencing factors of truthful information sharing. (3) If the conditions for information sharing can be achieved, the supplier prefers to set the wholesale price later. Otherwise, the supplier sets the wholesale price before inducing the online platform to share information.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141920116","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study examines whether digital transformation influences corporate violations in China. Using data from Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2020, this paper finds that digital transformation increases the incidence of corporate violations. The results remain robust through endogeneity checks, the use of alternative measurements for digital transformation and corporate violations, and subsample analyses. Cross-sectional analyses suggest that the impact of digital transformation on corporate violations is more salient in non-state-owned enterprises, firms with lower institutional investors shareholding ratios, and firms with higher agency costs. Mechanism analyses indicate that digital transformation leads to corporate violations by increasing operational complexity and affecting information quality. Additional tests reveal that effective corporate governance helps reduce the occurrence of corporate violations resulting from digital transformation. This research deepens our understanding of the economic implications of corporate digital transformation and provides valuable insights for businesses undergoing this process.
本研究探讨了数字化转型是否会影响中国企业的违规行为。利用 2007 年至 2020 年中国 A 股上市公司的数据,本文发现数字化转型会增加公司违规行为的发生率。通过内生性检验、使用其他衡量数字化转型和企业违规行为的方法以及子样本分析,研究结果依然稳健。横截面分析表明,数字化转型对企业违规行为的影响在非国有企业、机构投资者持股比例较低的企业和代理成本较高的企业中更为突出。机制分析表明,数字化转型通过增加运营复杂性和影响信息质量导致企业违规。其他测试表明,有效的公司治理有助于减少数字化转型导致的公司违规行为的发生。这项研究加深了我们对企业数字化转型的经济影响的理解,并为正在经历这一过程的企业提供了宝贵的见解。
{"title":"Does digital transformation increase corporate violations?","authors":"Wanwan Wang, Guoyiming Zhu, Shenwei Mo","doi":"10.1002/mde.4333","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4333","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study examines whether digital transformation influences corporate violations in China. Using data from Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2020, this paper finds that digital transformation increases the incidence of corporate violations. The results remain robust through endogeneity checks, the use of alternative measurements for digital transformation and corporate violations, and subsample analyses. Cross-sectional analyses suggest that the impact of digital transformation on corporate violations is more salient in non-state-owned enterprises, firms with lower institutional investors shareholding ratios, and firms with higher agency costs. Mechanism analyses indicate that digital transformation leads to corporate violations by increasing operational complexity and affecting information quality. Additional tests reveal that effective corporate governance helps reduce the occurrence of corporate violations resulting from digital transformation. This research deepens our understanding of the economic implications of corporate digital transformation and provides valuable insights for businesses undergoing this process.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141921639","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Live e-commerce is one of the important forms of digital transformation of supply chain, which has become increasingly popular in recent years as a powerful tool for internet advertising, interaction, and merchandising. We propose two pricing models to examine the strategies of information disclosure and pricing within the live-streaming supply chain. One model revolves around the agency framework, wherein the manufacturer determines the price while the streamer decides the level of information disclosure. The other model pertains to a self-implementing framework, wherein the manufacturer determines both the level of information disclosure and the price. To evaluate the robustness of our findings, we extend our models to encompass three significant scenarios: (i) the platform involvement model, where a live-streaming support platform becomes part of the supply chain; (ii) the fixed price model, which externalizes the manufacturer's pricing decision; and (iii) the dual-channel operations model. Our analysis reveals that the cost associated with information disclosure impacts the streamer's profits in a nonlinear manner within the agency model. Interestingly, expanding the revenue-sharing parameter does not invariably favor the manufacturer. Moreover, we observe that none of the live-streaming sales models exhibits a clear advantage over the others. Additionally, we demonstrate that the platform's involvement limits the manufacturer's ability to utilize the agency model for live-streaming sales. In situations with fixed pricing, the manufacturer is advised to disclose more production information during live-streaming sales.
{"title":"Information disclosure strategies of live-streaming supply chains in the digi-economy era","authors":"Xiaoyong Ma, Shuai Liu","doi":"10.1002/mde.4339","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4339","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Live e-commerce is one of the important forms of digital transformation of supply chain, which has become increasingly popular in recent years as a powerful tool for internet advertising, interaction, and merchandising. We propose two pricing models to examine the strategies of information disclosure and pricing within the live-streaming supply chain. One model revolves around the agency framework, wherein the manufacturer determines the price while the streamer decides the level of information disclosure. The other model pertains to a self-implementing framework, wherein the manufacturer determines both the level of information disclosure and the price. To evaluate the robustness of our findings, we extend our models to encompass three significant scenarios: (i) the platform involvement model, where a live-streaming support platform becomes part of the supply chain; (ii) the fixed price model, which externalizes the manufacturer's pricing decision; and (iii) the dual-channel operations model. Our analysis reveals that the cost associated with information disclosure impacts the streamer's profits in a nonlinear manner within the agency model. Interestingly, expanding the revenue-sharing parameter does not invariably favor the manufacturer. Moreover, we observe that none of the live-streaming sales models exhibits a clear advantage over the others. Additionally, we demonstrate that the platform's involvement limits the manufacturer's ability to utilize the agency model for live-streaming sales. In situations with fixed pricing, the manufacturer is advised to disclose more production information during live-streaming sales.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/mde.4339","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141928652","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Despite numerous enterprises embracing crowdsourcing to access several innovative solutions, the prevalence of information asymmetry among different participants has led to an increase in the submission of low-quality solutions and payment disputes. To improve the efficiency of crowdsourcing solutions for innovation, this study aims to employ an evolutionary game model to capture the dynamic interaction and decision-making process of the requesters, platforms, and solvers. Initially, we dissect the relevant factors influencing the behavioral decisions of participants to construct a tripartite evolutionary game model. Subsequently, we analyze five potential evolutionarily stable strategies and conditions. Ultimately, we simulate the dynamic evolution of participant decision-making behavior and the sensitivity of related parameters. The simulation results depict that the initial selection probabilities of populations bear no correlation to the system stability, which only influences the time required to reach equilibrium. The participant's behaviors are affected by price, loss, penalty, compensation, cost, and reputation recognition. Reward and punishment mechanisms help effectively mitigate the emergence of free-riding and collusion. These findings provide important implications for the sustainable development of crowdsourcing solutions for innovation.
{"title":"Crowdsourcing solutions for innovation: An evolutionary examination of participant behavior strategy","authors":"Lingling Wang, Sen Li, Haidong Zheng, Enjun Xia","doi":"10.1002/mde.4359","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4359","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Despite numerous enterprises embracing crowdsourcing to access several innovative solutions, the prevalence of information asymmetry among different participants has led to an increase in the submission of low-quality solutions and payment disputes. To improve the efficiency of crowdsourcing solutions for innovation, this study aims to employ an evolutionary game model to capture the dynamic interaction and decision-making process of the requesters, platforms, and solvers. Initially, we dissect the relevant factors influencing the behavioral decisions of participants to construct a tripartite evolutionary game model. Subsequently, we analyze five potential evolutionarily stable strategies and conditions. Ultimately, we simulate the dynamic evolution of participant decision-making behavior and the sensitivity of related parameters. The simulation results depict that the initial selection probabilities of populations bear no correlation to the system stability, which only influences the time required to reach equilibrium. The participant's behaviors are affected by price, loss, penalty, compensation, cost, and reputation recognition. Reward and punishment mechanisms help effectively mitigate the emergence of free-riding and collusion. These findings provide important implications for the sustainable development of crowdsourcing solutions for innovation.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141932941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We integrate the issue of economic calculation into the theory of the entrepreneur. In doing so, we fill a gap in the literature by demonstrating that retrospective economic calculation, i.e., financial accounting, dovetails with Kirzner's theory of the alert entrepreneur and that prospective calculation, i.e., the appraisal of investment objects, supports innovational activities by entrepreneurs and therefore facilitates creative destruction as emphasized by Schumpeter. Our integrative conceptualization of the calculating entrepreneur can lead to a better understanding of the role of economic calculation in the economy, thereby bringing theoretical economics and business administration closer together.
{"title":"The calculating entrepreneur — The role of economic calculation in supporting alertness and creative destruction","authors":"Eduard Braun, Florian Follert","doi":"10.1002/mde.4341","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4341","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We integrate the issue of economic calculation into the theory of the entrepreneur. In doing so, we fill a gap in the literature by demonstrating that retrospective economic calculation, i.e., financial accounting, dovetails with Kirzner's theory of the alert entrepreneur and that prospective calculation, i.e., the appraisal of investment objects, supports innovational activities by entrepreneurs and therefore facilitates creative destruction as emphasized by Schumpeter. Our integrative conceptualization of the calculating entrepreneur can lead to a better understanding of the role of economic calculation in the economy, thereby bringing theoretical economics and business administration closer together.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/mde.4341","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141932940","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Rizwan Ali, Mansoor Ahmed, Ali Amin, Ramiz ur Rehman
This study investigates the influence of corporate board attributes, such as board size, board independence, board meeting frequency, female representation on board, and audit committee size, on tax avoidance. Moreover, the study also explores the moderating role of institutional ownership on these relationships. We use sample of non-financial firms listed on Pakistan Stock Exchange over the period 2013–2020. Using the framework of agency theory, we report that board size, board independence, board meetings, gender diversity, and audit committees are associated with lower tax avoidance, and the presence of institutional ownership further strengthens these relationship. To test the hypotheses, ordinary least squares regression analysis is applied and robustness is ensured through by employing Generalized method of moments estimation. Overall, our study offers novel insights into the positive implication of board attributes on tax avoidance, particularly within the framework of institutional ownership settings.
{"title":"Board attributes and tax avoidance: The moderating role of institutional ownership","authors":"Rizwan Ali, Mansoor Ahmed, Ali Amin, Ramiz ur Rehman","doi":"10.1002/mde.4338","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4338","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study investigates the influence of corporate board attributes, such as board size, board independence, board meeting frequency, female representation on board, and audit committee size, on tax avoidance. Moreover, the study also explores the moderating role of institutional ownership on these relationships. We use sample of non-financial firms listed on Pakistan Stock Exchange over the period 2013–2020. Using the framework of agency theory, we report that board size, board independence, board meetings, gender diversity, and audit committees are associated with lower tax avoidance, and the presence of institutional ownership further strengthens these relationship. To test the hypotheses, ordinary least squares regression analysis is applied and robustness is ensured through by employing Generalized method of moments estimation. Overall, our study offers novel insights into the positive implication of board attributes on tax avoidance, particularly within the framework of institutional ownership settings.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141932942","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There are many uncertainties in the production/dissemination of academic research. This paper incorporates publication uncertainty in a game model between researchers and journal editors, and examines its effects on the quantity and quality of research and on citations. Authors seek to maximize satisfaction from their publishing efforts, while journal editors try to enhance reputations of their journals. Publication probability depends on the number of academic journals. Results show that the impacts of a change in the number of journals (capturing publication uncertanty) on citations and quality are symmetric. Citations and research quality can go up, while total publications (research quantity) can increase, decrease, or stay unchanged.
{"title":"Academic publication uncertainty and research behavior","authors":"Rajeev K. Goel, João Ricardo Faria","doi":"10.1002/mde.4340","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4340","url":null,"abstract":"<p>There are many uncertainties in the production/dissemination of academic research. This paper incorporates publication uncertainty in a game model between researchers and journal editors, and examines its effects on the quantity and quality of research and on citations. Authors seek to maximize satisfaction from their publishing efforts, while journal editors try to enhance reputations of their journals. Publication probability depends on the number of academic journals. Results show that the impacts of a change in the number of journals (capturing publication uncertanty) on citations and quality are symmetric. Citations and research quality can go up, while total publications (research quantity) can increase, decrease, or stay unchanged.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141932943","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Cultivating “SRDI” (abbreviation for “Specialized,” “Refinement,” “Differential,” and “Innovation”) enterprises can help solve the current “bottleneck” problems faced by China, enhance the stability and competitiveness of the industrial chain and supply chain, and promote high-quality economic development. Using the “SRDI” enterprises listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares in 2011–2021 as samples, this paper empirically tests the effect of product specialization on the internationalization level of “SRDI” enterprises. The results show that the product specialization of “SRDI” enterprises can significantly improve their internationalization level. Heterogeneity analysis shows that under the conditions of executives with overseas experience, a low degree of financing constraint, and fierce competition in the product market, the product specialization of “SRDI” enterprises has a more significant effect on improving their internationalization level. Therefore, China's “SRDI” enterprises should focus on the core business, give full play to the advantages of specialized operation, actively promote the internationalization strategy, and attach importance to the internal training and external recruitment of overseas executives. Governments at all levels should improve the policy support system, strengthen the incentive mechanism of scientific and technological innovation, and alleviate the financing constraints of “SRDI” enterprises.
{"title":"Can product specialization improve the internationalization level of enterprises? Empirical evidence from “SRDI” enterprises","authors":"Gengxi Xu, Xiaozhen Pan","doi":"10.1002/mde.4355","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4355","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Cultivating “SRDI” (abbreviation for “Specialized,” “Refinement,” “Differential,” and “Innovation”) enterprises can help solve the current “bottleneck” problems faced by China, enhance the stability and competitiveness of the industrial chain and supply chain, and promote high-quality economic development. Using the “SRDI” enterprises listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares in 2011–2021 as samples, this paper empirically tests the effect of product specialization on the internationalization level of “SRDI” enterprises. The results show that the product specialization of “SRDI” enterprises can significantly improve their internationalization level. Heterogeneity analysis shows that under the conditions of executives with overseas experience, a low degree of financing constraint, and fierce competition in the product market, the product specialization of “SRDI” enterprises has a more significant effect on improving their internationalization level. Therefore, China's “SRDI” enterprises should focus on the core business, give full play to the advantages of specialized operation, actively promote the internationalization strategy, and attach importance to the internal training and external recruitment of overseas executives. Governments at all levels should improve the policy support system, strengthen the incentive mechanism of scientific and technological innovation, and alleviate the financing constraints of “SRDI” enterprises.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141932945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}