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Licensing in a Differentiated Product Duopoly With Price and Quantity Contracts 具有价格和数量合同的差异化产品双寡头垄断中的许可
IF 2.7 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-09-09 DOI: 10.1002/mde.70021
Mehmet Ercoskun, Serhat Gokcekli, Ismail Saglam, Gizem Yılmaz

In this paper, we extend the differentiated product duopoly model of Singh and Vives (1984) to a setting where the firms are asymmetric in terms of their marginal costs, and the more efficient firm has the option to license its technology to its rival before they engage in price competition, quantity competition, or mixed competition. Our numerical computations reveal that the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the duopolistic competition game with licensing involves price competition when the products are complements. However, when the products are substitutes, either price or quantity competition can emerge in an equilibrium, depending on the level of cost asymmetry and the degree of substitution. Furthermore, when the products are complements, consumers and the firms benefit from licensing. In contrast, when the products are substitutes, licensing can benefit both consumers and the firms only if the degree of substitution and cost asymmetry are sufficiently low. Our results complement the earlier findings in Niu (2008), where the timing of licensing and contract decisions differs from ours.

在本文中,我们将Singh和Vives(1984)的差异化产品双寡头垄断模型扩展到企业边际成本不对称的情况下,效率更高的企业在进行价格竞争、数量竞争或混合竞争之前,可以选择将其技术许可给竞争对手。数值计算表明,当产品互补时,具有许可的双寡头竞争博弈的唯一子博弈完全纳什均衡涉及价格竞争。然而,当产品是替代品时,价格竞争或数量竞争都可能在均衡中出现,这取决于成本不对称程度和替代程度。此外,当产品互为补充时,消费者和公司都能从授权中获益。相反,当产品是替代品时,只有当替代程度和成本不对称足够低时,许可才能使消费者和企业都受益。我们的结果补充了Niu(2008)的早期发现,其中许可和合同决策的时间与我们的不同。
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引用次数: 0
Does the Team Manager Raise the Profit-Sharing Rate in Team Production and Product Market Competition? 团队管理者是否提高了团队生产和产品市场竞争的利润分成率?
IF 2.7 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-09-06 DOI: 10.1002/mde.70019
Jumpei Hamamura

An incentive design is an important system to manage the organization in management practice. In the previous management study, several researchers shed light on team performance evaluation under a specific incentive system. In this study, assuming the quantity competition in the product market, we consider the effect of team efforts under a hierarchical team to examine the effect of internal management on a firm's strategy. In particular, we focus on manager-determined share in the internal team under profit sharing as an incentive system because profit sharing can induce players to enhance their efforts. From our analysis, we find that when the manager in the team is more efficient than the staff, the manager shares a large profit with the staff to incentivize the staff's large effort. Our result not only provides the relationship between internal team production and product market competition but also suggests the incentive design of the team.

激励设计是管理实践中对组织进行管理的一项重要制度。在之前的管理研究中,一些研究者阐明了特定激励制度下的团队绩效评估。在本研究中,假设产品市场上存在数量竞争,我们考虑了层级团队下团队努力的影响,以检验内部管理对企业战略的影响。我们特别关注利润分享下的内部团队中管理者决定的份额作为一种激励机制,因为利润分享可以诱导球员提高他们的努力。通过我们的分析,我们发现当团队中的管理者比员工更有效率时,管理者与员工分享大量的利润,以激励员工的大量努力。我们的研究结果不仅提供了团队内部生产与产品市场竞争的关系,而且为团队的激励设计提供了建议。
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引用次数: 0
The Optimal Cooperation Model of a New Energy Vehicle Supply Chain With Asymmetric Quality Information 质量信息不对称的新能源汽车供应链最优合作模型
IF 2.7 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-09-06 DOI: 10.1002/mde.70023
Lian Ding, Peng Ma, Yuzhuo Qiu, Panos M. Pardalos

This paper investigates the optimal cooperation model of a new energy vehicle (NEV) supply chain comprising one NEV manufacturer and one power battery supplier. Considering asymmetric quality information, this paper develops the signaling game and the Stackelberg game to compare three cooperation models: the wholesale model, the joint venture model, and the patent licensing model. The results show that (1) under the wholesale model with asymmetric quality information, the separating equilibrium is a stable dominant equilibrium. The H-type supplier may upwardly distort the wholesale price to separate from the L-type supplier. (2) Compared with the wholesale model, the joint venture model and the patent licensing model may not be better. The choice of the optimal cooperation model is related to the cost of the high-quality power battery, the joint venture share, and the fixed patent licensing fee. (3) The information sharing enables Pareto improvements in the ex-ante profits. Furthermore, government subsidies can stimulate consumption and enhance ex-ante profits, but their effects vary substantially across different cooperation models.

本文研究了由一家新能源汽车制造商和一家动力电池供应商组成的新能源汽车供应链的最优合作模型。在质量信息不对称的情况下,利用信号博弈和Stackelberg博弈对批发模式、合资模式和专利许可模式三种合作模式进行了比较。结果表明:(1)在质量信息不对称的批发模式下,分离均衡是一个稳定的优势均衡。h型供应商可能会向上扭曲批发价格以与l型供应商分离。(2)与批发模式相比,合资模式和专利许可模式未必更好。最优合作模式的选择与优质动力电池的成本、合资份额和固定的专利授权费用有关。(3)信息共享使事前利润得到帕累托改进。此外,政府补贴可以刺激消费,提高事前利润,但其效果在不同的合作模式下差异很大。
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引用次数: 0
Free Walking Tours: A Game Theoretical Approach 免费徒步旅行:游戏理论方法
IF 2.7 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-09-03 DOI: 10.1002/mde.70024
Yizhaq Minchuk, Baruch Keren

Free guided walking tours are becoming increasingly common in cities that are popular tourist destinations. We use game theoretical tools to model and analyze the competition between several tour operators competing in one destination. The model consists of two stages: In the first, each operator decides on the level of effort to invest in order to attract tourists to its free tour. This effort includes advertising and marketing, primarily by means of digital platforms and social networks. At the same time, and still in the first stage, each operator decides on the level of effort to invest in the walking tour itself to make it an enjoyable experience for the participants. In the second stage, based only on the effort invested in the tour itself, the participants decide how much to tip. The model generates several theoretical and practical insights into the organization of free tours.

在热门旅游目的地城市,免费导游徒步游正变得越来越普遍。我们使用博弈论工具来建模和分析在一个目的地竞争的几个旅游经营者之间的竞争。该模型包括两个阶段:在第一阶段,每个运营商决定投资的努力程度,以吸引游客到他们的免费旅游。这种努力包括广告和营销,主要是通过数字平台和社交网络。与此同时,仍然在第一阶段,每个运营商决定在徒步旅行本身投入的努力程度,使其成为参与者的愉快体验。在第二阶段,参与者仅根据在旅行中投入的精力来决定给多少小费。该模型为组织免费旅游提供了一些理论和实践见解。
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引用次数: 0
Incentive Effect of Heterogeneity on Performance in Esports 异质性对电子竞技竞技绩效的激励效应
IF 2.7 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-08-31 DOI: 10.1002/mde.70018
Jan Rejthar, Vojtěch Kotrba

Tournament theory posits that ex-ante known heterogeneity in abilities can diminish the effort exerted by participants, leading to reduced overall performance. This article empirically tests this prediction within the context of professional esports, specifically using comprehensive data from the entire competitive history of Counter-Strike: Global Offensive. The analysis is conducted at both team and player levels, employing generalized additive mixed-effects models and utilizing three distinct proxy variables for team performance. The findings consistently reveal a negative incentive effect of ex-ante known ability heterogeneity on performance. Teams and players perform worse when ability differences are apparent before the match. While the direction and statistical significance of this effect remain stable across alternative model specifications, robustness checks reveal that its size can vary depending on model assumptions. These findings confirm tournament theory's predictions in a digital competitive environment.

竞赛理论认为,事前已知的能力异质性会减少参与者所付出的努力,导致整体表现下降。本文将在专业电子竞技的背景下对这一预测进行实证检验,特别是使用来自《反恐精英:全球攻势》整个竞技历史的综合数据。分析在团队和球员两个层面上进行,采用广义加性混合效应模型,并利用三个不同的代理变量来衡量团队绩效。研究结果一致表明,事前已知能力异质性对绩效具有负向激励作用。当能力差异在赛前就很明显时,球队和球员的表现就会更差。虽然这种效应的方向和统计显著性在不同的模型规范中保持稳定,但鲁棒性检查表明,其大小可能因模型假设而异。这些发现证实了比赛理论在数字竞争环境中的预测。
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引用次数: 0
Tilt Toward Exploration: How Does Firms' Innovation Openness Affect Exploratory Innovation Tendency? 探索性倾向:企业创新开放性对探索性创新倾向的影响?
IF 2.7 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-08-27 DOI: 10.1002/mde.70013
Guocai Chen, Tongying Liang, Xiude Chen

Firms' exploratory technology innovation plays an important role in industrial upgrading, especially in emerging economies. What drives a firm's tendency to exploratory innovation over exploitative innovation? Drawing on the knowledge-based theory, this study empirically investigates the impact of firms' innovation openness on exploratory innovation tendency. Innovation openness reflects the extent to which firms tend to adopt joint innovation strategies in technological innovation, capturing the dependence of firms' technological innovation on outsiders. Based on an unbalanced panel dataset of observations of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2009 to 2021, we employ standard two-way fixed effects regressions to estimate our hypotheses. We find that focal firms' innovation openness significantly promotes the tendency to exploratory innovation. From the perspective of knowledge structure, we further offer a contingent framework by revealing that the positive relationship between firms' innovation openness and exploratory innovation tendency is more prominent in the focal firms with greater knowledge breadth and depth. Our findings contribute to the literature on the antecedents of firms' exploratory innovation tendency by emphasizing the significant role of technological collaboration strategy and its interaction with focal firms' knowledge characteristics.

企业探索性技术创新在产业升级中发挥着重要作用,尤其是在新兴经济体。是什么驱使企业倾向于探索性创新而不是剥削性创新?本文运用知识基础理论,实证研究了企业创新开放程度对探索性创新倾向的影响。创新开放度反映了企业在技术创新中采取联合创新策略的程度,捕捉了企业技术创新对外部的依赖程度。基于2009年至2021年中国a股上市公司的非平衡面板数据集,我们采用标准的双向固定效应回归来估计我们的假设。研究发现,焦点企业的创新开放性显著促进了企业的探索性创新倾向。从知识结构的角度,我们进一步提供了一个权变框架,揭示了企业创新开放与探索性创新倾向的正相关关系在知识广度和深度越大的重点企业中更为突出。我们的研究结果通过强调技术协作战略的重要作用及其与焦点企业知识特征的交互作用,有助于研究企业探索性创新倾向的前因。
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引用次数: 0
Information and Investor Behavior in the Acquiring-a-Company Game 收购公司博弈中的信息与投资者行为
IF 2.7 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-08-24 DOI: 10.1002/mde.70020
Mengmeng Shi, Shaohui Wu, Hang Wu

This paper reports an experimental study examining decision-making biases in the acquiring-a-company (AC) game. We examine investment behavior across 40 rounds of the AC game under conditions of risk and ambiguity. Initial experimental phases reveal participant decisions consistent with ambiguity-seeking behavior: Investors in the ambiguity scenario submit significantly greater prices than those in the risk scenario. For the first 20 rounds of the experiment, we observe radical price adjustments towards the optimal choice in both scenarios; and the price difference between the two scenarios declines as the experiment proceeds. Interestingly, gambler's fallacy has a remarkable influence on investors' dynamic bidding behavior.

本文对公司收购博弈中的决策偏差进行了实验研究。我们在风险和模糊性条件下考察了40轮AC博弈中的投资行为。最初的实验阶段揭示了参与者的决策与模糊性寻求行为一致:模糊性情景下的投资者比风险情景下的投资者提交的价格显著更高。在前20轮实验中,我们观察到在两种情况下,价格都朝着最优选择剧烈调整;随着实验的进行,两种情况下的价格差异会逐渐减小。有趣的是,赌徒谬误对投资者的动态竞价行为有显著的影响。
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引用次数: 0
Role of Information and Communication Technology on Employment Growth in the Case of Indian Manufacturing Sector 信息和通信技术对印度制造业就业增长的作用
IF 2.7 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-08-19 DOI: 10.1002/mde.70017
Subal Danta, Badri Narayan Rath

This study investigates the impact of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) expenses on employment growth in the Indian manufacturing sector. Using firm-level data from the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE) Prowess, the analysis applies the panel System-Generalized Method of Moments estimator to assess the relationship between ICT expenses and employment growth. The findings indicate a positive association between ICT expenses and employment growth, though the effect varies depending on the firm's technical intensity. Moreover, firm-specific factors such as size, age, ownership structure, and export activity play a significant role in shaping employment growth. This study contributes to the existing literature by emphasizing the differentiated impact of ICT across firms with varying technological intensities. The results highlight the importance of ICT expenses tailored to firm characteristics to maximize employment growth. These insights offer valuable implications for policymakers and industry stakeholders seeking to enhance employment opportunities through digital transformation in the Indian manufacturing sector.

本研究调查了信息和通信技术(ICT)费用对印度制造业就业增长的影响。该分析使用来自印度经济实力监测中心(CMIE)的企业层面数据,采用面板系统广义矩量法估计器来评估ICT费用与就业增长之间的关系。研究结果表明,ICT费用与就业增长之间存在正相关关系,尽管这种影响取决于企业的技术强度。此外,企业的特定因素,如规模、年龄、所有权结构和出口活动,在塑造就业增长方面发挥着重要作用。本研究通过强调ICT在不同技术强度的企业之间的差异化影响,对现有文献做出了贡献。研究结果强调了根据企业特点量身定制ICT费用对于最大限度地提高就业增长的重要性。这些见解为寻求通过印度制造业的数字化转型增加就业机会的政策制定者和行业利益相关者提供了有价值的启示。
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引用次数: 0
Regulatory Minority Shareholders and Sustained Disclosure Quality: Dual Governance Channels in China 监管中小股东与持续披露质量:中国的双重治理渠道
IF 2.7 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-08-14 DOI: 10.1002/mde.70015
Siqi Li

This paper takes the A-share listed companies in China's Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2014 to 2023 as the sample to study the impact of the exercise of rights by the China Securities Investor Service Center (hereinafter referred to as the “Investor Service Center”) on the quality of corporate internal control information disclosure and its mechanism of action. The study finds that the exercise of rights by the Investor Service Center significantly improves the quality of corporate internal control information disclosure, and this impact is long-term and sustainable. Through the mechanism test of internal and external information governance channels, this paper finds that the exercise of rights by the Investor Service Center promotes enterprises to improve the quality of internal control information disclosure through internal and external information governance methods such as restraining the opportunistic behavior of corporate insiders, enhancing accounting conservatism, and attracting the attention of financial media and investors. In addition, the heterogeneity analysis shows that the effect of the exercise of rights by the Investor Service Center varies significantly depending on the way of exercising rights and the response status of listed companies. The research of this paper provides new empirical evidence for understanding the governance effect of the exercise of rights by the Investor Service Center, and also provides policy implications for improving the investor protection mechanism with Chinese characteristics.

本文以2014 - 2023年中国沪深两市a股上市公司为样本,研究中国证券投资者服务中心(以下简称“投资者服务中心”)行使权利对公司内部控制信息披露质量的影响及其作用机制。研究发现,投资者服务中心的权利行使显著提高了公司内部控制信息披露质量,且这种影响具有长期性和可持续性。通过内外部信息治理渠道的机制检验,本文发现投资者服务中心的权利行使,通过约束企业内部人机会主义行为、增强会计稳健性、吸引财经媒体和投资者关注等内外部信息治理方式,促进企业提高内控信息披露质量。此外,异质性分析表明,投资者服务中心行使权利的效果因行使权利的方式和上市公司的反应状况而有显著差异。本文的研究为理解投资者服务中心权利行使的治理效果提供了新的实证证据,也为完善中国特色投资者保护机制提供了政策启示。
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引用次数: 0
(Re)configurations in Digitally Transformed Dynamic Networks 数字转换动态网络中的(重新)配置
IF 2.7 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-08-13 DOI: 10.1002/mde.70016
Aveed Raha, Muhammad Zafar Yaqub, Murad Ali, Marijana Sreckovic, Josef Windsperger

The rapid rise of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (Industry 4.0), driven by integrating technologies such as big data, artificial intelligence, blockchain, and the internet of things into business systems, has significantly enhanced organizations' ability to reconfigure dynamically. This special issue advances academic discussions on how emerging digital technologies enable, support, or drive business elements' innovative (re)configuration across diverse organizational settings, particularly focusing on digitally transformed dynamic networks, including resources, structures, routines, strategies, and processes.

在将大数据、人工智能、区块链和物联网等技术整合到业务系统的推动下,第四次工业革命(工业4.0)迅速崛起,显著增强了组织动态重新配置的能力。本期特刊推动了关于新兴数字技术如何在不同组织环境中实现、支持或驱动业务要素创新(再)配置的学术讨论,特别关注数字化转型的动态网络,包括资源、结构、惯例、战略和流程。
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引用次数: 0
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Managerial and Decision Economics
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