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The impact of ESG on the cost efficiency of commercial banks—Evidence from Western European commercial banks 环境、社会和公司治理对商业银行成本效益的影响--来自西欧商业银行的证据
IF 2.5 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-08-13 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4360
Lien-Wen Liang, Tsui-Jung Lin, Meng-Yun Chung

This study examines the impact of Environmental (E), Social (S), and Governance (G) activities on the cost efficiency of commercial banks in Western Europe in 2010–2020. The stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) method was employed to investigate the impact of E, S, G, and bank characteristic variables on cost efficiency. The findings reveal that commercial banks can improve their cost efficiency by conducting E, S, and G activities. Banks that implemented these practices tended to have relatively better cost efficiency than those that did not. Overall, the results of this study are consistent with the stakeholder hypothesis and present the first evidence of the interplay between cost efficiency and ESG activities in the banking industry in Western Europe.

本研究探讨了 2010-2020 年环境(E)、社会(S)和治理(G)活动对西欧商业银行成本效率的影响。研究采用随机前沿分析(SFA)方法,探讨了 E、S、G 和银行特征变量对成本效率的影响。研究结果表明,商业银行可以通过开展 E、S 和 G 活动来提高成本效率。实施这些做法的银行往往比未实施这些做法的银行具有更高的成本效率。总体而言,本研究的结果符合利益相关者假设,并首次证明了西欧银行业成本效率与环境、社会和公司治理活动之间的相互作用。
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引用次数: 0
Endogenous coalition formation and free trade agreements 内生联盟的形成与自由贸易协定
IF 2.5 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-08-13 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4346
Vi Cao, Haifeng Fu, X. Henry Wang

This paper studies the endogenous formation of free trade agreements. There are four countries belonging to two types according to market demand and production technology. A unique strong Nash equilibrium exists for the coalition formation game. In equilibrium, two coalition structures may emerge: global free trade, wherein a single coalition encompassing all countries is established, or polarization, characterized by the formation of two symmetric agreements between the same type countries. The specific coalition structure that emerges in equilibrium depends on both the disparity in demand and the gap in unit cost of production between the two types of countries.

本文研究自由贸易协定的内生形成。根据市场需求和生产技术,有四个国家分属两种类型。联盟形成博弈存在唯一的强纳什均衡。在均衡状态下,可能出现两种联盟结构:一种是全球自由贸易,即建立一个包含所有国家的单一联盟;另一种是两极分化,即在同类型国家之间形成两个对称的协议。均衡中出现的具体联盟结构取决于两类国家之间的需求差距和单位生产成本差距。
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引用次数: 0
Managerial decisions and team performance: Evidence from professional elite soccer 管理决策与球队表现:职业精英足球的证据
IF 2.5 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-08-12 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4354
David Boto-García, Alessandro Bucciol, Luca Zarri

How do managerial decisions influence team performance? Using tournament data from four sources on 76 managers coaching 34 teams in 1580 matches covering 10 seasons of the Italian male soccer premier league, we provide field evidence on the impact of managerial perseverance in playing style and risk aversion on team performance. We document that managers' perseverance is positively related to team outcomes. Our core findings are robust to a battery of checks. By shedding light on key features of decision-making in a high-powered incentives industry with frequent feedback, our results help qualify the “managers matter” view advanced in prior research.

主教练的决策如何影响球队表现?我们使用了来自四个来源的 76 名主教练执教 34 支球队的 1580 场比赛数据,涵盖意大利男子足球超级联赛的 10 个赛季,提供了主教练在比赛风格和风险规避方面的毅力对球队表现的影响的实地证据。我们发现,主教练的毅力与球队成绩呈正相关。我们的核心发现在一系列检验中都是可靠的。我们的研究结果揭示了在反馈频繁的高功率激励行业中决策的关键特征,有助于对之前研究中提出的 "管理者很重要 "的观点进行定性。
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引用次数: 0
Temporal distance in dual sourcing: A behavioural investigation 双重采购中的时间距离:行为调查
IF 2.5 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-08-12 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4353
Alain Balaguer-Mercado, Samuel N. Kirshner, Chung-Li Tseng

We explored the influence of temporal distances on order allocation between a low-cost, less reliable supplier and a reliable, high-cost supplier. We posited that a far temporal distance increases the preference for the unreliable, low-cost supplier. We conducted a vignette-based experiment where participants placed orders between the suppliers with different reliability and cost levels. Our experiment showed that a longer lead time led to larger orders for the low-cost unreliable supplier. Our insights help explain how temporal distances inherent in supply chains can elicit differing evaluations of suppliers, altering ordering decisions.

我们探讨了时间距离对低成本、不太可靠的供应商和可靠、高成本供应商之间订单分配的影响。我们假设,较远的时间距离会增加对不可靠、低成本供应商的偏好。我们进行了一个基于小故事的实验,让参与者在不同可靠性和成本水平的供应商之间下订单。实验结果表明,较长的前置时间会导致不可靠的低成本供应商获得更多订单。我们的见解有助于解释供应链中固有的时间距离如何引起对供应商的不同评价,从而改变订购决策。
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引用次数: 0
Strategic demand information sharing in an e-commerce supply chain: The effect of the supplier's pricing timing 电子商务供应链中的战略需求信息共享:供应商定价时机的影响
IF 2.5 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-08-10 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4350
Jingru Wang, Jiawu Peng, Kuanyun Zhu, Wenyan Zhuo

The paper studies strategic demand information sharing on online retail platforms and explores how it is influenced by the wholesale pricing timing. The supplier sells the product under a wholesale price contract indirectly and by paying a proportional commission fee directly. We investigate both ex ante and ex post information sharing arrangements. Under each arrangement, the supplier needs to determine the sequence of the wholesale price setting and the information sharing stage. We find that (1) under ex ante information sharing, if the supplier sets the wholesale price before, the online platform always shares private information; otherwise, it prefers to share only when the commission fee is large. Interestingly, the online platform's information sharing incentive is independent of signal accuracy and market variability. (2) Under ex post information sharing, the online platform may manipulate the signal shared with the supplier. We characterize the conditions and influencing factors of truthful information sharing. (3) If the conditions for information sharing can be achieved, the supplier prefers to set the wholesale price later. Otherwise, the supplier sets the wholesale price before inducing the online platform to share information.

本文研究了在线零售平台上的战略需求信息共享,并探讨了它如何受到批发定价时机的影响。供应商根据批发价格合同间接销售产品,并直接支付一定比例的佣金。我们研究了事前和事后的信息共享安排。在每种安排下,供应商都需要确定批发价格制定和信息共享阶段的顺序。我们发现:(1) 在事前信息共享下,如果供应商在批发价确定之前,网络平台总是共享私人信息;否则,只有当佣金费用较大时,网络平台才倾向于共享信息。有趣的是,在线平台的信息共享动机与信号准确性和市场变化无关。(2)在事后信息共享的情况下,在线平台可能会操纵与供应商共享的信号。我们描述了真实信息共享的条件和影响因素。(3) 如果信息共享的条件可以实现,供应商倾向于在之后再确定批发价格。否则,供应商会先确定批发价格,然后再诱导网络平台共享信息。
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引用次数: 0
Does digital transformation increase corporate violations? 数字化转型是否会增加企业违规行为?
IF 2.5 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-08-09 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4333
Wanwan Wang, Guoyiming Zhu, Shenwei Mo

This study examines whether digital transformation influences corporate violations in China. Using data from Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2020, this paper finds that digital transformation increases the incidence of corporate violations. The results remain robust through endogeneity checks, the use of alternative measurements for digital transformation and corporate violations, and subsample analyses. Cross-sectional analyses suggest that the impact of digital transformation on corporate violations is more salient in non-state-owned enterprises, firms with lower institutional investors shareholding ratios, and firms with higher agency costs. Mechanism analyses indicate that digital transformation leads to corporate violations by increasing operational complexity and affecting information quality. Additional tests reveal that effective corporate governance helps reduce the occurrence of corporate violations resulting from digital transformation. This research deepens our understanding of the economic implications of corporate digital transformation and provides valuable insights for businesses undergoing this process.

本研究探讨了数字化转型是否会影响中国企业的违规行为。利用 2007 年至 2020 年中国 A 股上市公司的数据,本文发现数字化转型会增加公司违规行为的发生率。通过内生性检验、使用其他衡量数字化转型和企业违规行为的方法以及子样本分析,研究结果依然稳健。横截面分析表明,数字化转型对企业违规行为的影响在非国有企业、机构投资者持股比例较低的企业和代理成本较高的企业中更为突出。机制分析表明,数字化转型通过增加运营复杂性和影响信息质量导致企业违规。其他测试表明,有效的公司治理有助于减少数字化转型导致的公司违规行为的发生。这项研究加深了我们对企业数字化转型的经济影响的理解,并为正在经历这一过程的企业提供了宝贵的见解。
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引用次数: 0
Information disclosure strategies of live-streaming supply chains in the digi-economy era 数字经济时代直播供应链的信息披露策略
IF 2.5 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-08-08 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4339
Xiaoyong Ma, Shuai Liu

Live e-commerce is one of the important forms of digital transformation of supply chain, which has become increasingly popular in recent years as a powerful tool for internet advertising, interaction, and merchandising. We propose two pricing models to examine the strategies of information disclosure and pricing within the live-streaming supply chain. One model revolves around the agency framework, wherein the manufacturer determines the price while the streamer decides the level of information disclosure. The other model pertains to a self-implementing framework, wherein the manufacturer determines both the level of information disclosure and the price. To evaluate the robustness of our findings, we extend our models to encompass three significant scenarios: (i) the platform involvement model, where a live-streaming support platform becomes part of the supply chain; (ii) the fixed price model, which externalizes the manufacturer's pricing decision; and (iii) the dual-channel operations model. Our analysis reveals that the cost associated with information disclosure impacts the streamer's profits in a nonlinear manner within the agency model. Interestingly, expanding the revenue-sharing parameter does not invariably favor the manufacturer. Moreover, we observe that none of the live-streaming sales models exhibits a clear advantage over the others. Additionally, we demonstrate that the platform's involvement limits the manufacturer's ability to utilize the agency model for live-streaming sales. In situations with fixed pricing, the manufacturer is advised to disclose more production information during live-streaming sales.

电商直播是供应链数字化转型的重要形式之一,作为互联网广告、互动和商品销售的有力工具,近年来越来越受到人们的青睐。我们提出了两种定价模型来研究直播供应链中的信息披露和定价策略。一种模式围绕代理框架,即制造商决定价格,而流媒体决定信息披露水平。另一种模式涉及自我实施框架,即制造商决定信息披露水平和价格。为了评估我们研究结果的稳健性,我们扩展了我们的模型,以涵盖三种重要情况:(i) 平台参与模式,直播支持平台成为供应链的一部分;(ii) 固定价格模式,将制造商的定价决策外部化;(iii) 双渠道运营模式。我们的分析表明,在代理模式中,与信息披露相关的成本会以非线性方式影响流媒体的利润。有趣的是,扩大收入分享参数并不总是有利于制造商。此外,我们还发现,与其他模式相比,没有一种直播销售模式表现出明显的优势。此外,我们还证明,平台的参与限制了制造商利用代理模式进行直播销售的能力。在定价固定的情况下,建议制造商在直播销售中披露更多的生产信息。
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引用次数: 0
Crowdsourcing solutions for innovation: An evolutionary examination of participant behavior strategy 众包创新解决方案:对参与者行为策略的进化研究
IF 2.5 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-08-07 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4359
Lingling Wang, Sen Li, Haidong Zheng, Enjun Xia

Despite numerous enterprises embracing crowdsourcing to access several innovative solutions, the prevalence of information asymmetry among different participants has led to an increase in the submission of low-quality solutions and payment disputes. To improve the efficiency of crowdsourcing solutions for innovation, this study aims to employ an evolutionary game model to capture the dynamic interaction and decision-making process of the requesters, platforms, and solvers. Initially, we dissect the relevant factors influencing the behavioral decisions of participants to construct a tripartite evolutionary game model. Subsequently, we analyze five potential evolutionarily stable strategies and conditions. Ultimately, we simulate the dynamic evolution of participant decision-making behavior and the sensitivity of related parameters. The simulation results depict that the initial selection probabilities of populations bear no correlation to the system stability, which only influences the time required to reach equilibrium. The participant's behaviors are affected by price, loss, penalty, compensation, cost, and reputation recognition. Reward and punishment mechanisms help effectively mitigate the emergence of free-riding and collusion. These findings provide important implications for the sustainable development of crowdsourcing solutions for innovation.

尽管众多企业通过众包获得了一些创新解决方案,但由于不同参与者之间普遍存在信息不对称,导致提交的低质量解决方案和支付纠纷增多。为了提高众包创新解决方案的效率,本研究旨在采用进化博弈模型来捕捉请求者、平台和解决者的动态互动和决策过程。首先,我们剖析了影响参与者行为决策的相关因素,构建了一个三方进化博弈模型。随后,我们分析了五种潜在的进化稳定策略和条件。最后,我们模拟了参与者决策行为的动态演化及相关参数的敏感性。模拟结果表明,种群的初始选择概率与系统稳定性无关,只影响达到平衡所需的时间。参与者的行为受到价格、损失、惩罚、补偿、成本和声誉认可的影响。奖惩机制有助于有效缓解搭便车和串通行为的出现。这些发现对众包创新解决方案的可持续发展具有重要意义。
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引用次数: 0
The calculating entrepreneur — The role of economic calculation in supporting alertness and creative destruction 精打细算的企业家--经济计算在支持警觉性和创造性破坏中的作用
IF 2.5 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-08-07 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4341
Eduard Braun, Florian Follert

We integrate the issue of economic calculation into the theory of the entrepreneur. In doing so, we fill a gap in the literature by demonstrating that retrospective economic calculation, i.e., financial accounting, dovetails with Kirzner's theory of the alert entrepreneur and that prospective calculation, i.e., the appraisal of investment objects, supports innovational activities by entrepreneurs and therefore facilitates creative destruction as emphasized by Schumpeter. Our integrative conceptualization of the calculating entrepreneur can lead to a better understanding of the role of economic calculation in the economy, thereby bringing theoretical economics and business administration closer together.

我们将经济计算问题纳入企业家理论。在此过程中,我们通过证明回顾性经济计算(即财务会计)与柯兹纳的警觉型企业家理论相吻合,以及前瞻性计算(即投资对象评估)支持企业家的创新活动,从而促进熊彼特所强调的创造性破坏,填补了文献空白。我们对精打细算的企业家的综合概念化可使人们更好地理解经济计算在经济中的作用,从而拉近理论经济学与工商管理之间的距离。
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引用次数: 0
Board attributes and tax avoidance: The moderating role of institutional ownership 董事会属性与避税:机构所有权的调节作用
IF 2.5 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-08-05 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4338
Rizwan Ali, Mansoor Ahmed, Ali Amin, Ramiz ur Rehman

This study investigates the influence of corporate board attributes, such as board size, board independence, board meeting frequency, female representation on board, and audit committee size, on tax avoidance. Moreover, the study also explores the moderating role of institutional ownership on these relationships. We use sample of non-financial firms listed on Pakistan Stock Exchange over the period 2013–2020. Using the framework of agency theory, we report that board size, board independence, board meetings, gender diversity, and audit committees are associated with lower tax avoidance, and the presence of institutional ownership further strengthens these relationship. To test the hypotheses, ordinary least squares regression analysis is applied and robustness is ensured through by employing Generalized method of moments estimation. Overall, our study offers novel insights into the positive implication of board attributes on tax avoidance, particularly within the framework of institutional ownership settings.

本研究探讨了公司董事会属性对避税的影响,如董事会规模、董事会独立性、董事会会议频率、董事会中的女性代表以及审计委员会规模。此外,本研究还探讨了机构所有权对这些关系的调节作用。我们以 2013-2020 年期间在巴基斯坦证券交易所上市的非金融企业为样本。在代理理论的框架下,我们发现董事会规模、董事会独立性、董事会会议、性别多样性和审计委员会与较低的避税率相关,而机构所有权的存在进一步加强了这些关系。为了检验假设,我们采用了普通最小二乘法回归分析,并通过使用广义矩估计法确保稳健性。总之,我们的研究为董事会属性对避税的积极影响提供了新的见解,尤其是在机构所有权的框架内。
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引用次数: 0
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Managerial and Decision Economics
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