Managerial and Decision Economics最新文献

This paper investigates the impact of typhoon disasters on the operational performance of regional commercial banks in China. To better quantify disaster severity, we construct a novel, ex ante typhoon damage index by combining detailed typhoon trajectory data with a parametric wind-field model and a potential damage function. Applying this measure to a panel of 477 banks from 2014 to 2023, we find that typhoon strikes cause large and persistent declines in the deposit and loan ratios of coastal banks, whereas inland banks primarily experience deposit declines. In response to the resulting liquidity pressures, affected banks increase their reliance on wholesale funding. A heterogeneity analysis further reveals that rural, small-sized, and low-capital banks are disproportionately vulnerable. We trace these impacts to the real economy, finding that they are transmitted through significant disruptions to the sales, productivity, and supply chain resilience of firm borrowers. These findings underline the critical need for targeted climate risk management to strengthen the financial system's resilience against climate shocks.

The recycling of used products and the reuse of resources have emerged as prominent themes in current sustainability discussions. Although the influence of policy incentives and the behaviors of responsible entities are frequently cited, their effectiveness in enhancing recycling practices among various stakeholders remains ambiguous. Therefore, this study examines a closed-loop supply chain system consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer, and/or a third-party recycler. By incorporating a reward-penalty mechanism, we aim to assess the impact of the manufacturer's recycling altruistic behavior on recycling efficiency, considering scenarios involving retailer recycling and third-party recycling. Moreover, this research explores how the reward-penalty mechanism and the manufacturer's recycling altruistic behavior influence the choice of recycling channels. Through theoretical analysis of four game models and subsequent numerical experiments, our findings reveal that (1) incorporating a reward-penalty mechanism, coupled with the manufacturer's recycling altruistic behavior, not only enhances the recycling rate but also lowers retail prices and boosts consumer surplus. (2) The effectiveness of various recycling channels in achieving substantial recycling outcomes is significantly influenced by both the government's reward-penalty mechanism and the manufacturer's recycling altruistic behavior, which, in turn, affect the manufacturer's decisions regarding recycling outsourcing. (3) At lower levels of reward-penalty intensity or recycling altruistic coefficient, retailer recycling can improve the recycling rate, enhance profits for all involved parties, and advance social welfare, albeit at the expense of higher environmental impact. Conversely, at higher levels of these factors, third-party recycling becomes more advantageous for both corporate and social development.

In this paper, we extend the differentiated product duopoly model of Singh and Vives (1984) to a setting where the firms are asymmetric in terms of their marginal costs, and the more efficient firm has the option to license its technology to its rival before they engage in price competition, quantity competition, or mixed competition. Our numerical computations reveal that the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the duopolistic competition game with licensing involves price competition when the products are complements. However, when the products are substitutes, either price or quantity competition can emerge in an equilibrium, depending on the level of cost asymmetry and the degree of substitution. Furthermore, when the products are complements, consumers and the firms benefit from licensing. In contrast, when the products are substitutes, licensing can benefit both consumers and the firms only if the degree of substitution and cost asymmetry are sufficiently low. Our results complement the earlier findings in Niu (2008), where the timing of licensing and contract decisions differs from ours.

An incentive design is an important system to manage the organization in management practice. In the previous management study, several researchers shed light on team performance evaluation under a specific incentive system. In this study, assuming the quantity competition in the product market, we consider the effect of team efforts under a hierarchical team to examine the effect of internal management on a firm's strategy. In particular, we focus on manager-determined share in the internal team under profit sharing as an incentive system because profit sharing can induce players to enhance their efforts. From our analysis, we find that when the manager in the team is more efficient than the staff, the manager shares a large profit with the staff to incentivize the staff's large effort. Our result not only provides the relationship between internal team production and product market competition but also suggests the incentive design of the team.

This paper investigates the optimal cooperation model of a new energy vehicle (NEV) supply chain comprising one NEV manufacturer and one power battery supplier. Considering asymmetric quality information, this paper develops the signaling game and the Stackelberg game to compare three cooperation models: the wholesale model, the joint venture model, and the patent licensing model. The results show that (1) under the wholesale model with asymmetric quality information, the separating equilibrium is a stable dominant equilibrium. The H-type supplier may upwardly distort the wholesale price to separate from the L-type supplier. (2) Compared with the wholesale model, the joint venture model and the patent licensing model may not be better. The choice of the optimal cooperation model is related to the cost of the high-quality power battery, the joint venture share, and the fixed patent licensing fee. (3) The information sharing enables Pareto improvements in the ex-ante profits. Furthermore, government subsidies can stimulate consumption and enhance ex-ante profits, but their effects vary substantially across different cooperation models.

Firms' exploratory technology innovation plays an important role in industrial upgrading, especially in emerging economies. What drives a firm's tendency to exploratory innovation over exploitative innovation? Drawing on the knowledge-based theory, this study empirically investigates the impact of firms' innovation openness on exploratory innovation tendency. Innovation openness reflects the extent to which firms tend to adopt joint innovation strategies in technological innovation, capturing the dependence of firms' technological innovation on outsiders. Based on an unbalanced panel dataset of observations of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2009 to 2021, we employ standard two-way fixed effects regressions to estimate our hypotheses. We find that focal firms' innovation openness significantly promotes the tendency to exploratory innovation. From the perspective of knowledge structure, we further offer a contingent framework by revealing that the positive relationship between firms' innovation openness and exploratory innovation tendency is more prominent in the focal firms with greater knowledge breadth and depth. Our findings contribute to the literature on the antecedents of firms' exploratory innovation tendency by emphasizing the significant role of technological collaboration strategy and its interaction with focal firms' knowledge characteristics.

This paper reports an experimental study examining decision-making biases in the acquiring-a-company (AC) game. We examine investment behavior across 40 rounds of the AC game under conditions of risk and ambiguity. Initial experimental phases reveal participant decisions consistent with ambiguity-seeking behavior: Investors in the ambiguity scenario submit significantly greater prices than those in the risk scenario. For the first 20 rounds of the experiment, we observe radical price adjustments towards the optimal choice in both scenarios; and the price difference between the two scenarios declines as the experiment proceeds. Interestingly, gambler's fallacy has a remarkable influence on investors' dynamic bidding behavior.

This study investigates the impact of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) expenses on employment growth in the Indian manufacturing sector. Using firm-level data from the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE) Prowess, the analysis applies the panel System-Generalized Method of Moments estimator to assess the relationship between ICT expenses and employment growth. The findings indicate a positive association between ICT expenses and employment growth, though the effect varies depending on the firm's technical intensity. Moreover, firm-specific factors such as size, age, ownership structure, and export activity play a significant role in shaping employment growth. This study contributes to the existing literature by emphasizing the differentiated impact of ICT across firms with varying technological intensities. The results highlight the importance of ICT expenses tailored to firm characteristics to maximize employment growth. These insights offer valuable implications for policymakers and industry stakeholders seeking to enhance employment opportunities through digital transformation in the Indian manufacturing sector.